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“You	  can’t	  make	  Palm	  Beach	  out	  of	  the	  Bowery”	  
	  
It	   started	   to	  get	   looking	   like	  Toronto—upper–middle–class	  Black	  and	  
white	   people,	   and	   everybody	  was	   dressed	   nice,	   and	   ...	   we	   thought	   it	  
would	  be	  the	  entertainment	  center	  of	  the	  county,	  in	  all	  truth.	  And	  that	  
may	  be	  naïve,	  but	   that	  was	  my	  goal—let's	  make	   it	   the	  entertainment	  
center,	  let's	  make	  it	  so	  that	  everybody	  wants	  to	  be	  in	  downtown	  Flint.	  
We're	  going	  to	  have	  entertainment,	  we're	  going	  to	  have	  art,	   it's	  going	  
to	  be	  very	  cultural,	   it's	  going	  to	  be	  very	  upbeat.	  And	  someone	  said	   to	  
me—and	   maybe	   it’s	   true—they	   said,	   “Maxine,	   you	   can’t	   make	   Palm	  
Beach	  out	  of	  the	  Bowery.	  You	  want	  Palm	  Beach,	  you	  have	  to	  go	  to	  Palm	  
Beach.”	  
	   —Maxine	  Kronick,	  City	  of	  Flint	  Director	  of	  	  
	   	   Special	  Events,	  19891	  
	  
In	  Roger	  &	  Me,	  Michael	  Moore’s	  blockbuster	  1989	  documentary	  about	  his	  
hometown	  of	  Flint,	  Michigan,	  city	  official	  Maxine	  Kronick	  offers	  the	  above	  
explanation	  for	  the	  seemingly	  inevitable	  failure	  of	  early	  1980s	  efforts	  to	  transform	  
the	  city	  from	  a	  industrial	  and	  manufacturing	  center	  into	  a	  tourist	  magnet.	  Used	  by	  
Moore	  to	  punctuate	  a	  particularly	  devastating	  segment	  of	  the	  film	  in	  which	  an	  array	  
of	  flashy,	  expensive	  development	  projects	  and	  obliviously	  optimistic	  spokespeople	  
are	  presented	  to	  the	  viewer	  as	  lambs	  to	  the	  slaughter	  of	  hindsight,	  Kronick’s	  
explanation	  stands	  as	  the	  final	  word	  on	  this	  flurry	  of	  hopeful	  activity,	  and	  on	  the	  
millions	  of	  dollars	  invested	  in	  urban	  revitalization	  and	  downtown	  development	  
projects,	  including	  a	  “luxury”	  hotel,	  a	  riverside	  “festival	  marketplace,”	  and	  more.	  In	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Roger	  &	  Me.	  Prod.	  Michael	  Moore.	  By	  Michael	  Moore.	  Dir.	  Michael	  Moore.	  1989.	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the	  end,	  Kronick	  reminds	  us	  that	  one	  had	  to	  face	  the	  facts—Flint	  was	  Flint.	  Looking	  
back,	  she	  can	  see	  that	  these	  hopes	  for	  making	  Flint	  something	  besides	  itself	  were	  
futile	  and	  foolish	  and	  we,	  as	  viewers	  with	  the	  benefit	  of	  at	  least	  5	  years	  of	  
perspective,	  are	  expected	  to	  see	  the	  pageantry	  and	  optimism	  of	  these	  efforts	  as	  a	  
farce,	  albeit	  a	  tragic	  one.	  In	  this	  brief	  but	  powerful	  sequence,	  Moore	  is	  largely	  
visually	  absent,	  narrating	  the	  story	  off–screen	  in	  the	  knowing	  and	  mock–earnest	  
tone	  for	  which	  he	  would	  become	  famous.	  Maxine	  Kronick	  is	  held	  up	  as	  a	  generic	  
“downtown	  official,”	  meant	  to	  stand	  in	  for	  the	  mass	  of	  interests,	  public	  and	  private,	  
that	  backed	  Flint’s	  AutoWorld—the	  eighty	  million	  dollar	  theme	  park/museum	  
devoted	  to	  the	  automotive	  industry,	  which	  closed	  its	  doors	  less	  than	  a	  year	  after	  its	  
grand	  opening	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  visitors—and	  their	  ambitions	  for	  reviving	  the	  city’s	  
failing	  economy.	  In	  tone,	  both	  Moore	  and	  Kronick	  express	  ultimately	  similar	  
sentiments:	  AutoWorld	  was	  clearly	  a	  doomed,	  if	  not	  deeply	  misguided,	  effort.	  	  
This	  is	  not	  entirely	  surprising	  for	  Moore,	  who	  had	  been	  a	  longtime	  critic	  of	  
the	  project	  as	  more	  energy	  and	  money	  were	  poured	  into	  it,	  running	  stories	  about	  
AutoWorld	  in	  his	  self–published	  alternative	  newspaper,	  The	  Flint	  Voice,	  with	  
colorfully	  descriptive	  headlines	  such	  as	  “Dance	  Band	  on	  the	  Titanic.”	  Kronick,	  as	  we	  
learn	  in	  a	  short	  scene	  intercut	  with	  the	  final	  credits,	  is	  headed	  out	  of	  the	  city	  herself,	  
presumably	  to	  a	  place	  with	  more	  inherent	  possibility	  after	  the	  disappointing	  results	  
of	  Flint’s	  revitalization—she	  moved	  first	  to	  Tel	  Aviv	  and	  eventually	  to	  Florida	  
(though	  not	  Palm	  Beach).	  But	  standing	  on	  a	  sunny	  afternoon	  in	  front	  of	  the	  
shuttered	  AutoWorld	  facility,	  Kronick	  gives	  us	  an	  explanation	  that	  is	  overstuffed	  
with	  significance,	  not	  only	  for	  Flint,	  but	  also	  for	  illuminating	  the	  broader	  political	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economic	  and	  cultural	  predicament	  of	  American	  cities	  in	  the	  late	  twentieth	  century.	  
It	  is	  in	  this	  moment,	  as	  the	  New	  Deal	  order	  “died”	  and	  national	  ideas	  solidified	  
regarding	  which	  places	  and	  populations	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  survive	  and	  grow	  in	  a	  
new,	  flexible,	  neoliberal	  America,	  that	  cities	  like	  Flint	  were	  increasingly	  seen	  as	  
unchangeable	  and	  unsalvageable.	  
	   In	  Roger	  &	  Me,	  however—a	  film	  that	  makes	  up	  the	  bulk	  of	  most	  of	  people’s	  
general	  knowledge	  of	  the	  city	  of	  Flint—both	  Moore	  and	  Kronick	  articulate	  analyses	  
that	  are	  too	  simple	  and	  too	  steeped	  in	  hindsight	  to	  be	  historically	  useful.	  According	  
to	  Moore,	  AutoWorld	  was	  a	  colossally	  stupid	  attempt	  at	  urban	  revitalization	  on	  par	  
with	  “expecting	  a	  million	  people	  a	  year	  to	  go	  to	  New	  Jersey	  to	  Chemical	  World,	  or	  to	  
Valdez,	  Alaska,	  to	  Exxon	  World.	  Some	  people,”	  he	  reasons,	  “just	  don't	  like	  to	  
celebrate	  human	  tragedy	  while	  on	  vacation.”2	  But	  when	  we	  look	  at	  “successful”	  
revitalization	  strategies	  regionally	  and	  nationally,	  a	  museum/theme	  park	  based	  on	  
local	  “heritage”	  doesn’t	  seem	  entirely	  ridiculous.	  As	  for	  the	  vision	  that	  Kronick	  
describes	  in	  the	  film,	  it	  was	  also	  not	  an	  extraordinary	  or	  novel	  one.	  Despite	  her	  
incongruous	  choice	  of	  Toronto	  as	  a	  reasonable	  comparison,	  this	  vision	  is	  cast	  from	  
the	  same	  mold	  as	  many	  of	  the	  basic	  dreams	  of	  city	  governments,	  business	  leaders	  
and	  urban	  boosters	  for	  at	  least	  a	  century:	  spaces	  of	  consumption,	  business	  and	  
leisure	  made	  safe	  from	  people	  and	  forces	  that	  are	  perceived	  as	  threatening	  to	  
destabilize	  the	  peace	  and	  plenty.3	  Downtown	  areas	  in	  particular	  have	  consistently	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Ibid.	  
3	  Although	  situated	  in	  similar	  geographic	  regions,	  Flint	  or	  even	  its	  larger	  downstate	  
neighbor	  of	  Detroit	  have	  significantly	  different	  economies	  and	  population	  demographics	  
(both	  in	  size	  and	  racial	  composition).	  Toronto,	  as	  a	  Canadian	  city,	  is	  also	  the	  product	  of	  
vastly	  different	  governmental	  and	  corporate	  policies	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century	  in	  terms	  of	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been	  the	  terrain	  upon	  which	  the	  struggle	  for	  this	  vision	  takes	  place,	  and	  the	  ongoing	  
battles	  over	  the	  form	  and	  function	  of	  urban	  space	  more	  often	  than	  not	  rest	  upon	  the	  
basic	  vision	  of	  an	  “upbeat”	  city	  filled	  with	  the	  “right	  kind”	  of	  people,	  safe	  to	  
consume.4	  Of	  course,	  the	  terms	  and	  stakes	  of	  this	  struggle	  change	  according	  to	  
cultural,	  historical,	  and	  economic	  context—as	  illustrated	  here	  by	  Kronick’s	  
subsuming	  a	  discourse	  of	  race	  into	  one	  of	  class—but	  ultimately,	  this	  vision	  is	  no	  
more	  or	  less	  naïve	  than	  the	  dreams	  held	  by	  generations	  of	  those	  in	  her	  privileged	  
position.	  
There	  is,	  however,	  something	  significantly	  different	  about	  this	  articulation	  of	  
a	  somewhat	  familiar	  vision,	  and	  this	  difference	  hinges	  on	  the	  larger	  historical	  
moment	  and	  the	  broad	  political	  economic	  and	  cultural	  shifts	  taking	  place	  in	  the	  US	  
during	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  80s,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  place-­‐specific	  way	  in	  which	  
Kronick	  imagines	  Flint,	  Michigan	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country.	  In	  her	  
estimation,	  the	  future	  prosperity	  of	  the	  city	  would	  depend	  upon	  an	  embrace	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
employment	  and	  housing,	  and	  is	  thus	  in	  a	  very	  different	  historical	  position	  in	  terms	  of	  race	  
and	  class	  dynamics.	  
4	  For	  an	  in–depth	  analysis	  of	  downtown	  politics	  throughout	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  see	  
Isenberg,	  Alison.	  Downtown	  America:	  A	  History	  of	  the	  Place	  and	  the	  People	  Who	  Made	  It.	  
Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago,	  2004.	  
see	  also:	  Teaford,	  Jon	  C.	  The	  Rough	  Road	  to	  Renaissance:	  Urban	  Revitalization	  in	  America,	  
1940–1985.	  Baltimore:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  UP,	  1990.;	  Sorkin,	  Michael.	  Variations	  on	  a	  Theme	  
Park:	  The	  New	  American	  City	  and	  the	  End	  of	  Public	  Space.	  New	  York:	  Hill	  and	  Wang,	  1992.;	  
Hannigan,	  John.	  Fantasy	  City:	  Pleasure	  and	  Profit	  in	  the	  Postmodern	  Metropolis.	  London:	  
Routledge,	  1998.;	  Simon,	  Bryant.	  Boardwalk	  of	  Dreams:	  Atlantic	  City	  and	  the	  Fate	  of	  Urban	  
America.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  UP,	  2004.;	  Gillette,	  Howard.	  Camden	  after	  the	  Fall:	  Decline	  and	  
Renewal	  in	  a	  Post–industrial	  City.	  Philadelphia:	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania,	  2005;	  Boyer,	  M.	  
Christine.	  Dreaming	  the	  Rational	  City:	  The	  Myth	  of	  American	  City	  Planning.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  
MIT,	  1983;	  Ross,	  Andrew.	  The	  Celebration	  Chronicles:	  Life,	  Liberty	  and	  the	  Pursuit	  of	  Property	  
Value	  in	  Disney's	  New	  Town.	  New	  York:	  Ballantine,	  1999;	  Nasaw,	  David.	  Going	  Out:	  The	  Rise	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exploitation	  of	  “the	  cultural,”	  broadly	  defined.	  Instead	  of	  the	  concern	  for	  local	  
downtown	  merchants	  that	  characterized	  an	  older	  “Main	  Street”	  boosterism,	  let	  
alone	  for	  the	  manufacturing	  base	  that	  built	  and	  sustained	  the	  prosperity	  of	  Flint	  and	  
former	  industrial	  centers	  like	  it,	  she	  and	  other	  city	  and	  business	  leaders	  express	  a	  
faith	  in	  the	  economic	  value	  of	  entertainment,	  art,	  and	  self–representation.	  In	  the	  
end,	  however,	  she	  implies	  that	  there	  is	  simply	  no	  hope	  and	  no	  place	  in	  this	  vision	  of	  
urban	  America	  for	  the	  kind	  of	  town	  with	  the	  essential,	  unchangeable	  characteristics	  
of	  the	  dead	  and	  dying	  Rust	  Belt,	  and	  maybe	  it	  was	  naïve	  to	  ever	  imagine	  otherwise.	  
It	  is	  this	  sometimes	  disastrous	  intersection	  of	  political,	  economic,	  and	  cultural	  
factors	  in	  Midwestern	  and	  Northeastern	  former	  industrial	  centers	  during	  the	  1970s	  
and	  80s	  that	  produced	  what	  we	  now	  commonly	  understand	  as	  the	  “Rust	  Belt”—an	  
abstract	  cultural	  construction	  with	  very	  real	  implications	  for	  very	  real	  places	  and	  
people.	  
	  
Deindustrialization,	  Neoliberal	  Transformation,	  and	  AutoWorld	  
Much	  of	  the	  historical	  work	  concerning	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  late	  
twentieth	  century,	  and	  in	  the	  post–war	  period	  more	  generally,	  is	  haunted	  by	  the	  
specter	  of	  Ronald	  Reagan	  and	  the	  question	  of	  how	  the	  nation	  “became”	  
conservative.5	  This	  is	  not	  surprising	  given	  a	  twenty–first	  century	  political	  climate	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  This	  is	  the	  case	  for	  a	  generation	  of	  leftist	  scholars	  who	  began	  or	  continued	  to	  produce	  
work	  in	  the	  Reagan	  era,	  but	  also	  serves	  as	  a	  model	  for	  especially	  postwar	  history	  of	  the	  last	  
three	  decades,	  where	  the	  progressive	  moment	  of	  the	  New	  Deal	  declines	  toward	  the	  
conservatism	  of	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  and	  beyond.	  Examples	  of	  this	  declension	  narrative,	  or	  
at	  least	  one	  of	  missed	  opportunities,	  are	  too	  numerous	  to	  mention,	  but	  some	  examples	  of	  
the	  most	  explicitly	  reactionary	  are	  Fraser,	  Steve,	  and	  Gary	  Gerstle.	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  the	  
New	  Deal	  Order,	  1930–1980.	  Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  UP,	  1989.;	  Schulman,	  Bruce	  J.,	  and	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which	  the	  national	  political	  center	  has	  seemed	  to	  shift	  ever	  rightward,	  and	  where	  
the	  central	  tenets	  of	  the	  New	  Deal	  have	  seemed	  to	  steadily	  erode	  (and	  have	  arguably	  
thus	  become	  overly	  romanticized	  on	  the	  left).	  A	  number	  of	  recent	  scholars	  including	  
Kimberly	  Phillips–Fein,	  Bethany	  Moreton,	  Angus	  Burgin	  and	  others	  have	  
convincingly	  argued	  for	  the	  need	  to	  examine	  a	  longer	  twentieth–century	  history	  of	  
pro–business	  activism	  that	  has	  consistently	  fought	  against	  New	  Deal–type	  programs	  
and	  policies	  from	  their	  inception,	  tracing	  an	  established	  thread	  of	  conservative	  
continuity	  that	  gained	  adherents	  and	  influence	  during	  the	  1970s	  and	  throughout	  the	  
1980s.	  From	  this	  vantage,	  the	  rise	  of	  neoliberalism	  in	  the	  latter	  decades	  of	  the	  
twentieth	  century	  doesn’t	  come	  out	  of	  nowhere,	  and	  the	  common	  historical	  
narrative	  of	  right–wing	  “backlash,”	  as	  well	  as	  the	  tragic	  declension	  narrative	  of	  the	  
Rust	  Belt	  synthesis,	  finds	  a	  bit	  more	  historical	  footing6.	  The	  Rust	  Belt	  synthesis	  in	  its	  
most	  basic	  form	  constructs	  a	  history	  that	  progresses	  linearly	  from	  the	  1950s	  apex	  of	  
US	  manufacturing—sometimes	  uncomplicated	  by	  considerations	  of	  racial	  and	  class	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Julian	  E.	  Zelizer.	  Rightward	  Bound:	  Making	  America	  Conservative	  in	  the	  1970s.	  Cambridge,	  
MA:	  Harvard	  UP,	  2008.;	  Bailey,	  Beth	  L.,	  and	  David	  R.	  Farber.	  America	  in	  the	  Seventies.	  
Lawrence:	  University	  of	  Kansas,	  2004.;	  as	  well	  as	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  neoliberalism,	  
such	  as	  Harvey,	  David.	  A	  Brief	  History	  of	  Neoliberalism.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  UP,	  2005.	  
6	  Phillips–Fein,	  Kim.	  Invisible	  Hands:	  The	  Making	  of	  the	  Conservative	  Movement	  from	  the	  New	  
Deal	  to	  Reagan.	  New	  York:	  W.	  W.	  Norton	  &,	  2009.;	  Moreton,	  Bethany.	  To	  Serve	  God	  and	  Wal–
Mart:	  The	  Making	  of	  Christian	  Free	  Enterprise.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  UP,	  2009.	  Burgin,	  
Angus.	  The	  Great	  Persuasion:	  Reinventing	  Free	  Markets	  since	  the	  Depression.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  
Harvard	  UP,	  2012.	  A	  foundational	  articulation	  of	  the	  Rust	  Belt	  synthesis	  can	  be	  found	  in	  
Bluestone,	  Barry,	  and	  Bennett	  Harrison.	  The	  Deindustrialization	  of	  America:	  Plant	  Closings,	  
Community	  Abandonment,	  and	  the	  Dismantling	  of	  Basic	  Industry.	  New	  York:	  Basic,	  1982.	  For	  
a	  critical	  discussion	  of	  the	  Rust	  Belt	  synthesis,	  see	  Ch.	  1	  in	  Highsmith,	  Andrew.	  Demolition	  
Means	  Progress:	  Race,	  Class,	  and	  the	  Deconstruction	  of	  the	  American	  Dream	  in	  Flint,	  Michigan.	  
Diss.	  University	  of	  Michigan,	  2009.,	  as	  well	  as	  examples	  in	  Cowie,	  Jefferson.	  Capital	  Moves:	  
RCA's	  Seventy–year	  Quest	  for	  Cheap	  Labor.	  Ithaca,	  NY:	  Cornell	  UP,	  1999.;	  Bensman,	  David,	  
and	  Roberta	  Lynch.	  Rusted	  Dreams:	  Hard	  times	  in	  a	  Steel	  Community.	  New	  York:	  McGraw–
Hill,	  1987.;	  Beauregard,	  Robert	  A.	  Voices	  of	  Decline:	  The	  Postwar	  Fate	  of	  US	  Cities.	  Oxford,	  
UK:	  B.	  Blackwell,	  1993.;	  Cowie,	  Jefferson,	  and	  Joseph	  Heathcott.	  Beyond	  the	  Ruins:	  The	  
Meanings	  of	  Deindustrialization.	  Ithaca:	  ILR,	  2003.	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issues	  in	  Northern	  industrial	  cities—to	  a	  sharp	  crisis	  of	  deindustrialization	  in	  the	  
1970s	  and	  1980s.	  In	  any	  discussion	  of	  deindustrialization,	  however,	  it	  is	  important	  
to	  keep	  in	  view	  the	  longer	  history	  of	  residential	  segregation,	  institutional	  racism,	  
and	  corporate	  industrial	  efforts	  to	  undermine	  union	  power	  and	  constantly	  migrate	  
toward	  cheaper	  labor,	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  recapitulating	  a	  simplified	  narrative	  in	  
which	  the	  mid–century	  “golden	  years	  of	  prosperity”	  gave	  way	  to	  the	  decline	  and	  
wholesale	  collapse	  of	  Rust	  Belt	  industry	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  80s.	  	  
This	  longer	  history,	  however,	  does	  not	  preclude	  the	  need	  for	  an	  examination	  
of	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s	  as	  a	  crucial	  turning	  point	  in	  US	  political	  economic	  
and	  cultural	  history.	  The	  truth	  and	  depth	  of	  urban	  crisis	  in	  the	  Rust	  Belt	  at	  this	  time	  
compels	  me	  to	  stake	  out	  a	  position	  between	  a	  relativist	  view	  of	  treating	  this	  period	  
either	  as	  one	  unremarkable	  point	  in	  a	  series	  of	  larger	  cycles	  or,	  at	  the	  other	  extreme,	  
as	  one	  singular	  cataclysmic	  turning	  point	  in	  global	  capital,	  unmoored	  from	  longer	  
histories	  or	  the	  particularities	  of	  place.	  Lisa	  Duggan,	  for	  example,	  has	  charted	  the	  
complex	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  New	  Deal	  coalition	  initially	  marginalized	  antistatist	  
conservatives	  while	  absorbing	  (or	  marginalizing)	  multiple	  leftist	  viewpoints,	  before	  
coming	  under	  attack	  again	  through	  the	  1960s,	  and	  finally	  coming	  up	  against	  a	  new	  
and	  vigorous	  pro–business	  activism	  that	  flourished	  in	  the	  1970s.7	  Historicizing	  this	  
decades–long	  development	  on	  the	  right	  of	  a	  mode	  of	  critiquing	  and	  dismantling	  the	  
New	  Deal	  coalition	  and	  unleashing	  corporate	  power	  to	  maximize	  profits	  takes	  into	  
account	  the	  late	  1970s	  rise	  of	  neoliberalism	  as	  increasingly	  hegemonic.	  My	  
understanding	  of	  neoliberalism	  is	  based	  on	  this	  model,	  which	  views	  it	  not	  as	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Duggan,	  Lisa.	  The	  Twilight	  of	  Equality?:	  Neoliberalism,	  Cultural	  Politics,	  and	  the	  Attack	  on	  
Democracy.	  Boston:	  Beacon,	  2003.	  XI.	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narrow	  economic	  policy	  program,	  but	  as	  an	  ideology	  within	  which	  which	  US	  politics	  
and	  culture	  have	  been	  constructed	  and	  viewed	  over	  the	  last	  three	  decades,	  and	  
which	  has	  effectively	  become	  “common	  sense.”	  As	  Duggan	  describes	  it,	  
neoliberalism	  encompasses	  “the	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  everyday	  life	  of	  capitalism.”8	  
Recently,	  scholars	  of	  neoliberalism	  have	  felt	  compelled	  to	  defend	  their	  
analytical	  frameworks—in	  whatever	  form	  they	  take—against	  critiques	  that	  allege	  
an	  over–reliance	  on	  the	  term	  “neoliberalism”	  to	  encompass	  too	  broad	  a	  range	  of	  
processes	  to	  be	  precise	  or	  useful.	  In	  his	  book	  The	  Neoliberal	  City,	  Jason	  Hackworth	  
compares	  the	  increasing	  frequency	  of	  the	  term’s	  academic	  use	  to	  that	  of	  
“globalization”	  in	  the	  1990s,	  complaining	  that	  “it	  is	  used	  broadly	  to	  characterize	  the	  
right	  wing;	  to	  mean	  the	  guiding	  light	  for	  the	  ‘Washington	  consensus’;	  to	  mean	  
anything	  related	  to	  business;	  to	  mean	  anything	  related	  to	  capitalism;	  to	  mean	  
anything	  related	  to	  liberals	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Neoliberalism	  is	  everywhere	  and,	  
apparently,	  everything.”9	  	  Despite	  somewhat	  accurately	  describing	  the	  effect	  of	  
neoliberal	  paradigms’	  expansion	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  “common	  sense,”	  Hackworth’s	  
critique,	  which	  admonishes	  scholars	  and	  activists	  for	  deploying	  the	  term	  without	  a	  
rigorous	  historical	  mooring,	  or	  a	  full	  understanding	  of	  the	  longer	  liberal	  tradition	  
from	  which	  neoliberalism	  developed,	  represents	  an	  increasingly–voiced	  concern.	  In	  
some	  cases,	  scholars	  avoid	  neoliberalism	  as	  a	  concept	  or	  analytical	  frame	  altogether,	  
as	  Kim	  Phillips–Fein	  explains	  in	  the	  bibliographic	  essay	  to	  her	  book	  Invisible	  Hands:	  
the	  Businessmen’s	  Crusade	  Against	  the	  New	  Deal—“Some	  people	  may	  wonder	  why	  I	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Ibid.	  
9	  Hackworth,	  Jason	  R.	  The	  Neoliberal	  City:	  Governance,	  Ideology,	  and	  Development	  in	  
American	  Urbanism.	  Ithaca:	  Cornell	  UP,	  2007.	  xii.	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call	  these	  businessmen	  conservative	  rather	  than	  neoliberal	  or	  libertarian”	  she	  says,	  
going	  on	  to	  detail	  all	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  could	  in	  fact	  be	  classified	  as	  such	  in	  
contemporary	  terms.10	  She	  argues,	  however,	  that	  these	  men	  overwhelmingly	  called	  
themselves	  “conservatives,”	  and	  although	  they	  subscribed	  to	  and	  fought	  for	  a	  set	  of	  
principles	  that	  are	  core	  neoliberal	  tenets—a	  low–regulation,	  low–tax	  economy;	  a	  
fear	  of	  the	  threat	  of	  economic	  redistribution;	  a	  belief	  that	  the	  “free	  market”	  is	  
equivalent	  to	  freedom	  itself—they	  also	  believed	  that	  the	  term	  “liberal”	  had	  been	  
claimed	  by	  Roosevelt	  for	  the	  New	  Deal,	  never	  to	  be	  regained.	  
Questions	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  term	  is	  “overused,”	  or	  used	  without	  proper	  
grounding,	  are	  on	  one	  level	  indicative	  of	  academic	  fashion	  or	  disciplinary	  concern—
social	  scientists,	  economists,	  and	  historians	  have	  different	  disciplinary	  investments	  
in	  and	  anxieties	  over	  how	  the	  longer	  tradition	  of	  liberalism	  is	  framed	  and	  deployed,	  
what	  processes	  might	  be	  at	  work	  in	  the	  development	  of	  “neoliberal”	  politics	  and	  
policies,	  and	  what	  names	  must	  be	  given	  to	  these	  processes	  at	  any	  given	  historical	  
moment,	  and	  all	  of	  these	  are	  important	  distinctions	  that	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  
consideration	  to	  understand	  and	  critique	  neoliberalism	  as	  an	  ideology,	  an	  economic	  
philosophy,	  or	  a	  cultural	  phenomenon.	  In	  fact,	  there	  has	  been	  much	  useful	  
scholarship	  recently	  that	  has	  grown	  out	  of	  these	  concerns	  and	  has	  taken	  the	  longer	  
history	  of	  neoliberalism	  seriously,	  carefully	  avoiding	  the	  totalizing	  notion	  of	  
neoliberalism	  as	  “everything	  and	  everywhere.”11	  	  Though	  it	  is	  undoubtedly	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Phillips–Fein,	  Invisible	  Hands:	  The	  Making	  of	  the	  Conservative	  Movement	  from	  the	  New	  
Deal	  to	  Reagan.	  321.	  
11	  See	  especially	  Ch	  1	  in	  Hackworth,	  The	  Neoliberal	  City:	  Governance,	  Ideology,	  and	  
Development	  in	  American	  Urbanism;	  also	  Boltanski,	  Luc,	  and	  Eve	  Chiapello.	  The	  New	  Spirit	  of	  
Capitalism.	  London:	  Verso,	  2005.;	  Brenner,	  Neil,	  and	  Nikolas	  Theodore.	  Spaces	  of	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(deliberately)	  slippery	  concept,	  and	  though	  I	  sympathize	  with	  the	  need	  to	  step	  back	  
from	  the	  urge	  to	  simply	  swim	  in	  its	  expansiveness,	  what	  I	  find	  productive	  about	  
neoliberalism	  as	  a	  concept	  is	  precisely	  its	  more	  open,	  rather	  than	  narrowed,	  utility	  
in	  describing	  a	  broad	  political	  economic	  and	  cultural	  project	  of	  the	  late	  twentieth	  
century.	  
Duggan	  is	  a	  useful	  model	  for	  using	  neoliberalism	  as	  a	  framework	  for	  
understanding	  complex	  and	  sometimes	  contradictory	  processes,	  and	  as	  an	  
analytical	  tool	  for	  making	  broader	  connections	  that	  may	  be	  excluded	  from	  a	  strictly	  
economic	  perspective,	  without	  losing	  a	  historical	  grounding.	  Specifically,	  she	  
examines	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  neoliberalism	  developed	  out	  of	  the	  pro–business	  
activism	  (of	  the	  sort	  that	  Phillips–Fein	  describes)	  as	  a	  “wide–ranging	  political	  and	  
cultural	  project,”	  and	  has	  been	  integrated	  into	  political	  economic	  and	  cultural	  
discourse	  as	  “common	  sense.”12	  	  In	  Duggan’s	  view,	  the	  two	  realms—of	  culture	  and	  
of	  political	  economy—are	  not	  only	  related,	  but	  depend	  upon	  one	  another	  for	  
existence.	  Hence	  she	  argues	  that,	  even	  though	  neoliberalism	  is	  generally	  associated	  
with	  a	  set	  of	  specific	  policy	  imperatives,	  at	  every	  stage	  of	  its	  development,	  “the	  
construction	  of	  neoliberal	  politics	  and	  policy	  in	  the	  US	  has	  relied	  on	  identity	  and	  
cultural	  politics.”13	  This	  is	  a	  crucial	  point	  in	  understanding	  that	  neoliberalism	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Neoliberalism:	  Urban	  Restructuring	  in	  North	  America	  and	  Western	  Europe.	  Malden,	  MA:	  
Blackwell,	  2002.;	  Jessop,	  Bob.	  "Liberalism,	  Neoliberalism	  and	  Urban	  Governance:	  A	  State–
Theoretical	  Perspective."	  Antipode	  34	  (2002):	  452–72.;	  Touraine,	  Alain.	  Beyond	  
Neoliberalism.	  Cambridge,	  UK:	  Polity,	  2001.;	  Saad–Filho,	  Alfredo,	  and	  Deborah	  Johnston.	  
Neoliberalism:	  A	  Critical	  Reader.	  London:	  Pluto,	  2005.;	  Davis,	  Mike,	  and	  Daniel	  Bertrand	  
Monk.	  Evil	  Paradises:	  Dreamworlds	  of	  Neoliberalism.	  New	  York:	  New,	  2007.	  
12	  Duggan,	  The	  Twilight	  of	  Equality?:	  Neoliberalism,	  Cultural	  Politics,	  and	  the	  Attack	  on	  
Democracy:	  xi.	  
13	  Ibid.,	  xii.	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slippery	  and	  expansive	  by	  design,	  and	  even	  while	  its	  boundaries	  and	  history	  must	  
be	  understood	  and	  maintained,	  it	  must	  in	  some	  ways	  be	  dealt	  with	  as	  such.	  One	  way	  
in	  which	  Duggan	  does	  this	  is	  to	  use	  neoliberalism’s	  central	  tenets	  themselves	  as	  
lenses	  through	  which	  to	  interrogate	  its	  internal	  logic.	  Key	  terms	  for	  her	  that	  define	  
the	  dominant	  intersections	  between	  culture	  and	  economic	  vision	  are	  “privatization”	  
and	  “personal	  responsibility,”	  both	  of	  which	  rhetorically	  justify	  the	  redistribution	  
and	  concentration	  of	  wealth	  and	  power	  upward	  in	  a	  reversal	  of	  New	  Deal	  social	  and	  
economic	  ideals,	  and	  which	  depend	  for	  their	  power	  upon	  cultural	  notions	  of	  
legitimate	  citizenship	  and	  worth	  based	  on	  divisions	  of	  class,	  race,	  and	  gender.	  
Although	  this	  connection	  is	  crucial	  for	  understanding	  the	  expansive	  nature	  of	  how	  
neoliberalism	  operates	  and	  is	  deployed,	  I	  would	  argue	  for	  a	  reexamination	  of	  this	  
point	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  urban	  space.	  Duggan’s	  formulation	  of	  “personal	  responsibility”	  
(as	  well	  as	  in	  much	  other	  relevant	  scholarship)	  understands	  neoliberalism	  as	  a	  
process	  of	  individuation	  and	  social	  atomization,	  as	  it	  is	  categorically	  opposed	  to	  
collectivism	  of	  any	  kind—the	  individual	  is	  ultimately	  responsible	  for	  his/her	  own	  
conduct,	  successes	  and	  failures.	  Duggan	  identifies	  the	  “broadest	  cultural	  project”	  of	  
neoliberalism	  as	  “the	  transforming	  of	  global	  cultures	  into	  market	  cultures,”	  and	  it	  is	  
often	  through	  the	  flexible	  disciplinary	  framework	  of	  “personal	  responsibility”	  that	  
upwardly	  redistributive	  economic	  goals	  are	  joined	  to	  cultural	  values.14	  If,	  however,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Ibid,	  14.	  Although	  the	  conservative	  trope	  of	  “personal	  responsibility”	  certainly	  exists	  
before	  Ronald	  Reagan	  deployed	  it	  so	  effectively—Nixon’s	  calls	  for	  “law	  and	  order”	  and	  
appeals	  for	  reasonable,	  patriotic	  Americans	  to	  resist	  the	  challenges	  of	  disenfranchised	  
groups	  for	  economic	  and	  social	  change	  come	  to	  mind—Duggan’s	  discussion	  of	  “personal	  
responsibility”	  argues	  convincingly	  that	  the	  framework	  takes	  on	  a	  particular	  and	  newly	  
powerful	  disciplinary	  form	  in	  this	  moment.	  She	  also	  attempts	  to	  track	  the	  ways	  that	  it	  is	  
historically	  deployed	  through	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s.	  See	  her	  discussion	  of	  Bill	  Clinton’s	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we	  apply	  these	  key	  terms	  to	  urban	  space	  in	  the	  US,	  we	  can	  usefully	  analyze	  how	  
entire	  cities	  and	  regions	  also	  come	  to	  be	  seen	  culturally	  and	  economically	  as	  “good”	  
or	  “bad”	  places	  depending	  upon	  their	  success	  in	  the	  marketplace.	  In	  other	  words,	  
the	  declining	  Rust	  Belt	  is	  understood	  in	  a	  neoliberal	  context	  as	  being	  as	  undeserving	  
as	  Ronald	  Reagan’s	  infamously	  scapegoated	  (and	  fictional)	  “welfare	  queen,”	  and	  
suffers	  a	  similar	  dismal	  fate	  in	  popular	  and	  political	  discourse.	  	  
“Neoliberalism”	  is	  difficult	  to	  attach	  a	  static	  definition	  to,	  in	  part	  because	  of	  
its	  integration	  into	  political	  economic	  and	  cultural	  discourse	  as	  naturalized	  common	  
sense.	  If	  we	  understand	  neoliberalism	  as	  a	  cultural	  as	  well	  as	  a	  political	  economic	  
project—and	  accept	  that,	  as	  Duggan	  argues,	  neoliberalism	  depends	  upon	  an	  
artificial	  separation	  of	  these	  two	  realms	  to	  sustain	  itself—this	  allows	  us	  to	  narrate	  
together	  the	  too–often	  separated	  analytical	  threads	  of	  deindustrialization,	  urban	  
economy,	  and	  cultural	  history.	  
Returning	  to	  my	  opening	  example,	  it	  was	  in	  fact	  a	  pro–business	  reaction	  to	  
leftist	  cultural	  criticism	  that	  generated	  the	  idea	  for	  what	  would	  become	  AutoWorld.	  
Harding	  Mott,	  son	  of	  Flint	  automotive	  pioneer	  and	  philanthropist	  Charles	  Stewart	  
Mott	  and	  head	  of	  the	  powerful	  and	  influential	  Mott	  Foundation,	  was	  infuriated	  by	  
reports	  of	  a	  1970	  student	  protest	  at	  San	  Jose	  State	  College	  in	  which	  an	  automobile	  
was	  buried	  to	  mark	  the	  first	  Earth	  Day,	  in	  a	  demonstration	  meant	  to	  symbolically	  
declare	  the	  death	  of	  the	  internal	  combustion	  engine.15	  “We’ve	  got	  to	  do	  something	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
revamping	  of	  welfare	  and	  Temporary	  Aid	  for	  Needy	  Families,	  with	  broad	  cultural	  goals	  such	  
as	  “self-­‐esteem,”	  p.	  16.	  	  
15"San	  Jose	  Car	  Burial	  Put	  Ecological	  Era	  in	  Gear."	  SFGate.	  Web.	  16	  Mar.	  2013.	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show	  how	  important	  the	  automobile	  has	  been	  in	  improving	  society,”	  Mott	  said.16	  	  
His	  reaction	  was	  one	  not	  only	  of	  personal	  offense,	  but	  also	  of	  offense	  on	  the	  behalf	  of	  
one	  of	  the	  largest	  industries	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  US.	  Never	  mind	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
automobile	  industry’s	  viewpoint	  was	  arguably	  one	  of	  the	  best–represented	  in	  US	  
politics	  and	  culture,	  truly	  disproportionate	  to	  a	  student	  protest	  of	  any	  size;	  at	  a	  
moment	  when	  the	  auto	  industry	  was	  headed	  into	  a	  decade	  of	  multiple	  crises,	  Mott’s	  
impulse	  was	  to	  mobilize	  his	  vast	  resources	  to	  tell	  the	  story	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  
corporate	  and	  industrial	  power,	  in	  the	  city	  where	  General	  Motors	  was	  born.	  Mott’s	  
initial	  idea	  was	  to	  form	  some	  sort	  of	  spectacular	  automotive	  “hall	  of	  fame”	  that	  
would	  focus	  on	  GM	  and	  the	  corporation’s	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  twentieth	  century	  
world—a	  role	  that	  is	  indeed	  difficult	  to	  overstate,	  and	  which	  would	  also	  significantly	  
feature	  the	  history	  of	  Flint	  as	  the	  city	  that	  was	  built	  by	  GM.	  What	  AutoWorld	  would	  
become	  as	  the	  decade	  progressed,	  economic	  crises	  deepened,	  and	  auto	  industry	  jobs	  
dwindled	  in	  Flint,	  was	  the	  centerpiece	  of	  a	  revitalization	  strategy	  based	  on	  shifting	  
the	  basis	  of	  the	  local	  economy	  from	  manufacturing	  to	  tourism.	  This	  strategy	  was	  
informed	  by,	  and	  in	  turn	  informed,	  developing	  Reagan–era	  neoliberal	  policies	  and	  
rhetoric	  around	  urban	  space	  and	  race,	  economy,	  and	  labor.	  
What	  began	  as	  a	  “hall	  of	  fame”	  became	  a	  sprawling,	  conceptually	  complex	  
theme	  park/museum	  hybrid	  costing	  nearly	  eighty	  million	  dollars	  and	  lasting	  less	  
than	  a	  year	  before	  it	  closed	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  attendance.	  AutoWorld	  lay	  mostly	  
dormant—with	  all	  its	  animatonic	  history	  lessons,	  giant	  model	  engines,	  and	  dreams	  
of	  a	  rebirth	  for	  the	  city—for	  more	  than	  a	  decade,	  until	  it	  was	  finally	  demolished	  by	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  “The	  Road	  to	  AutoWorld:	  The	  Project	  Started	  with	  a	  Chance	  Remark	  and	  Rode	  Over	  
Hurdles	  Into	  High	  Gear,”	  Flint	  Journal,	  22	  June	  1980.	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Mott	  Foundation–funded	  implosion	  in	  1997.	  This	  final	  chapter	  in	  its	  history	  
demonstrates	  that	  AutoWorld	  was	  clearly	  driven	  by	  the	  Mott	  Foundation,	  from	  
beginning	  to	  end.	  In	  fact,	  Flint	  itself	  was	  and	  is	  not	  possible	  without	  the	  Mott	  
Foundation.	  Founder	  C.S.	  Mott	  was	  an	  early	  automotive	  industrialist	  in	  the	  city	  of	  
Flint	  and	  helped	  to	  found	  General	  Motors.	  He	  was	  also	  a	  multiple–term	  mayor	  of	  the	  
city,	  the	  head	  of	  GM	  and,	  as	  an	  example	  of	  the	  very	  definition	  of	  a	  “company	  town,”	  
he	  was	  occasionally	  both	  of	  these	  at	  once.	  In	  short,	  Mott	  Foundation	  money	  makes	  
Flint	  possible—the	  Foundation	  chooses	  what	  programs	  to	  fund	  at	  what	  level,	  and	  in	  
many	  ways	  determines	  the	  priorities	  of	  the	  city.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  AutoWorld,	  it	  is	  clear	  
from	  its	  origins	  that	  the	  project’s	  goal	  was	  to	  present	  a	  corporate	  view	  of	  the	  
automobile,	  of	  Flint,	  and	  of	  their	  intertwining	  histories,	  because	  there	  was	  a	  
perceived	  need	  “to	  show”—the	  critics,	  the	  people	  of	  an	  increasingly	  troubled	  Flint,	  
the	  world—just	  how	  beneficial	  corporate	  power	  had	  been.	  
The	  power	  of	  the	  Mott	  Foundation	  to	  shape	  urban	  revitalization	  in	  Flint—
and	  certainly	  beyond,	  as	  one	  of	  the	  top	  50	  charitable	  giving	  organizations	  in	  the	  
world,	  comparable	  to	  the	  Carnegie	  Corporation	  of	  New	  York	  and	  the	  Rockefeller	  
Foundation—is	  both	  particular	  and	  illustrative.	  While	  it	  is	  certainly	  historically	  
conservative	  in	  its	  founding	  and	  some	  of	  its	  positions,	  it,	  like	  all	  philanthropic	  
enterprises,	  exists	  to	  serve	  a	  public	  good.	  The	  role	  of	  philanthropic	  organizations	  in	  
the	  shaping	  of	  urban	  life	  and	  landscapes	  is	  a	  massively	  influential	  one;	  such	  
organizations	  act	  as	  a	  third	  pillar	  of	  power	  in	  American	  cities	  alongside	  government	  
and	  commercial	  enterprise,	  and	  have	  been	  a	  critical	  part	  of	  the	  public/private	  
partnerships	  that	  increasingly	  fueled	  urban	  revitalization	  throughout	  the	  1970s	  and	  
	  
	   15	  
80s.	  Especially	  in	  the	  history	  of	  post–World	  War	  II	  American	  cities,	  and	  particularly	  
cities	  that	  have	  attempted	  to	  revitalize	  their	  way	  out	  of	  the	  “urban	  crisis,”	  
philanthropic	  and	  non–profit	  organizations	  have	  wielded	  tremendous	  influence	  
over	  revitalization	  processes,	  as	  well–funded	  arbiters	  of	  social	  good.	  As	  historian	  
Oliver	  Zunz	  argues,	  while	  Andrew	  Carnegie	  may	  have	  been	  following	  a	  “social	  gospel	  
of	  wealth”	  that	  obligated	  him	  to	  give	  back	  to	  society,	  the	  nonprofit	  sector	  (of	  which	  
the	  Mott	  foundation	  in	  the	  1970s	  was	  certainly	  a	  part)	  is	  a	  flexible	  “hybrid	  capitalist	  
creation	  that	  operates	  tax–free	  so	  long	  as	  the	  profits	  are	  reinvested	  in	  the	  common	  
good.”17	  Zunz	  also	  argues	  that	  American	  philanthropists’	  most	  important	  innovation	  
has	  been	  “to	  envision	  an	  unlimited	  agenda	  of	  works	  in	  which	  participants	  redefined	  
goals	  as	  circumstances	  changed.”18	  	  
This	  flexibility	  and	  power	  to	  redefine	  “the	  common	  good”	  depending	  upon	  
circumstances	  is,	  I	  believe,	  crucial	  to	  understanding	  how	  the	  Mott	  Foundation	  
operated	  in	  Flint	  during	  the	  city’s	  revitalization	  efforts	  of	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  
1980s—not	  in	  a	  strictly	  top-­‐down	  way,	  but	  as	  a	  powerful	  interpreter	  of	  neoliberal	  
logic	  into	  widely	  accepted	  “common	  good.”	  On	  the	  subject	  of	  urban	  renewal,	  
historian	  Samuel	  Zipp	  argues	  that,	  “If	  postwar	  cities	  were	  formed	  by	  explicitly	  
political	  and	  social	  contestation—policy	  initiatives,	  struggles	  between	  political	  
coalitions,	  electoral	  decisions,	  and	  street	  level	  conflicts	  over	  racial	  and	  class	  
boundaries—they	  were	  also	  subject	  to	  symbolic	  and	  imaginative	  struggle,	  attempts	  
to	  give	  various	  cityscapes	  of	  feeling	  purchase	  in	  the	  actual	  cityscape	  of	  fact.	  These	  
symbolic	  acts	  amounted	  to	  a	  fight	  for	  the	  right	  to	  give	  imaginative	  shape	  to	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Zunz,	  Oliver.	  Philanthropy	  in	  America:	  A	  History.	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  UP,	  2011:	  4.	  
18	  Ibid.	  3.	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city—to	  describe	  the	  character	  and	  nature	  of	  urban	  life—and	  to	  make	  that	  
conception	  natural	  or	  normal,	  the	  commonsense,	  shared	  understanding	  of	  that	  
place.”19	  This	  fight	  for	  the	  right	  to	  give	  a	  city	  imaginative	  shape,	  I	  would	  argue,	  is	  
also	  the	  one	  successfully	  waged	  by	  the	  Mott	  Foundation	  when	  advocating	  for	  pro–
business,	  free	  market	  revitalization	  mega–projects	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  “the	  common	  
good.”20	  
The	  theme	  of	  “the	  need	  to	  show,”	  first	  articulated	  by	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Mott	  
Foundation,	  is	  one	  that	  resonates	  throughout	  AutoWorld’s	  history.	  An	  alternate	  
origin	  story,	  probably	  no	  less	  true,	  features	  Harding	  Mott	  saying	  to	  Mott	  Foundation	  
vice	  president	  Homer	  Dowdy,	  “You	  know,	  what	  this	  community	  really	  needs	  is	  
something	  to	  get	  its	  pride	  together.	  It’s	  fading.	  We	  need	  to	  restore	  it.	  We	  ought	  to	  be	  
able	  to	  do	  something	  about	  what	  we’ve	  got	  right	  here.	  After	  all,	  we’re	  one	  of	  the	  
main	  centers	  in	  the	  history	  of	  automaking.”21	  	  There	  are	  two	  important	  points	  to	  
consider	  in	  this	  statement:	  first,	  that	  the	  problem	  in	  Flint,	  an	  archetypal	  model	  of	  
deindustrialization,	  was	  in	  fact	  a	  deficit	  of	  pride;	  and	  second,	  that	  this	  deficit	  could	  
be	  remedied	  with	  a	  spectacular	  representation	  of	  the	  greatness	  of	  the	  auto	  industry.	  
Whichever	  moment	  was	  actually	  the	  initial	  catalyst	  to	  create	  AutoWorld,	  
these	  impulses	  by	  Harding	  Mott	  and	  the	  Mott	  Foundation,	  and	  the	  solutions	  they	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Zipp,	  Samuel.	  Manhattan	  Projects:	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  Urban	  Renewal	  in	  Cold	  War	  New	  
York.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  UP,	  2010:	  6.	  	  
20	  The	  role	  and	  projects	  of	  the	  Mott	  Foundation,	  in	  Flint	  and	  beyond,	  obviously	  evolved	  form	  
its	  founding	  to	  the	  period	  that	  I	  examine.	  Highsmith	  is	  particularly	  useful	  in	  understanding	  
the	  influential	  community	  schools	  projects	  that	  Mott	  engineered	  in	  the	  postwar	  period,	  and	  
for	  a	  contemporary	  account	  of	  the	  Foundation	  and	  Mott	  himself	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1960s,	  see	  
Young,	  Clarence	  H.,	  and	  William	  A.	  Quinn.	  Foundation	  for	  Living;	  the	  Story	  of	  Charles	  Stewart	  
Mott	  and	  Flint,.	  New	  York:	  McGraw-­‐Hill,	  1963.	  
21	  “The	  Road	  to	  AutoWorld:	  The	  Project	  Started	  with	  a	  Chance	  Remark	  and	  Rode	  Over	  
Hurdles	  Into	  High	  Gear,”	  Flint	  Journal,	  22	  June	  1980.	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produced,	  were	  specifically	  cultural.	  As	  the	  project	  came	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  
center	  of	  a	  jobs–generating	  transformation	  of	  local	  economy,	  its	  mission	  became	  
more	  complex,	  but	  at	  the	  core	  of	  it,	  there	  was	  the	  need	  to	  show.	  This	  is	  of	  course	  not	  
a	  new	  phenomenon,	  for	  either	  cities	  or	  industry.	  From	  the	  World’s	  Fair	  to	  the	  circus,	  
we	  can	  point	  to	  examples	  of	  exhibition	  from	  at	  least	  the	  last	  200	  years,	  but	  there	  
seems	  to	  be	  something	  unique	  happening	  in	  AutoWorld’s	  emergence	  as	  both	  a	  
corporate	  public	  relations	  reaction,	  and	  as	  a	  proposition	  to	  remedy	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  
postwar	  economic	  crisis.22	  	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  something	  new	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  80s	  
about	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  corporate	  vision	  of	  history	  and	  notions	  of	  community	  
“heritage”	  are	  mobilized	  through	  the	  form	  of	  the	  museum.	  The	  incredible	  success	  of	  
developer	  James	  Rouse’s	  “festival	  marketplace”	  strategy	  for	  revitalizing	  such	  urban	  
spaces	  as	  New	  York’s	  South	  Street	  Seaport	  and	  Boston’s	  Fanuiel	  Hall	  demonstrates	  
an	  increasing	  enthusiasm	  and	  return	  on	  investment	  for	  areas	  seen	  as	  abandoned,	  
now	  transformed	  into	  safe,	  nostalgic	  spaces	  of	  consumption—almost	  museums	  of	  
themselves.23	  With	  the	  memory	  and	  heritage	  boom	  of	  the	  1970s—including	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  On	  World’s	  Fairs,	  Expositions,	  and	  museums,	  see	  Conn,	  Steven.	  Museums	  and	  American	  
Intellectual	  Life,	  1876–1926.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago,	  1998.;	  Evans,	  Jessica,	  and	  David	  
Boswell.	  Representing	  the	  Nation:	  A	  Reader	  :	  Histories,	  Heritage	  and	  Museums.	  London:	  
Routledge,	  1999.;	  Loewen,	  James	  W.	  Lies	  across	  America:	  What	  Our	  Historic	  Sites	  Get	  Wrong.	  
New	  York:	  New,	  1999.;	  Rydell,	  Robert	  W.	  All	  the	  World's	  a	  Fair:	  Visions	  of	  Empire	  at	  
American	  International	  Expositions,	  1876–1916.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago,	  1984.;	  
Linenthal,	  Edward	  Tabor,	  and	  Tom	  Engelhardt.	  History	  Wars:	  The	  Enola	  Gay	  and	  Other	  
Battles	  for	  the	  American	  past.	  New	  York:	  Metropolitan,	  1996.;	  Kammen,	  Michael	  G.	  Mystic	  
Chords	  of	  Memory:	  The	  Transformation	  of	  Tradition	  in	  American	  Culture.	  New	  York:	  Knopf,	  
1991.;	  Kirshenblatt–Gimblett,	  Barbara.	  Destination	  Culture:	  Tourism,	  Museums,	  and	  Heritage.	  
Berkeley	  [Calif.:	  University	  of	  California,	  1998.;	  Hinsley,	  “The	  World	  as	  Marketplace:	  
Comodification	  of	  the	  Exotic	  at	  the	  World’s	  Columbian	  Exhibition,	  Chicago,	  1893”	  in	  Karp,	  
Ivan,	  and	  Steven	  Lavine.	  Exhibiting	  Cultures:	  The	  Poetics	  and	  Politics	  of	  Museum	  Display.	  
Washington:	  Smithsonian	  Institution,	  1991.	  
23	  The	  literature	  on	  heritage	  and	  self–display	  is	  instructive	  here,	  as	  is	  postmodern	  theory	  of	  
the	  spectacle.	  For	  a	  book–length	  discussions	  of	  heritage,	  see	  Kirschenblatt–Gimblett,	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Holocaust	  and	  white	  ethnic	  identity,	  African–American	  identity	  and	  the	  Roots	  
phenomenon,	  and	  interest	  in	  local	  identity—actual	  museums	  also	  grappled	  with	  
their	  missions	  to	  represent	  and	  serve	  communities	  while	  still	  maintaining	  relevance	  
and	  keeping	  their	  doors	  open.24	  The	  1970s	  and	  80s	  saw	  dramatic	  changes	  in	  the	  
way	  museums	  and	  cultural	  institutions	  represented	  themselves,	  and	  others,	  and	  
remained	  economically	  viable.	  AutoWorld,	  as	  a	  place	  that	  claimed	  to	  tell	  the	  story	  of	  
the	  automobile	  generally	  and	  of	  Flint	  in	  particular,	  is	  one	  example	  of	  the	  shifting	  
meanings	  around	  community,	  history,	  and	  even	  the	  term	  “museum”	  in	  this	  crucial	  
historical	  moment.	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  basic	  arguments	  that	  I	  make	  is	  simply	  that	  AutoWorld	  
matters.	  This	  statement	  is	  actually	  quite	  a	  controversial	  one	  in	  Flint,	  but	  to	  explain	  
in	  slightly	  less	  simple	  terms,	  AutoWorld	  is	  representative	  of	  an	  early	  attempt	  by	  a	  
Rust	  Belt	  city	  to	  adapt	  to	  deindustrialization	  through	  a	  single	  cultural	  mega-­‐project,	  
meant	  to	  satisfy	  multiple	  neoliberal	  demands—including	  demands	  for	  flexibility,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Destination	  Culture;	  Lowenthal,	  David.	  The	  Heritage	  Crusade	  and	  the	  Spoils	  of	  History.	  
Cambridge,	  U.K.:	  Cambridge	  UP,	  1998.;	  MacCannell,	  Dean.	  The	  Tourist:	  A	  New	  Theory	  of	  the	  
Leisure	  Class.	  New	  York:	  Schocken,	  1976.;	  Karp,	  Ivan,	  Christine	  Mullen.	  Kreamer,	  and	  Steven	  
Lavine.	  Museums	  and	  Communities:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Public	  Culture.	  Washington:	  Smithsonian	  
Institution,	  1992.;	  Karp,	  Ivan.	  Museum	  Frictions:	  Public	  Cultures/global	  Transformations.	  
Durham:	  Duke	  UP,	  2006.	  For	  discussions	  of	  the	  postmodern	  spectacle,	  see	  classic	  texts	  such	  
as	  Debord,	  Guy.	  The	  Society	  of	  the	  Spectacle.	  New	  York:	  Zone,	  1994.;	  Debord,	  Guy.	  Comments	  
on	  the	  Society	  of	  the	  Spectacle.	  London:	  Verso,	  1990.;	  Baudrillard,	  Jean.	  Simulacra	  and	  
Simulation.	  Ann	  Arbor:	  University	  of	  Michigan,	  1994.;	  Jameson,	  Fredric.	  Postmodernism,	  Or,	  
The	  Cultural	  Logic	  of	  Late	  Capitalism.	  Durham:	  Duke	  UP,	  1991.;	  and	  in	  a	  specifically	  urban	  
context,	  Harvey,	  David.	  The	  Condition	  of	  Postmodernity:	  An	  Enquiry	  into	  the	  Origins	  of	  
Cultural	  Change.	  Oxford	  England:	  Blackwell,	  1990.	  
24	  For	  discussion	  of	  Rouse	  and	  his	  impact	  on	  urban	  renewal	  projects,	  see	  Bloom,	  Nicholas	  
Dagen.	  Merchant	  of	  Illusion:	  James	  Rouse,	  American's	  Salesman	  of	  the	  Businessman's	  Utopia.	  
Columbus:	  Ohio	  State	  UP,	  2004.;	  Olsen,	  Joshua.	  Better	  Places,	  Better	  Lives:	  A	  Biography	  of	  
James	  Rouse.	  Washington,	  D.C.:	  ULI–	  the	  Urban	  Land	  Institute,	  2003.;	  Sorkin,	  Variations	  on	  a	  
Theme	  Park;	  Isenberg,	  Downtown	  America;	  Hannigan,	  Fantasy	  City;	  Gottdiener,	  Mark.	  The	  
Theming	  of	  America:	  Dreams,	  Visions,	  and	  Commercial	  Spaces.	  Boulder,	  CO:	  Westview,	  1997.;	  
Judd,	  Dennis	  R.,	  and	  Susan	  S.	  Fainstein.	  The	  Tourist	  City.	  New	  Haven,	  CT:	  Yale	  UP,	  1999.	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image	  marketability,	  private–sector	  leadership,	  and	  profitability.	  AutoWorld	  is	  
important	  for	  understanding	  the	  rise	  of	  neoliberalism	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  1980s,	  
and	  provides	  us	  a	  unique	  opportunity	  to	  examine	  a	  material	  site	  where	  questions	  of	  
identity	  and	  economy	  converge.	  AutoWorld	  also	  represents	  a	  unique	  site	  of	  
analytical	  overlap,	  where	  the	  economic	  and	  cultural	  logics	  of	  neoliberalism	  interact	  
and	  reveal	  themselves	  on	  the	  ground,	  giving	  us	  a	  tool	  with	  which	  to	  link	  
conversations	  about	  capital,	  culture,	  heritage,	  and	  urban	  economy	  that	  too	  rarely	  
intersect.	  
The	  so–called	  “cultural	  turn”	  in	  US	  history	  happened	  during	  roughly	  the	  
same	  period	  on	  which	  this	  dissertation	  is	  focused.	  This	  shift	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  
early	  1980s—really	  a	  series	  of	  “turns”	  in	  multiple	  disciplines	  and	  fields	  of	  study,	  
rather	  than	  a	  consolidation	  of	  method	  or	  viewpoint—marked	  the	  influence	  of	  
emerging	  inter/disciplines	  and	  theoretical	  positions	  including	  those	  produced	  in	  the	  
fields	  of	  gender	  and	  women’s	  studies,	  literary	  criticism,	  ethnic	  studies,	  and	  popular	  
culture	  studies,	  and	  deepened	  as	  younger	  scholars	  further	  developed	  these	  
theoretical	  and	  analytical	  positions.	  As	  William	  Sewell	  theorizes	  in	  his	  meditation	  on	  
this	  intellectual	  moment,	  “the	  broad	  differences	  between	  the	  emerging	  form	  of	  
capitalism	  and	  its	  Fordist	  predecessor	  are	  clear	  and	  not	  very	  controversial.	  During	  
the	  forty	  years	  I	  am	  covering	  in	  this	  essay,	  we	  have	  lived	  through	  an	  epochal	  
transformation	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  capitalist	  world	  economy.	  I	  believe	  that	  this	  
great	  transformation	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  explaining	  the	  history	  of	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historical	  thought	  in	  these	  years.”25	  The	  idea	  that	  the	  neoliberal	  turn	  of	  the	  late	  
twentieth	  century	  also	  produced	  new	  ways	  of	  thinking	  culture	  and	  economy	  
together	  has	  informed	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  I’ve	  formulated	  my	  historical	  approach	  
here,	  and	  I,	  like	  Sewell,	  find	  utility	  in	  arguments	  advanced	  by	  scholars	  such	  as	  
Fredric	  Jameson	  and	  David	  Harvey	  in	  the	  1980s	  for	  getting	  at	  the	  broader	  forces	  at	  
work	  on	  both	  economic	  and	  intellectual	  transformation.26	  Jameson’s	  “structures	  of	  
feeling”	  produced	  by	  late	  capitalism	  (his	  take	  on	  Raymond	  Williams’	  earlier	  phrase)	  
is	  particularly	  informative,	  as	  I	  am	  interested	  throughout	  this	  dissertation	  in	  the	  
political	  and	  economic	  usefulness	  of	  feeling	  in	  the	  discourses	  of	  urban	  revitalization,	  
and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  feelings	  are	  bound	  up	  in	  neoliberalism’s	  logics	  of	  
revitalization	  and	  strategically	  deployed	  in	  its	  service.	  	  
I	  am	  also	  influenced	  by	  Nan	  Enstad’s	  recent	  exploration	  of	  the	  possibilities	  of	  
a	  “visionary	  cultural	  history”	  that	  takes	  seriously	  failure	  and	  grief.27	  This	  vision	  is	  
based	  in	  part	  on	  the	  lessons	  of	  a	  cultural	  studies	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  1990s,	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Sewell,	  William	  Hamilton.	  Logics	  of	  History:	  Social	  Theory	  and	  Social	  Transformation.	  
Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago,	  2005:	  55.	  
26	  A	  brief	  list	  of	  some	  other	  works	  of	  cultural	  history	  that	  have	  informed	  this	  dissertation,	  
especially	  as	  related	  to	  thinking	  about	  culture,	  capital	  and	  history	  together	  include	  Susman,	  
Warren.	  Culture	  as	  History:	  The	  Transformation	  of	  American	  Society	  in	  the	  Twentieth	  Century.	  
New	  York:	  Pantheon,	  1984.,	  Fox,	  Richard	  Wightman,	  and	  T.	  J.	  Jackson	  Lears.	  The	  Power	  of	  
Culture:	  Critical	  Essays	  in	  American	  History.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago,	  1993.,	  Cook,	  
James	  W.,	  Lawrence	  B.	  Glickman,	  and	  Michael	  O'Malley.	  The	  Cultural	  Turn	  in	  U.S.	  History:	  
Past,	  Present,	  and	  Future.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago,	  2008.,	  Kasson,	  Joy	  S.	  Buffalo	  Bill's	  
Wild	  West:	  Celebrity,	  Memory,	  and	  Popular	  History.	  New	  York:	  Hill	  and	  Wang,	  2000.,	  Zunz,	  
Olivier.	  Making	  America	  Corporate,	  1870-­‐1920.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago,	  1990.,	  
Sandage,	  Scott	  A.	  Born	  Losers:	  A	  History	  of	  Failure	  in	  America.	  Cambridge,	  Ma:	  Harvard	  UP,	  
2005.,	  Nasaw,	  David.	  Going	  Out:	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  Public	  Amusements.	  New	  York,	  NY:	  
Basic,	  1993.,	  Kasson,	  John	  F.	  Amusing	  the	  Million:	  Coney	  Island	  at	  the	  Turn	  of	  the	  Century.	  
New	  York:	  Hill	  &	  Wang,	  1978.	  
27	  Nan	  Enstad,	  “On	  Grief	  and	  Complicity:	  Notes	  Toward	  a	  Visionary	  Cultural	  History,”	  in	  
Cook,	  James	  W.,	  Lawrence	  B.	  Glickman,	  and	  Michael	  O'Malley.	  The	  Cultural	  Turn	  in	  U.S.	  
History:	  Past,	  Present,	  and	  Future.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago,	  2008.	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she	  labels	  “deconstructive	  cultural	  history	  of	  categories	  and	  hierarchies,”	  and	  from	  
which	  she	  argues	  that	  we	  gained	  “the	  imperative	  of	  seeing	  power	  and	  ideology	  in	  
more	  complex	  terms.”28	  Enstad	  imagines	  from	  this	  starting	  point	  the	  possibilities	  of	  
a	  new	  cultural	  history	  “poised	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  telling	  new	  kinds	  of	  stories,”	  and	  
which	  might	  allow	  us	  to	  “figure	  out	  what	  that	  hybridity	  and	  complicity	  means	  for	  
our	  examination	  of	  culture	  and	  human	  action,	  and	  how	  we	  can	  envision	  justice	  
utilizing	  such	  a	  critique.”	  This	  is	  an	  appealing	  and	  useful	  vision	  to	  me	  of	  how	  to	  do	  
cultural	  history,	  because	  this	  dissertation	  is	  shot	  through	  with	  failure—literally,	  
symbolically,	  and	  rhetorically.	  AutoWorld	  closed	  its	  doors	  less	  than	  a	  year	  after	  
opening,	  and	  the	  Rust	  Belt	  itself	  became	  a	  national	  totem	  for	  economic,	  social,	  and	  
moral	  failure.	  The	  very	  act	  of	  taking	  AutoWorld	  seriously	  begs	  the	  question,	  “why	  
did	  it	  fail?”	  The	  answer	  is,	  as	  one	  might	  expect,	  complicated—AutoWorld	  failed	  
because	  it	  tried	  to	  be	  too	  many	  things	  (museum,	  theme	  park,	  local	  heritage	  center,	  
tourist	  trap),	  and	  didn’t	  do	  enough	  of	  them	  well;	  it	  failed	  because	  visitors	  expected	  
thrilling	  rides	  and	  got	  singing	  animatronic	  robots;	  it	  failed	  because	  it	  miscalculated	  
the	  desire	  among	  suburbanites	  and	  middle-­‐class	  vacationers	  to	  visit	  an	  already–
infamously	  depressed	  urban	  center;	  it	  failed	  because	  a	  drastically	  deindustrializing	  
auto	  manufacturing	  town	  celebrating	  their	  automobile	  “heritage”	  for	  tourists	  
showed	  too	  accurately	  the	  cruelly	  ironic	  economic	  transformations	  at	  work	  
throughout	  the	  Rust	  Belt.	  The	  reasons	  for	  AutoWorld’s	  failure	  are	  made	  even	  more	  
complex	  with	  hindsight,	  as	  explanations	  offered	  in	  the	  almost	  thirty	  years	  since	  its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  This	  moment	  also	  produced	  an	  intellectual	  context	  for	  young	  scholars	  such	  as	  Bethany	  
Moreton,	  whose	  work	  interrogates	  how	  modern	  capitalism	  operates	  in	  economic	  and	  
cultural	  terms.	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closing	  have	  ranged	  from	  underfunding	  (dubious,	  given	  the	  project’s	  price	  tag)	  to	  
simply	  being	  a	  ridiculous	  idea	  all	  along.	  Many	  in	  this	  range	  of	  explanations	  seem	  
retrofitted	  to	  either	  cover	  up	  or	  perversely	  own	  the	  embarrassment	  of	  such	  a	  
publicly	  ridiculed	  failure,	  and	  ultimately	  serve	  a	  broader	  historical	  narrative	  in	  
which	  the	  Rust	  Belt’s	  failure	  in	  a	  flexible	  new	  economy	  is	  naturalized	  or	  inevitable.	  	  
But	  what	  do	  we	  do	  with	  failure	  as	  the	  object	  of	  historical	  inquiry?	  Enstad,	  
referencing	  Judith	  Butler,	  sees	  the	  possibilities	  for	  “an	  argument	  about	  the	  political	  
potential	  that	  arises	  when	  we	  recognize	  our	  common	  dispossession	  by	  our	  relations.	  
Butler	  argues	  that	  this	  dispossession	  could	  be	  a	  foundation	  for	  political	  community:	  
we	  might	  recognize	  and	  become	  responsible	  to	  this	  commonality	  rather	  than	  to	  
fantasies	  of	  autonomy	  and	  mastery.”	  This	  is	  a	  cultural	  studies	  vision	  that	  I	  have	  
found	  useful	  and	  appealing—one	  set	  against	  the	  isolation	  of	  neoliberalism,	  and	  
which	  interrogates	  the	  meanings	  and	  usefulness	  of	  failure.	  	  
This	  vision	  also	  informs	  my	  methodology	  for	  this	  dissertation,	  as	  a	  serious	  
consideration	  of	  failure	  calls	  for	  the	  serious	  consideration	  of	  sometimes	  
unconventional	  materials	  and	  sources.	  When	  AutoWorld	  was	  imploded	  in	  1997,	  all	  
of	  the	  exhibits	  and	  many	  of	  the	  records	  inside	  went	  with	  it.	  Archival	  sources	  of	  
information	  on	  its	  planning,	  execution,	  communications,	  and	  existence	  are	  limited	  
and	  somewhat	  scattered,	  and	  so	  piecing	  together	  a	  narrative	  of	  a	  place	  as	  
structurally	  and	  ideologically	  complex	  as	  AutoWorld	  is	  a	  challenge.	  In	  my	  analysis	  of	  
this	  and	  the	  other	  sites	  I	  examine,	  I	  find	  that	  a	  remark	  from	  a	  single	  visitor	  can	  speak	  
as	  much	  about	  how	  meaning	  is	  being	  made	  by	  and	  through	  these	  sites	  as	  an	  archival	  
memo	  or	  official	  press	  release.	  Even	  though	  it	  may	  go	  without	  saying	  at	  this	  point,	  I	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am—as	  are	  a	  few	  generations	  of	  scholars	  interested	  in	  the	  intersections	  of	  
power/knowledge,	  culture,	  and	  political	  economy—indebted	  to	  Michel	  Foucault	  in	  
my	  desire	  to	  understand	  how	  power	  operates	  at	  the	  broadest	  and	  smallest	  levels.	  
The	  1980s	  are	  a	  moment	  when	  what	  Aihwa	  Ong	  calls	  the	  first	  “wave”	  of	  
neoliberalism—economic	  policies	  that	  implement	  the	  widespread	  privatization	  of	  
public	  resources	  and	  deregulation	  of	  capital	  on	  a	  global	  scale—begins	  to	  overlap	  
with	  a	  second	  “wave,”	  in	  which	  neoliberalism	  takes	  on	  a	  moral	  dimension	  and	  
individuals	  are	  called	  upon	  to	  adopt	  characteristics	  and	  behaviors	  (flexibility,	  self–
discipline,	  entrepreneurialism)	  compatible	  with	  the	  new	  economic	  world	  that	  those	  
policies	  have	  created.29	  Scholars	  interested	  in	  governmentality	  and	  in	  economic	  
globalization	  have	  done	  much	  to	  explicate	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  individuals	  and	  
nation–states,	  respectively,	  have	  been	  recruited	  into	  neoliberal	  regimes	  of	  self–
governance,	  and	  subsequently	  judged	  and	  disciplined	  according	  to	  their	  
responsiveness	  to	  those	  regimes.30	  With	  this	  study,	  I	  hope	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  
parallel	  demands	  have	  been	  placed	  on	  American	  institutions,	  cities,	  and	  regions.31	  
That	  is,	  as	  neoliberal	  economic	  policy	  has	  led	  to	  state	  and	  federal	  divestment	  from	  
both	  cultural	  institutions	  and	  Rust	  Belt	  cities,	  those	  institutions	  and	  cities	  have	  been	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Ong,	  Aihwa.	  Neoliberalism	  as	  Exception:	  Mutations	  in	  Citizenship	  and	  Sovereignty.	  Durham	  
[N.C.:	  Duke	  UP,	  2006.	  
30	  See	  Ong,	  Neoliberalism	  as	  Exception:	  Mutations	  in	  Citizenship	  and	  Sovereignty;	  Rose,	  
Nikolas	  S.	  Governing	  the	  Soul:	  The	  Shaping	  of	  the	  Private	  Self.	  London:	  Routledge,	  1990.,	  
McRobbie,	  Angela.	  The	  Aftermath	  of	  Feminism:	  Gender,	  Culture	  and	  Social	  Change.	  Los	  
Angeles:	  SAGE,	  2009.	  
31	  There	  is	  also	  much	  to	  be	  said	  outside	  the	  bounds	  of	  this	  particular	  project	  about	  the	  
parallels	  between	  the	  processes	  within	  the	  U.S.	  of	  austerity,	  disinvestment	  and	  
deindustrialization	  in	  particular	  regions	  and	  the	  attempt	  to	  shift	  to	  a	  more	  “culturally-­‐
based”	  economy,	  and	  global	  capitalist	  processes	  of	  international	  debt,	  structural	  adjustment	  
and	  shifts	  to	  tourist-­‐based	  economies.	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called	  upon	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  new	  norm	  of	  austerity	  by	  internalizing	  the	  same	  
neoliberal	  logics,	  traits,	  and	  priorities	  (flexibility,	  self–discipline,	  self–
entrepreneurialism)	  that	  are	  required	  of	  workers	  in	  the	  new	  economy.	  When	  it	  
comes	  to	  cultural	  institutions	  and	  urban	  politics	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  80s,	  culture	  and	  
public	  policy	  are	  deeply	  and	  messily	  entangled,	  co–constitutive,	  and	  sometimes	  
impossible	  to	  separate.	  Thus,	  methodologically,	  I	  employ	  a	  hybrid	  or	  “scavenger”	  
methodology,	  tracing	  the	  discourses	  that	  produce	  such	  categories	  as	  “the	  Rust	  Belt”	  
across	  multiple	  sites,	  from	  official	  government	  policy	  to	  the	  lyrics	  sung	  by	  a	  dancing	  
animatronic	  robot	  in	  a	  theme	  park	  exhibit.32	  The	  proliferation	  of	  particular	  
discourses	  across	  these	  diverse	  sites	  is	  evidence	  of	  their	  power	  and	  hegemony	  in	  the	  
making	  of	  new	  economic	  “common	  sense”	  in	  a	  time	  and	  place	  when	  much	  of	  what	  
had	  been	  understood	  as	  the	  bedrock	  of	  US	  economic	  life	  was	  shaken.	  My	  inquiry	  
into	  the	  sites	  and	  projects	  that	  I	  examine	  is	  geared	  toward	  understanding	  how	  
neoliberal	  ideology	  shaped,	  and	  was	  shaped	  by,	  articulation	  of	  a	  place’s	  economic	  
and	  cultural	  value,	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  “good”	  or	  “bad”	  city	  in	  a	  moment	  of	  
profound	  regional	  and	  national	  economic	  change,	  and	  what	  was	  seen	  as	  possible	  
and	  effective	  in	  terms	  of	  revitalization	  strategies	  for	  these	  places	  struggling	  to	  
reinvent	  themselves.	  Thus	  my	  hybrid	  methodology	  uses	  traditional	  archives	  of	  
historical	  research	  in	  combination	  with	  a	  visual	  studies	  approach	  of	  reading	  the	  
material	  culture	  of	  places	  like	  AutoWorld—the	  exhibits,	  the	  scripts,	  the	  costumes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Such	  a	  hybrid	  approach	  has	  been	  put	  to	  particularly	  effective	  use	  in	  feminist	  and	  queer	  
historical	  research.	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  “scavenger”	  methodologies	  as	  a	  way	  to	  attend	  to	  
subjects	  ignored	  or	  erased	  by	  traditional	  disciplinary	  coherence,	  see	  Halberstam,	  Judith.	  
Female	  Masculinity.	  Durham:	  Duke	  UP,	  1998.	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As	  historian	  Andrew	  Highsmith	  recounts	  in	  his	  study	  of	  segregation	  in	  
metropolitan	  Flint,	  Buick	  historian	  Carl	  Crow	  once	  claimed	  that	  “America	  is	  a	  
thousand	  Flints.”33	  	  Of	  course,	  that	  was	  a	  positive	  assessment	  by	  Crow	  in	  1945,	  
when	  the	  economic	  health	  of	  the	  city	  was	  considerably	  more	  robust,	  and	  its	  future	  
more	  bright,	  than	  during	  the	  later	  twentieth	  century.	  I	  contend,	  however,	  that	  Flint	  
can	  bear	  the	  same	  representative	  weight	  in	  1984,	  inasmuch	  as	  any	  particular	  city	  
can	  be	  “representative.”	  	  As	  a	  canary	  in	  the	  coal	  mine	  of	  urban	  revitalization	  in	  the	  
midst	  of	  neoliberal	  transformation,	  I	  make	  the	  case	  in	  this	  dissertation	  for	  Flint	  as	  a	  
crucial	  site,	  materially	  and	  symbolically,	  for	  understanding	  the	  political,	  economic	  
and	  cultural	  changes	  that	  accompanied	  the	  emergence	  and	  increasing	  hegemony	  of	  
neoliberal	  policy	  and	  ideology	  from	  the	  late	  1970s	  to	  1997—the	  year	  of	  
AutoWorld’s	  demolition—and	  up	  to	  the	  present	  day.	  
Flint’s	  history	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century	  closely	  mirrors	  the	  historical	  and	  
popular	  narrative	  of	  the	  nation,	  and	  it	  has	  often	  been	  used	  as	  an	  exemplar,	  for	  better	  
and	  worse.	  As	  a	  major	  crucible	  of	  organized	  labor,	  the	  1930s	  sit–down	  strikes	  
against	  General	  Motors	  in	  Flint	  are	  universally	  recognized	  as	  a	  turning	  point	  and	  
model	  for	  worker	  activism.	  As	  the	  national	  model	  of	  a	  prosperous	  “company	  town”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Crow,	  Carl.	  The	  City	  of	  Flint	  Grows	  Up;	  the	  Success	  Story	  of	  an	  American	  Community.	  New	  
York:	  Harper,	  1945.	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in	  the	  1950s,	  Flint	  was	  the	  image	  of	  what	  a	  well–functioning	  industrial	  urban	  center	  
should	  be	  (despite	  the	  inequality,	  racial	  and	  otherwise,	  that	  lay	  beneath	  the	  surface	  
of	  this	  image,	  and	  made	  such	  functionality	  possible).34	  Since	  the	  1970s,	  even	  as	  the	  
nationally	  recognized	  “worst	  place	  to	  live	  in	  America,”	  as	  named	  officially	  by	  Money	  
magazine	  among	  other	  publications,	  Flint	  has	  often	  been	  used	  on	  the	  national	  stage	  
to	  illustrate	  the	  triumphs	  and	  disasters	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  For	  me,	  Flint	  is	  the	  
anchor	  that	  holds	  together	  the	  broader	  questions	  taken	  up	  by	  this	  dissertation.	  
Here,	  the	  cultural	  politics	  of	  race,	  class,	  and	  gender	  are	  central	  not	  only	  to	  the	  
construction	  of	  competing	  perceptions	  and	  (un)marketable	  images	  of	  Flint,	  the	  
Midwestern	  Rust	  Belt,	  and	  urban	  space	  in	  general,	  but	  also	  to	  the	  specific	  
representational	  and	  narrative	  tools	  employed	  by	  cultural	  institutions	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  
survive,	  as	  David	  Harvey	  puts	  it,	  the	  “revolutionary	  turning	  point”	  that	  was	  the	  rise	  
of	  neoliberalism.	  
Perhaps	  the	  most	  convincing	  example	  of	  the	  ties	  between	  Flint	  and	  the	  
national	  arena	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  AutoWorld	  itself	  was	  partially	  financed,	  in	  the	  amount	  
of	  $8.6	  million,	  by	  a	  grant	  from	  the	  federal	  department	  of	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  
Development,	  making	  it	  the	  first	  theme	  park	  to	  receive	  such	  funding.	  HUD	  officials	  
were	  so	  impressed	  by	  the	  AutoWorld	  plan	  that	  when	  they	  made	  the	  grant	  in	  1980	  
they	  not	  only	  awarded	  the	  full	  amount	  sought	  by	  the	  city,	  but	  they	  also	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  As	  in	  many	  cities	  throughout	  the	  industrial	  north,	  a	  veneer	  of	  opportunity	  and	  relative	  
equality	  masked	  (and	  in	  many	  ways	  depended	  upon)	  deep	  racial	  and	  class	  tensions,	  
segregation,	  and,	  as	  Thomas	  Sugrue	  puts	  it,	  “the	  origins	  of	  the	  urban	  crisis.”	  See	  Sugrue,	  
Thomas	  J.	  The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Urban	  Crisis:	  Race	  and	  Inequality	  in	  Postwar	  Detroit.	  Princeton,	  
NJ:	  Princeton	  UP,	  1996.;	  Gillette,	  Howard.	  Camden	  after	  the	  Fall:	  Decline	  and	  Renewal	  in	  a	  
Post–industrial	  City.	  Philadelphia:	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania,	  2005.;	  Highsmith,	  Andrew.	  
Demolition	  Means	  Progress:	  Race,	  Class,	  and	  the	  Deconstruction	  of	  the	  American	  Dream	  in	  
Flint,	  Michigan.	  Diss.	  University	  of	  Michigan,	  2009.	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enthusiastically	  prepared	  to	  make	  it	  a	  national	  showcase	  as	  the	  way	  forward	  for	  the	  
nation’s	  troubled	  cities.35	  In	  its	  unsuccessful	  efforts	  to	  navigate	  the	  neoliberal	  
transformations	  of	  the	  late	  twentieth	  century,	  Flint	  instead	  became	  a	  negative	  
exemplar	  that	  ultimately	  served	  to	  further	  legitimate,	  on	  both	  a	  local	  and	  national	  
scale,	  the	  new	  model	  of	  increasingly	  fierce	  regional	  and	  individual	  competition	  for	  
tourist	  revenue	  through	  its	  failure	  to	  achieve	  the	  central	  neoliberal	  tenet	  of	  
“personal	  responsibility.”36	  	  As	  a	  key	  connection	  between	  cultural	  and	  economic	  
realms,	  “personal	  responsibility”	  functions	  in	  my	  analysis	  as	  not	  only	  a	  framework	  
for	  understanding	  the	  individual	  implications	  of	  a	  neoliberal	  regime	  and	  its	  
demands	  that	  citizens	  “take	  care”	  of	  themselves,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  way	  of	  interrogating	  
the	  discipline	  that	  neoliberal	  policy	  and	  ideology	  impose	  upon	  urban	  spaces	  and	  
communities.	  By	  absolving	  corporate	  responsibility	  in	  favor	  of	  maximizing	  profits	  
and	  championing	  capital	  mobility,	  the	  requirement	  of	  “responsibility”	  can	  be	  as	  
applicable	  to	  deindustrialized	  Rust	  Belt	  cities	  that	  fail	  to	  flourish	  in	  a	  changing	  
economy	  as	  it	  can	  to	  the	  image	  of	  Reagan’s	  “welfare	  queens”—in	  the	  end,	  both	  have	  
negative	  moral	  implications	  and	  lasting	  social,	  economic,	  and	  cultural	  consequences.	  
Today,	  Flint	  is	  a	  changing	  but	  still	  iconically	  troubled	  city.	  After	  four	  decades	  
of	  steady	  population	  decline—losing	  residents	  since	  1970	  both	  to	  the	  out–county	  
suburbs	  and	  to	  relocation	  out	  of	  Michigan	  altogether—Flint	  is	  at	  its	  lowest	  
population	  since	  1920	  with	  approximately	  102,000	  residents,	  almost	  60%	  of	  whom	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  “Grant	  Virtually	  Assures	  AutoWorld:	  HUD	  Awards	  All	  Flint	  Sought	  for	  Theme	  Park	  ––	  $8.6	  
million,”	  Flint	  Journal,	  30	  October	  1980.	  
36	  In	  Lisa	  Duggan’s	  analysis,	  “personal	  responsibility,”	  along	  with	  “privatization”	  are	  the	  
central	  intersections	  between	  the	  culture	  and	  economic	  vision	  of	  neoliberalism.	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are	  African	  American.37	  Despite	  being	  listed	  by	  Kiplinger’s	  magazine	  in	  2011	  as	  one	  
of	  eleven	  American	  “comeback	  cities,”	  in	  an	  article	  that	  citied	  a	  slight	  upturn	  in	  
health	  care	  and	  automotive	  industry	  jobs,	  unemployment	  remains	  in	  the	  double–
digits	  at	  10%	  after	  a	  peak	  of	  almost	  15%	  following	  the	  2008	  nationwide	  economic	  
downturn.38	  Health	  care	  employment	  has	  taken	  over	  as	  the	  city’s	  primary	  employer,	  
with	  a	  cluster	  of	  hospitals	  and	  peripheral	  organizations	  ranking	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  
individual	  employers	  for	  the	  city	  and	  county.	  General	  Motors,	  once	  the	  
unquestioned	  lifeblood	  of	  the	  city,	  still	  provides	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  jobs	  and	  is	  
the	  city’s	  number	  two	  employer,	  even	  if	  the	  raw	  numbers	  are	  a	  fraction	  of	  what	  they	  
were	  at	  the	  company’s	  peak.	  
But	  Flint	  is	  also	  in	  many	  ways	  a	  symbol	  of	  the	  seemingly	  endless	  urban	  crisis	  
of	  the	  Rust	  Belt.	  Routinely	  posting	  staggering	  numbers	  of	  murders,	  arson,	  and	  other	  
crime,	  Flint	  regularly	  hovers	  in	  the	  top	  five	  positions	  on	  the	  FBI’s	  “most	  dangerous	  
cities”	  list,	  usually	  trading	  off	  specific	  rankings	  with	  other	  Rust	  Belt	  (and,	  more	  often	  
than	  not,	  other	  Michigan)	  cities	  from	  year	  to	  year.	  In	  2013,	  Flint	  ranked	  at	  number	  
three,	  with	  chances	  of	  becoming	  a	  victim	  of	  violent	  crime	  reported	  as	  1	  in	  42.	  
Echoing	  the	  infamous	  1986	  proclamation	  by	  Money	  magazine	  of	  Flint	  as	  the	  “worst	  
place	  in	  America	  to	  live,”	  Flint	  also	  makes	  regular	  appearances	  in	  Forbes’	  annual	  
“Most	  Miserable	  Cities”	  list.	  In	  2013,	  Flint	  came	  in	  at	  number	  two—only	  Detroit	  was	  
deemed	  more	  miserable,	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  only	  Detroit	  has	  a	  higher	  out–
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  City	  of	  Flint	  Comprehensive	  Annual	  Financial	  Report,	  2011:	  163.	  
38	  Roshania,	  Neema,	  and	  Laura	  Kennedy.	  "Downtrodden	  Cities	  Making	  a	  
Comeback."	  www.kiplinger.com.	  N.p.,	  Apr.	  2011.	  Web.	  28	  May	  2013.	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migration	  rate.39	  In	  late	  2011,	  a	  Michigan	  State	  review	  panel	  appointed	  by	  newly	  
elected	  Republican	  Governor	  Rick	  Snyder	  declared	  the	  City	  of	  Flint	  to	  be	  in	  the	  state	  
of	  a	  “local	  government	  financial	  emergency,”	  and	  recommended	  that	  the	  state	  again	  
appoint	  an	  Emergency	  Manager.	  Michael	  Brown	  was	  named	  to	  the	  controversially	  
powerful	  post—superseding	  the	  authority	  of	  both	  the	  Mayor	  and	  City	  Council—
effective	  on	  December	  1,	  2011.	  
Still,	  despite	  a	  continually	  dismal	  national	  reputation,	  Flint	  is	  currently	  in	  the	  
midst	  of	  another	  round	  of	  intensive	  revitalization	  efforts.	  A	  small	  group	  of	  private	  
investors,	  in	  concert	  with	  the	  Downtown	  Development	  Authority	  and	  the	  city	  
government,	  has	  accelerated	  efforts	  to	  remake	  downtown	  Flint	  as	  a	  middle–class	  
consumer	  destination	  with	  numerous	  bars,	  nightlife	  activities	  and	  upscale	  
restaurants	  as	  well	  as	  multiple	  “loft	  style”	  apartments	  built	  into	  the	  formerly	  vacant	  
buildings	  along	  downtown’s	  South	  Saginaw	  Street.	  There	  is	  likewise	  a	  conscious	  
effort	  by	  city	  officials	  and	  boosters	  to	  promote	  the	  University	  of	  Michigan–Flint	  as	  
the	  basis	  for	  a	  new,	  modern,	  knowledge–based	  identity	  for	  the	  city,	  or	  at	  least	  for	  its	  
downtown.	  Meanwhile,	  debates	  rage	  about	  the	  relative	  lack	  of	  investment	  and	  
resource	  allocation	  in	  the	  city’s	  non–downtown	  neighborhoods,	  especially	  in	  
traditionally	  African	  American	  neighborhoods,	  where	  development	  discussions	  
have	  been	  much	  more	  geared	  toward	  strategies	  for	  “shrinking”	  the	  city	  inward	  to	  
consolidate	  resources.	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  "Detroit	  Tops	  2013	  List	  Of	  America's	  Most	  Miserable	  Cities."	  Forbes.	  
Forbes	  Magazine,	  21	  Feb.	  2013.	  Web.	  28	  May	  2013. 
	  
	  
	   30	  
Rather	  than	  a	  case	  study	  of	  one	  place	  and	  its	  bounded,	  if	  fascinating,	  
significance,	  this	  dissertation	  tells	  two	  parallel	  and	  intersecting	  stories.	  One	  is	  a	  
local	  account	  of	  how	  a	  specific	  community	  attempted	  to	  navigate	  a	  difficult	  turning	  
point	  in	  its	  history,	  with	  all	  the	  quirks	  and	  intricacies	  and	  particular	  politics	  of	  that	  
place.	  The	  other	  charts	  the	  longer–term	  political	  economic	  and	  cultural	  trajectories	  
that	  shape,	  and	  are	  shaped	  by,	  ground–level	  responses	  and	  battles	  in	  places	  like	  
Flint	  during	  the	  1970s	  and	  80s.	  This	  latter	  history	  thus	  considers	  the	  stories	  of	  other	  
local	  efforts	  and	  institutions	  both	  within	  and	  outside	  the	  regional/cultural	  
designation	  of	  the	  Rust	  Belt—Cleveland	  and	  its	  quest	  for	  the	  Rock	  and	  Roll	  Hall	  of	  
Fame;	  Toledo,	  Ohio’s	  efforts	  to	  transform	  its	  image	  and	  economy;	  Youngstown,	  
Ohio’s	  attempt	  to	  memorialize	  the	  declining	  steel	  industry.	  Each	  contributes	  to	  a	  
narrative	  that	  operates	  simultaneously	  on	  national,	  regional	  and	  local	  registers.	  
A	  1982	  Detroit	  Free	  Press	  article	  examined	  revitalization	  efforts	  in	  five	  
different	  cities,	  chosen	  because	  of	  their	  similarity	  in	  some	  way	  to	  Detroit.40	  	  With	  the	  
headline	  “Some	  Downtowns	  are	  Coming	  Back	  to	  Life,”	  the	  article	  looks	  at	  Baltimore,	  
Pittsburgh,	  Minneapolis,	  Philadelphia,	  and	  Louisville	  to	  highlight	  both	  the	  successes	  
and	  the	  challenges	  of	  each	  former	  industrial	  center,	  and	  how	  they	  might	  reflect	  upon	  
Detroit’s	  efforts	  to	  revitalize	  its	  downtown—efforts	  that	  had	  become	  a	  well–worn	  
story	  by	  1982,	  and	  one	  that	  would	  only	  continue	  to	  grow	  more	  grim.	  The	  common	  
problems	  of	  these	  urban	  centers	  identified	  in	  the	  article—including	  age,	  industrial	  
past,	  suburban	  flight,	  and	  overwhelming	  fiscal	  problems—provide	  comparative	  
angles	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  article,	  but	  also	  allow	  us	  some	  insight	  into	  how	  these	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common	  problems	  were	  talked	  about	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  and	  what	  solutions	  were	  
thought	  of	  as	  reasonable	  and	  innovative.	  For	  instance,	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  
Pittsburgh	  Urban	  Development	  Authority	  is	  quoted	  in	  the	  article	  as	  saying,	  “People	  
used	  to	  see	  us	  as	  a	  smoky,	  dirty	  industrial	  city.	  Well,	  there’s	  nothing	  like	  that.	  In	  fact,	  
we’re	  becoming	  a	  very	  good	  city.”	  	  The	  automatic	  equation	  of	  “industrial”	  with	  “bad”	  
in	  this	  moment	  speaks	  volumes	  about	  what	  is	  perceived	  to	  be	  “the	  problem”	  with	  
the	  Rust	  Belt.	  Here,	  the	  key	  to	  a	  city’s	  vitality	  is	  in	  large	  part	  image	  management	  and	  
public	  perception—a	  “good	  city”	  is	  not	  industrial,	  but	  rather	  must	  reorient	  its	  
priorities	  and	  economic	  base	  toward	  an	  entertaining	  and	  “cultural”	  downtown.	  In	  
the	  piece’s	  conclusion,	  a	  Pittsburgh	  local	  official	  praises	  the	  city’s	  efforts	  to	  revitalize	  
via	  “historical	  preservation”	  and	  “that	  grand	  Victorian	  presence,”	  and	  the	  issue	  of	  
revitalization	  is	  framed	  similarly	  for	  each	  city	  as	  one	  primarily	  of	  image	  
management,	  meeting	  with	  varying	  levels	  of	  success	  in	  each	  location.41	  The	  spatial	  
framing	  of	  “downtown”	  in	  the	  piece	  points	  toward	  an	  increasing	  level	  of	  interest	  in	  
the	  boundaries	  of	  urban	  revitalization	  and	  the	  policing	  of	  those	  boundaries	  
according	  to	  “desirable”	  populations	  of	  consumers.	  At	  least	  two	  of	  the	  “success	  
stories”	  profiled	  in	  the	  article—the	  renovated	  “eyesore”	  of	  Harbor	  Place	  in	  
Baltimore	  as	  well	  as	  parts	  of	  Minneapolis	  and	  Pittsburgh—are	  James	  Rouse	  or	  
Rouse–inspired	  developments.	  James	  Rouse,	  a	  Master	  Planner	  and	  real	  estate	  
developer	  who	  became	  widely	  celebrated	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  80s	  for	  his	  successful	  
“festival	  marketplace”	  urban	  developments,	  is	  a	  significant	  and	  symbolic	  figure	  in	  
the	  rise	  of	  neoliberal	  strategies	  of	  urban	  revitalization	  in	  the	  Rust	  Belt,	  and	  is	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examined	  more	  extensively	  in	  chapters	  one	  and	  three.	  This	  kind	  of	  comparative	  
framework,	  especially	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  fellow	  deindustrialized	  urban	  
center,	  is	  valuable	  in	  understanding	  the	  terms	  of	  debate	  on	  local,	  regional,	  and	  
national	  levels.	  
Returning	  for	  a	  moment	  to	  Maxine	  Kronick	  and	  her	  comments,	  with	  which	  I	  
began	  this	  introduction,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  underlying	  sadness	  or	  at	  least	  sense	  of	  
disappointment	  as	  she	  looks	  back	  on	  the	  failed	  efforts	  to	  reinvigorate	  a	  city	  that	  
was,	  and	  continues	  to	  be,	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  perpetually	  dying	  Rust	  Belt.	  As	  I	  
write	  this,	  there	  are	  glimmers	  of	  hope	  for	  city	  boosters	  and	  officials	  as	  downtown	  
Flint	  slowly	  fills	  up	  with	  small	  restaurants	  and	  hip	  new	  loft	  apartments,	  but	  they	  are	  
cautious	  about	  making	  any	  grand	  claims.	  Twenty–five	  years	  after	  AutoWorld	  
opened	  and	  closed,	  its	  failure	  still	  haunts	  any	  new	  development	  plan,	  and	  it	  is	  still	  
referenced	  in	  local	  media	  as	  a	  punch	  line	  and	  a	  bogeyman.	  If	  you	  want	  to	  stop	  a	  
conversation	  with	  a	  Mott	  Foundation	  official	  or	  a	  downtown	  developer,	  simply	  
mention	  AutoWorld—believe	  me,	  I’ve	  tried.	  But	  even	  though	  the	  outcome	  of	  those	  
efforts	  seems	  so	  clear	  and	  predictable	  in	  hindsight,	  and	  can	  be	  the	  object	  of	  such	  
gallows	  humor	  as	  it	  is	  Roger	  &	  Me,	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  AutoWorld	  made	  sense	  to	  
at	  least	  some	  important	  people	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  changing	  economic,	  political,	  
and	  cultural	  landscape	  of	  the	  early	  1980s.	  Neither	  the	  goal	  of	  image–transformation,	  
nor	  the	  resources	  and	  representations	  mobilized	  in	  its	  cause,	  could	  have	  coalesced	  
in	  any	  other	  historical	  moment,	  and	  the	  consequences	  still	  resonate	  into	  the	  present.	  
As	  cities	  have	  become	  more	  and	  more	  “Disneyfied,”	  and	  as	  scholars	  and	  cultural	  
critics	  mourn	  the	  loss	  of	  a	  romanticized	  notion	  of	  urban	  public	  space,	  I	  believe	  we	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can	  more	  profitably	  examine	  the	  places	  that	  were	  excluded	  from	  (or	  failed	  in)	  this	  
process—places	  that	  couldn’t	  or	  wouldn’t	  be	  remade	  into	  something	  more.	  
In	  the	  increasingly	  unequal	  map	  of	  neoliberal	  development	  and	  growth,	  cities	  
like	  Flint	  and	  regions	  like	  the	  Rust	  Belt	  function	  as	  a	  discourse	  as	  much	  as	  a	  
collection	  of	  physical	  locations,	  helping	  to	  designate	  the	  new	  from	  the	  old,	  safe	  from	  
dangerous,	  responsible	  from	  irresponsible.	  One	  of	  the	  goals	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  to	  
keep	  an	  eye	  fixed	  on	  the	  longer	  history	  of	  the	  processes	  that	  shaped,	  and	  were	  
shaped	  by,	  Flint	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  and	  also	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  processes	  
continue	  into	  the	  present,	  often	  with	  unexpected	  outcomes.	  After	  all,	  the	  Bowery	  
now	  has	  luxury	  loft	  living	  and	  a	  Whole	  Foods	  Market,	  even	  if	  Flint	  is	  still	  just	  …	  Flint.	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Figure	  1:	  AutoWorld	  as	  it	  appeared	  on	  opening	  day,	  July	  4,	  1984	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Figure	  2:	  Special	  95–page	  section	  of	  the	  Flint	  Journal	  to	  	  
commemorate	  AutoWorld	  opening	  day	  
	   	  
	  









Neoliberal	  Strategies	  of	  Revitalization:	  	  
Public/Private	  Partnerships	  and	  Mega–Projects	  	  
	  
It	   is	   a	   great	   privilege	   for	  me	   to	   extend	  warm	   greetings	   to	   all	   who	   gather	   for	   the	  
Grand	   Opening	   of	   AutoWorld.	   This	   important	   occasion	   provides	   me	   with	   a	   most	  
welcome	  opportunity	  to	  commend	  the	  people	  in	  both	  the	  private	  and	  public	  sectors	  
who	  have	  brought	  this	  project	  to	  fruition.	  
	   —President	  Ronald	  Reagan,	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  mark	  the	  	  
	   	   Grand	  Opening	  of	  AutoWorld,	  June	  29,	  1984	  
	  
	  
The	   people	   of	   Flint	   have	   a	   right	   to	   be	   very	   proud	   of	   AutoWorld.	   It	   is	   a	   perfect	  
example	   of	   how	   government,	   business,	   and	   most	   importantly	   a	   community,	   can	  
work	  together	  for	  a	  better	  future.	  
	   —US	  Senator	  Donald	  Riegle,	  Jr.,	  in	  remarks	  at	  the	  	  
	   	   “Salute	  to	  AutoWorld”	  dinner,	  July	  3,	  1984	  
	  
	  
The	  public	  side	  of	  the	  public/private	  partnership	  has	  been	  slighted	  over	  the	  years,	  
leaving	   government,	   and	   particularly	   urban	   mayors,	   the	   questionable	   role	   of	  
subsidizing	  business	  interests.	  
	   —Nicholas	  Dagen	  Bloom,	  Merchant	  of	  Illusion:	  James	  	  
	   	   Rouse,	  America’s	  Salesman	  of	  the	  Businessman’s	  	  
	   	   Utopia42	  
	  
	   The	  late	  1970s	  is	  generally	  regarded	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  tumultuous	  times	  in	  
Cleveland’s	  history.	  Deindustrialization,	  financial	  crisis,	  an	  infamously	  flammable	  
river,	  and	  other	  now–familiar	  problems	  common	  to	  many	  cities	  in	  the	  “Rust	  Belt”	  
combined	  to	  create	  the	  image	  of	  a	  hopeless,	  mismanaged	  “mistake	  on	  the	  Lake.”	  In	  
1978,	  when	  the	  city’s	  young	  mayor,	  Dennis	  Kucinich,	  refused	  to	  give	  in	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Dagen	  Bloom,	  185.	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tremendous	  local	  pressure	  to	  privatize	  Cleveland’s	  electrical	  utility,	  banks	  refused	  to	  
continue	  extending	  credit	  to	  the	  city,	  causing	  a	  financial	  crisis,	  a	  recall	  effort,	  and	  
even	  a	  mafia	  hit	  allegedly	  being	  called	  out	  on	  Kucinich.	   	  
Just	  eight	  years	  later,	  in	  1986,	  Cleveland	  officially	  won	  a	  determined	  bid	  to	  
become	  the	  site	  of	  the	  new	  Rock	  and	  Roll	  Hall	  of	  Fame	  Museum.	  Ostensibly	  chosen	  
because	  the	  city	  was	  home	  to	  early	  Rock	  and	  Roll	  DJ	  Alan	  Freed,	  Cleveland	  won	  the	  
right	  to	  call	  itself	  the	  home	  of	  Rock	  and	  Roll	  over	  cities	  like	  New	  York	  and	  Memphis,	  
along	  with	  the	  potential	  tourist	  business,	  related	  economic	  boosts	  and	  image–
transforming	  cultural	  capital	  that	  would	  undoubtedly	  come	  along	  with	  it.	  Cleveland	  
also	  had	  something	  else	  that	  those	  other	  cities	  didn’t—a	  package	  of	  $65	  million	  in	  
public	  and	  private	  funds	  that	  local	  leaders,	  eager	  to	  bring	  a	  tourist	  attraction	  to	  the	  
city,	  put	  together	  to	  make	  it	  a	  particularly	  appealing	  location	  to	  the	  Hall	  of	  Fame.	  As	  
Cleveland	  Plain	  Dealer	  music	  critic	  Michael	  Norman	  said,	  “It	  wasn't	  Alan	  Freed.	  It	  
was	  $65	  million.	  Cleveland	  wanted	  it	  here	  and	  put	  up	  the	  money.”	  
	  	   These	  two	  events,	  while	  not	  necessarily	  historical	  bookends,	  illustrate	  a	  
transformative	  period	  in	  the	  life	  of	  American	  cities,	  and	  especially	  in	  the	  life	  of	  the	  
(de)industrial	  cities	  of	  the	  Midwest	  and	  Northeast.	  In	  the	  late	  1970s,	  as	  the	  
manufacturing	  and	  corporate	  patronage	  that	  built	  cities	  like	  Cleveland,	  Pittsburgh,	  
Detroit,	  and	  Flint	  hastened	  their	  retreat	  from	  the	  region,	  local	  governments	  
searched	  for	  survival	  strategies	  that	  would	  diversify	  their	  economies	  and	  stem	  the	  
bleeding	  of	  jobs,	  population,	  and	  funds.	  The	  federal	  government	  had	  also	  retreated	  
from	  their	  support	  of	  urban	  centers	  throughout	  the	  1970s,	  and	  the	  dawn	  of	  the	  
Reagan	  era	  saw	  a	  dedicated	  acceleration	  of	  that	  trend—federal	  support	  to	  state	  and	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local	  spending	  didn’t	  significantly	  turn	  down	  until	  midway	  through	  the	  Carter	  
administration,	  but	  a	  clear	  trend	  was	  present	  by	  even	  the	  early	  1970s,	  when	  both	  
Congress	  and	  the	  White	  House	  showed	  less	  and	  less	  interest	  in	  helping	  especially	  
industrial	  urban	  centers	  in	  the	  Midwest	  and	  Northeast	  as	  they	  struggled	  to	  remain	  
financially	  solvent.	  In	  one	  of	  the	  most	  famous	  headlines	  of	  the	  decade,	  the	  New	  York	  
Daily	  News	  declared	  “Ford	  to	  City:	  Drop	  Dead”	  when	  President	  Ford	  refused	  to	  help	  
New	  York	  out	  of	  its	  fiscal	  crisis	  in	  1975.43	  “Clearly	  by	  the	  1980s,”	  historian	  Jon	  
Teaford	  concludes,	  “most	  older	  cities	  were	  on	  their	  own.”44	  Increasingly,	  as	  
Cleveland	  illustrates,	  “Rust	  Belt”	  cities	  attempted	  to	  transform	  their	  image	  and	  
economy	  through	  cultural	  institutions	  with	  tourist	  appeal,	  often	  massive	  and	  
spectacular	  in	  scale	  and	  funded	  through	  some	  combination	  of	  public	  money,	  tax	  
incentives,	  and	  private	  business	  or	  philanthropic	  support.	  
The	  triumph	  of	  the	  public/private	  partnership	  is	  a	  hallmark	  of	  revitalization	  
in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  1980s,	  and	  signaled	  a	  neoliberal	  model	  of	  development	  and	  
governance	  that	  would	  become	  a	  new	  “common	  sense”	  for	  troubled	  urban	  centers.	  
As	  the	  quotations	  that	  begin	  this	  chapter	  help	  to	  illustrate,	  the	  public/private	  
partnership	  was	  hailed	  at	  the	  federal,	  state,	  and	  local	  levels	  as	  the	  new	  way	  to	  “get	  
things	  done”	  in	  cities—President	  Reagan,	  Senator	  from	  Michigan	  Riegle,	  and	  many	  
other	  officials	  on	  the	  local	  level	  all	  noted	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  public/private	  
partnership	  in	  making	  AutoWorld’s	  opening	  day	  a	  reality.	  As	  Rob	  Collier,	  who	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Though	  Ford	  didn’t	  explicitly	  say	  this	  phrase,	  it	  has	  come	  to	  symbolize	  an	  early	  
articulation	  of	  federal	  unwillingness	  to	  support	  urban	  centers	  seen	  as	  fiscally	  or	  otherwise	  
irresponsible.	  See	  discussion	  in	  Frieden,	  Bernard	  J.,	  and	  Lynne	  B.	  Sagalyn.	  Downtown,	  Inc.:	  
How	  America	  Rebuilds	  Cities.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  MIT,	  1989.	  291.	  
44	  Teaford,	  The	  Rough	  Road	  to	  Renaissance:	  Urban	  Revitalization	  in	  America,	  1940–1985.	  261.	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served	  as	  Flint	  City	  Administrator	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  says,	  the	  public/private	  
partnership	  was	  “born	  out	  of	  the	  ineptness”	  of	  government	  as	  well	  as	  business	  in	  
this	  moment,	  and	  their	  seeming	  inability	  to	  accomplish	  any	  real	  change	  on	  their	  
own.45	  The	  concept	  of	  business	  and	  government	  working	  together	  was	  not	  an	  
entirely	  new	  one	  in	  the	  early	  1980s—there	  is	  a	  long	  history	  of	  relationships	  
between	  the	  two.46	  I	  will	  argue,	  however,	  that	  the	  public/private	  partnership,	  and	  
the	  rhetoric	  around	  it,	  is	  fundamentally	  different	  than	  the	  boosterism,	  sponsorship,	  
or	  social	  relationships	  between	  business	  and	  government	  that	  have	  long	  been	  a	  
fixture	  of	  the	  American	  urban	  landscape.	  As	  a	  product	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  ideologies	  
that	  increasingly	  permeated	  political	  and	  cultural	  life	  throughout	  the	  1970s	  and	  80s,	  
the	  public/private	  partnership	  is	  emblematic	  of	  the	  narrowing	  of	  possibilities	  for	  
cities	  when	  it	  came	  to	  negotiating	  postindustrial	  economic	  and	  cultural	  crises.	  	  
AutoWorld,	  Flint,	  Michigan’s	  $80	  million	  revitalization	  project	  built	  by	  a	  
combination	  of	  public	  and	  private	  funds—and	  described	  by	  political	  and	  business	  
leaders	  in	  glowing	  terms	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  complex	  and	  unique	  funding	  packages	  
of	  its	  kind	  ever	  put	  together—is	  another	  clear	  example	  of	  this	  search	  for	  economic	  
solutions	  when	  both	  government	  support	  and	  private	  business	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  
General	  Motors	  jobs)	  were	  steadily	  retreating.	  The	  well–documented	  mania	  for	  
privatization	  ushered	  in	  by	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  also	  framed	  the	  retreat	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Collier,	  Robert.	  Telephone	  interview.	  26	  Oct.	  2012.	  
46	  This	  includes	  individual	  boosterism	  as	  well	  as	  through	  non–profit	  foundations	  (such	  as	  
the	  Mott	  Foundation)	  as	  well	  as	  social	  and	  professional	  clubs	  (such	  as	  Rotary	  International,	  
Freemasons,	  and	  so	  on).	  For	  some	  discussion	  of	  these	  relationships	  in	  longer	  historical	  
context,	  see	  Isenberg,	  Downtown	  America:	  A	  History	  of	  the	  Place	  and	  the	  People	  Who	  Made	  It;	  
Teaford,	  The	  Rough	  Road	  to	  Renaissance:	  Urban	  Revitalization	  in	  America,	  1940–1985;	  Cowie	  
and	  Heathcott,	  Beyond	  the	  Ruins:	  The	  Meanings	  of	  Deindustrialization.	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federal	  support	  for	  struggling	  cities—which	  were	  increasingly	  seen	  as	  obsolete	  and	  
morally	  deficient—as	  an	  opportunity	  for	  more	  private–sector	  intervention	  in	  
revitalization.	  This	  reframing	  was	  a	  culmination	  of	  a	  decades–long	  effort	  by	  
business	  conservatives	  to	  not	  only	  undermine	  the	  role	  of	  government	  in	  
maintaining	  functioning	  cities,	  but	  also	  to	  propose	  the	  private	  sector	  as	  the	  best	  and	  
only	  solution	  to	  urban	  problems,	  with	  the	  “public”	  contribution	  being	  to	  largely	  stay	  
out	  of	  the	  way	  of	  progress.	  As	  Jason	  Hackworth	  observes	  in	  The	  Neoliberal	  City,	  
“‘Good’	  governance	  at	  the	  municipal	  level	  is	  now	  largely	  defined	  by	  the	  ability	  of	  
formal	  government	  to	  assist,	  collaborate	  with,	  or	  function	  like	  the	  corporate	  
community.	  Extant	  regulatory	  powers	  such	  as	  land–use	  zoning	  have	  been	  
weakened,	  as	  have	  redistributive	  impulses	  in	  the	  area	  of	  social	  services	  and	  housing.	  
Neoliberalism	  has	  been	  naturalized	  as	  the	  ‘only’	  choice	  available	  to	  cities	  in	  the	  
United	  States	  and	  elsewhere.”47	  The	  legacy	  that	  Hackworth	  describes	  originated	  in	  
the	  transformational	  moment	  of	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s.	  	  
The	  “Rust	  Belt”	  had	  a	  particular	  challenge	  to	  meet	  in	  this	  era,	  making	  it	  even	  
more	  susceptible	  to	  the	  neoliberal	  turn.	  In	  both	  material	  and	  rhetorical	  terms,	  it	  was	  
crucial	  for	  northern	  cities	  to	  seem	  as	  “business	  friendly”	  as	  their	  less–unionized	  and	  
less–regulated	  competition	  in	  the	  thriving	  Southern/Western	  “Sun	  Belt.”	  This	  effort	  
sometimes	  took	  the	  form	  of	  strategies	  to	  retain	  traditional	  manufacturing	  jobs	  at	  
steeper	  and	  steeper	  social	  and	  financial	  costs.	  For	  example,	  amid	  massive	  job	  losses,	  
Detroit	  Mayor	  Coleman	  Young	  granted	  substantial	  incentives	  to	  General	  Motors	  in	  
exchange	  for	  building	  what	  would	  become	  the	  Detroit/Hamtramck	  Assembly	  Plant,	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  Hackworth,	  The	  Neoliberal	  City:	  Governance,	  Ideology,	  and	  Development	  in	  American	  
Urbanism.	  10–11.	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using	  eminent	  domain	  to	  raze	  an	  entire	  neighborhood	  of	  4,200	  residents,	  1,300	  
homes,	  140	  businesses,	  six	  churches	  and	  one	  hospital	  to	  build	  a	  factory	  that	  has	  
produced	  uneven	  and	  dubious	  economic	  benefits.48	  Cultural	  institutions	  such	  as	  
Flint’s	  AutoWorld—an	  unwieldy	  combination	  of	  history	  museum	  and	  
theme/amusement	  park—were	  carefully	  aimed	  at	  retaining	  and	  creating	  jobs	  in	  
struggling	  northern	  cities,	  fashioned	  after	  “Sun	  Belt”	  successes	  like	  Orlando,	  
Florida’s	  Disney	  World	  and	  Texas–based	  Six	  Flags	  (the	  company	  that	  would	  
ultimately	  be	  hired	  to	  manage	  AutoWorld	  when	  it	  opened).	  Funded	  through	  an	  
impossibly	  complex	  combination	  of	  philanthropic	  funds,	  private	  investment,	  tax	  
dollars,	  and	  government	  funding,	  AutoWorld	  promoted	  itself	  as	  a	  “new”	  kind	  of	  
institution,	  built	  through	  a	  new	  model	  of	  bold,	  efficient	  development	  that	  largely	  
bypassed	  the	  traditional	  governmental	  “red	  tape”	  and	  bureaucracy	  that	  marked	  
what	  was	  increasingly	  seen	  as	  a	  failed,	  outdated	  era	  in	  American	  city	  governance.	  
Furthermore,	  the	  quotations	  that	  begin	  this	  chapter	  illustrate	  the	  rhetorical	  echo	  
chamber	  that	  neoliberal	  strategies	  of	  revitalization	  became:	  Ronald	  Reagan	  had	  
clearly	  laid	  out	  an	  agenda	  of	  retreat	  from	  American	  urban	  centers	  through	  a	  variety	  
of	  federal	  policies,	  promoting	  private–sector	  involvement	  whenever	  possible;	  local	  
political	  and	  business	  leaders	  explicitly	  reaffirmed	  the	  need	  for	  such	  partnerships;	  
and	  then	  everyone	  gave	  speeches	  and	  statements	  celebrating	  how	  crucial	  this	  new	  
framework	  was	  for	  advancing	  struggling	  cities	  back	  toward	  morally–right	  self–
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  “Michigan	  History.”	  Detnews.com.	  Web.	  17	  Mar.	  2013.	  For	  a	  recent	  discussion	  on	  how	  
corporations	  have	  consistently	  benefited	  over	  municipalities	  with	  this	  strategy	  of	  tax	  
incentives	  in	  exchange	  for	  location,	  with	  extensive	  analysis	  of	  General	  Motors	  in	  Michigan	  
among	  other	  cases,	  see	  Research.,	  Louise	  Story;	  Lisa	  Schwartz	  And	  Ramsey	  Merritt	  
Contributed.	  “The	  Empty	  Promise	  of	  Tax	  Incentives.”	  The	  New	  York	  Times.	  The	  New	  York	  
Times,	  02	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  Web.	  17	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sufficiency.49	  At	  the	  federal,	  state,	  and	  local	  level	  (not	  to	  mention	  the	  global),	  
neoliberal	  strategies	  of	  revitalization	  were,	  and	  are,	  in	  this	  manner	  reified	  as	  the	  
only	  sensible	  solution	  to	  urban	  problems.	  	  
Writing	  about	  Cleveland’s	  predicament	  under	  Kucinich,	  Jason	  Hackworth	  
argues	  that	  “the	  notion	  that	  city	  officials	  should	  do	  everything	  in	  their	  power	  to	  
placate	  corporate	  financial	  interests	  that	  threaten	  to	  leave	  or	  penalize	  the	  locality	  
has	  become	  so	  unquestioned	  that	  it	  is	  considered	  common	  sense	  by	  public	  
administrators	  and	  the	  popular	  press.”50	  The	  public/private	  partnership	  and	  the	  
changing	  relationships	  between	  government,	  business,	  philanthropic	  organizations	  
and	  the	  public	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  80s	  are	  the	  roots	  of	  this	  “common	  sense.”	  In	  
Cleveland,	  for	  instance—where	  Kucinich	  was	  seen	  by	  the	  media	  and	  by	  Clevelanders	  
as	  a	  failure,	  dependent	  on	  an	  outdated	  New	  Deal	  politics—the	  Rock	  and	  Roll	  Hall	  of	  
Fame	  was,	  and	  remains,	  a	  success	  due	  to	  the	  power	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  working	  
through	  the	  auspices	  of	  government.	  This	  “common	  sense”	  ties	  together	  
revitalization	  strategies	  from	  Cleveland	  to	  Flint	  and	  beyond,	  and	  it	  has	  a	  political	  
and	  intellectual	  history	  that	  precedes	  any	  of	  these	  mega–projects.	  Although	  not	  
exclusively	  a	  right–wing	  framework—the	  public/private	  partnership	  and	  urban	  
revitalization	  in	  general	  certainly	  share	  some	  common	  goals	  and	  concerns	  with	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  For	  the	  most	  compelling	  discussion	  of	  the	  Reagan–era	  moral	  underpinnings	  of	  
neoliberalism,	  see	  Duggan,	  Twilight	  of	  Equality?	  The	  extensive	  literature	  on	  
governmentality	  and	  the	  neoliberal	  policing	  of	  the	  self	  are	  also	  instructive	  here,	  as	  it	  
illustrates	  the	  links	  between	  political	  economics	  and	  morality,	  including	  Rose,	  Nikolas	  S.	  
Governing	  the	  Soul:	  The	  Shaping	  of	  the	  Private	  Self.	  London:	  Routledge,	  1990.;	  Cruikshank,	  B.,	  
“Revolutions	  within:	  self–government	  and	  self–esteem”	  in	  Barry,	  Andrew,	  Thomas	  Osborne,	  
and	  Nikolas	  S.	  Rose.	  Foucault	  and	  Political	  Reason:	  Liberalism,	  Neo–liberalism,	  and	  
Rationalities	  of	  Government.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago,	  1996.	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  Hackworth,	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progressives	  and	  even	  New	  Deal	  Liberals—the	  push	  toward	  a	  more	  powerful	  
private–sector	  presence	  in	  shaping	  urban	  development	  is	  rooted	  in	  a	  decades–long	  
anti–New	  Deal	  business	  conservative	  tradition.	  
	  
American	  Business	  “Under	  Attack”	  
	   In	  1972,	  Business	  Week	  magazine	  published	  an	  article	  nervously	  titled	  
“America’s	  Growing	  Antibusiness	  Mood,”	  which	  was,	  as	  the	  title	  suggests,	  an	  
examination	  of	  the	  overwhelming	  lack	  of	  public	  confidence	  in	  corporations	  that	  had	  
emerged	  by	  the	  early	  1970s.51	  In	  fact,	  as	  Kim	  Phillips–Fein	  argues	  about	  the	  late	  
twentieth–century	  critical	  mass	  of	  antibusiness	  sentiment	  and	  activism,	  ranging	  
from	  student	  protest	  to	  bank	  bombings	  to	  new	  government	  regulation,	  “all	  of	  it	  
seemed	  a	  single	  continuum,	  one	  discordant	  challenge	  rising	  against	  American	  
businessmen.”52	  And	  although	  much	  of	  this	  was	  certainly	  rooted	  in	  the	  postwar	  
affluence	  that	  had	  defined	  almost	  two	  previous	  decades	  beginning	  to	  give	  way	  to	  
inflation	  and	  unemployment,	  American	  business	  also	  had	  a	  profound	  image	  
problem,	  reaching	  back	  to	  at	  least	  Ralph	  Nader	  and	  the	  first	  line	  of	  his	  massively	  
influential	  1965	  best–seller,	  Unsafe	  at	  Any	  Speed:	  “For	  over	  half	  a	  century	  the	  
American	  automobile	  has	  brought	  death,	  injury	  and	  the	  most	  inestimable	  sorrow	  
and	  deprivation	  to	  millions	  of	  people.”53	  When	  General	  Motors	  attempted	  to	  
discredit	  Nader	  upon	  his	  Congressional	  testimony	  regarding	  consumer	  safety	  and	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  “America’s	  Growing	  Antibusiness	  Mood,”	  Business	  Week,	  June	  17,	  1972.	  100.	  
52	  Phillips–Fein,	  Invisible	  Hands:	  The	  Making	  of	  the	  Conservative	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the	  automobile	  industry,	  their	  attempts	  backfired,	  effectively	  further	  demonizing	  
the	  company	  and	  making	  Nader	  an	  even	  more	  influential	  national	  figure.	  And	  
although	  public	  opinion	  on,	  for	  instance,	  organized	  labor	  was	  also	  growing	  more	  
unfavorable,	  by	  the	  1970s	  business	  elites	  felt	  increasingly	  and	  unfairly	  under	  attack	  
from	  a	  public	  who	  needed	  to	  be	  “educated”—or	  by	  other	  means	  persuaded—back	  to	  
the	  side	  of	  American	  free	  market	  capitalism.	  	  
	   As	  Phillips–Fein,	  Bethany	  Moreton,	  and	  others	  have	  argued,	  one	  response	  of	  
business	  elites	  to	  this	  image	  problem	  was	  to	  wage	  a	  cultural	  war	  for	  the	  hearts	  and	  
minds	  of	  American	  youth,	  creating	  academic	  positions,	  scholarships,	  think	  tanks	  and	  
college	  courses	  designed	  to	  spread	  free	  market	  capitalist	  philosophies	  to	  young	  
people	  on	  their	  own	  terms.54	  Although	  business	  elites	  saw	  young	  people’s	  
unfavorable	  sentiments	  toward	  business	  as	  closely	  linked	  to	  student	  agitation	  
around	  the	  American	  war	  in	  Vietnam,	  they	  also	  understood	  this	  alienation	  more	  
generally	  as	  a	  product	  of	  a	  generational	  divide	  and	  a	  matter	  of	  “economic	  illiteracy.”	  
In	  1971,	  Pepsico	  CEO	  Donald	  Kendall	  bemoaned	  “the	  Generation	  Gap—the	  chronic	  
alienation	  of	  youth	  and	  parents,	  youth	  and	  religion	  …	  youth	  and	  free	  enterprise.”55	  
Opposition	  to	  American	  capitalism	  was	  thus,	  in	  the	  view	  of	  business	  conservatives,	  a	  
misguided	  critique	  based	  on	  either	  ignorance	  that	  could	  be	  corrected	  or	  the	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  Phillips–Fein’s	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  “Conservatism:	  A	  
State	  of	  the	  Field,”	  Journal	  of	  American	  History	  (2011)	  98	  (3):	  723–743.	  provides	  a	  thorough	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  of	  the	  recent	  literature	  on	  business	  conservatism	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  For	  longer	  
historical	  views,	  see	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  Galambos,	  Louis,	  and	  Barbara	  Barrow	  Spence.	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  of	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  in	  America,	  1880–1940:	  A	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  1975.;	  Fraser,	  Steve,	  and	  Gary	  Gerstle.	  Ruling	  America:	  A	  History	  of	  Wealth	  and	  
Power	  in	  a	  Democracy.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  UP,	  2005.;	  Chandler,	  Alfred	  D.	  The	  Visible	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  The	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  Revolution	  in	  American	  Business.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  Belknap,	  1977.;	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  Olivier.	  Making	  America	  Corporate,	  1870–1920.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago,	  1990.	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dangerous	  troublemaking	  of	  spoiled	  children.	  Then–California	  Governor	  Ronald	  
Reagan,	  for	  instance,	  paternalistically	  questioned	  what	  gave	  these	  arrogant	  children	  
the	  right	  to	  bite	  the	  hand	  that	  fed	  them	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  America	  in	  a	  1972	  speech	  on	  
“free	  enterprise.”56	  In	  either	  case,	  business	  leaders’	  response	  was	  to	  regard	  such	  
opposition	  as	  illegitimate,	  personally	  insulting,	  even	  strangely	  hurtful,	  often	  framing	  
critique	  as	  a	  form	  of	  immature,	  ungrateful	  betrayal.	  Business	  conservatives,	  who	  
had	  been	  organizing	  and	  agitating	  against	  the	  New	  Deal	  in	  various	  ways	  since	  its	  
inception,	  saw	  the	  1970s	  as	  a	  moment	  of	  crisis	  and	  an	  opportunity	  to	  answer	  and	  
convert	  opposition,	  and	  to	  change	  the	  terms	  of	  discourse	  around	  the	  role	  of	  business	  
in	  public	  life.	  
	   One	  man	  who	  was	  motivated	  to	  act	  by	  widespread	  opposition	  to	  American	  
business	  was	  Harding	  Mott,	  then–President	  of	  the	  Charles	  Stewart	  Mott	  Foundation	  
and	  son	  of	  C.S.	  Mott,	  founder	  and	  original	  partner	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  General	  Motors.	  
Harding	  Mott	  was	  angry	  and	  indignant	  upon	  hearing	  the	  news	  in	  1970	  that	  students	  
at	  San	  Jose	  State	  College	  had	  staged	  an	  “automotive	  funeral”	  as	  part	  of	  a	  proto–Earth	  
Day	  demonstration	  on	  campus,	  burying	  a	  brand	  new	  car	  in	  a	  12–foot	  deep	  grave	  to	  
make	  an	  anti–internal	  combustion,	  anti–automotive	  industry	  statement	  (Fig.	  3).	  
Widely	  covered	  in	  local	  and	  national	  news	  media,	  the	  demonstration	  ultimately	  
resulted	  in	  one	  of	  the	  first	  Environmental	  Studies	  programs	  established	  at	  a	  US	  
university.57	  Mott,	  who	  was	  himself	  very	  much	  a	  product	  of	  the	  automobile	  industry,	  
and	  who	  presided	  over	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  philanthropic	  foundations	  in	  the	  country,	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which	  also	  happened	  to	  be	  a	  product	  of	  that	  industry,	  was	  less	  impressed.	  
Recounting	  the	  story	  of	  Mott’s	  reaction,	  his	  successor	  at	  the	  Foundation,	  William	  S.	  
White,	  said	  in	  1984,	  	  
…	  back	  in	  the	  late	  1960s	  [it]	  became	  fashionable	  to	  begin	  to	  knock	  the	  
automobile	   industry.	   In	   particular,	   there	  were	   some	   students	   at	   San	  
Jose	   State	   University	   who	   buried	   an	   automobile	   …	   Harding	   said	  
someone	  needed	  to	  tell	   the	  story	  of	  the	  automobile	   industry:	  what	   it	  
has	  done	  for	  our	  American	  society	  and	  culture	  and	  the	  world	  at	  large;	  
the	  number	  of	  people	  it	  employs;	  the	  technology	  which	  has	  been	  spun	  
off	  of	  it;	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  has	  truly	  revolutionized	  the	  world	  and	  is	  not	  
necessarily	  the	  demon	  people	  make	  it	  out	  to	  be.58	  	  
	  
In	  this	  statement,	  we	  again	  see	  the	  complex	  interpenetration	  of	  institutional	  and	  
personal	  viewpoints,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  rhetorics	  of	  “ungratefulness”	  and	  arrogance	  that	  
frame	  business	  elites’	  response	  to	  criticism.	  Not	  only	  does	  Harding	  Mott’s	  original	  
response	  to	  the	  relatively	  small	  student	  protest	  across	  the	  country	  from	  Flint,	  
Michigan	  illustrate	  a	  much	  broader	  anxiety	  about	  the	  security	  of	  the	  automotive	  
industry,	  and	  by	  extension	  the	  executive	  ruling	  class,	  but	  it	  frames	  that	  anxiety	  as	  
one	  of	  a	  wounded	  patriarch,	  feelings	  hurt	  by	  a	  nation	  questioning	  his	  leadership	  
instead	  of	  young	  people	  appreciating	  the	  world	  provided	  them	  by	  the	  American	  
businessman.	  Moreover,	  White’s	  retelling	  in	  1984	  of	  Harding	  Mott’s	  reaction	  
illustrates	  the	  intensifying	  of	  this	  framework	  through	  the	  1970s	  and	  into	  the	  
1980s—with	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight	  and	  a	  businessman’s	  perspective	  (White	  had	  a	  
Master’s	  degree	  in	  business	  administration	  and	  worked	  for	  a	  New	  York	  
management	  consulting	  firm	  for	  ten	  years	  before	  leading	  the	  Mott	  Foundation),	  
White	  displays	  both	  an	  increased	  confidence	  as	  well	  as	  undiminished	  anxiety	  in	  his	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role.	  Instead	  of	  the	  sharp	  anger	  and	  defensiveness	  of	  Harding	  Mott,	  White	  has	  taken	  
on	  a	  paternalistic	  dismissiveness	  in	  his	  tone,	  describing	  the	  days	  back	  in	  the	  late	  
1960s,	  “when	  it	  became	  fashionable	  to	  knock	  the	  automobile	  industry.”	  In	  
referencing	  the	  San	  Jose	  students	  involved	  in	  the	  protest,	  he	  goes	  on	  to	  say,	  “One	  of	  
the	  interesting	  side	  incidents	  of	  that	  little	  story	  of	  them	  burying	  the	  automobile	  was	  
that	  the	  person	  who	  organized	  that	  protest	  later	  was	  employed	  in	  one	  of	  our	  grant	  
programs	  on	  a	  fellowship	  here	  in	  Flint.”59	  The	  implication	  here	  is	  clearly	  that	  not	  
only	  was	  this	  protest	  a	  minor,	  passing	  moment	  of	  immature	  opposition,	  but	  that	  in	  
the	  end,	  even	  the	  organizer	  of	  this	  protest	  was	  helped	  (or	  absorbed,	  appropriated,	  
etc.)	  by	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  automotive	  industry	  through	  the	  Foundation,	  effectively	  
negating	  his	  original,	  youthful,	  wrong–headed	  beliefs.	  	  
	   The	  Charles	  Stewart	  Mott	  Foundation	  is	  a	  philanthropic	  foundation	  built	  on	  
the	  $750	  million	  personal	  fortune	  of	  C.S.	  Mott,	  an	  early	  partner	  in	  founding	  General	  
Motors	  in	  Flint.	  Although	  the	  Foundation	  is	  global	  in	  its	  scope,	  promoting	  a	  vision	  of	  
individual	  empowerment	  as	  well	  “community	  well–being”	  both	  locally	  and	  
throughout	  the	  world,	  the	  city	  of	  Flint	  itself	  was	  and	  is	  not	  possible	  without	  the	  Mott	  
Foundation.	  C.S.	  Mott,	  fiercely	  opposed	  to	  federal	  income	  taxation,	  clearly	  started	  his	  
foundation	  in	  1926	  at	  least	  in	  part	  as	  a	  way	  to	  shelter	  a	  portion	  of	  his	  wealth,	  but	  
also,	  according	  to	  his	  biographers,	  to	  reflect	  “an	  engineer‘s	  kind	  of	  planning	  for	  the	  
future,	  a	  way	  of	  organizing	  his	  help	  to	  the	  community	  and	  making	  it	  business–like—
taking	  as	  much	  care	  in	  the	  spending	  of	  his	  money	  as	  he	  had	  devoted	  to	  earning	  it.”60	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Almost	  always	  preferring	  self–help	  strategies	  rather	  than	  direct	  aid,	  he	  integrated	  
his	  “business–like”	  viewpoint	  into	  the	  foundation	  that	  he	  built	  from	  the	  beginning.	  
In	  short,	  Mott	  Foundation	  money	  makes	  Flint	  possible—the	  Foundation	  chooses	  
what	  programs	  to	  fund	  at	  what	  level,	  and	  in	  many	  ways	  determines	  the	  priorities	  of	  
the	  city.	  This	  is	  of	  course	  not	  unusual,	  as	  early	  industrialist	  fortunes	  founded	  many	  
of	  the	  largest	  philanthropic	  organizations,	  and	  imbued	  them	  with	  similar	  business	  
conservative	  philosophical	  views.61	   	  
The	  product	  of	  Harding	  Mott’s	  anger	  over	  the	  San	  Jose	  student	  protest	  was	  
an	  idea	  for	  a	  cultural	  institution	  that,	  in	  his	  mind,	  would	  restore	  the	  automotive	  
industry	  to	  its	  rightful	  place	  in	  the	  American	  imagination	  as	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  
forces	  for	  good	  in	  modern	  history.	  Initially	  conceived	  as	  a	  respectable	  National	  
Automotive	  Hall	  of	  Fame,	  his	  idea	  transformed	  over	  the	  course	  of	  a	  decade	  into	  the	  
multi–million	  dollar	  complex	  of	  AutoWorld—a	  shape–shifting	  amusement	  
park/historical	  museum	  hybrid	  that	  would	  bear	  the	  burdens	  of	  deindustrialization,	  
job	  loss,	  and	  the	  need	  for	  economic	  diversification	  as	  the	  1970s	  piled	  them	  onto	  
cities	  like	  Flint.	  More	  importantly,	  this	  narrative	  of	  Harding	  Mott’s	  anger	  was	  
continually	  cited	  by	  officials	  and	  in	  the	  press	  as	  the	  origin	  of	  what	  AutoWorld	  
became,	  authorizing	  a	  project	  intended	  to	  transform	  criticism	  of	  the	  auto	  industry—
and	  increasingly,	  despair	  over	  material	  losses	  as	  General	  Motors	  steadily	  backed	  
away	  from	  the	  city	  of	  its	  birth—into	  support,	  respect,	  and	  something	  like	  “pride”	  for	  
those	  who	  were	  left	  with	  only	  a	  dubiously	  marketable	  automotive	  “heritage.”	  Mott	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
discussion	  of	  Mott	  and	  the	  founding	  of	  the	  Mott	  Foundation,	  see	  Highsmith,	  Demolition	  
Means	  Progress.	  
61	  The	  relationship	  between	  Pittsburgh	  and	  the	  Carnegie	  fortune,	  for	  example,	  is	  in	  many	  
ways	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  Flint	  and	  Mott.	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himself	  was	  more	  cautious	  about	  the	  final	  version	  of	  AutoWorld,	  though	  his	  
business	  conservative	  viewpoint	  remained	  unchanged.	  “We	  aren’t	  going	  to	  go	  ahead	  
with	  something	  that’s	  doomed	  even	  before	  the	  start,”	  he	  said	  in	  1982,	  when	  the	  
Foundation	  for	  which	  he	  still	  served	  as	  a	  trustee	  was	  split	  on	  its	  support	  for	  the	  
project.	  “It’s	  a	  worthwhile	  attempt,	  but	  it	  would	  not	  be	  right	  for	  the	  community	  if	  it’s	  
not	  going	  to	  work	  out.”62	  As	  it	  turned	  out,	  AutoWorld	  did	  not	  “work	  out,”	  closing	  
after	  only	  nine	  months	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  attendance,	  and	  it	  was,	  just	  as	  some	  trustees	  
feared,	  “not	  right	  for	  the	  community.”	  	  
It	  perhaps	  illustrates	  the	  difference	  between	  Harding	  Mott	  and	  an	  earlier	  
generation	  of	  industrialists,	  more	  secure	  in	  their	  claims	  to	  power	  that,	  when	  he	  told	  
his	  father	  C.S.	  Mott	  in	  1970	  of	  his	  idea	  to	  enshrine	  the	  industry’s	  contributions	  in	  
institutional	  form,	  the	  elder	  Mott	  was	  not	  impressed.	  Then	  in	  his	  90s,	  the	  father	  
scoffed,	  “I	  don’t	  need	  that.”63	  While	  the	  elder	  Mott	  certainly	  disliked	  attempts	  to	  
monumentalize	  him	  personally,	  there	  is	  also	  the	  suggestion	  of	  a	  generation	  gap	  in	  
his	  reaction,	  informed	  by	  a	  different	  relationship	  to	  his	  own	  power,	  and	  his	  
unfamiliarity	  with	  the	  impulse	  to	  use	  something	  like	  a	  cultural	  institution	  to	  
respond	  to	  anxieties	  over	  the	  image	  of	  big	  business.	  “What	  in	  the	  world	  would	  you	  
need	  that	  for?”	  the	  two–time	  former	  Flint	  mayor	  seems	  to	  ask.	  “Don’t	  you	  know	  
you’re	  already	  in	  charge?”	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  Graham,	  David	  V.	  “AutoWorld	  Flops:	  The	  Flint	  Journal	  Presents:	  Journal	  of	  the	  Twentieth	  
Century.”	  AutoWorld	  Flops:	  The	  Flint	  Journal	  Presents:	  Journal	  of	  the	  Twentieth	  Century.	  The	  
Flint	  Journal,	  n.d.	  Web.	  17	  Mar.	  2013.	  
63	  “The	  Road	  to	  AutoWorld:	  The	  Project	  Started	  with	  a	  Chance	  Remark	  and	  Rode	  Over	  
Hurdles	  Into	  High	  Gear.”	  The	  Flint	  Journal	  22	  June	  1980.	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   Dovetailing	  neatly	  with	  this	  deeply	  felt,	  culturally	  based	  backlash	  was	  a	  long–
term	  effort	  on	  the	  part	  of	  business	  conservatives	  to	  advance	  a	  vision	  for	  America’s	  
cities	  that	  would	  place	  the	  best	  and	  only	  real	  solution	  to	  urban	  problems—problems	  
that	  only	  seemed	  to	  grow	  more	  serious	  as	  decades	  passed—in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  
private	  sector,	  and	  away	  from	  New	  Deal–style	  federal	  government	  intervention.	  As	  
historian	  Nicholas	  Dagen	  Bloom	  argues,	  American	  businessmen	  were	  eager	  to	  
provide	  free–market	  solutions	  to	  urban	  problems	  at	  the	  dawn	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  in	  
response	  to	  European	  nation–states’	  socialist	  strategies	  for	  rebuilding	  their	  own	  
cities.	  “Business	  ideology,	  with	  its	  emphasis	  on	  cutthroat	  management,	  profit	  
creation,	  self–help,	  and	  low	  taxation,	  gained	  remarkable	  strength	  exclusively	  in	  the	  
United	  States	  as	  the	  best	  approach	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  long–standing	  and	  complex	  urban	  
problems,”	  he	  writes.	  “Businessmen,	  or	  at	  least	  the	  most	  idealistic	  among	  them	  …	  
sought	  a	  perfectly	  managed	  vision	  of	  capitalism	  that	  could,	  with	  only	  a	  delicate	  
amount	  of	  government	  money,	  create	  a	  uniformly	  impressive	  urban	  civilization.”64	  
In	  fact,	  Bloom	  argues,	  business	  leaders	  took	  on	  urban	  improvement	  and	  
revitalization	  projects	  in	  the	  postwar	  period	  largely	  to	  avoid	  the	  perceived	  need	  for	  
federal	  involvement—in	  this	  context,	  business	  working	  in	  partnership	  with	  local	  
and	  state	  governments	  was	  the	  conservative,	  anti–New	  Deal	  option,	  and,	  as	  
developer	  James	  Rouse	  stated	  on	  several	  occasions,	  “It’s	  conservative	  to	  be	  radical	  
in	  giving	  powers	  to	  local	  government.	  Unless	  we	  give	  the	  power	  to	  local	  government	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  Dagen	  Bloom,	  Merchant	  of	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  Rouse,	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to	  take	  the	  action	  necessary	  to	  solve	  the	  problems,	  we	  are	  creating	  a	  demand	  for	  the	  
power	  of	  federal	  government	  to—that	  gets	  beyond	  their	  control.”65	  	  
This	  business	  conservative	  philosophy	  also	  celebrates	  the	  public/private	  
partnership	  as	  the	  most	  efficient	  way	  to	  solve	  America’s	  urban	  problems,	  not	  only	  
because	  it	  is	  the	  properly	  conservative	  approach,	  but	  because	  the	  power	  of	  local	  
governments—the	  comparatively	  more	  desirable	  “small	  government”	  in	  
conservative	  terms—is	  seen	  as	  more	  easily	  bent	  to	  the	  will	  of	  business	  interests.	  
This,	  it	  is	  implied,	  is	  how	  change	  will	  actually	  happen.	  Though	  Rouse	  articulated	  this	  
view	  as	  early	  as	  the	  late	  1950s,	  the	  deterioration	  of	  both	  material	  conditions	  in,	  and	  
broader	  public	  sentiment	  concerning	  the	  state	  of,	  deindustrializing	  “Rust	  Belt”	  cities	  
in	  the	  late	  1970s	  gave	  new	  import	  to	  private–sector–based	  solutions.	  Furthermore,	  
the	  turn	  toward	  neoliberal	  economic	  policies	  in	  this	  same	  period,	  which	  accelerated	  
under	  the	  Reagan	  administration,	  promoted	  business	  conservative	  approaches	  to	  
urban	  revitalization	  as	  the	  new	  “common	  sense”	  in	  saving	  cities	  from	  failed	  New	  
Deal–era	  interventions.	  James	  Rouse,	  although	  part	  of	  a	  decades–long	  tradition	  of	  
antistatist	  activism,	  and	  hardly	  alone	  in	  his	  views,	  became	  emblematic	  of	  the	  
businessman	  as	  urban	  savior.	  The	  creation	  of	  his	  Enterprise	  Foundation	  in	  1982,	  a	  
private–sector	  institution	  designed	  to	  develop	  urban	  revitalization	  projects	  with	  
only	  minimal	  government	  involvement,	  “made	  Rouse	  a	  darling	  of	  politicians,	  both	  
Democrats	  and	  Republicans,	  throughout	  the	  country.	  The	  vacuum	  created	  by	  the	  
Reagan,	  Bush,	  and	  Clinton	  administrations’	  destruction	  of	  national	  housing	  
programs	  and	  social	  welfare	  was	  partly	  filled	  with	  Rouse’s	  vision	  of	  private	  sector	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solutions.”66	  Rouse’s	  business	  conservative	  philosophies,	  though	  hardly	  unique,	  
served	  a	  national	  neoliberal	  agenda	  so	  neatly	  that	  he	  was	  awarded	  a	  Presidential	  
Medal	  of	  Freedom	  in	  1995	  for	  his	  contributions	  to	  public	  life.	  Furthermore,	  Rouse	  is	  
a	  crucial	  figure	  in	  linking	  a	  longer	  tradition	  of	  business	  conservatism	  to	  the	  
neoliberal	  turn	  of	  the	  late	  1970s	  through	  culturally–based	  approaches	  to	  urban	  
revitalization—beginning	  in	  the	  mid–1970s,	  his	  trademark	  “Festival	  Marketplaces”	  
with	  their	  mix	  of	  shopping,	  entertainment,	  locally–flavored	  “heritage,”	  and	  attention	  
to	  middle–class	  consumer	  comfort	  became	  a	  go–to	  model	  for	  cities	  from	  Baltimore	  
to	  New	  York	  to	  Toledo	  to	  inject	  life	  into	  depressed	  city	  centers.	  	  
More	  broadly,	  the	  neoliberal	  model	  of	  public/private	  partnerships	  became	  
celebrated	  and	  naturalized	  by	  officials	  at	  all	  levels	  as	  the	  “common	  sense”	  solution	  
for	  saving	  troubled	  American	  cities	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  80s,	  signaling	  a	  new	  
relationship	  between	  capital	  and	  government.	  Struggling	  local	  governments,	  now	  
characterized	  as	  failed,	  inefficient	  relics	  of	  a	  Keynsian	  welfare	  state,	  cooperated	  with	  
and	  even	  behaved	  as	  private	  businesses	  in	  order	  to	  adapt	  and	  survive.67	  In	  the	  
absence	  of	  federal	  support,	  and	  in	  the	  face	  of	  increasingly	  mobile	  corporate	  capital,	  
local	  governments	  became	  entrepreneurial,	  pursuing	  strategies	  to	  transform	  and	  
revitalize	  local	  economies	  hand–in–hand	  with	  private	  funding	  sources.	  
Which	  brings	  us	  back	  to	  Cleveland,	  Flint,	  and	  the	  quotations	  that	  began	  this	  
chapter.	  Cleveland	  under	  Mayor	  Kucinich	  in	  1978	  is	  a	  textbook	  case	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  
city’s	  predicament,	  as	  banks	  rather	  than	  elected	  officials	  were	  dictating	  public	  policy	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  Ibid.	  90.	  
67	  see	  Hackworth,	  The	  Neoliberal	  City:	  Governance,	  Ideology,	  and	  Development	  in	  American	  
Urbanism.	  26.	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decisions,	  threatening	  the	  city	  with	  default	  unless	  local	  government	  accepted	  the	  
privatization	  of	  public	  services.	  But	  this	  does	  not	  exactly	  illuminate	  the	  more	  
complex	  operations	  of	  power	  at	  play	  in	  Flint,	  where	  the	  city	  leveraged	  significant	  
public	  money	  to	  make	  the	  Mott	  Foundation’s	  shrine	  to	  business	  a	  reality.	  Business	  
leaders	  and	  Mott	  Foundation	  officials	  wrote	  letters	  to	  both	  the	  Mayor	  and	  President	  
Reagan,	  asking	  for	  recognition	  of	  the	  impressive	  public/private	  partnership	  that	  
made	  AutoWorld	  a	  reality.	  The	  Mayor,	  business	  leaders,	  and	  the	  Mott	  Foundation	  all	  
made	  requests	  that	  Reagan	  speak	  at	  the	  opening	  of	  AutoWorld,	  in	  appeals	  that	  
highlighted	  the	  public/private	  partnership	  that	  made	  AutoWorld	  happen	  as	  
evidence	  of	  Flint’s	  status	  as	  a	  responsible	  neoliberal	  citizen.	  And	  though	  Reagan	  
didn’t	  ultimately	  speak	  at	  the	  opening,	  he	  sent	  a	  letter	  to	  be	  read,	  affirming	  that	  the	  
arrangement	  had	  his	  blessing,	  and	  that	  this	  was	  a	  way	  forward	  for	  the	  nation’s	  
troubled	  cities.	  Yet	  all	  of	  these	  scripts	  were	  almost	  formalities,	  since	  Everyone	  
involved	  already	  understood	  what	  was	  expected	  of	  each	  actor,	  and	  what	  types	  of	  
action	  were	  legitimate	  strategies	  for	  revitalization.	  AutoWorld	  was	  touted	  by	  
officials	  and	  by	  the	  press	  as	  a	  “unique	  partnership”	  between	  public	  and	  private	  
investment,	  and	  the	  baffling	  complexity	  of	  its	  funding	  structure	  seen	  as	  a	  comforting	  
stamp	  of	  legitimacy.	  When	  Senator	  Riegle	  said	  “[AutoWorld]	  is	  a	  perfect	  example	  of	  
how	  government,	  business,	  and	  most	  importantly	  a	  community,	  can	  work	  together	  
for	  a	  better	  future,”	  did	  “the	  community”	  actually	  have	  a	  place	  besides	  accepting	  the	  
only	  option	  offered?	  Did	  government	  have	  a	  role	  other	  than	  as	  an	  arm	  of	  the	  Mott	  
Foundation’s	  business–conservative	  agenda?	  In	  Cleveland,	  why	  was	  Dennis	  
Kucinich	  seen	  as	  a	  failure,	  and	  the	  Rock	  and	  Roll	  Hall	  of	  Fame	  a	  savior?	  These	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questions	  not	  only	  illustrate	  the	  neoliberal	  turn	  in	  American	  cities,	  and	  how	  it	  
specifically	  structured	  “Rust	  Belt”	  revitalization	  efforts,	  but	  also	  allow	  us	  to	  draw	  
together	  the	  seemingly	  disparate	  economic,	  political,	  and	  cultural	  dimensions	  of	  that	  
turn.	  	  
	  
The	  Endless	  Urban	  Marketplace	  
In	  a	  city,	  you	  ought	  to	  be	  able	  to	  buy	  chocolate–covered	  spinach	  or	  fried	  marbles	  if	  
you	  want	  to.	  
	   —Richard	  Stein,	  Market	  Center	  Development	  Corp.,	  	  
	   	   Baltimore68	  
	  
The	   commercial	   core	   has	   become	   the	   billboard	   of	   neoliberal	   governance	   in	  
American	  cities,	  mega–projects	  the	  featured	  product.	  
	   —Jason	  Hackworth,	  The	  Neoliberal	  City	  
	  
	  
The	  vision	  laid	  out	  by	  Richard	  Stein	  above	  is	  at	  once	  age–old	  and	  profoundly	  
of	  the	  moment	  (that	  moment	  being	  1983).	  The	  idea	  of	  urban	  centers	  as	  a	  bazaar	  of	  
goods	  was	  nothing	  new.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  Baltimore,	  however—or	  indeed	  of	  Detroit,	  
whose	  daily	  newspaper	  printed	  this	  quotation	  as	  an	  introduction	  to	  a	  story	  on	  
primarily	  Rust	  Belt	  downtown	  retail—it	  illustrates	  the	  anxieties	  and	  possibilities	  
envisioned	  by	  these	  former	  industrial	  cities	  for	  transforming	  themselves	  at	  a	  
moment	  of	  economic	  and	  cultural	  transition.	  This	  vision	  imagines	  the	  purpose	  of	  a	  
city—that	  is,	  what	  and	  whom	  a	  city	  is	  for—as	  an	  endless	  marketplace,	  existing	  to	  
provide	  consumers	  with	  whatever	  they	  might	  desire,	  however	  ridiculous,	  and	  to	  
offer	  it	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  so	  unique	  and	  total	  that	  it	  will	  draw	  these	  consumers	  from	  as	  
far	  and	  wide	  as	  is	  possible.	  Furthermore,	  this	  statement	  suggests	  an	  explanation	  for	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  Betsey.	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just	  what	  was	  wrong	  with	  cities	  like	  Baltimore—or,	  again,	  Detroit—and	  why	  they	  
were	  in	  such	  desperate	  need	  of	  reinvention.	  The	  implication	  is	  that	  these	  cities	  have	  
so	  far	  failed	  entirely	  in	  the	  mission	  of	  meeting	  consumer	  demand,	  not	  in	  what	  they	  
make—or,	  in	  most	  cases,	  made—but	  in	  what	  they	  are.	  To	  be	  a	  “real”	  city,	  in	  other	  
words,	  is	  to	  be	  a	  unique,	  entrepreneurial,	  and	  completely	  available	  landscape	  of	  
exciting	  shopping	  and	  entertainment	  choices	  for	  middle–class	  consumers.	  Although	  
cities	  have	  always	  been	  some	  combination	  of	  community	  and	  marketplace,	  and	  
never	  purely	  egalitarian	  public	  spaces,	  this	  new	  emphasis	  on	  the	  city	  itself,	  and	  
more	  importantly	  the	  image	  of	  the	  city,	  as	  a	  consumable	  and	  marketable	  product	  
illuminates	  the	  neoliberal	  shift	  that	  structured	  Rust	  Belt	  urban	  revitalization	  
strategies	  in	  late	  70s	  and	  early	  80s.	  
	   The	  private	  sector	  clearly	  had	  a	  material	  and	  philosophical	  stake	  in	  strategies	  
that	  prioritized	  market	  solutions	  over	  direct	  government	  intervention	  and/or	  aid,	  
but	  such	  strategies	  were	  also	  clearly	  put	  forth	  by	  other	  major	  actors	  in	  urban	  
revitalization	  at	  this	  time,	  including	  philanthropic	  foundations.	  In	  their	  1983	  annual	  
report,	  the	  C.S.	  Mott	  Foundation	  clearly	  articulates	  their	  position	  on	  the	  changing	  
role	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  philanthropic	  foundations	  in	  the	  revitalization	  of	  
distressed	  urban	  centers,	  especially	  in	  the	  struggling	  Midwestern	  Rust	  Belt.	  In	  the	  
narrative	  portion	  of	  the	  annual	  report,	  which	  is	  traditionally	  the	  place	  where	  the	  
Foundation	  conveys	  the	  overall	  theme	  of	  their	  funding	  priorities	  for	  that	  year	  (titled	  
“The	  Rebuilding	  of	  America”	  for	  1983),	  they	  go	  so	  far	  as	  to	  begin	  by	  quoting	  a	  
favorite	  neoliberal	  proverb	  and	  celebrating	  its	  “universal”	  implications:	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Give	  a	  hungry	  man	  a	   fish	  and	  he	  will	  be	   satisfied	   for	   the	  whole	  day.	  
Teach	   him	   how	   to	   fish	   and	   he	   will	   never	   be	   hungry	   again.	   That	  
proverb,	  with	   its	   theme	  of	   self–sufficiency,	   is	   finding	  an	   increasingly	  
receptive	   audience	   among	   those	   concerned	   about	   the	   conditions	   of	  
life	   facing	   many	   Americans.	   There	   is	   growing	   agreement	   that	  
facilitating	  and	  accelerating	  the	  development	  of	  the	  US	  economy	  may	  
be	  the	  most	  effective	  way	  of	  addressing	  many	  of	  the	  problems,	  social	  
as	  well	  as	  economic,	  facing	  the	  country.69	  
	  
Claiming	  support	  for	  this	  “growing	  agreement”—meaning,	  presumably,	  the	  
rightward–shifting	  consensus	  of	  the	  Reagan	  era—on	  how	  to	  best	  fix	  social	  
problems,	  the	  strong	  positioning	  of	  philanthropy	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  is	  
not	  exactly	  surprising,	  especially	  given	  the	  industrial	  roots	  of	  the	  Mott	  Foundation	  
and	  other	  similar	  institutions,	  but	  it	  nevertheless	  illustrates	  the	  increasingly	  
dominant	  neoliberal	  framework	  of	  market–based	  solutions	  for	  urban	  problems	  that	  
had	  become	  the	  new	  “common	  sense”	  by	  the	  early	  1980s.	  Again,	  private	  sector	  
involvement	  in	  urban	  development	  was	  not	  a	  radically	  new	  phenomenon	  in	  the	  
early	  1980s,	  but	  the	  terms	  in	  which	  solutions	  were	  proposed	  by	  the	  private	  sector,	  
government,	  and	  non–profit/philanthropic	  institutions—and	  the	  “public/private	  
partnerships”	  proposed	  and	  advanced	  by	  all	  of	  them—were	  specific	  to	  this	  moment.	  
Solutions	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  former	  industrial	  cities,	  for	  example,	  were	  explicitly	  set	  
against	  what	  was	  characterized	  as	  the	  obvious	  failure	  of	  government	  programs	  from	  
the	  1960s,	  placing	  new	  “common	  sense”	  market–based	  solutions	  in	  stark	  contrast	  
with	  New	  Deal	  and	  Great	  Society	  models	  of	  urban	  revitalization	  and	  aid.	  It	  is	  worth	  
quoting	  the	  Mott	  Foundation	  annual	  report	  at	  length	  on	  this	  point:	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Similarly,	   the	   social	   welfare	   programs	   launched	   to	   improve	   the	  
economic	   and	   social	   conditions	   of	   the	   disadvantaged	   face	   sharp	  
constraints	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  have	  a	   lasting	   impact.	  Since	  the	  1960s,	  
vast	  sums	  have	  been	  spent	  to	  provide	  new	  housing,	  improved	  medical	  
care,	  and	  a	  better	  standard	  of	  living	  for	  the	  poor.	  Yet	  these	  programs	  
are	   now	   perceived	   as	   dangerously	   addictive	   for	   many	   of	   the	  
beneficiaries,	   trapping	   the	  poor	   in	  a	   culture	  of	  dependency.	  Families	  
that	  know	  only	  welfare	  cannot	  easily	  teach	  their	  children	  about	  work	  
or	  encourage	  them	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  economy.	  
	  
In	  light	  of	  these	  trends,	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  American	  welfare	  debate	  have	  
changed	   markedly	   since	   the	   1960s,	   when	   many	   argued	   that	   an	  
affluent	  nation	  could	  afford	  to	  sustain	  its	  poorest	  members	  in	  dignity	  
and	  a	  measure	  of	  comfort	  through	  government–administered	  transfer	  
payments.	  Significantly,	  minority	  leaders	  have	  become	  the	  most	  vocal	  
critics	   of	   the	   dependency	   and	   despair	   that	   the	  welfare	   system	  often	  
breeds,	   but	   they	   are	   hardly	   alone.	   Increasingly,	   there	   is	   broad	  
agreement	   that	   welfare	   exacts	   a	   toll	   on	   its	   recipients	   as	   well	   as	   on	  
those	  who	  pay	  for	  it,	  and	  there	  is	  growing	  consensus	  that	  places	  a	  high	  
value	   on	   the	   economic	   and	   psychological	   values	   of	   having	   a	   regular	  
job	  and	  a	  regular	  paycheck.70	  	  
	  
Aside	  from	  reproducing	  the	  racially	  and	  sexually	  loaded	  language	  of	  Reagan	  
conservatism	  on	  welfare	  (welfare	  as	  “addictive,”	  and	  as	  “breeding”	  problematic	  
behavior;	  Black	  women	  as	  deviant,	  immoral,	  and	  irresponsible),	  and	  despite	  the	  fact	  
that	  it	  is	  the	  stated	  mission	  of	  the	  Foundation	  to	  improve	  the	  quality	  of	  life	  for	  the	  
disadvantaged,	  the	  solution	  proposed	  by	  the	  Mott	  Foundation	  to	  what	  was	  
“generally	  agreed”	  as	  the	  “failed”	  policies	  of	  the	  1960s	  is	  clearly	  laid	  out	  in	  this	  
narrative,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  their	  funding	  priorities:	  to	  stimulate	  the	  private	  sector	  to	  
create	  jobs	  where	  industrial	  work	  has	  disappeared.	  Specifically,	  they	  suggest	  “a	  
‘public/private	  partnership’	  involving	  a	  variety	  of	  American	  institutions”	  to	  provide	  
a	  business–friendly	  climate	  that	  will	  ultimately	  encourage	  the	  formation	  of	  new	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  Ibid.	  10.	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economic	  development.71	  The	  public/private	  partnership,	  specifically	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  
neoliberal	  growth	  and	  revitalization	  to	  combat	  a	  dismal	  history	  of	  excessive	  
government	  intervention,	  is	  posited	  here	  by	  the	  Mott	  Foundation	  as	  a	  central	  and	  
defining	  feature	  of	  the	  strategy	  to	  finally	  turn	  distressed	  cities	  around.	  	  
	   In	  some	  ways,	  institutions	  like	  the	  Mott	  Foundation	  were	  not	  purely	  
ideological,	  but	  were	  perhaps	  simply	  reacting	  to	  the	  political	  reality	  of	  the	  Reagan	  
administration,	  and	  its	  antipathy	  toward	  federal	  support	  for	  urban	  centers,	  and	  
especially	  toward	  Democratically	  leaning,	  labor–friendly	  strongholds	  of	  the	  
Northeast	  and	  Midwest.	  Under	  Reagan,	  the	  goal	  of	  national	  policy	  was	  
fundamentally	  reoriented	  toward	  encouraging	  the	  “development	  of	  private	  
institutions	  conducive	  to	  individual	  responsibility	  and	  initiative,”	  and,	  as	  Bruce	  
Schulman	  has	  noted,	  business	  assumed	  “much	  more	  responsibility	  not	  just	  for	  the	  
economic	  but	  for	  social	  and	  cultural	  life	  as	  well.”72	  Cutbacks	  in	  appropriations	  to	  
cities	  during	  the	  Reagan	  administration—which	  began	  even	  earlier	  under	  Carter,	  
but	  accelerated	  dramatically	  beginning	  in	  1980—also	  forced	  urban	  mayors	  and	  
others	  involved	  in	  revitalization	  to	  look	  toward	  a	  “new	  localism”	  that	  shifted	  the	  
burden	  for	  development	  and	  economic	  activity	  to	  state	  and	  local	  governments	  and	  
public/private	  partnership	  arrangements,	  ultimately	  pitting	  struggling	  cities	  against	  
each	  other	  in	  bidding	  wars	  using	  tax	  abatements	  and	  incentives	  in	  attempts	  to	  
attract	  economic	  activity.73	  Non–profit	  foundations,	  however,	  presumably	  still	  had	  a	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  Ibid.	  11.	  
72	  Schulman,	  Bruce	  J.	  The	  Seventies:	  The	  Great	  Shift	  in	  American	  Culture,	  Society,	  and	  Politics.	  
New	  York:	  Free,	  2001.	  230.	  
73	  see	  Times,	  John	  Herbers,	  Special	  To	  The	  New	  York.	  “MAYORS	  STRESS	  'NEW	  LOCALISM'	  IN	  
REBUILDING	  CITIES.”	  The	  New	  York	  Times.	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  York	  Times,	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basic	  mission	  to	  remain	  in	  troubled	  communities	  and	  to	  foster	  positive	  change—the	  
conflicted	  nature	  of	  this	  mission	  can	  be	  easily	  seen	  in	  the	  contradictory	  list	  of	  
organizations	  that	  received	  Mott	  Foundation	  funding	  in	  1982,	  which	  included	  both	  
James	  Rouse’s	  Enterprise	  Foundation	  (which	  promoted	  market–based	  urban	  
revitalization)	  and	  the	  National	  Congress	  for	  Community	  Economic	  Development	  
(which	  worked	  to	  fill	  the	  gap	  “caused	  by	  the	  reduction	  in	  federal	  funding	  for	  
economic	  development”).74	  	  These	  contractions	  also	  illustrate	  how	  influential	  the	  
neoliberal	  framework	  had	  become	  in	  discussions	  at	  multiple	  levels	  about	  what	  was	  
seen	  as	  possible	  and	  desirable	  in	  terms	  of	  revitalization	  and	  development.	  Explicitly	  
referencing	  the	  constraints	  within	  which	  cities	  and	  institutions	  found	  themselves	  
forced	  to	  work,	  the	  Mott	  Foundation	  even	  recognized	  that,	  “As	  federal	  support	  for	  
many	  activities	  ceases	  to	  grow,	  non–profit	  organizations	  have	  a	  responsibility	  to	  
their	  constituents	  to	  develop	  alternative	  means	  of	  sustaining	  themselves	  and	  their	  
work.”75	  Almost	  immediately	  following	  this	  recognition,	  however,	  the	  Foundation	  
defines	  a	  role	  for	  itself	  in	  the	  same	  market–based	  terms,	  arguing	  that	  “the	  nation’s	  
great	  foundations	  can	  almost	  invariably	  trace	  their	  histories	  back	  to	  a	  single	  
entrepreneur	  and	  the	  growth	  of	  a	  major	  corporation.	  They	  would	  do	  well	  to	  help	  the	  
wheel	  turn	  full	  circle	  by	  using	  the	  fruits	  of	  those	  earlier	  entrepreneurial	  successes	  to	  
help	  spawn	  new	  enterprises.”	  Community	  support	  and	  urban	  development	  is	  thus	  
defined	  as	  a	  closed	  business	  circuit,	  with	  the	  philanthropic	  organization	  as	  venture	  
capitalist.	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  Steeltown	  U.S.A.,	  231.;	  Harvey,	  The	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  of	  
Postmodernity.	  
74	  C.	  S.	  Mott	  Foundation	  Annual	  Report.	  Publication.	  Flint:	  C.	  S.	  Mott	  Foundation,	  1982.	  88.	  
75	  C.	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  Foundation	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  Publication.	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  Foundation,	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   The	  specific	  history	  of	  the	  Mott	  Foundation	  intersects	  with	  the	  broader	  
history	  of	  philanthropic	  organizations	  in	  important	  ways.	  In	  1963,	  Charles	  Stewart	  
Mott	  gave	  the	  bulk	  of	  his	  vast	  assets	  to	  the	  Foundation,	  multiplying	  the	  
organization’s	  already	  considerable	  power	  for	  grant–making	  and	  giving,	  and	  putting	  
it	  on	  the	  path	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  top	  fifteen	  philanthropic	  organizations	  in	  the	  country	  
based	  on	  assets.	  Already	  heavily	  involved	  in	  shaping	  the	  Flint	  public	  school	  system,	  
the	  organization	  expanded	  their	  reach	  and	  scope	  while	  maintaining	  a	  general	  
charitable	  mission	  that	  allowed	  it	  to	  adapt	  to	  funding	  priorities	  as	  it	  saw	  fit;	  in	  the	  
late	  1960s	  and	  into	  the	  1970s,	  the	  Mott	  Foundation	  took	  an	  increasingly	  active	  
interest	  in	  addressing	  Flint’s	  “urban	  crisis.”76	  	  	  	  
Other	  powerful	  non–profit	  organizations	  were	  also	  developing	  and	  
promoting	  neoliberal	  urban	  revitalization	  strategies	  based	  in	  public/private	  
partnerships	  and	  market–based	  frameworks.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  clear	  trend	  of	  
declining	  federal	  support,	  the	  Ford	  Foundation	  produced	  an	  influential	  discussion	  
paper	  in	  1979	  titled	  “Communities	  and	  Neighborhoods:	  A	  Possible	  Private	  Sector	  
Initiative	  for	  the	  1980s,”	  which	  called	  for	  a	  new	  strategy	  for	  funding	  Community	  
Development	  Corporations	  with	  a	  combination	  of	  public	  and	  private	  sources,	  and	  
which	  established	  the	  Local	  Initiatives	  Support	  Corporation	  (LISC)	  later	  the	  same	  
year.77	  LISC,	  along	  with	  Rouse’s	  Enterprise	  Foundation	  and	  the	  Mott	  Foundation,	  
were,	  according	  to	  Mott	  Program	  Officer	  Rob	  Collier,	  all	  key	  parts	  of	  an	  emerging	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  For	  an	  extensive	  discussion	  of	  the	  Mott	  Foundation’s	  role	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  schools	  as	  well	  as	  other	  
arean	  in	  this	  era,	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  Highsmith,	  Andrew.	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  Means	  Progress:	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  Class,	  and	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Deconstruction	  of	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  Dream	  in	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  University	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77	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  Roland	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  intermediary	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  Building	  the	  
Organizations	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model	  for	  urban	  development	  in	  cities	  like	  Flint	  in	  the	  late	  70s	  and	  early	  80s,	  based	  
in	  the	  neoliberal	  public/private	  partnership.78	  
While	  they	  shared	  a	  common	  framework,	  what	  these	  revitalization	  strategies	  
looked	  like	  “on	  the	  ground”	  of	  course	  varied.	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  at	  length	  in	  the	  
following	  chapter,	  it	  was	  not	  uncommon	  for	  projects	  funded	  by	  these	  philanthropic	  
organizations,	  in	  partnership	  with	  private	  stakeholders,	  to	  focus	  on	  image	  
transformation	  and/or	  quasi–therapeutic	  goals.	  For	  example,	  one	  project	  in	  South	  
Bend,	  Indiana	  was	  extensively	  profiled	  in	  the	  Mott	  Foundation	  annual	  report	  from	  
1984.	  The	  South	  Bend	  Heritage	  Foundation,	  a	  group	  dedicated	  to	  “halting	  physical,	  
economic	  and	  social	  decline	  in	  several	  inner	  city	  neighborhoods”—as	  well	  as	  
managing	  real	  estate	  in	  these	  neighborhoods	  by	  marshaling	  both	  public	  and	  private	  
funds—had	  taken	  over	  management	  of	  an	  arts	  and	  education	  center	  called	  the	  
Colfax	  Cultural	  Center,	  and	  the	  Mott	  Foundation	  was	  supporting	  their	  efforts.	  South	  
Bend	  was	  once	  a	  thriving	  industrial	  town,	  home	  to	  the	  Studebaker	  automotive	  
corporation	  among	  others,	  but	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  it	  was	  suffering	  the	  effects	  of	  
deindustrialization	  like	  many	  Rust	  Belt	  cities—the	  workforce	  of	  the	  largest	  
employer	  in	  town	  had	  dwindled	  from	  20,000	  to	  about	  4,500	  by	  1984.	  The	  Mott	  
Foundation	  saw	  funding	  organizations	  like	  the	  South	  Bend	  Heritage	  Foundation	  as	  
important	  because,	  according	  to	  the	  grant	  profile,	  “revitalizing	  neighborhood	  spirits	  
is	  as	  important	  as	  refurbishing	  structures.	  And	  the	  Colfax	  Cultural	  Center	  neatly	  
serves	  that	  purpose.”79	  Furthermore,	  the	  profile	  is	  titled,	  “South	  Bend,	  Indiana:	  
Revitalizing	  Spirits	  as	  Well	  as	  Structures.”	  While	  not	  directly	  funding	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  Collier,	  Robert.	  Telephone	  interview.	  Dec.	  2012.	  
79	  C.	  S.	  Mott	  Foundation	  Annual	  Report.	  Publication.	  Flint:	  C.	  S.	  Mott	  Foundation,	  1984:	  30	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entrepreneurial	  venture,	  this	  funding	  priority—so	  appealing	  to	  the	  Mott	  Foundation	  
that	  it	  warrants	  its	  own	  narrative	  section	  in	  their	  annual	  report—reveals	  the	  
multilayered	  relationship	  between	  the	  economic	  and	  the	  cultural	  spheres	  of	  
neoliberalism.	  At	  a	  time	  when	  union–wage	  industrial	  work,	  and	  the	  peripheral	  
industries	  surrounding	  it,	  that	  had	  built	  and	  sustained	  what	  were	  now	  becoming	  
Rust	  Belt	  cities	  were	  disappearing,	  the	  focus	  of	  redevelopment	  strategies	  often	  
shifted	  toward	  a	  self–help	  model	  of	  esteem–building	  projects	  that	  would	  essentially	  
make	  revitalization	  an	  individual	  task	  in	  which	  each	  citizen	  could	  take	  responsibility	  
for	  their	  own	  attitude,	  thereby	  transforming	  community	  spirit	  in	  the	  process—
revitalizing	  spirits	  was,	  in	  this	  model,	  a	  goal	  in	  itself,	  meant	  to	  generate	  material	  
change.	  
AutoWorld	  was	  certainly	  a	  project	  dedicated	  to	  revitalizing	  the	  spirits	  of	  Flint	  
at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  effects	  of	  deindustrialization	  were	  becoming	  increasingly	  acute,	  
but	  it	  combined	  its	  therapeutic	  goals	  with	  image	  restoration,	  economic	  
transformation,	  and	  downtown	  redevelopment	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  make	  it	  a	  perfect	  
storm	  of	  neoliberal	  revitalization	  strategies.	  Again,	  the	  AutoWorld	  concept	  was	  born	  
out	  of	  the	  Mott	  Foundation,	  and	  Mott’s	  guiding	  support	  for	  the	  project	  brought	  it	  to	  
fruition	  (and	  would	  ultimately	  demolish	  its	  abandoned	  shell).	  As	  a	  “mega–project”	  
par	  excellence,	  AutoWorld	  expanded	  into	  the	  role	  of	  all–purpose	  savior	  for	  the	  
struggling	  city	  of	  Flint,	  an	  investment	  in	  scale	  and	  spectacle	  to	  combat	  Flint’s	  myriad	  
problems—big	  problems,	  logic	  dictated,	  called	  for	  big,	  bold	  solutions.	  As	  Jason	  
Hackworth	  argues	  specifically	  about	  AutoWorld,	  it	  was	  indeed	  a	  thoroughly	  
neoliberal	  project	  and	  was	  furthermore	  not	  anomalous	  in	  the	  annals	  of	  city	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government	  in	  the	  1980s.80	  He	  explains	  that	  projects	  such	  as	  AutoWorld	  “can	  be	  
considered	  neoliberal	  not	  least	  because	  they	  entail	  a	  turn	  toward	  the	  market	  to	  
solve	  social	  problems	  in	  particular	  regions,	  and	  also	  because	  they	  involve	  a	  
significant	  privatization	  of	  publicly	  held	  land	  or	  resources	  to	  reach	  completion.”81	  
AutoWorld	  relied	  not	  solely	  on	  Mott	  Foundation	  money,	  but	  on	  a	  complex	  
web	  of	  funding	  that	  was	  in	  fact	  reliant	  on	  extensive	  public	  resources—for	  which	  a	  
potentially	  tourist–friendly	  mega–project	  was	  deemed	  by	  private	  and	  philanthropic	  
interests	  to	  be	  the	  best	  use.	  The	  financial	  arrangement	  for	  AutoWorld,	  however,	  was	  
notoriously	  complex	  and	  even	  inscrutable,	  and	  accounts	  of	  the	  funding	  details	  
changed	  from	  year	  to	  year,	  and	  sometimes	  from	  account	  to	  account	  (Figs.	  4	  and	  5).	  
This	  is	  perhaps	  because	  there	  were	  undoubtedly	  sound	  criticisms	  offered	  for	  the	  use	  
of	  public	  funds,	  among	  other	  things—G.	  Bridget	  Ryan,	  president	  of	  the	  Historic	  Flint	  
AutoWorld	  Foundation,	  consistently	  declined	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  project’s	  financing	  
details	  to	  the	  media.	  This	  is	  perhaps	  also	  in	  part	  because	  of	  the	  inherently	  complex	  
nature	  of	  the	  public/private	  partnerships	  under	  which	  AutoWorld	  operated,	  and	  the	  
labyrinth	  of	  legal	  entities	  those	  partnerships	  created.	  For	  example,	  AutoWorld	  itself	  
was	  a	  for–profit	  venture,	  but	  was	  controlled	  in	  the	  development	  stages	  by	  the	  Mott–
created	  non–profit	  “Historical	  Flint	  AutoWorld	  Foundation,”	  not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  
the	  group	  of	  private	  investors	  called	  “AutoWorld	  Associates	  Inc.,”	  who	  would	  own	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  Hackworth	  mistakenly	  identifies	  AutoWorld	  as	  a	  
James	  Rouse-­‐managed	  project,	  which	  it	  was	  not.	  I	  would	  also	  argue	  against	  his	  reading	  of	  
AutoWorld	  as	  simply	  a	  “bread	  and	  circus”	  distraction	  from	  “real”	  economic	  issues.	  	  
81	  Hackworth,	  The	  Neoliberal	  City:	  Governance,	  Ideology,	  and	  Development	  in	  American	  
Urbanism.	  151.	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most	  of	  the	  building	  in	  partnership	  with	  the	  non–profit	  Flint	  Renaissance	  group.	  As	  
the	  Detroit	  Free	  Press	  reported	  in	  July	  1983,	  	  
Lawyers	  who	  drew	  up	  the	  AutoWorld	  financing	  agreement	  said	  it	  was	  
the	   most	   complex	   financial	   deal	   they	   had	   ever	   seen.	   The	   closing	  
supposedly	  involved	  500,000	  sheets	  of	  paper.	  
	  
“This	  project	  almost	  beat	  us,”	  said	  one	  city	  official	  who	  worked	  on	  the	  
package.	  
	  
The	   financing	   involves	   a	   complex	  mix	   of	   private	   and	   public	  monies.	  
AutoWorld	  will	  cost	  about	  $63	  million,	  which	   interest	  payments	  will	  
push	  that	  into	  at	  least	  $70	  millon.82	  	  
	  
This	  complex	  arrangement	  was	  celebrated,	  however,	  by	  the	  project’s	  partners	  and	  
supporters,	  as	  exemplary	  of	  a	  new	  funding	  model	  that	  would	  ultimately	  save	  Flint	  
and	  finally	  “make	  things	  happen.”	  A	  hallmark	  of	  legitimacy,	  the	  financing	  structure	  
also	  had	  the	  crucial	  sheen	  of	  private–sector	  stability	  and	  innovation.	  The	  for–profit	  
Downtown	  Development	  Authority	  (who	  in	  2013	  almost	  completely	  controls	  Flint	  
downtown	  affairs)	  was	  proud	  enough	  of	  their	  role	  to	  declare	  in	  their	  own	  1983	  
annual	  report:	  
The	  AutoWorld	  project	   is	   innovative	   in	   two	  significant	  respects:	   it	   is	  
the	   first	  major	   urban	   indoor	   entertainment	   of	   its	   kind	   in	   the	  world,	  
and	  it	  is	  supported	  by	  a	  unique	  and	  complex	  financing	  package.	  
	  
The	   package	   involves	   one	   of	   the	   most	   intricate	   combination	   of	  
participants	   and	   requirements	   ever.	   The	   Downtown	   Development	  
Authority	   Participated	   with	   the	   C.S.	   Mott	   Foundation,	   private	  
investors,	  private	   contributors,	   a	  non–profit	   foundation	  and	   the	  city,	  
county,	   state	   and	   federal	   governments	   to	   develop	   a	   financial	  
arrangement	  satisfying	  the	  objectives	  of	  every	  one	  of	  the	  participants.	  	  
	  
Mott	  Foundation	  head	  William	  S.	  White	  expressed	  the	  same	  sentiment	  with	  a	  bit	  
more	  concern,	  saying,	  “I’ve	  never	  seen	  such	  a	  complex	  project,	  in	  terms	  of	  financing.	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  Christoff,	  Chris.	  “AutoWorld:	  A	  Car	  City	  Will	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  the	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  Detroit	  Free	  Press	  24	  July	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It	  could	  fall	  apart	  at	  any	  time.”83	  Ultimately	  though,	  as	  the	  Flint	  Journal	  reassured	  its	  
readers	  in	  1984,	  “the	  financing	  was	  successful	  and,	  more	  important,	  it	  was	  a	  success	  
for	  a	  unique	  public–private	  partnership	  aimed	  at	  revitalizing	  downtown	  Flint.”84	  In	  
short,	  the	  enormous	  complexity	  and	  scale	  of	  this	  cutting–edge	  revitalization	  strategy	  
was	  intended	  to	  communicate	  comfort	  to	  the	  general	  public,	  in	  large	  part	  because	  of	  
the	  entrepreneurial	  stakes	  and	  business	  experience	  being	  injected	  into	  the	  funding	  
mix—a	  comfort	  enhanced	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  public’s	  financial	  stake	  was	  effectively	  
obscured	  by	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  funding	  structure	  itself,	  thereby	  further	  
minimizing	  the	  perceived	  risks	  of	  such	  an	  arrangement.	  
	   And	  what	  was	  the	  public’s	  financial	  stake	  in	  AutoWorld?	  In	  the	  most	  simple	  
breakdown	  of	  the	  financing	  structure,	  $6.5	  million	  was	  to	  come	  from	  the	  City	  of	  
Flint’s	  sale	  of	  tax	  increment	  bonds,	  and	  $7.5	  million	  from	  the	  sale	  of	  revenue	  bonds,	  
a	  sum	  roughly	  equal	  to	  the	  Mott	  Foundation’s	  direct	  initial	  investment	  of	  $11	  million	  
in	  grants	  and	  a	  $2.4	  million	  land	  lease—a	  commitment	  from	  Mott	  that	  would	  
continue	  to	  grow	  as	  the	  project	  progressed,	  to	  a	  total	  of	  about	  $31.6	  million	  by	  
opening	  day	  on	  July	  4,	  1984.85	  Public	  funds,	  supposedly	  proven	  ineffective	  if	  used	  
for	  New	  Deal/Great	  Society–style	  aide	  programs	  and	  investment,	  were	  now	  seen	  as	  
having	  the	  most	  impact	  when	  combined	  with	  private	  investment	  toward	  
entrepreneurial	  and	  market–based	  projects.	  There	  was	  criticism,	  particularly	  from	  
mayoral	  candidates	  looking	  to	  challenge	  sitting	  Mayor	  Jim	  Rutherford,	  who	  was	  a	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  “AutoWorld	  Would	  Not	  Exist	  without	  Mott	  Foundation	  Aid.”	  The	  Flint	  Journal	  24	  June	  
1984:	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  Christoff,	  Chris.	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loyal	  supporter	  of	  the	  Mott	  Foundation’s	  vision.	  City	  Councilman	  Chester	  Simmons	  
advanced	  an	  argument	  based	  on	  the	  very	  real	  concern	  that	  projects	  like	  this	  came	  at	  
the	  expense	  of	  support	  for	  African	  American	  communities	  and	  business,	  long	  
neglected	  by	  city	  governments	  both	  in	  Flint	  and	  throughout	  the	  Rust	  Belt.	  Calling	  
AutoWorld	  a	  “pie–in–the–sky	  monument,”	  Simmons	  expressed	  frustrations	  that	  
existed	  among	  the	  city’s	  Black	  residents,	  who	  by	  then	  made	  up	  45%	  of	  Flint’s	  
population.	  Another	  candidate,	  former	  Flint	  ombudsman	  Joseph	  Dupcza,	  opposed	  
the	  use	  of	  public	  money	  for	  private	  projects	  in	  general,	  presciently	  saying	  that	  if	  
AutoWorld	  were	  to	  fail	  (which	  it	  did	  almost	  immediately)	  the	  city	  would	  be	  
responsible	  for	  paying	  off	  the	  $6.5	  million	  in	  general	  obligation	  bonds	  sold	  by	  the	  
Flint	  Downtown	  Development	  Authority.	  “The	  investors	  have	  nothing	  to	  lose,”	  
Dupcza	  said.	  “The	  city	  does.”86	  Dissenting	  voices	  were	  rarely	  reported	  by	  a	  
positivity–centered	  local	  media,	  however,	  and	  were	  dismissed	  publicly	  as	  having	  the	  
“wrong	  attitude”	  on	  revitalization,	  and	  as	  ultimately	  being	  part	  of	  the	  city’s	  
problems—Mayor	  Rutherford	  himself	  responded	  to	  critics	  by	  labeling	  them	  “those	  
negative	  doomsday	  people.”87	  	  
	   The	  role	  of	  those	  private	  investors	  who	  had	  nothing	  to	  lose	  is	  crucial	  in	  
understanding	  the	  power	  of	  public/private	  partnerships,	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  
such	  partnerships	  blur	  political	  authority	  and	  economic	  power,	  on	  the	  national	  level	  
as	  well	  as	  the	  local.	  Although	  private–sector	  fundraising	  was	  generally	  
disappointing,	  a	  private	  investment	  firm	  ultimately	  did	  provide	  $9.5	  million	  of	  their	  
clients’	  money	  toward	  AutoWorld’s	  financing.	  This	  investor	  money	  was	  then	  used	  to	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leverage	  millions	  of	  dollars	  in	  federal	  funds,	  as	  the	  presence	  of	  private	  support	  was	  
the	  element	  most	  attractive	  within	  the	  Reagan	  administration’s	  neoliberal	  ideal	  of	  
market–friendly	  self–sufficiency.	  As	  the	  Flint	  Journal	  reported,	  “The	  investors	  were	  
attracted	  by	  tax	  benefits	  primarily	  generated	  by	  the	  rehabilitation	  of	  a	  historic	  
structure—the	  IMA	  Auditorium—in	  which	  part	  of	  AutoWorld	  is	  housed	  and	  by	  
depreciation	  benefits.”88	  Here,	  we	  see	  that	  in	  neoliberal	  strategies	  of	  revitalization,	  
what	  is	  most	  critical,	  and	  what	  will	  produce	  results—in	  terms	  of	  both	  access	  to	  
federal	  support,	  and	  also	  theoretically	  success	  in	  revitalization—is	  the	  presence	  of	  
financial	  stakeholders	  who	  are	  able	  to	  see	  a	  struggling	  city	  as	  a	  sound	  investment	  
opportunity,	  ideally	  without	  necessarily	  having	  any	  particular	  interest	  in	  the	  social	  
ramifications	  of	  the	  proposed	  project.	  The	  consensus	  on	  the	  part	  of	  local	  
government,	  the	  non–profit	  sector,	  and	  the	  business	  community	  regarding	  exactly	  
what	  was	  expected	  of	  Flint	  in	  its	  revitalization	  to	  become	  a	  model	  neoliberal	  city,	  
and	  to	  be	  recognized	  as	  such	  on	  a	  national	  scale,	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  letters	  sent	  to	  
President	  Reagan	  requesting	  his	  presence	  to	  speak	  at	  AutoWorld’s	  grand	  opening.	  
“AutoWorld	  has	  been	  funded	  through	  a	  unique	  blend	  of	  local,	  state,	  federal	  and	  
philanthropic	  funding	  as	  well	  as	  private	  investment,”	  new	  mayor	  James	  Sharp,	  Jr.	  
wrote	  in	  his	  letter	  to	  the	  White	  House.	  “Soon	  this	  city	  that	  has	  had	  to	  battle	  with	  so	  
many	  obstacles,	  will	  be	  receiving	  national	  attention,	  because	  of	  the	  numerous	  
progressive	  changes	  it	  will	  be	  making	  in	  the	  future.”89	  The	  General	  Motors	  
Corporation,	  itself	  a	  significant	  source	  of	  funding	  to	  AutoWorld,	  was	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  “AutoWorld	  Would	  Not	  Exist	  without	  Mott	  Foundation	  Aid.”	  The	  Flint	  Journal	  24	  June	  
1984:	  71.	  
89	  Sharp,	  James	  A.	  Letter	  to	  Ronald	  Reagan.	  13	  Mar.	  1984.	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  Sloan	  Archives,	  Flint,	  
Michigan.	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straightforward	  in	  its	  ambitions	  for	  a	  Presidential	  appearance:	  “We	  are	  hopeful	  the	  
President	  will	  be	  able	  to	  comment	  (10	  to	  20	  minutes)	  on	  AutoWorld	  as	  a	  prime	  
example	  of	  a	  private	  sector/public	  sector	  partnership,	  used	  to	  diversify	  the	  
economy	  of	  a	  major	  industrial	  city	  which	  has	  experienced	  very	  high	  unemployment	  
in	  the	  recent	  past.”90	  There	  is	  a	  noticeable	  lack	  of	  elaboration	  here	  on	  General	  
Motors’	  role	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  cause	  of	  Flint’s	  “very	  high	  unemployment.”	  	  
	   Just	  as	  crucial	  to	  AutoWorld,	  and	  countless	  urban	  revitalization	  projects	  in	  
other	  cities,	  were	  federal	  Urban	  Development	  Action	  Grants	  (UDAGs).	  Created	  in	  
1977	  by	  the	  Carter	  administration	  as	  part	  of	  its	  comprehensive	  urban	  policy	  
initiatives,	  UDAGs	  were	  designed	  to	  provide	  funding	  for	  struggling	  cities	  to	  
undertake	  significant	  redevelopment	  projects	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  increasing	  shrinking	  
tax	  bases	  and	  providing	  avenues	  toward	  fiscal	  recovery.	  Although	  technically	  
available	  to	  cities	  nationwide,	  UDAGs	  were	  aimed	  primarily	  at	  the	  Rust	  Belt	  cities	  
that	  were	  experiencing	  financial	  crises	  en	  masse	  in	  the	  late	  1970s.	  While	  UDAGs	  
were	  a	  significant	  source	  of	  federal	  support	  for	  urban	  areas	  at	  a	  time	  when	  such	  
support	  was	  generally	  in	  decline,	  they	  were	  also	  very	  much	  an	  early	  vehicle	  for	  
neoliberal	  strategies	  of	  revitalization.	  At	  their	  most	  basic	  level,	  UDAGs	  represented	  a	  
shift	  away	  from	  federally	  funded	  and	  administered	  urban	  programs	  in	  the	  mold	  of	  
the	  Great	  Society,	  and	  toward	  the	  market–driven,	  private–sector–oriented	  solutions	  
that	  would	  become	  increasingly	  dominant	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  following	  decade	  
and	  beyond.	  Requirements	  for	  UDAG	  awards	  explicitly	  favored	  market–based	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  Relations	  Staff	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  Manager	  Kenneth	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  to	  Anthony	  
DeLorenzo.	  Cameron,	  Kenneth.	  Letter	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revitalization	  projects,	  as	  private	  investment	  funds	  had	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  funding	  
equation	  for	  cities	  to	  leverage	  federal	  money.	  In	  this	  way,	  public/private	  
partnerships	  were	  not	  only	  favored,	  but	  mandated,	  leaving	  struggling	  cities	  more	  or	  
less	  at	  the	  mercy	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  when	  it	  came	  to	  the	  types	  of	  revitalization	  
projects	  that	  were	  possible.	  Although	  not	  exactly	  popular	  with	  the	  Reagan	  
administration	  once	  it	  came	  to	  power,	  the	  UDAG	  program	  was	  continued	  through	  
the	  1980,	  although	  it	  experienced	  steady	  cuts	  and	  the	  almost	  constant	  threat	  of	  
elimination	  during	  that	  time.	  Just	  months	  after	  AutoWorld’s	  grand	  opening	  in	  1984,	  
and	  in	  the	  face	  of	  possible	  elimination	  of	  the	  UDAG	  program	  during	  a	  post–re–
election	  round	  of	  federal	  budget	  cutting,	  the	  Flint	  Journal	  reported	  on	  the	  significant	  
role	  of	  UDAG	  support	  in	  Flint’s	  recent	  revitalization	  efforts.	  Not	  only	  did	  AutoWorld	  
itself	  receive	  $8.6	  million	  in	  UDAGs,	  but	  the	  Hyatt	  Hotel	  built	  to	  lodge	  expected	  
AutoWorld	  visitors	  received	  $6.5	  million;	  Water	  Street	  Pavilion,	  Flint’s	  James	  
Rouse–designed	  Festival	  Marketplace,	  received	  $3.5	  million;	  Windmill	  Place,	  an	  
enclosed	  downtown	  shopping	  center,	  received	  $731,000;	  and	  other	  projects	  in	  the	  
city	  had	  received	  $34.8	  million	  in	  total	  UDAGs	  since	  1979.	  All	  of	  these	  projects	  used	  
private	  investment	  dollars	  along	  with	  public	  funds	  to	  leverage	  federal	  support.	  
Anxieties	  over	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  UDAG	  program	  in	  the	  mid–1980s	  were	  high,	  
however	  and,	  as	  Flint’s	  community	  development	  director	  Kathryn	  Stoughton	  
explained,	  “The	  Southwest	  states	  claim	  they	  aren’t	  getting	  their	  share	  of	  the	  
UDAGs.”91	  Besides	  exacerbating	  the	  divide	  between	  the	  “Rust	  Belt”	  and	  the	  “Sun	  
Belt,”	  this	  made	  political	  sense	  to	  Reagan,	  who	  drew	  much	  more	  support	  from	  the	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  Graham,	  David	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  Journal	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Southwest	  and	  West	  than	  from	  the	  traditionally	  pro–union	  industrial	  Northeast	  and	  
Midwest—whose	  urban	  areas	  were	  particularly	  in	  need	  of	  financial	  support,	  and	  
which	  had	  taken	  greatest	  advantage	  of	  that	  support,	  whether	  it	  came	  with	  neoliberal	  
strings	  attached	  or	  not.	  Director	  Stoughton	  goes	  on	  to	  put	  the	  rationale	  for	  
elimination	  more	  bluntly:	  although	  the	  UDAG	  program	  was	  in	  many	  ways	  pro–
business	  conservative,	  “The	  administration	  wants	  to	  kill	  it	  because	  it	  thinks	  this	  
[redevelopment]	  is	  something	  the	  states	  ought	  to	  do.”92	  	  
	   Michigan’s	  US	  Senators	  Donald	  Riegle	  and	  Dale	  Kildee	  first	  announced	  the	  
$8.6	  million	  UDAG	  grant	  to	  support	  AutoWorld—the	  full	  amount	  that	  Flint	  officials	  
sought—in	  October	  1980.	  This	  was	  unusual	  at	  the	  time	  for	  several	  reasons,	  not	  the	  
least	  of	  which	  was	  what	  seemed	  like	  a	  radically	  elastic	  interpretation	  of	  HUD	  
mission—after	  all,	  AutoWorld	  was	  explicitly	  defined	  in	  the	  grant	  proposal	  as	  a	  
“theme	  park.”	  In	  fact,	  this	  was	  the	  first	  grant	  ever	  given	  by	  the	  Department	  for	  a	  
project	  of	  this	  kind,	  essentially	  placing	  building	  a	  theme	  park	  on	  par	  with	  building	  
low–cost	  housing.	  In	  addition,	  HUD	  would	  provide	  significant	  support	  for	  
AutoWorld	  outside	  the	  UDAG	  program	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  $4.5	  million	  Section	  108	  loan	  
guarantee.	  Riegle	  suggested	  that	  “Flint	  having	  the	  highest	  unemployment	  rate	  in	  the	  
country	  because	  of	  the	  slump	  in	  auto	  sales	  probably	  helped	  get	  the	  grant.”93	  Flint	  
was	  to	  be	  a	  national	  test	  case	  for	  this	  new	  type	  of	  urban	  revitalization,	  and	  there	  was	  
excitement	  and	  high	  hopes	  on	  both	  sides,	  especially	  with	  the	  clear	  recognition	  that	  
this	  had	  simply	  not	  been	  done	  before.	  Riegle	  acknowledged	  that	  “getting	  the	  action	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  Ibid.	  	  
93	  Gustin,	  Lawrence	  R.	  “Grant	  Virtually	  Assures	  AutoWorld.”	  The	  Flint	  Journal	  3	  Oct.	  1980,	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grant	  was	  difficult	  because	  a	  theme	  park	  is	  such	  a	  novel	  use	  for	  a	  federal	  grant,”	  
especially	  in	  the	  last	  month	  before	  the	  1980	  election	  that	  would	  bring	  Ronald	  
Reagan	  to	  power.	  “HUD	  granted	  the	  full	  amount,”	  Riegle	  continued,	  “because	  it	  
wants	  to	  make	  sure	  its	  first	  use	  of	  such	  a	  grant	  will	  be	  successful.	  This	  project	  is	  
crucial	  to	  Flint	  and	  it	  could	  be	  a	  HUD	  national	  showcase.”94	  
	   In	  AutoWorld,	  HUD	  saw	  an	  opportunity	  to	  display	  the	  power	  of	  market–
based	  solutions	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  market	  failure,	  i.e.	  deindustrialization,	  financial	  
crisis	  and	  the	  attending	  social	  disintegration.	  What	  seemed	  to	  be	  an	  unusual	  funding	  
target	  actually	  made	  perfect	  neoliberal	  sense—a	  theme	  park	  that	  could	  transform	  
the	  economy	  of	  a	  textbook	  “company	  town”	  once	  the	  company	  moved	  on	  to	  the	  
greener	  pastures	  of	  cheaper	  labor,	  and	  turn	  a	  profit	  for	  investors,	  all	  with	  less	  
government	  intervention.	  The	  fact	  that	  AutoWorld	  failed	  to	  do	  any	  of	  these	  things,	  
instead	  of	  invalidating	  the	  proposed	  model,	  perhaps	  only	  served	  to	  reinforce	  a	  
broader	  neoliberal	  logic	  of	  regional	  identity,	  and	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  cities	  were	  
emerging	  as	  losers	  in	  the	  national	  competition	  for	  tourists	  and	  service	  jobs	  were	  
suffering	  because	  they	  could	  or	  would	  not	  adapt	  to	  the	  new	  realities	  of	  urban	  
economy.	  	  
	   In	  hindsight,	  after	  AutoWorld’s	  dramatic	  failure,	  there	  seemed	  to	  be	  a	  
consensus	  that	  the	  strategy	  was	  either	  (a)	  interesting	  but	  fundamentally	  misguided,	  
or	  (b)	  obviously	  doomed	  from	  the	  beginning,	  even	  if	  no	  one	  involved	  could	  see	  it	  at	  
the	  time,	  blinded	  as	  they	  were	  by	  admirably	  foolish	  optimism.	  There	  was	  some	  
public	  outcry	  in	  the	  immediate	  aftermath—a	  special	  section	  of	  the	  Flint	  Journal	  ran	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a	  full	  page	  story	  in	  February	  1985,	  when	  the	  park	  closed	  its	  doors	  just	  six	  months	  
after	  the	  grand	  opening,	  detailing	  the	  range	  of	  reader	  responses	  they	  got	  to	  the	  
question	  of	  “what	  about	  AutoWorld?”	  One	  respondent,	  Albert	  Mansour	  of	  Flint,	  
offered	  these	  thoughts:	  
I	  agree	  with	  Flint’s	  Ombudsman	  James	  D.	  Ananich,	  who	  said	  ‘the	  Mott	  
Foundation	   suckered	   the	   city	   into	   building	   this	   monument	   to	  
someone,	   and	   they	   should	   pick	   up	   the	   tab.	  …	  Millions	   of	   federal	   tax	  
dollars	  went	   into	  AutoWorld,	  and	  Mayor	  James	  Sharp	  is	  going	  to	  ask	  
for	   more	   tax	   money	   for	   “a	   major	   redevelopment.”	   A	   recent	   news	  
report	  stated	  GM	  is	  going	  to	  spend	  $5	  billion	  on	  a	  new	  plant,	  and	  $2.5	  
billion	   of	   that	   amount	  will	   be	   a	   tax	  writeoff.	   Probably	   another	   $100	  
million	  or	  so	  will	  be	  written	  off	  by	  the	  state	  in	  which	  the	  plant	  will	  be	  
built.	  At	  this	  rate	  AutoWorld	  Associates	  and	  GM	  should	  be	  home	  free	  
after	  they	  sucker	  us	  taxpayers,	  as	  we	  pick	  up	  the	  tab	  for	  them.	  
	  
Here,	  we	  see	  not	  just	  a	  critique	  of	  one	  particular	  project,	  but	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  model	  
that	  subsidizes	  private	  development	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  public	  resources.	  In	  a	  sense,	  
Mansour	  suggests,	  there	  is	  very	  little	  functional	  difference	  between	  a	  theme	  park	  
and	  a	  manufacturing	  plant,	  since	  the	  possibilities	  for	  development	  cost	  the	  public	  
the	  same	  in	  any	  case,	  with	  very	  little	  chance	  of	  a	  real	  return	  on	  investment	  (unlike	  
the	  private	  sector,	  which	  will	  certainly	  reap	  some	  reward).	  In	  the	  end,	  however,	  
critiques	  like	  this	  one	  had	  little	  impact—”those	  negative	  doomsday	  people,”	  as	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“Out-­‐Rocking”	  the	  Competition	  
	  
[The	  decision	  to	  base	  the	  Rock	  and	  Roll	  Hall	  of	  Fame	  Museum	  in	  Cleveland]	  means	  
that	  Cleveland	  is	  alive	  and	  well	  and	  has	  a	  future,	  and	  it’s	  hep	  and	  has	  a	  great	  appeal	  
to	  a	  lot	  of	  younger	  people.	  
—Cleveland	  Mayor	  George	  Voinovich,	  198695	  
	  
	  
	   Cleveland	  in	  the	  1980s	  was	  anything	  but	  “hep.”	  The	  city	  had	  experienced	  
problems	  similar	  to	  those	  faced	  by	  other	  deindustrializing	  Rust	  Belt	  cities	  since	  at	  
least	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  pervious	  decade,	  including	  population	  loss,	  increases	  in	  
crime,	  a	  dismal	  national	  image,	  and	  staggering	  job	  loss.	  Metropolitan	  Cleveland	  had	  
seen	  manufacturing	  jobs	  decline,	  gone	  from	  employing	  two	  out	  of	  every	  three	  
workers	  in	  the	  more	  robust	  1940s,	  to	  just	  one	  out	  of	  three	  by	  the	  1980s.96	  Local	  
business	  and	  political	  leaders	  were	  desperate	  for	  ways	  to	  replace	  lost	  
manufacturing	  jobs,	  rebuild	  a	  tax	  base	  stretched	  thin	  by	  population	  loss,	  and	  
reignite	  some	  kind	  of	  excitement	  to	  “rebuild	  the	  spirits”	  of	  current	  and	  potential	  
Cleveland	  residents.	  According	  to	  Bruce	  Conforth,	  the	  first	  curator	  of	  the	  Rock	  and	  
Roll	  Hall	  of	  Fame,	  Cleveland	  in	  many	  ways	  saw	  Baltimore	  and	  its	  successful	  James	  
Rouse–developed	  “Festival	  Marketplace,”	  Harborplace,	  as	  a	  viable	  model	  for	  
revitalization.97	  This	  was	  a	  feeling	  shared	  by	  many	  Rust	  Belt	  cities	  that	  saw	  
Baltimore	  seemingly	  transform	  itself	  from	  depressed	  deindustrialized	  urban	  center	  
into	  a	  celebrated	  national	  icon	  of	  market–driven,	  tourist–based	  development.	  Not	  
only	  would	  a	  tourist	  destination	  ostensibly	  create	  jobs	  (primarily	  low–wage	  service	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  Landsberg,	  Mitchell.	  “Cleveland	  Picked	  for	  Rock	  Hall	  of	  Fame.”	  Associated	  Press	  5	  May	  
1986	  
96	  Frieden	  and	  Sagalyn,	  Downtown,	  Inc.:	  How	  America	  Rebuilds	  Cities,	  287.	  
97	  Conforth,	  Bruce.	  Personal	  interview.	  12	  Dec.	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jobs,	  but	  jobs	  nonetheless),	  tourism	  neatly	  fit	  a	  neoliberal	  logic	  of	  healthy	  
competition	  between	  destinations	  and	  an	  appealing	  self–reliance—after	  all,	  what	  
was	  a	  successful	  tourist	  destination	  but	  a	  self–made	  industry	  based	  on	  the	  attractive	  
individual	  character	  of	  the	  location?	  So	  when	  the	  recently	  formed	  Rock	  and	  Roll	  Hall	  
of	  Fame	  began	  to	  look	  for	  a	  permanent	  institutional	  home	  in	  1985,	  Cleveland	  went	  
to	  work.	  
	   	  	  When	  the	  Rock	  and	  Roll	  Hall	  of	  Fame	  was	  founded	  in	  1983,	  primarily	  by	  
Atlantic	  Records	  co–founder	  Ahmet	  Ertegun	  and	  Rolling	  Stone	  magazine’s	  Jann	  
Wenner,	  it	  was	  essentially	  placeless	  for	  the	  first	  three	  years	  of	  inductee	  selection	  
and	  even	  its	  first	  “all–star	  jam,”	  except	  for	  a	  conceptual	  home	  in	  New	  York	  City.	  
Seeing	  an	  opportunity	  for	  a	  unique	  tourist	  attraction	  and	  motivated	  by	  a	  
desperation	  to	  revitalize	  the	  city,	  Cleveland	  business	  and	  political	  leaders,	  in	  
conjunction	  with	  local	  media,	  mobilized	  a	  campaign	  in	  August	  1985	  to	  gather	  
660,000	  signatures	  in	  one	  month	  for	  a	  petition	  to	  locate	  the	  Hall	  of	  Fame	  Museum	  in	  
Cleveland.	  Early	  the	  next	  year,	  after	  a	  scouting	  visit	  from	  the	  Hall	  of	  Fame	  
Foundation,	  Cleveland	  residents	  swamped	  telephone	  lines	  responding	  to	  a	  USA	  
Today	  reader	  opinion	  poll	  on	  where	  the	  museum	  should	  be	  located.	  Cleveland	  
outpolled	  all	  the	  other	  cities	  combined	  by	  about	  5–1,	  with	  110,315	  calls	  in	  its	  favor.	  
This	  allowed	  Ohio	  Governor	  Richard	  Celeste	  to	  announce	  at	  the	  official	  press	  
conference	  naming	  Cleveland	  the	  official	  home	  of	  the	  future	  Hall	  of	  Fame	  Museum	  
that	  the	  decision	  “was	  irresistible	  because	  of	  the	  cooperation	  of	  the	  tremendous	  
outpouring	  of	  support	  for	  rock	  'n'	  roll	  that's	  been	  here	  since	  the	  day	  the	  phrase	  was	  
first	  coined	  right	  here,”	  and	  the	  Associated	  Press	  to	  argue	  that	  “Cleveland,	  which	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claims	  to	  be	  the	  birthplace	  of	  rock	  'n'	  roll,	  won	  the	  board's	  approval	  over	  arch–rivals	  
Philadelphia	  and	  Chicago	  by	  simply	  out–rocking	  them.”	  The	  general	  support	  for	  the	  
Hall	  of	  Fame	  or	  rock	  and	  roll	  in	  general,	  and	  the	  great	  outpouring	  of	  enthusiasm	  
from	  the	  people	  of	  Cleveland	  was	  over	  and	  over	  again	  used	  as	  the	  most	  convincing	  
evidence	  for	  the	  Foundation’s	  decision,	  which	  only	  further	  illustrates	  the	  
dependence	  of	  neoliberal	  strategies	  of	  revitalization	  on	  the	  shifting	  of	  public	  
attention	  toward	  individualized	  issues	  of	  “attitude”	  (or	  in	  this	  case,	  a	  positive,	  can–
do,	  “rocking”	  outlook)	  on	  the	  part	  of	  citizens,	  and	  away	  from	  the	  complex	  play	  of	  
capital	  at	  work—or	  a	  conscious	  statement	  on	  the	  part	  of	  distressed	  cities	  and	  their	  
residents	  advertising	  a	  willingness	  to	  submit	  to	  the	  desires	  of	  business	  in	  exchange	  
for	  choosing	  them	  over	  other	  possible	  locations.	  
Beyond	  the	  serviceable	  but	  generally	  flimsy	  rationale	  that	  Cleveland	  coined	  
the	  term	  “rock	  and	  roll”—true,	  DJ	  Alan	  Freed	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  rock	  
history,	  but	  certainly	  no	  more	  so	  than	  any	  other	  figure	  that	  Philadelphia	  or	  Chicago	  
could	  claim—the	  “community	  support”	  story	  rang	  hollow	  almost	  immediately.	  
According	  to	  Conforth,	  “The	  only	  reason	  Cleveland	  got	  it	  was	  for	  the	  financial	  
package	  from	  businessmen.”98	  Mayor	  Voinovich	  himself	  went	  on	  record	  saying	  that	  
he	  didn’t	  even	  much	  care	  for	  rock	  and	  roll,	  but	  that	  clearly	  wasn’t	  at	  issue,	  any	  more	  
than	  his	  car	  preference	  would	  be	  if	  he	  were	  courting	  an	  automotive	  plant	  to	  locate	  in	  
the	  city.	  This	  was	  a	  competition	  for	  revitalization	  prestige	  and	  potential	  revenue,	  as	  
evidenced	  by	  the	  t–shirts	  that	  the	  Mayor,	  Governor	  and	  others	  wore	  at	  the	  press	  
conference	  declaring,	  “Cleveland—We	  Won”	  (Fig.	  6).	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   The	  selection	  of	  Cleveland	  for	  the	  opportunity	  to	  build	  such	  a	  potential	  
tourist	  destination	  was	  clearly	  the	  result	  of	  the	  $65	  million	  dollar	  package	  of	  public	  
and	  private	  funds	  offered	  to	  the	  Hall	  of	  Fame	  by	  city	  leaders.	  In	  addition,	  the	  funding	  
package	  included	  the	  sale	  of	  $18	  million	  in	  tax–exempt	  bonds	  towards	  the	  project.	  
The	  state	  promised	  to	  contribute	  about	  $4.4	  million,	  Cuyahoga	  County	  committed	  $5	  
million,	  and	  corporations	  and	  other	  donors	  pledged	  $7.4	  million.99	  Years	  later,	  after	  
the	  Museum	  had	  been	  established	  and	  judged	  a	  success	  by	  many,	  Ziona	  Austrian,	  
director	  of	  the	  Center	  for	  Economic	  Development	  at	  Cleveland	  State	  University's	  
Maxine	  Goodman	  Levin	  College	  of	  Urban	  Affairs,	  argued	  that	  The	  Rock	  Hall	  and	  
other	  public–private	  partnerships	  in	  downtown	  Cleveland	  had	  been	  critical	  to	  the	  
local	  economy.	  “To	  make	  our	  downtown	  into	  a	  more	  livable	  and	  enjoyable	  place,	  you	  
need	  public–private	  partnerships,”	  Austrian	  said.	  “You	  need	  unique	  attractions	  to	  
attract	  people,	  and	  the	  Rock	  Hall	  is	  definitely	  unique.	  You	  can't	  find	  it	  in	  the	  next	  
city.”100	  In	  this	  formulation,	  clearly	  the	  only	  way	  to	  survive	  as	  a	  viable	  city	  is	  to	  
“attract	  people,”	  and	  the	  only	  way	  to	  competitively	  attract	  people	  is	  through	  the	  
proven	  model	  of	  neoliberal	  public/private	  partnerships.	  
	   Interestingly,	  however,	  the	  federal	  government	  did	  not	  support	  the	  Rock	  and	  
Roll	  Hall	  of	  fame	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  they	  had	  AutoWorld	  (and	  perhaps	  precisely	  
because	  they	  had	  supported	  AutoWorld	  so	  publicly).	  In	  1989,	  questions	  arose	  as	  to	  
the	  future	  of	  the	  yet–to–be–built	  Hall	  of	  Fame	  Museum	  when	  a	  $6.9	  million	  UDAG	  
grant	  to	  help	  fund	  the	  more	  than	  $85	  million	  dollar	  total	  price	  tag	  was	  denied.	  HUD	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  Rizzo,	  Katherine.	  “No	  Hope	  From	  HUD:	  Hall	  of	  Fame	  May	  Remain	  Cleveland's	  Rock	  'N'	  Roll	  
Fantasy.”	  Associated	  Press	  13	  Oct.	  1989.	  
100	  Soeder,	  John.	  “Rock	  and	  Roll	  Hall	  of	  Fame	  and	  Museum	  Is	  Going	  Strong,	  15	  Years	  after	  
Opening.”	  Cleveland	  Plain	  Dealer	  29	  Aug.	  2010.	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Secretary	  Jack	  Kemp	  told	  the	  city,	  “My	  children	  love	  rock	  ‘n’	  roll.	  I	  love	  rock	  ‘n’	  roll.	  
But	  I	  have	  no	  discretion.	  The	  rock	  ‘n’	  roll	  museum	  is	  a	  worthwhile	  project	  for	  
Cleveland	  and	  rock	  ‘n’	  roll	  but	  it	  couldn't	  meet	  the	  criteria	  for	  a	  UDAG	  grant.”101	  
Clearly,	  Kemp’s	  enthusiasm	  for	  rock	  and	  roll	  didn’t	  translate	  into	  material	  support	  
the	  way	  that	  the	  citizens	  of	  Cleveland’s	  had,	  but	  the	  denial	  points	  to	  two	  trends:	  first,	  
the	  steady	  shift	  away	  from	  supporting	  struggling	  cities	  through	  UDAG	  grants	  in	  
general	  throughout	  the	  decade	  had	  created	  even	  more	  scarcity	  of	  federal	  funds	  than	  
existed	  earlier	  in	  the	  1980s;	  and	  second,	  neoliberal	  strategies	  of	  revitalization	  were	  
becoming	  increasingly	  dependent	  upon	  the	  “private”	  side	  of	  public/private	  
partnerships.	  Kemp	  ended	  his	  statement	  on	  the	  matter,	  addressing	  a	  clearly	  
disappointed	  Mayor,	  Governor,	  Representative	  and	  city	  by	  saying,	  “There	  is	  nothing	  
that	  I	  can	  do	  about	  the	  rock	  ‘n’	  roll	  museum	  aside	  from	  urging	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  
the	  rock	  ‘n’	  roll	  musicians	  and	  the	  music	  industry	  to	  put	  up	  some	  more	  money.”102	  	  
	   And	  that	  is	  in	  fact	  exactly	  what	  happened.	  The	  project	  was	  deemed	  too	  
important	  to	  Cleveland’s	  future	  economic	  wellbeing	  to	  lose,	  and	  widely	  understood	  
to	  be	  a	  savior	  mega–project	  for	  the	  city	  and	  its	  “best	  hope	  for	  transforming	  a	  
decaying	  riverfront	  area	  into	  a	  glistening	  tourist	  draw.”103	  	  And	  so	  to	  avoid	  
defaulting	  on	  a	  Hall	  of	  Fame	  Foundation	  deadline	  for	  securing	  funding	  before	  pulling	  
the	  project,	  the	  city's	  major	  banks	  agreed	  to	  back	  up	  private	  investor	  pledges	  with	  a	  
$7	  million	  loan	  intended	  to	  make	  up	  the	  difference	  if	  the	  major	  pledges	  didn't	  come	  
through.	  Today,	  the	  Hall	  of	  Fame	  Museum’s	  economic	  impact	  on	  the	  city	  is	  debated,	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but	  it	  remains	  open	  and	  in	  many	  ways	  a	  symbol	  of	  the	  power	  of	  public/private	  
partnerships	  and	  neoliberal	  strategies	  of	  revitalization.	  At	  issue,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  is	  
more	  than	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  Hall	  of	  Fame	  is	  a	  strictly	  financial	  success.	  Even	  as	  a	  
break-­‐even	  proposition,	  the	  terms	  of	  revitalization	  success	  are	  also	  judged	  by	  
intangible	  factors	  such	  as	  “livability	  and	  enjoyability,”	  or	  the	  simple	  ability	  to	  draw	  
people	  with	  “unique	  attractions”	  and	  perhaps	  change	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  larger	  public	  
as	  to	  what	  Cleveland	  is,	  and	  what	  it	  can	  be.	  The	  full	  dimensions	  of	  the	  therapeutic	  
and	  image-­‐changing	  aspects	  of	  these	  revitalization	  projects	  will	  be	  taken	  up	  in	  the	  
following	  chapter.	  





	   79	  
	  
	   	  




	   80	  
	  
	   	  
	  
Figures	  4	  &	  5:	  Flint	  Journal	  graphics	  attempting	  to	  detail	  some	  of	  
AutoWorld’s	  complex	  funding	  structure	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Figure	  6:	  Mayor	  George	  Voinovich	  announces	  Cleveland	  as	  the	  official	  location	  










	   	  
	  









“Positive	  Thoughts”:	  Deindustrialization,	  Personal	  Responsibility	  	  
and	  the	  Image	  of	  the	  Rust	  Belt	  
	  
	  
In	  the	  summer	  of	  2011,	  the	  voters	  of	  Detroit,	  Oregon	  were	  faced	  with	  an	  
important	  decision.	  An	  initiative	  brought	  to	  the	  ballot	  by	  business	  leaders	  of	  the	  
small	  resort	  community	  in	  Northwest	  Oregon	  asked	  voters	  to	  consider	  changing	  the	  
name	  that	  the	  town	  had	  held	  since	  1891	  to	  “Detroit	  Lake.”	  Although	  the	  town	  does	  
border	  the	  Detroit	  Lake,	  the	  catalyst	  for	  the	  proposed	  change	  was	  a	  more	  symbolic	  
one	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  local	  business	  community—as	  hotel	  owner	  Doug	  DeGeorge	  
explains,	  “the	  name	  Detroit	  doesn’t	  bring	  positive	  thoughts	  to	  anybody’s	  mind.”104	  
	   Despite	  being	  separated	  by	  more	  than	  2,000	  miles	  and	  a	  population	  
difference	  of	  more	  than	  700,000	  residents,	  business	  leaders	  were	  concerned	  that	  
the	  possible	  association	  between	  Detroit	  Lake	  and	  Detroit,	  Michigan	  would	  be	  
damaging	  to	  the	  town’s	  tourism	  industry,	  and	  that	  the	  name	  itself	  would	  be	  a	  “turn–
off”	  to	  potential	  visitors.	  The	  name	  change,	  it	  was	  argued,	  would	  “shift	  the	  mental	  
image”	  that	  the	  old	  “Detroit”	  moniker	  would	  conjure	  in	  tourists’	  minds,	  scrubbing	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104	  Lehman,	  Chris.	  "Detroit,	  Oregon	  To	  Vote	  On	  Name	  Change."	  NPR.	  NPR,	  4	  Aug.	  2011.	  Web.	  
20	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of	  the	  crumbling	  Rust	  Belt	  city’s	  “unsavory	  image”	  and	  its	  “crime,	  corruption,	  failing	  
schools	  and	  a	  shaky	  auto	  industry.”105	  	  
	   Although	  the	  measure	  was	  ultimately	  voted	  down	  by	  Detroit,	  Oregon’s	  
residents,	  the	  premise	  of	  the	  proposal—as	  well	  as	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  item	  was	  picked	  
up	  and	  reported	  by	  the	  Associated	  Press,	  National	  Public	  Radio,	  CBS	  News,	  the	  
Huffington	  Post	  and	  other	  national	  media	  outlets—poses	  deeper	  and	  more	  
important	  questions	  than	  the	  brief	  story	  may	  at	  first	  suggest.	  What’s	  in	  a	  name?	  
What	  are	  the	  ties	  between	  image	  and	  the	  “real?”	  How	  does	  a	  “mental	  image”	  impact	  
economy,	  and	  vice	  versa?	  
	   These	  are	  questions	  that	  have	  been	  asked	  by	  and	  of	  “Rust	  Belt”	  cities	  as	  they	  
have	  struggled	  to	  defend,	  define,	  and	  sometimes	  salvage	  a	  respectable—and,	  most	  
importantly,	  a	  marketable—image	  within	  a	  shifting	  national	  context.	  Especially	  in	  
the	  latter	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  urban	  centers	  in	  the	  industrial	  Midwest	  and	  
Northeast	  US	  have	  experienced	  increasing	  economic	  pressures	  to	  reinvent	  
themselves	  as	  “cultural”	  destinations	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  massive	  deindustrialization,	  and	  
have	  become	  competitors	  for	  tourist	  revenue.106	  This	  competition	  has	  produced	  
both	  a	  rhetoric	  and	  a	  reality	  wherein	  a	  city’s	  image—as	  a	  “cultural	  center,”	  as	  
“desirable,”	  or	  as	  “business	  friendly”—defines	  the	  “real”	  economic	  opportunities	  
available	  to	  that	  particular	  place.	  And,	  as	  the	  business	  leaders	  of	  Detroit,	  Oregon	  
understood,	  a	  bad	  image	  (even	  if	  it’s	  a	  confused	  one)	  can	  mean	  economic	  disaster.	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  Auletta,	  Kate.	  "Detroit,	  Oregon	  Considers	  Changing	  Its	  Name	  To	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  More	  Tourists	  
(PHOTOS)."	  The	  Huffington	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106	  For	  a	  definitive	  discussion	  of	  this	  phenomenon,	  see	  Ch.	  4,	  “Postmodernism	  in	  the	  City,”	  in	  
David	  Harvey,	  The	  Condition	  of	  Postmodernity.	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There	  is	  a	  difficulty	  in	  speaking	  with	  any	  real	  specificity	  about	  the	  thing	  we	  
know	  as	  “the	  Rust	  Belt,”	  especially	  since	  there	  is	  obviously	  a	  diversity	  of	  local	  
experiences	  that	  are	  impossible	  to	  take	  account	  of	  individually.	  Chicago’s	  story	  is	  
not	  the	  same	  as	  Flint’s,	  and	  Cleveland’s	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  Gary,	  Indiana’s	  and	  so	  on.	  
This	  has	  been	  the	  challenge	  of	  thinking	  regionally	  and	  trying	  to	  make	  meaning	  out	  of	  
large,	  often	  vaguely	  defined	  geographical	  areas	  in	  US	  history.	  Rust	  Belt	  scholar	  
Steven	  High	  notes	  a	  trend	  in	  recent	  scholarship	  on	  deindustrialization	  leaning	  
toward	  the	  individual	  case	  study,	  especially	  told	  through	  oral	  history	  and/or	  
photographs	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  capture	  the	  “lost	  voices”	  of	  workers	  and	  places	  
seemingly	  left	  behind	  in	  deindustrialization’s	  wake,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  loss	  of	  regional,	  
national	  and	  broader	  historical	  meaning	  that	  accompanies	  this	  “scholarly	  penchant	  
for	  local	  community.”107	  My	  goal	  here	  is	  to	  analyze	  the	  “cultural”	  as	  economic	  (and	  
vice	  versa)	  in	  specific	  cities	  such	  as	  Flint,	  Toledo	  and	  Baltimore,	  as	  a	  way	  to	  better	  
understand	  both	  how	  the	  “Rust	  Belt”	  took	  shape	  as	  a	  discourse	  in	  the	  American	  
popular	  imagination,	  and	  how	  that	  discourse	  shaped	  real	  economic	  revitalization	  
strategies,	  and	  had	  material	  consequences	  for	  many	  people	  in	  the	  deindustrializing	  
Midwest	  and	  Northeast.	  	  
I	  use	  the	  Rust	  Belt,	  then,	  as	  an	  analytical	  framework	  that	  is	  both	  a	  discrete	  
region	  made	  up	  of	  multiple	  sites,	  and	  as	  a	  cultural	  construct	  that	  takes	  on	  new	  and	  
powerful	  material	  economic	  dimensions	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s.	  
Stretching	  from	  east	  coast	  cities	  such	  as	  Baltimore,	  Philadelphia	  and	  even	  New	  York,	  
west	  through	  Pennsylvania	  and	  upstate	  New	  York	  and	  encompassing	  the	  Great	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Lakes	  region,	  the	  Rust	  Belt	  is	  a	  phrase	  commonly	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  former	  
industrial	  and	  manufacturing	  centers	  largely	  concentrated	  in	  this	  geographic	  region,	  
all	  to	  some	  extent	  devastated	  by	  concentrated	  waves	  of	  deindustrialization.	  As	  High	  
explains	  in	  his	  Industrial	  Sunset:	  The	  Making	  of	  North	  America’s	  Rust	  Belt,	  1969–
1984,	  the	  term	  “Rust	  Belt”	  was	  born	  out	  of	  a	  culturally	  association	  of	  the	  ailing	  
industrial	  cities	  of	  the	  Midwest	  with	  the	  Great	  Depression–era	  “Dust	  Bowl,”	  as	  
evidenced	  by	  the	  interim	  term	  “Rust	  Bowl.”	  In	  the	  1970s,	  national	  media	  were	  
grasping	  for	  ways	  to	  describe	  a	  vaguely	  bounded	  but	  ultimately	  conceptual	  region	  
encompassing	  cities	  that	  were	  suffering	  similar	  economic	  and	  social	  pains.	  Attempts	  
to	  describe	  the	  apparent	  decline	  in	  this	  region	  from	  what	  was	  once	  “The	  Foundry	  of	  
the	  Nation,”	  as	  well	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  conceptually	  contrast	  this	  region	  with	  the	  
ascending	  “Sun	  Belt,”	  eventually	  coalesced	  into	  the	  phrase	  “Rust	  Belt.”108	  	  
As	  a	  cultural	  construct,	  the	  image	  of	  the	  Rust	  Belt	  is	  tied	  to	  a	  specific	  
economic	  history,	  but	  also	  expanded	  to	  fill	  the	  antagonist	  role	  in	  a	  national	  image	  
economy	  deeply	  influenced	  by	  a	  cresting	  neoliberal	  wave	  of	  New	  Deal	  order	  
backlash	  in	  the	  late	  twentieth	  century,	  in	  which	  Northern	  industrial	  centers	  were	  
becoming	  densely	  layered	  symbols	  of	  Liberal	  failure,	  especially	  on	  the	  fronts	  of	  
labor	  and	  race.	  Mike	  Royko,	  columnist	  for	  the	  Chicago	  Tribune,	  wrote	  in	  1985,	  “I	  
guess	  we	  must	  face	  sad	  reality—the	  pain	  and	  humiliation	  of	  rejection.	  A	  lot	  of	  
people	  out	  there	  just	  don’t	  like	  us.”	  He	  continues,	  
By	   “us,”	   I’m	   speaking	   as	   a	   Chicagoan.	   But	   I	   could	   just	   as	   well	   be	  
speaking	   as	   a	   resident	   of	   any	   of	   the	   big,	   old,	   Rust	   Belt,	   Snow	   Belt,	  
smokestack	  cities	  of	  America.	  Detroit,	  Cleveland,	  New	  York,	  Newark—
any	  of	  them	  …	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I	  get	  mail	  from	  all	  over	  the	  country.	  And	  oh,	  the	  things	  they	  say	  about	  
us.	   First	   of	   all,	  we	   are	   too	  black.	  Those	  who	  mention	   that	   to	  me	  are	  
usually	  talking	  about	  Chicago,	  but	  it	  applies	  to	  Detroit,	  New	  York	  and	  
most	  of	  the	  others.	  And	  we	  are	  too	  Puerto	  Rican.	  We	  are	  too	  sinful	  and	  
criminally	   inclined.	  We	  have	  too	  much	  welfare	  and	  too	  many	  babies.	  
At	   the	   same	   time	   we	   have	   too	   many	   babies,	   we	   have	   too	   much	  
abortion.	   We	   have	   too	   much	   garbage	   and	   too	   much	   political	  
corruption,	  and	  most	  of	  us	  are	  dirty,	  depraved	  and	  gritty	  and	  deserve	  
everything	  that	  happens	  to	  us—whether	  it	  is	  snow	  or	  budget	  cuts.	  
	  
Despite	  Royko’s	  trademark	  liberal	  snark,	  the	  views	  he	  is	  caricaturing	  are	  not	  
entirely	  off	  the	  mark—or	  they	  at	  least	  align	  with	  the	  common	  sense	  emerging	  out	  of	  
this	  historical	  moment,	  the	  widely	  held	  notion	  that,	  despite	  decades	  of	  migration	  to	  
cities	  in	  this	  region	  for	  a	  chance	  at	  some	  form	  of	  the	  American	  Dream	  through	  
industrial	  work,	  it	  now	  has	  nothing	  to	  offer.	  It	  has	  been	  used	  up,	  and	  any	  memory	  of	  
cities	  like	  Detroit	  or	  Cleveland	  or	  Flint	  as	  desirable,	  either	  culturally	  or	  
economically,	  is	  a	  dim	  one.	  	  
As	  a	  parallel	  analysis	  of	  the	  national	  image	  of	  cities	  in	  the	  Rust	  Belt,	  Flint	  
native	  Michael	  Moore,	  in	  his	  breakthrough	  documentary	  Roger	  &	  Me,	  dismisses	  
(without	  much	  irony)	  the	  early	  1980s	  efforts	  to	  turn	  the	  city	  into	  a	  tourist	  
destination:	  	  
I	   guess	   it	   was	   like	   expecting	   a	   million	   people	   a	   year	   to	   go	   to	   New	  
Jersey	  to	  ChemicalWorld	  or	  a	  million	  people	  going	  to	  Valdez,	  Alaska	  to	  
ExxonWorld.	  Some	  people	   just	  don’t	   like	  to	  celebrate	  human	  tragedy	  
while	  on	  vacation.109	  
	  
The	  pairing	  of	  these	  two	  quotations	  illustrates	  what	  I	  will	  argue	  are	  two	  major	  and	  
interrelated	  ways	  that	  the	  nation	  made	  meaning	  out	  of	  the	  Rust	  Belt	  in	  the	  late	  
1970s	  and	  1980s,	  and	  that	  the	  Rust	  Belt	  made	  meaning	  out	  of	  itself	  in	  the	  emerging	  
neoliberal	  political	  and	  cultural	  order.	  First,	  there	  was	  an	  increasing	  national	  sense	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that	  these	  (post)industrial	  urban	  spaces	  were	  dirty,	  dark,	  dangerous,	  and	  generally	  
undesirable.	  Second,	  Rust	  Belt	  cities	  absorbed	  this	  narrative	  and	  tried	  (often	  in	  vain)	  
to	  navigate	  revitalization	  strategies	  within	  a	  neoliberal	  framework	  of	  personal	  
responsibility,	  resilience,	  and	  economic	  flexibility.	  Image–management	  and	  image–
improvement	  was	  in	  many	  ways	  central	  to	  urban	  revitalization	  efforts	  in	  
deindustrializing	  cities	  in	  this	  period,	  and	  a	  new	  consciousness	  of	  that	  undesirable	  
regional	  image	  both	  produced	  and	  reacted	  to	  the	  developing	  conceptual	  framework	  
of	  the	  “Rust	  Belt.”	  	  
Image–consciousness	  is,	  of	  course,	  nothing	  new	  in	  the	  history	  of	  American	  
cities,	  especially	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century—boosterism,	  civic	  organizations,	  and	  
Convention	  and	  Visitors	  Bureaus	  have	  histories	  that	  long	  predate	  the	  1970s.	  Alison	  
Isenberg,	  for	  instance,	  makes	  a	  convincing	  case	  in	  her	  Downtown	  America	  about	  the	  
serious	  role	  that	  promotional	  postcards	  played	  in	  image–creation	  campaigns	  for	  
cities	  and	  towns	  in	  the	  1940s,	  playing	  with	  idealized	  views	  of	  downtown	  to	  promote	  
a	  safe,	  clean,	  business–friendly	  environment.110	  These	  were	  certainly	  attempts	  by	  
local	  business	  leaders	  and	  government	  to	  “sell”	  a	  particular	  image	  of	  a	  place,	  and	  an	  
important	  part	  of	  the	  story	  of	  twentieth–century	  urban	  development.	  I	  will	  argue,	  
however,	  that	  although	  there	  is	  a	  convergence,	  there	  are	  also	  meaningful	  differences	  
between	  the	  long	  tradition	  of	  urban	  boosterism	  and	  late	  twentieth–century	  
strategies	  for	  image	  transformation.	  “Image”	  takes	  on	  a	  specific	  meaning	  in	  the	  race	  
during	  this	  period	  to	  transform	  older	  manufacturing	  centers	  into	  differentiated,	  
“brandable”	  destinations	  in	  a	  growing	  tourist	  and	  service	  economy,	  in	  which	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shedding	  the	  symbolic	  burden	  of	  “dirty”	  factories,	  racialized	  notions	  of	  crime,	  and	  
[especially	  white]	  population	  flight	  becomes	  paramount	  in	  a	  city’s	  effort	  to	  attract	  
new	  business	  investment	  and	  tourist	  dollars.	  In	  this	  sense,	  cultural	  perception	  of	  a	  
particular	  place	  plays	  a	  vital	  material	  role	  in	  a	  city’s	  survival,	  and	  in	  determining	  its	  
chances	  in	  a	  national	  landscape	  of	  “winners”	  and	  “losers,”	  “good	  cities”	  and	  “bad	  
cities,”	  that	  became	  increasingly	  regional	  especially	  beginning	  in	  the	  mid–1970s.	  	  
Also	  specific	  to	  this	  moment	  are	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  image–consciousness	  
became	  a	  framework	  that	  shaped	  and	  shored	  up	  emerging	  neoliberal	  logics	  of	  
privatization	  and	  personal	  responsibility.111	  “Personal	  responsibility,”	  as	  it	  is	  
understood	  in	  much	  scholarship	  on	  neoliberalism,	  is	  a	  process	  of	  individuation	  and	  
social	  atomization,	  and	  is	  categorically	  opposed	  to	  collectivism	  of	  any	  kind—the	  
individual	  is	  ultimately	  responsible	  for	  his/her	  own	  conduct,	  successes,	  and	  failures,	  
in	  a	  supposedly	  free	  market	  of	  equal	  opportunity	  and	  choice.	  This	  tenet	  is	  central	  to	  
Reagan	  era	  political	  logic,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  growing	  business–friendly,	  anti–New	  Deal	  
Right	  coalition	  that	  preceded	  him	  in	  the	  1970s.	  If	  we	  apply	  these	  key	  terms	  to	  urban	  
space	  in	  the	  US,	  however,	  we	  can	  also	  usefully	  analyze	  how	  cities	  and	  regions	  come	  
to	  be	  understood—and	  to	  understand	  themselves—culturally	  and	  economically	  as	  
“good”	  or	  “bad”	  places,	  depending	  upon	  their	  success	  in	  the	  marketplace.	  In	  this	  
way,	  it	  perfectly	  serves	  a	  neoliberal	  logic	  to	  shift	  and	  fix	  a	  city’s	  economic	  fate	  based	  
on	  cultural	  notions	  of	  “attitude,”	  “pride”	  and	  “image,”	  a	  framework	  for	  assessing	  
urban	  economic	  success	  or	  failure	  that	  sharply	  distinguishes	  it	  from	  earlier	  modes	  
of	  boosterism.	  It	  also	  illuminates	  the	  new	  ways	  that	  urban	  revitalization	  came	  to	  be	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framed	  as	  each	  individual	  citizen’s	  personal	  responsibility,	  as	  campaigns,	  slogans,	  
and	  political	  rhetoric	  placed	  a	  real,	  material	  stake	  on	  “feeling	  good/proud/positive”	  
about	  the	  city,	  and	  blamed	  “naysayers”	  and	  negative	  thinking	  for	  cities’	  economic	  
plight.	  	  
By	  examining	  the	  deep	  interpenetration	  of	  the	  cultural	  and	  economic	  spheres	  
at	  work	  here,	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  understand	  this	  moment	  as	  a	  turning	  point	  in	  not	  only	  
urban	  economy,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  broader	  understanding	  of	  what	  American	  cities	  
were	  and	  what	  they	  were	  for.	  It	  also	  helps	  us	  to	  more	  fully	  understand	  the	  sense	  
that	  Mike	  Royko	  got	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country	  that	  “we	  deserve	  everything	  that	  
happens	  to	  us,”	  or	  Michael	  Moore’s	  hyperbolic	  sense	  of	  his	  own	  home	  as	  a	  tragic	  
wasteland.	  There	  is	  something	  embedded	  in	  these	  parallel	  statements,	  too,	  that	  
speaks	  to	  the	  role	  of	  “feeling”	  in	  shaping	  notions	  of	  regional	  and	  local	  image,	  and	  
more	  importantly,	  the	  materiality	  of	  affect	  at	  play	  in	  this	  historical	  moment.	  Lauren	  
Berlant’s	  concept	  of	  “cruel	  optimism”	  is	  instructive	  here	  in	  examining	  the	  linkages	  
between	  affect	  and	  “that	  moral–intimate–economic	  thing	  called	  ‘the	  good	  life,’”	  in	  
that	  a	  sense	  of	  optimism—shot	  through	  with	  a	  feeling	  of	  personal	  responsibility—
about	  attaining	  and	  maintaining	  the	  increasingly	  impossible	  postwar	  liberal	  
American	  dream	  is	  central	  to	  how	  American	  individuals,	  cities,	  and	  regions	  have	  
understood	  and	  determined	  worth	  since	  the	  1970s.	  As	  Berlant	  points	  out,	  
“Discussions	  about	  the	  contours	  and	  contents	  of	  the	  shared	  historical	  present	  are	  
therefore	  always	  profoundly	  political	  ones,	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  about	  what	  forces	  
should	  be	  considered	  responsible	  and	  what	  crises	  urgent	  in	  our	  adjudication	  of	  our	  
survival	  strategies	  and	  conceptions	  of	  a	  better	  life	  than	  what	  the	  metric	  of	  survival	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can	  supply.”	  Such	  discussions	  also	  track	  the	  “fraying	  relation	  between	  post–Second	  
World	  War	  state/economic	  practices	  and	  certain	  postwar	  fantasies	  of	  the	  good	  life	  
endemic	  to	  liberal,	  social	  democratic,	  or	  relatively	  wealthy	  regions.”112	  In	  other	  
words,	  while	  it	  became	  more	  and	  more	  structurally	  difficult	  for	  urban	  centers	  in	  the	  
Rust	  Belt	  to	  survive	  as	  model	  cities—or	  even	  respectable	  ones—in	  a	  neoliberal	  
climate	  of	  increasingly	  mobile	  capital,	  budget	  cutting,	  and	  population	  flight,	  their	  
failure	  to	  adapt	  was	  increasingly	  framed	  in	  moral	  terms,	  placing	  blame	  collectively	  
on	  cities	  themselves,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  individual	  citizens	  whose	  “positive	  feelings”	  were	  
now	  a	  material	  part	  of	  the	  economic	  equation,	  and	  must	  be	  properly	  policed	  and	  
maintained.	  	  
And	  indeed,	  that	  is	  exactly	  what	  discussions	  of	  urban	  revitalization	  became,	  
as	  feelings	  of	  responsibility,	  self–worth,	  and	  a	  compulsory	  optimism	  about	  a	  better	  
future	  in	  the	  face	  of	  unimaginable	  structural	  obstacles	  powerfully	  shaped	  what	  
survival	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  were	  seen	  as	  responsible	  and	  appropriate	  in	  a	  climate	  
of	  ongoing	  crisis.	  As	  an	  artifact	  of	  that	  early	  1980s	  legacy,	  one	  can	  still	  see	  the	  mass–
produced	  bumper	  stickers	  plastered	  on	  mid–Michigan	  cars	  that	  read,	  “ATTITUDE:	  
The	  Magic	  Word	  for	  Success	  in	  Flint	  and	  Genesee	  County”	  (Fig.	  7).	  Produced	  in	  the	  
mid–2000s,	  by	  the	  “Committee	  to	  Promote	  Flint’s	  Attitude,”	  in	  response	  to	  the	  
prolonged	  economic	  dislocation	  in	  the	  area,	  this	  bit	  of	  material	  culture	  speaks	  to	  the	  
long	  shadow	  that	  optimism	  has	  cast	  in	  the	  public	  imagination	  about	  economic	  
possibilities,	  and	  the	  internalization	  of	  the	  demand	  for	  personal	  responsibility,	  not	  
only	  on	  the	  individual	  level,	  but	  in	  terms	  of	  city	  identity	  and	  governance.	  In	  fact,	  this	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sentiment	  has	  specific	  roots	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  as	  billboards	  from	  1982	  also	  identify	  
“attitude”	  as	  the	  “magic	  word”	  that	  will	  keep	  Flint	  alive	  and	  well	  (see	  Fig.	  8).	  
Optimism	  is	  integral	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  neoliberal	  political	  economy,	  bearing	  the	  
weight	  of	  loss	  as	  older	  modes	  of	  material	  and	  political	  support	  for	  urban	  centers	  
have	  been	  eroded	  through	  privatization,	  deregulation,	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  
governmental	  retreat	  from	  New	  Deal	  involvement	  and	  support.	  In	  Bright–Sided,	  an	  
examination	  of	  what	  she	  sees	  as	  the	  particularly	  American	  obsession	  with	  positivity,	  
Barabara	  Ehrenreich	  links	  optimism	  with	  neoliberal	  imperatives,	  saying	  that,	  “If	  
optimism	  is	  the	  key	  to	  material	  success,	  and	  if	  you	  can	  achieve	  an	  optimistic	  outlook	  
through	  the	  discipline	  of	  positive	  thinking,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  excuse	  for	  failure.”	  “The	  
flip	  side	  of	  positivity,”	  she	  goes	  on	  to	  explain,	  “is	  thus	  a	  harsh	  insistence	  on	  personal	  
responsibility.”113	  My	  intention	  in	  this	  chapter	  is,	  in	  part,	  to	  employ	  these	  analytical	  
frameworks	  developed	  and	  argued	  by	  contemporary	  scholarship	  on	  neoliberalism,	  
which	  in	  many	  ways	  focus	  on	  the	  increasing	  individualization	  of	  governmentality	  
and	  personal	  responsibility	  since	  the	  1970s,	  and	  expand	  them	  back	  out,	  exploring	  
how	  they	  also	  are	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  entire	  communities,	  cities,	  and	  regions.	  By	  
understanding	  how	  image,	  self–image,	  and	  national	  narratives	  of	  moral	  fitness	  
shaped	  the	  material	  economic	  and	  political	  landscape	  in	  former	  industrial	  centers,	  
we	  can	  perhaps	  start	  to	  make	  some	  sense	  of	  the	  real	  stakes	  of	  Mike	  Royko’s	  feeling	  
that	  “a	  lot	  of	  people	  out	  there	  just	  don’t	  like	  us.”	  	  
I	  also	  find	  that	  I	  share	  Berlant’s	  interest	  in	  generalization,	  and	  desire	  to	  
“track	  the	  becoming	  general	  of	  singular	  things”—not	  to	  smooth	  over	  the	  irreducible,	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un–smoothable	  diversity	  of	  experience,	  but	  in	  fact	  to	  attempt	  to	  avoid	  an	  ultimately	  
myopic	  hyper–individualization,	  and	  to	  make	  important	  linkages	  between	  the	  local,	  
the	  regional,	  and	  the	  national	  through	  a	  commitment	  to	  a	  hybrid	  methodology	  
intended	  to	  bridge	  a	  standard	  “historical”	  and	  a	  Cultural	  Studies	  approach.	  Instead	  
empirically	  demonstrating	  through	  archival	  sources	  that	  Detroit	  was	  a	  national	  
cautionary	  example,	  or	  unearthing	  the	  specific	  origins	  of	  Cleveland’s	  nickname	  “the	  
Mistake	  on	  the	  Lake,”	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  strategies	  that	  Rust	  Belt	  cities	  employed	  in	  
response	  to	  a	  tanking	  national	  reputation	  are	  illustrative	  of	  the	  process	  by	  which	  the	  
“Rust	  Belt”	  became	  a	  discourse	  for	  multiple	  forms	  of	  failure,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  material	  
effects	  that	  this	  discourse	  had	  for	  cities	  in	  this	  region—and	  for	  the	  revitalization	  
strategies	  that	  were	  understood	  as	  possible	  and	  appropriate	  for	  them.	  	  
	  
“Dirty	  Factory	  Town”	  or	  “A	  Good	  City?”	  
“Once	  we	  get	  people	  here,	  they	  are	  surprised	  by	  the	  fun	  and	  the	  exciting	  
atmosphere.”	  These	  are	  the	  optimistic	  words	  of	  Steven	  Wilson,	  president	  of	  the	  Flint	  
Convention	  and	  Visitors	  Bureau	  in	  1986.	  “People	  have	  a	  stereotyped	  image	  of	  a	  
factory	  town,”	  he	  continues,	  “but	  when	  they	  arrive,	  they’re	  delighted	  to	  see	  a	  
beautiful	  city.”114	  
	  	   Wilson	  is	  quoted	  here	  in	  a	  special	  “Economic	  and	  Lifestyle”	  edition	  of	  
Piedmont	  Airlines’	  PACE	  in–flight	  magazine	  focusing	  on	  the	  Flint	  area,	  presumably	  
because	  Piedmont	  served	  Flint’s	  Bishop	  International	  Airport.	  The	  entire	  58–page	  
document	  is	  a	  fascinating	  archive	  of	  image	  promotion—particularly	  since	  less	  than	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one	  year	  later,	  Money	  magazine	  produced	  its	  first	  “Best	  Places	  to	  Live	  in	  America”	  
edition,	  in	  which	  Flint	  placed	  infamously	  last—but	  the	  most	  prominent	  theme	  
throughout	  the	  magazine’s	  discussion	  of	  image	  is	  that	  of	  combating	  “stereotypes”	  
and	  “previously	  held	  images.”	  This	  is	  not	  unusual	  in	  the	  language	  of	  Rust	  Belt	  
revitalization,	  and	  in	  fact,	  the	  language	  employed	  by	  city	  officials,	  boosters,	  and	  
residents	  themselves	  often	  juxtaposes	  the	  image	  of	  a	  place	  that	  is	  “dirty,”	  “dreary,”	  
or	  otherwise	  unappealing	  with	  that	  of	  a	  “good,”	  “beautiful,”	  or	  otherwise	  appealing	  
(and	  marketable)	  place.	  Reflecting	  a	  damage–control	  marketing	  ethic	  that	  has	  
absorbed	  national	  narratives	  of	  Rust	  Belt	  failure,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  internalization	  of	  
these	  very	  narratives,	  this	  language	  frames	  the	  issue	  of	  deindustrialization	  in	  the	  
moral	  terms	  of	  personal	  responsibility,	  setting	  up	  success	  and	  failure	  in	  the	  national	  
marketplace	  of	  tourist	  destinations	  in	  terms	  of	  use–value	  and	  of	  “good”	  and	  “bad,”	  
“beautiful”	  and	  “ugly,”	  “light”	  and	  “dark.”	  
	   Historian	  Steven	  High	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  useful	  history	  of	  the	  language	  of	  the	  
Rust	  Belt,	  and	  how	  it	  emerged	  to	  describe	  not	  only	  a	  discrete	  geographical	  region,	  
but	  also	  a	  cultural	  image	  of	  deindustrialized	  urban	  space.	  Drawing	  on	  Michel	  
Foucault’s	  contention	  that	  societies	  contain	  their	  problems	  spatially	  and	  
imaginatively,	  he	  asserts	  that	  “many	  of	  the	  industrial	  cities	  of	  the	  northern	  tier	  of	  
the	  United	  States	  were	  overwhelmed	  by	  racial	  strife	  and	  deindustrialization	  …	  The	  
discourse	  of	  industrial	  decline	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Rust	  Belt	  label	  provided	  a	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spatial	  fix	  for	  Americans’	  generalized	  insecurities	  about	  economic	  change	  in	  the	  late	  
twentieth	  century.”115	  
The	  phenomenon	  of	  deindustrialization	  itself	  is	  not	  necessarily	  confined	  to	  
the	  late	  1970s,	  as	  American	  popular	  imagination	  might	  suggest	  (Thomas	  Sugrue,	  
among	  others,	  has	  argued	  for	  a	  “long	  history”	  of	  deindustrialization	  rooted	  in	  
capital’s	  concerted	  effort	  to	  combat	  organized	  labor	  since	  at	  least	  the	  1930s),	  but	  
late	  capitalism	  has	  produced	  particularly	  acute	  and	  intensifying	  crises	  of	  
deindustrialization	  in	  multiple	  locations,	  particularly	  in	  former	  industrial	  capitals	  
throughout	  the	  Rust	  Belt.116	  The	  phenomenon	  of	  deindustrialization,	  first	  
introduced	  widely	  and	  defined	  by	  Barry	  Bluestone	  and	  Bennett	  Harrison	  in	  1982	  as	  
“the	  widespread,	  systematic	  disinvestment	  in	  the	  nation’s	  basic	  productive	  
capacity,”	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  way	  “capital—in	  the	  form	  of	  financial	  resources	  and	  
of	  real	  plant	  and	  equipment—has	  been	  diverted	  from	  productive	  investment	  in	  our	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115	  High,	  Steven	  C.,	  and	  David	  W.	  Lewis.	  Corporate	  Wasteland:	  The	  Landscape	  and	  Memory	  of	  
Deindustrialization.	  Ithaca:	  IRL,	  2007.	  26.	  
116	  The	  literature	  of	  deindustrialization	  is	  vast,	  and	  I	  can	  in	  no	  way	  claim	  a	  comprehensive	  
bibliography	  of	  the	  subject.	  However,	  useful	  texts	  in	  this	  study	  have	  been	  Bluestone,	  Barry,	  
and	  Bennett	  Harrison.	  The	  Deindustrialization	  of	  America:	  Plant	  Closings,	  Community	  
Abandonment,	  and	  the	  Dismantling	  of	  Basic	  Industry.	  New	  York:	  Basic,	  1982.;	  Wilson,	  
William	  J.	  When	  Work	  Disappears:	  The	  World	  of	  the	  New	  Urban	  Poor.	  New	  York:	  Knopf,	  
1996.;	  Dandaneau,	  Steven	  P.	  A	  Town	  Abandoned:	  Flint,	  Michigan,	  Confronts	  
Deindustrialization.	  Albany:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York,	  1996.;	  Sugrue,	  Thomas	  J.	  The	  
Origins	  of	  the	  Urban	  Crisis:	  Race	  and	  Inequality	  in	  Postwar	  Detroit.	  Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  
UP,	  1996.;	  Lord,	  George	  F.,	  and	  Albert	  C.	  Price.	  "Growth	  Ideology	  in	  a	  Period	  of	  Decline:	  
Deindustrialization	  and	  Restructuring,	  Flint	  Style."	  Social	  Problems	  39.2	  (1992):	  155-­‐69.;	  
Steven	  High,	  Industrial	  Sunset:	  The	  Making	  of	  North	  America’s	  Rust	  Belt,	  1969-­‐1984.;Cowie,	  
Capital	  Moves	  and	  Cowie	  and	  Heathcott,	  eds.,	  Beyond	  the	  Ruins:	  The	  Meanings	  of	  
Deindustrialization.	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basic	  national	  industries	  into	  unproductive	  speculations,	  mergers	  and	  acquisitions	  
and	  foreign	  investment.”117	  	  
Linking	  deindustrialization	  to	  an	  emerging	  moral/political/economic	  
framework	  of	  neoliberalism	  from	  the	  1970s	  into	  the	  Reagan	  80s,	  however,	  is	  crucial	  
for	  understanding	  how	  Rust	  Belt	  cities’	  revitalization	  strategies	  responded	  to	  the	  
economic	  and	  cultural	  crises	  brought	  on	  by	  deindustrialization,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  the	  
“Rust	  Belt”	  designation	  functioned	  as	  a	  complex	  national	  discourse	  of	  class	  anxiety,	  
racial	  fear,	  and	  urban	  failure.	  A	  prime	  example	  of	  this	  moral–economic	  discourse	  
comes	  from	  John	  Robin,	  chairman	  of	  the	  Pittsburgh	  Urban	  Development	  Authority.	  
A	  1982	  article	  in	  the	  Detroit	  Free	  Press	  with	  the	  headline	  “Some	  American	  
Downtowns	  are	  Coming	  Back	  to	  Life”	  examines	  five	  deindustrializing	  Rust	  Belt	  cities	  
and	  the	  revitalization	  efforts	  underway	  in	  each,	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  sizing	  up	  Detroit’s	  
chances	  of	  a	  renaissance	  based	  on	  the	  developments	  in	  urban	  areas	  facing	  similar	  
circumstances.	  Beyond	  Pittsburgh	  being	  described	  as	  “grim,”	  the	  article	  quotes	  
Robin	  as	  saying,	  “People	  used	  to	  see	  us	  as	  a	  smoky,	  dirty	  industrial	  city.	  Well,	  there’s	  
nothing	  like	  that.	  In	  fact,	  we’re	  becoming	  a	  very	  good	  city.”118	  This	  deceptively	  short	  
quote	  calls	  for	  significant	  unpacking.	  
To	  begin	  with,	  for	  Robin	  to	  say	  “there’s	  nothing	  like	  that”	  unintentionally	  
crystallizes	  the	  economic	  situation	  in	  Pittsburgh	  and	  other	  cities	  like	  it.	  The	  collapse	  
of	  the	  steel	  industry	  in	  Pittsburgh	  in	  the	  years	  surrounding	  this	  statement	  produced	  
some	  undeniably	  grim	  circumstances,	  as	  1982	  saw	  some	  of	  the	  highest	  national	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117	  Quoted	  in	  Dandenau,	  A	  Town	  Abandoned:	  Flint,	  Michigan,	  Confronts	  Deindustrialization.	  
xx.	  
118	  "Some	  American	  Downtowns	  Are	  Coming	  Back	  to	  Life:	  A	  Look	  at	  Efforts	  in	  Five	  Cities."	  
Detroit	  Free	  Press	  25	  Apr.	  1982,	  sec.	  A:	  1.	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rates	  of	  unemployment	  of	  the	  decade	  (Flint	  topped	  all	  metro	  areas	  at	  the	  peak	  of	  
this	  recession	  with	  a	  rate	  of	  23.4%,	  while	  national	  rates	  were	  up	  to	  10.8%	  by	  official	  
statistics,	  which	  generally	  under–represent	  actual	  numbers),	  and	  Pennsylvania’s	  
historical	  high	  would	  be	  reached	  the	  next	  year	  at	  nearly	  13%.119	  Following	  the	  
1981–82	  recession,	  steel	  mills	  laid	  off	  more	  than	  150,000	  workers,	  and	  two	  years	  
later,	  the	  Homestead	  Steel	  Works	  would	  be	  demolished,	  making	  the	  seemingly	  
positive	  statement	  that	  there	  is	  “nothing	  like”	  an	  industrial	  city	  in	  Pittsburgh	  
unfortunately	  somewhat	  accurate.120	  
	   More	  importantly,	  the	  contrasting	  juxtaposition	  of	  the	  “industrial	  city”	  and	  
the	  “good	  city”	  points	  to	  the	  moral	  framework	  that	  deindustrializing	  urban	  spaces	  
found	  themselves	  navigating.	  In	  this	  binary,	  “industrial”	  becomes	  equated	  with	  
“bad,”	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  very	  economic	  crisis	  that	  Pittsburgh	  was	  facing—again,	  
since	  failure	  is	  always	  seen	  a	  product	  of	  a	  breakdown	  of	  personal	  responsibility	  and	  
not	  structural	  forces,	  Pittsburgh	  must	  prove	  that	  it	  can	  defy	  its	  national	  reputation	  
and	  redeem	  itself	  through	  the	  erasure	  (through	  image	  transformation	  after	  the	  
material	  fact)	  of	  smoky,	  dirty	  industrial	  labor.	  In	  fact,	  Robin’s	  choice	  of	  “becoming”	  
as	  the	  active	  verb	  is	  key	  to	  understanding	  the	  active	  self–policing	  that	  is	  required	  of	  
cities	  in	  this	  moment.	  Image–shaping	  and	  economic	  revitalization	  are	  active	  
processes,	  and	  Pittsburgh’s	  renewal	  seems	  contingent	  upon	  the	  same	  technologies	  
of	  governmentality	  that	  scholars	  have	  argued	  are	  central	  to	  producing	  the	  neoliberal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119	  Flaim,	  Paul	  O.	  "Unemployment	  in	  1982:	  The	  Cost	  to	  Workers	  and	  Their	  Families."	  
Monthly	  Labor	  Review	  107.2	  (1984):	  30-­‐37.;	  "State's	  Jobless	  Rate	  Trails	  Only	  Michigan,	  West	  
Virginia."	  Gadsden	  Times	  19	  Jan.	  1983:	  18.	  
120	  Hoerr,	  John	  P.	  And	  the	  Wolf	  Finally	  Came:	  The	  Decline	  of	  the	  American	  Steel	  Industry.	  
Pittsburgh,	  PA:	  University	  of	  Pittsburgh,	  1988.	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individual.121	  This	  seemingly	  small	  statement	  has	  at	  its	  core	  the	  essence	  of	  Rust	  Belt	  
revitalization	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  1980s—an	  appeal	  to	  the	  nation	  that	  is	  at	  once	  
contrite	  for	  what	  this	  city	  was	  (an	  “industrial	  city,”	  with	  the	  attendant	  smoke,	  dirt,	  
and	  New	  Deal	  organizations	  of	  unionized	  labor	  and	  fixed	  capital),	  and	  a	  promise	  of	  
what	  it’s	  “becoming”	  (a	  “good	  city,”	  self–policed	  and	  flexible	  through	  new	  
organizations	  of	  labor	  in	  a	  service	  economy).	  Whether	  a	  city	  like	  Pittsburgh	  can	  
“become”	  something	  besides	  what	  it	  “was”	  is	  an	  altogether	  different	  question.	  
	   Baltimore,	  too,	  is	  a	  case	  in	  which	  image–transformation	  efforts	  were	  based	  
upon	  the	  juxtaposition	  of	  the	  bad	  “old”	  city,	  and	  the	  good	  “new”	  city	  that	  it	  can	  
become.	  Known	  by	  Washington,	  D.C.	  residents	  as	  “the	  Pit	  up	  the	  Parkway”	  or	  
“Washington’s	  Brooklyn	  (back	  when	  that	  was	  still	  an	  insult),”	  by	  1981,	  Baltimore	  
was	  a	  well–known	  symbol	  of	  urban	  decline.	  Familiar	  urban	  Rust	  Belt	  issues	  such	  as	  
riots,	  deindustrialization,	  and	  racial	  anxiety	  brought	  on	  by	  white	  flight	  and	  Black	  
population	  growth	  plagued	  the	  city	  and	  damaged	  its	  image	  as	  an	  “undesirable”	  
location.	  Between	  1960	  and	  1980,	  Baltimore’s	  population	  dropped	  from	  939,000	  
residents	  down	  to	  780,	  000	  (a	  trend	  mirrored	  by	  virtually	  all	  of	  the	  cities	  in	  the	  Rust	  
Belt),	  with	  55%	  of	  them	  African	  American,	  and	  of	  that	  group	  40%	  or	  more	  
unemployed.122	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121	  See	  especially	  Barry,	  Andrew,	  Thomas	  Osborne,	  and	  Nikolas	  S.	  Rose.	  Foucault	  and	  
Political	  Reason:	  Liberalism,	  Neo-­‐liberalism,	  and	  Rationalities	  of	  Government.	  Chicago:	  
University	  of	  Chicago,	  1996.;	  Lemke,	  Thomas.	  Foucault,	  Governmentality,	  and	  Critique.	  
Boulder,	  CO:	  Paradigm,	  2011.;	  Rose,	  Nikolas	  S.	  Governing	  the	  Soul:	  The	  Shaping	  of	  the	  Private	  
Self.	  London:	  Routledge,	  1990.	  
122	  Demarest,	  Michael.	  "He	  Digs	  Downtown:	  For	  Master	  Planner	  James	  Rouse,	  Urban	  Life	  Is	  a	  
Festival."	  Time	  24	  Aug.	  1981:	  42-­‐53.	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   It	  was	  also	  in	  1980	  that	  developer	  and	  “urban	  visionary”	  James	  Rouse	  
opened	  Harborplace,	  one	  of	  many	  successful	  “festival	  marketplace”	  developments	  
that	  sought	  to	  transform	  areas	  of	  “declining”	  cities—particularly	  in	  the	  former	  
manufacturing	  centers	  of	  the	  northeast	  and	  Midwest—through	  concentrated	  
shopping	  and	  entertainment	  districts	  meant	  to	  attract	  white	  middle	  class	  shoppers	  
back	  to	  central	  cities.	  Harborplace	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  fantastically	  successful	  venture	  
upon	  opening,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  important	  development	  in	  revitalizing	  cities	  that	  were	  
seen	  as	  “dead.”	  In	  its	  first	  year	  of	  operation,	  Harborplace	  attracted	  18	  million	  
visitors	  and	  generated	  $42	  million	  in	  income,	  prompting	  a	  wave	  of	  media	  attention	  
that	  speculated	  on	  its	  significance	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  American	  city.	  
	   One	  of	  these	  celebratory	  pieces	  of	  media	  coverage	  was	  a	  TIME	  magazine	  
cover	  story	  in	  August	  1981	  dedicated	  to	  Rouse’s	  vision	  of	  urban	  revitalization,	  
focusing	  specifically	  on	  Harborplace.	  Of	  particular	  interest	  is	  the	  insistence	  upon	  the	  
terms	  of	  Baltimore’s	  transformation,	  and	  the	  contrast	  that	  the	  author	  draws	  
between	  what	  the	  city	  “was”	  and	  what	  it	  was,	  in	  1981,	  “becoming.”	  	  
This	   is	   the	   new	   Baltimore,	   not	   to	   be	   confused	   with	   the	   old,	   a.k.a.	  
Bawlamer,	  in	  the	  state	  of	  Merlin.	  (The	  naves	  drop	  consnans	  as	  liberally	  
as	  cockneys	  dispense	  with	  aitches).	  The	  machine	  with	  which	  you	  mow	  
your	   lawn	   is,	   of	   course,	   your	   paramour.	   It	   has	   long	   been	   called	  
Survival	   City.	   Another	   moniker	   was	   Mobtown,	   after	   its	   citizens’	  
proclivity	   for	   rioting.	   Because	   it	  was	   long	   famed	   for	   5	   cent	   beer,	   10	  
cent	   crabcakes	   and	   15	   cent	   rye	  whiskey,	   it	   was	  more	   affectionately	  
dubbed	   Nickel	   City.	   Bawlamer,	   252	   years	   old,	   was	   traditionally	   a	  
beer–and–shot	   town,	  built	  on	  19th	  century	  technologies,	  mainly	  steel	  
and	  shipbuilding,	  that	  has	  since	  trailed	  off,	  as	  has	  its	  population.123	  
	  
Baltimore’s	  national	  image	  as	  an	  old	  city	  is	  being	  forcefully	  asserted	  in	  this	  passage,	  
in	  the	  most	  negative	  sense—dirty,	  run–down,	  primitive	  in	  its	  desires	  and	  tastes.	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Images	  of	  class	  difference	  are	  central	  to	  the	  description,	  as	  the	  author	  draws	  
obvious	  comparisons	  to	  British	  cockney	  accents,	  long	  associated	  with	  the	  
uneducated	  lower	  and	  working	  classes,	  but	  not	  without	  a	  certain	  quaint	  whiff	  of	  
“authentic”	  local	  culture	  that	  Rouse’s	  festival	  marketplace	  developments	  required.	  
Specific	  references	  to	  deindustrialization	  (the	  industries	  that	  have	  “trailed	  off”)	  are	  
framed	  again	  as	  the	  logical	  passing	  of	  emphatically	  old	  manufacturing	  technologies	  
that	  are	  now	  understood	  as	  rightfully	  outmoded	  in	  the	  “new”	  Baltimore,	  which	  is	  
celebrated	  in	  the	  article	  as	  finally	  drawing	  important	  white	  middle–class	  consumers	  
back	  to	  the	  city	  through	  “clean”	  and	  modern	  service	  industries.	  “Today,	  the	  Inner	  
Harbor	  is	  not	  a	  cesspool	  but	  a	  scene	  of	  jams	  and	  jollity,”	  the	  author	  praises.	  “The	  
white	  middle	  class	  is	  returning	  from	  the	  suburbs	  in	  droves.”124	  Elsewhere,	  Rouse	  
himself	  says	  that	  his	  goal	  was	  to	  create	  a	  “warm	  and	  human	  place,	  with	  diversity	  of	  
choice,	  full	  of	  festival	  and	  delight,”	  which	  is	  a	  long	  way	  from	  the	  image	  of	  “old”	  
Baltimore—dirty,	  abandoned	  (by	  whites),	  and	  virtually	  devoid	  of	  use.	  What	  
becomes	  clear	  in	  this	  article	  is	  that	  “becoming”	  the	  new	  Baltimore	  is	  a	  cultural	  
process	  in	  which	  image	  transformation	  plays	  a	  central	  role,	  as	  it	  is	  above	  all	  an	  
image	  of	  white	  middle–class	  safety	  and	  clean	  family	  fun	  that	  will	  produce	  economic	  
results	  in	  a	  post–industrial	  urban	  center.	  	  
	   Toledo,	  Ohio	  was	  one	  of	  several	  smaller	  cities	  that	  invested	  in	  James	  Rouse’s	  
acclaimed	  “festival	  marketplace”	  strategy	  in	  the	  early	  1980s.	  A	  city	  of	  nearly	  
355,000	  residents	  in	  1980	  (down	  from	  its	  historical	  peak	  of	  385,000	  in	  1970),	  
Toledo	  was	  a	  primarily	  automotive	  manufacturing	  town	  that	  faced	  similar	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challenges	  as	  other	  Rust	  Belt	  urban	  centers	  in	  this	  moment.	  When	  Portside,	  Toledo’s	  
Rouse–developed	  festival	  marketplace	  opened	  on	  May	  19,	  1984,	  it	  was	  the	  
culmination	  of	  an	  effort	  to	  transform	  the	  city’s	  image	  that	  was	  framed	  by	  the	  media,	  
residents,	  and	  officials	  as	  a	  moral	  and	  economic	  triumph	  of	  positive	  thought.	  
	   Portside’s	  perceived	  role	  in	  transforming	  Toledo’s	  image—as	  well	  as	  the	  
prevailing	  image	  of	  Toledo—can	  be	  glimpsed	  in	  a	  Detroit	  Free	  Press	  travel	  article	  
focusing	  on	  the	  new	  attraction.	  “Painstaking	  research	  has	  revealed	  the	  five	  words	  
never	  uttered	  in	  the	  history	  of	  travel,”	  the	  article	  teases,	  before	  revealing	  the	  slightly	  
pointed	  punch	  line:	  “‘Hey,	  let’s	  go	  to	  Toledo!’”125	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  major	  newspaper	  
in	  a	  city	  as	  nationally	  denigrated	  as	  Detroit	  in	  1984	  would	  make	  such	  a	  snide	  joke	  
the	  framing	  device	  for	  an	  overwhelmingly	  positive	  travel	  article	  certainly	  gives	  
some	  sense	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  projects	  such	  as	  Portside	  were	  seen	  as	  regional	  
engines	  of	  image	  transformation,	  putting	  that	  transformation	  in	  dramatic	  “before”	  
and	  “after”	  terms.	  Explicitly	  citing	  the	  fact	  that	  Portside	  “draws	  on	  the	  marketplace	  
concept	  of	  two	  successful	  cousins	  [Harborplace	  and	  Fanuiel	  Hall],”	  the	  article	  goes	  
on	  to	  assert	  that	  positive	  words	  on	  Toledo’s	  tourist	  value	  have	  never	  before	  been	  
uttered,	  “until	  Portside.”126	  In	  fact,	  the	  very	  headline	  of	  this	  piece	  celebrates	  the	  fact	  
that	  Toledo	  has,	  through	  this	  new	  project,	  somehow	  harnessed	  the	  ephemeral,	  
hard–to–describe	  quality	  that	  desirable	  destinations	  all	  share:	  “Portside	  gives	  
Toledo	  a	  new	  sizzle.”127	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  Sylvain,	  Rick.	  "Portside	  Gives	  Toledo	  a	  New	  Sizzle."	  Detroit	  Free	  Press	  22	  July	  1984,	  sec.	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   Moreover,	  the	  opening	  of	  Portside	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  moral	  victory	  for	  the	  city	  
and	  a	  much–needed	  boost	  to	  its	  collective	  confidence,	  which	  was	  framed	  as	  virtually	  
synonymous	  with	  economic	  progress.	  Wayman	  Palmer,	  director	  of	  the	  Toledo	  
Economic	  Planning	  Council,	  said	  of	  Portside,	  “I’ve	  lived	  in	  Toledo	  for	  50	  years	  and	  
I’ve	  never	  seen,	  felt,	  heard	  anything	  just	  like	  the	  spirit	  here.”128	  Reuben	  Bumpus,	  the	  
chairman	  of	  the	  Greater	  Toledo	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  agrees,	  and	  argues	  that	  the	  
biggest	  part	  of	  Toledo’s	  new	  economic	  development	  strategy	  hinges	  primarily	  on	  an	  
intangible	  sense	  of	  optimism,	  saying	  “the	  most	  significant	  thing	  here	  today	  is	  the	  
positive	  feeling	  by	  all	  that	  we	  are	  on	  the	  move.”129	  
	   At	  the	  Portside	  grand	  opening,	  there	  were	  more	  officials	  and	  residents	  that	  
seemed	  to	  agree,	  as	  Toledo	  Mayor	  Donna	  Owens	  excitedly	  proclaimed	  that	  “[This	  
year	  marks]	  the	  turning	  point	  for	  Toledo.	  Our	  heart	  isn’t	  beating,	  it’s	  pounding!”130	  
Declaring	  Toledo	  not	  only	  “not	  dead”—it	  had	  a	  heartbeat	  after	  all,	  despite	  rumors	  to	  
the	  contrary—but	  at	  a	  “turning	  point”	  was	  a	  bold	  statement,	  echoed	  by	  those	  in	  
attendance.	  James	  Heer,	  a	  37	  year–old	  elementary	  school	  principal	  from	  the	  city	  said	  
that	  “the	  most	  significant	  impact	  Portside	  has	  had	  on	  Toledo	  is	  a	  renewed	  sense	  of	  
pride	  in	  the	  city.”	  “I’ve	  lived	  here	  all	  my	  life,”	  he	  continued,	  “and	  the	  transition	  
downtown	  recently	  has	  been	  amazing	  and	  refreshing.	  It	  [Portside	  and	  other	  
riverfront	  developments]	  creates	  a	  good	  feeling	  and	  pride	  in	  Toledo	  natives.”131	  The	  
conflation	  here,	  as	  seen	  in	  Flint	  and	  other	  Rust	  Belt	  cities,	  between	  the	  purposes	  of	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  Graham,	  David	  V.	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  Point."	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attracting	  a	  tourist	  audience	  and	  a	  feeling	  of	  “local	  pride”	  is	  significant,	  as	  it	  calls	  
attention	  to	  the	  neoliberal	  discourse	  of	  personal	  responsibility	  as	  it	  functions	  on	  
local	  and	  regional	  registers—“good	  feelings”	  of	  “pride”	  here	  will	  logically	  make	  a	  
location	  more	  desirable	  on	  any	  number	  of	  material	  economic	  levels,	  whether	  for	  
tourists	  or	  business.	  One	  Flint	  Journal	  article	  praising	  the	  opening	  of	  Portside—and	  
there	  were	  many,	  since	  Flint	  explicitly	  saw	  itself	  as	  allied	  with	  Toledo’s	  festival	  
marketplace	  project—ties	  the	  realms	  of	  economics	  and	  morale	  together	  neatly,	  as	  
the	  writer	  observes,	  “like	  Flint,	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  dollars	  have	  been	  spent	  on	  
riverfront	  redevelopments	  designed	  to	  improve	  the	  downtown	  retail	  situation	  while	  
raising	  the	  morale	  of	  a	  blue	  collar	  town	  hurt	  by	  white	  flight	  to	  the	  suburbs,	  and	  a	  
poor	  self–image.	  In	  short,	  Toledo	  is	  remarkably	  like	  Flint.”132	  There	  seem	  to	  be	  two	  
things	  at	  work	  in	  this	  quotation:	  first,	  the	  huge	  sums	  of	  public/private	  money	  being	  
invested	  into	  downtown	  redevelopment	  projects	  like	  Portside,	  in	  locations	  tied	  
together	  through	  a	  “Rust	  Belt”	  identity	  defined	  by	  a	  working–class	  base	  and	  white	  
flight,	  are	  authorized	  by	  the	  logical	  connections	  between	  the	  business	  environment	  
and	  community	  morale;	  second,	  the	  term	  “hurt”	  can	  be	  understood	  both	  in	  a	  real	  
economic	  sense,	  through	  a	  fleeing	  tax	  base	  and	  retail	  failure,	  but	  also	  in	  a	  less	  
tangible	  emotional	  sense,	  where	  the	  city	  itself	  has	  experienced	  some	  trauma	  
(presumably	  shared	  by	  other	  similar	  cities)	  that	  has	  caused	  their	  ever–worsening	  
situation.	  “Poor	  self–image”	  is	  here	  bound	  up	  with	  the	  broader	  national	  image	  of	  
Rust	  Belt	  cities,	  shifting	  the	  responsibility	  for	  Toledo’s	  structural	  woes	  to	  the	  
citizenry,	  who	  somehow	  don’t	  even	  think	  highly	  enough	  of	  themselves	  to	  succeed.	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  Ibid.	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   For	  those	  involved	  in	  creating	  projects	  such	  as	  these,	  there	  was	  likewise	  no	  
room	  for	  negativity,	  especially	  if	  it	  undermined	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  strategy	  as	  a	  
whole.	  One	  year	  after	  Portside’s	  opening,	  merchants	  at	  Portside	  told	  the	  Toledo	  
Blade	  that	  Enterprise	  Development	  Co.—Rouse’s	  firm	  that	  developed	  festival	  
marketplaces	  for	  several	  Midwestern	  cities—“exaggerated	  revenue	  and	  attendance	  
projections,	  charged	  too	  much	  for	  rent	  and	  provided	  weak	  leadership.	  This,	  they	  
said,	  resulted	  in	  sub–par	  performances	  by	  a	  number	  of	  Portside	  businesses.”133	  
Because	  of	  “overblown	  projections”	  based	  on	  the	  glowing	  success	  of	  Baltimore’s	  
Harborplace	  four	  years	  earlier,	  business	  owners	  in	  Toledo	  were	  claiming	  that	  
expectations	  for	  Portside	  were	  unrealistic—and,	  in	  fact,	  Portside	  continued	  to	  
struggle	  until	  it	  closed	  completely	  in	  1990.	  James	  Rouse’s	  reaction	  to	  complaints	  
such	  as	  these	  was	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  premise	  of	  positivity	  at	  work	  in	  his	  creations,	  
as	  he	  wrote	  in	  an	  internal	  memo	  to	  executives	  at	  the	  Enterprise	  Development	  Co.:	  
“We	  cannot	  let	  this	  rest	  without	  word	  from	  us.	  Perhaps	  the	  best	  response	  is	  to	  not	  
deal	  with	  these	  negative	  notes,	  but	  to	  engineer	  positive	  word	  from	  Portside.”134	  	  
	   In	  Flint,	  revitalization	  hopes	  were	  likewise	  pinned	  on	  the	  proven	  success	  of	  
Rouse,	  as	  his	  firm	  was	  tapped	  to	  develop	  Water	  Street	  Pavilion,	  a	  festival	  
marketplace	  modeled,	  like	  Portside,	  after	  past	  Rouse	  successes.	  AutoWorld,	  
however,	  was	  the	  clear	  centerpiece	  of	  Flint’s	  cluster	  of	  downtown	  projects	  in	  the	  
early	  1980s,	  and	  was	  instrumental	  to	  a	  comprehensive	  revitalization	  strategy	  in	  a	  
city	  that	  was	  being	  recognized	  as	  an	  early	  poster	  child	  for	  the	  consequences	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133	  Tanber,	  George	  J.	  "Portside	  Merchants	  Blame	  Management	  for	  Business	  Woes."	  The	  
Toledo	  Blade	  15	  Aug.	  1985,	  sec.	  A:	  1.	  
134	  Rouse,	  James	  W.	  "Portside."	  Letter	  to	  K.	  Aubrey	  Gorman.	  20	  Aug.	  1985.	  MS.	  Columbia	  
Archives,	  Columbia,	  Maryland.	  (Emphasis	  in	  original.)	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deindustrialization.135	  As	  the	  birthplace	  of	  General	  Motors,	  Flint	  experienced	  the	  
prosperity	  associated	  with	  being	  the	  quintessential	  postwar	  “company	  town,”	  where	  
the	  majority	  of	  the	  local	  economy	  and	  employment	  was	  tied	  to	  the	  auto	  industry.	  
Beginning	  in	  the	  late	  1960’s,	  however,	  General	  Motors	  began	  to	  cut	  costs	  by	  building	  
more	  cars	  in	  the	  non–union	  South,	  and	  the	  process	  of	  withdrawal	  from	  Flint	  had	  
begun.	  By	  1984,	  when	  AutoWorld	  opened	  its	  doors,	  GM’s	  Flint	  labor	  force,	  which	  
had	  numbered	  120,000	  employees	  in	  the	  1950’s,	  had	  shrunk	  to	  60,000.136	  The	  
city’seconomy	  was	  largely	  dependent	  on	  money	  paid	  by	  General	  Motors—or,	  as	  it	  
was	  both	  affectionately	  and	  bitterly	  referred	  to	  in	  Flint,	  “Generous	  Motors”—with	  a	  
$2	  billion–plus	  local	  annual	  payroll.137	  As	  this	  influx	  of	  capital	  became	  increasingly	  a	  
thing	  of	  the	  past,	  Flint	  found	  itself	  in	  multiple	  crises	  of	  economy	  and	  of	  identity.	  
AutoWorld	  was	  developed	  to	  address	  these	  crises,	  and	  was	  invested	  with	  an	  
impossible	  mission	  to	  reverse	  Flint’s	  spiraling	  economic,	  social,	  and	  psychic	  states	  
through	  therapeutic	  image–shaping	  and	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  local	  economic	  
base	  from	  industrial	  to	  tourist	  revenue—or,	  as	  Frederic	  Hope,	  the	  designer	  
responsible	  for	  much	  of	  AutoWorld’s	  exhibit	  content,	  put	  it,	  the	  project	  “was	  
developed	  to	  bring	  a	  little	  light	  to	  the	  dark	  place	  that	  was	  Flint	  1979–82.”138	  Hope’s	  
stated	  mission	  here	  is	  an	  almost	  grotesque	  collision	  of	  therapeutic	  and	  image–based	  
language	  with	  dire	  economic	  need—indeed,	  by	  the	  time	  that	  AutoWorld	  opened	  in	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  See	  Zwerdling,	  Daniel.	  "And	  Then	  There’s	  the	  Disneyland	  Solution."	  The	  Progressive	  46.7	  
(1982):	  35.	  
136	  Moore,	  Michael.	  "Dance	  Band	  on	  the	  Titanic:	  AutoWorld	  and	  the	  Death	  of	  Flint."	  The	  
Michigan	  Voice	  [Flint]	  Sept.	  1984:	  10.	  
137	  Dandenau,	  A	  Town	  Abandoned:	  Flint,	  Michigan	  Confronts	  Deindustrialization:	  xxi	  
138	  Historic	  Flint	  AutoWorld	  Foundation.	  Storytellers:	  Art	  and	  Artists	  of	  the	  AutoWorld	  Rides.	  
Flint:	  Historic	  Flint	  AutoWorld	  Foundation,	  1984.	  
	  
	   105	  
July	  1984,	  the	  community	  that	  it	  greeted	  with	  its	  celebratory	  message	  had	  26%	  
unemployment,	  80%	  unemployment	  among	  Black	  and	  Latino/a	  youth,	  and	  25,000	  
families	  in	  food	  stamp	  lines	  each	  month.	  One	  half	  of	  the	  30%	  of	  residents	  who	  were	  
unemployed	  in	  1982	  had	  left	  the	  city,	  and	  75%	  of	  original	  downtown	  stores	  (a	  short	  
2	  blocks	  away	  from	  the	  AutoWorld	  complex)	  had	  been	  boarded	  up.139	  
Even	  before	  the	  exhibits	  were	  designed,	  however,	  the	  economic	  promise	  of	  
image	  transformation	  through	  cultural	  projects	  and	  personal	  responsibility	  can	  be	  
clearly	  seen	  in	  the	  1981	  promotional	  film	  The	  Little	  Town	  That	  Could:	  An	  
Introduction	  to	  Flint’s	  AutoWorld.	  This	  film	  was	  produced	  for	  the	  Charles	  Stewart	  
Mott	  Foundation,	  which	  was	  the	  main	  economic	  and	  ideological	  engine	  of	  the	  
AutoWorld	  project,	  by	  New	  York-­‐based	  public	  relations	  firm	  The	  Glyn	  Group.	  The	  
Mott	  foundation,	  which	  was	  built	  on	  $750	  million	  of	  Mott’s	  personal	  fortune	  (he	  was	  
an	  early	  partner	  in	  founding	  General	  Motors	  in	  Flint),	  conceived	  of	  and	  funded	  the	  
AutoWorld	  concept	  as	  a	  way	  to	  promote	  the	  virtues	  of	  the	  automobile	  and	  its	  
history	  in	  a	  time	  of	  perceived	  “image	  problems”	  for	  the	  industry.	  The	  film	  was	  
scripted	  by	  the	  Glyn	  Group	  with	  collaboration	  and	  guidance	  from	  the	  Mott	  
Foundation/AutoWorld	  officials.	  Through	  multiple	  drafts,	  the	  script	  is	  grand	  in	  
scope	  and	  tone	  and	  consistent	  in	  its	  narrative	  construction—a	  “little	  town”	  called	  
Flint	  becomes	  an	  important	  and	  “internationally	  famous”	  industrial	  center,	  but	  
“despite	  its	  fame,	  it	  somehow	  never	  occurred	  to	  outsiders	  that	  the	  ‘Vehicle	  City’—
which	  was	  what	  the	  town	  came	  to	  be	  called—was	  an	  interesting,	  historical	  and	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  Moore,	  “Dance	  Band	  on	  the	  Titanic,”	  10.	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exciting	  place,	  a	  good	  place	  to	  visit.”140	  So,	  according	  to	  this	  narrative,	  despite	  its	  
fame,	  the	  problem	  with	  Flint	  was	  that	  it	  was	  somehow	  not	  bringing	  anyone	  to	  see—
or	  spend	  tourist	  dollars—in	  the	  city.	  Denying	  economic	  difficulty	  as	  a	  motivation	  for	  
the	  creation	  of	  AutoWorld,	  and	  instead	  maintaining	  focus	  on	  the	  “issue”	  of	  proper	  
recognition	  or	  respect	  in	  the	  broader	  culture,	  film	  introduces	  the	  character	  of	  “Fred	  
the	  Carriageless	  Horse”	  as	  a	  foil	  to	  the	  “progress”	  of	  this	  supposedly	  unifying	  and	  
uniformly	  beneficial	  transformation,	  from	  an	  urban	  identity	  based	  on	  blue	  collar	  
manufacturing	  to	  one	  linked	  to	  a	  culture–based	  service	  economy	  (see	  Fig.	  9).	  The	  
passages	  introducing	  and	  characterizing	  Fred	  are	  worth	  quoting	  at	  length.	  In	  his	  
first	  appearance,	  he	  interrupts	  “the	  townspeople,”	  who	  are	  giddy	  with	  excitement	  
about	  the	  idea	  of	  AutoWorld:	  
“What	  a	  load	  of	  horse	  feathers,”	  said	  Fred,	  the	  Carriageless	  Horse,	  who	  
always	   knew	   everything	   about	   everything.	   “You’ll	   never	   pull	   it	   off.”	  
Fred,	   of	   course,	   was	   the	   local	   noodge.	   Ever	   since	   the	   advent	   of	   the	  
car—which	   had	   forced	   Fred	   into	   an	   early	   retirement—he’d	   always	  
pooh–poohed	   everything,	   always	   looked	   on	   the	   dark	   side	   of	   things.	  
But	   people	   didn’t	   really	   mind	   Fred,	   because	   they	   knew	   that	   if	   they	  
tried	  hard—they	  could	  pull	  it	  off.141	  
	  
Here,	  Fred’s	  character	  is	  positioned	  as	  adversarial	  from	  the	  very	  beginning.	  He	  is	  
unrelentingly	  negative	  about	  not	  only	  the	  prospect	  (though	  significantly	  not	  the	  
concept)	  of	  AutoWorld,	  but	  of	  his	  entire	  situation—he	  “always	  looked	  on	  the	  dark	  
side	  of	  things.”	  Furthermore,	  his	  negativity	  is	  a	  nuisance	  of	  the	  worst	  kind,	  in	  that	  he	  
is	  sure	  that	  he	  knows	  best	  in	  every	  possible	  situation,	  and	  this	  negativity	  is	  explicitly	  
caused	  by	  his	  forced	  unemployment	  due	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  automobile	  production.	  Fred	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is	  unable	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  realities	  of	  “progress”	  and	  an	  industrial	  capitalist	  
marketplace,	  and	  so	  he	  is	  perpetually—and	  unreasonably—bitter,	  and	  ultimately	  
marginalized	  by	  the	  dominant	  discourse	  of	  “the	  townspeople”	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
“local	  noodge”	  to	  whom	  no	  one	  pays	  much	  attention.	  Moreover,	  the	  use	  of	  this	  
character	  effectively	  shifts	  any	  blame	  of	  failure	  or	  lack	  of	  progress	  onto	  an	  
individual	  “negative”	  citizen.	  
	   There	  is	  the	  promise	  of	  salvation	  for	  Fred,	  however,	  later	  in	  the	  script,	  after	  
the	  preparation	  and	  construction	  of	  AutoWorld	  (described	  in	  hyperbolic,	  almost	  
magical	  language	  as	  events	  where	  “everyone	  cheered	  and	  hugged	  each	  other”	  and	  
“everyone	  agreed”):	  
…one	  of	  AutoWorld’s	  major	  attractions	  [was]	  a	  terrific	  ride	  that	  took	  
you	   through	   a	   whole	   series	   of	   colorful	   adventures	   depicting	   a	  
humorous	  history	  of	   the	  automobile.	  A	   tour	  down	  through	   the	  years	  
with	  the	  most	  perfect	  guide	  in	  the	  world—you	  guessed	  it—Fred!	  For	  
the	   townspeople	   brought	   him	   out	   of	   retirement	   to	   be	   his	   own	  
inimitable	  noodgey	  self	  and	  remind	  the	  audience	  of	  his	  favorite	  topic	  
…	   “how	   the	   car	   could	   never	   seriously	   replace	   the	   horse.”	   Well	  
everyone	   thought	   Fred	   was	   a	   riot;	   and	   cheered	   and	   applauded	   and	  
bought	   Fred–buttons	   and	   Fred–hats	   and	   Fred–t–shirts.	   Fred	   loved	  
every	  minute	  of	  it.142	  
	  
Resurrected	  from	  obsolescence	  and	  reinserted	  into	  the	  marketplace	  as	  an	  
aesthetisized	  representative	  of	  his	  “species,”	  Fred	  is	  given	  a	  new	  purpose	  and	  
opportunity	  to	  be	  of	  use	  in	  a	  new	  and	  spectacular	  version	  of	  his	  former,	  pre–
industrial	  reality.	  What	  makes	  him	  “the	  most	  perfect	  guide	  in	  the	  world”	  is	  the	  fact	  
of	  his	  being	  nostalgically	  authentic	  as	  a	  representative,	  but	  endearingly	  laughable	  in	  
his	  irretrievably	  antiquated	  worldview—as	  well	  as	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  believes,	  in	  the	  
face	  of	  all	  evidence	  to	  the	  contrary,	  that	  he	  is	  not	  beaten	  by	  technology.	  It	  is	  even,	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and	  arguably	  most,	  important	  that	  he	  remain	  “noodgey”	  and	  adversarial	  as	  a	  marker	  
of	  his	  authenticity	  and	  his	  at	  least	  partial	  inassimilability	  into	  the	  current	  culture	  
and	  economy.	  In	  fact,	  in	  later	  correspondence	  concerning	  the	  script	  for	  the	  
“Humorous	  History”	  ride,	  AutoWorld	  officials	  are	  specific	  in	  their	  concern	  that	  Fred	  
does	  not	  have	  enough	  “edge	  to	  his	  wit”	  and	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  “chip	  on	  his	  shoulder”	  
would	  leave	  little	  to	  laugh	  about.143	  Any	  instance	  in	  the	  script	  of	  Fred	  voicing	  a	  
dissenting	  opinion	  outside	  the	  context	  of	  his	  role	  within	  AutoWorld,	  it	  is	  worth	  
noting,	  is	  met	  with	  affectionately	  patronizing	  pats	  on	  the	  head.144	  	  
	   The	  goals	  of	  this	  characterization	  in	  the	  context	  of	  AutoWorld	  and	  of	  Flint	  in	  
1984,	  either	  intentional	  or	  unintentional,	  seem	  relatively	  obvious.	  Of	  course,	  Fred	  
embodies	  anxieties	  surrounding	  and	  actual	  dissent	  challenging	  the	  project	  of	  
AutoWorld	  and	  the	  proposed	  “revitalization”	  plan	  in	  general.	  These	  sentiments	  are	  
figured	  in	  Fred	  as	  working–class	  and	  certainly	  irrationally	  embittered	  in	  regard	  to	  a	  
dislocated	  economic	  position	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  changing	  economy.	  By	  casting	  this	  
dissent	  as	  irrational	  (and	  literally	  animalistic),	  he	  is	  set	  up	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  
overwhelming	  majority	  of	  positive	  “townspeople”	  who	  are	  in	  clear	  agreement	  about	  
the	  move	  forward	  that	  AutoWorld	  represents.	  By	  determinedly	  and	  patiently	  
enduring	  the	  protests	  of	  one	  bitter	  horse,	  the	  project	  is	  able	  to	  move	  forward	  
through	  hard	  work	  and,	  in	  the	  devastatingly	  inaccurate	  conclusion	  of	  the	  script,	  
“AutoWorld	  went	  down	  in	  history	  as	  a	  grand	  and	  noble	  event	  that	  brought	  great	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  J.	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  to	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  Sloan	  Archives,	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  That	  Could:	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  Introduction	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reward	  and	  recognition.”145	  Fred	  is	  even	  convinced	  in	  the	  end	  that	  his	  new	  and	  
rightful	  place	  is	  now	  as	  a	  spokeshorse	  and	  celebrity,	  a	  role	  that	  he	  ultimately	  
embraces—thus	  is	  his	  dissenting	  voice	  is	  contained	  and	  even	  commodified	  rather	  
than	  being	  completely	  ignored.	  Most	  significant,	  though,	  is	  the	  insistence	  in	  this	  
narrative—produced	  by	  a	  national	  agency	  in	  close	  collaboration	  with	  local	  elites—
on	  economic	  revitalization	  being	  mainly	  a	  question	  of	  image	  transformation,	  
emanating	  from	  positive	  individual	  outlooks	  and	  a	  sense	  that	  Rust	  Belt	  cities	  had	  
something	  worth	  showing	  to	  a	  national	  tourist	  audience.	  
Narratives	  such	  as	  those	  promoted	  and	  deployed	  in	  this	  script	  were	  not	  just	  
the	  product	  of	  a	  shadowy	  group	  of	  powerful	  but	  disconnected	  Flint	  officials	  
designed	  to	  suppress	  discontent,	  but	  a	  collaboration	  between	  local	  elites	  who	  
conceived	  of	  and	  pursued	  AutoWorld	  and	  a	  group	  of	  professional	  producers	  from	  
New	  York	  who	  had	  no	  particular	  stake	  in	  the	  project	  or	  in	  Flint	  beyond,	  presumably,	  
their	  contract	  obligations.	  This	  outside	  perspective	  that	  helped	  to	  produce	  the	  
picture	  of	  Flint	  that	  we	  see	  in	  The	  Little	  Town	  That	  Could	  suggests	  that	  conceptions	  
of	  deindustrialization	  in	  urban	  centers	  such	  as	  Flint	  were	  already	  circulating	  
nationally	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  and	  that	  perhaps	  the	  conflicts	  that	  Fred	  embodies	  and	  
anticipates	  were,	  to	  those	  working	  on	  the	  formation	  of	  AutoWorld’s	  image	  and	  
developmental	  narrative,	  unavoidable	  if	  not	  unsolvable.	  For	  instance,	  Daniel	  
Zwerdling,	  an	  “outsider”	  writing	  for	  the	  national	  The	  Progressive	  in	  1982,	  at	  the	  
height	  of	  the	  Reagan	  recession,	  was	  already	  describing	  the	  effects	  of	  
deindustrialization	  in	  Flint	  as	  an	  iconic	  case	  study.	  In	  national	  media,	  Flint	  was	  an	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example	  commonly	  used	  in	  what	  were	  becoming	  hegemonic	  ways	  of	  representing	  
the	  phenomenon	  of	  urban	  deindustrialization,	  and	  managing	  the	  race	  and	  class	  
conflicts	  that	  emerge	  in	  deindustrialized	  urban	  contexts.146	  In	  the	  Little	  Town	  that	  
Could	  script,	  we	  see	  not	  only	  the	  specific	  situation	  in	  Flint	  at	  this	  time—Fred	  and	  the	  
rest	  of	  this	  story	  certainly	  have	  their	  basis	  in	  real	  local	  anxieties—but	  also	  an	  
example	  of	  local	  and	  national	  discourses	  converging	  to	  produce	  ideas	  of	  what	  the	  
“problem”	  in	  Flint	  was	  about,	  what	  it	  meant,	  and	  a	  strategy	  for	  how	  to	  fix	  it.	  Fred’s	  
character—which	  never	  changed	  through	  multiple	  script	  drafts	  that	  were	  otherwise	  
overwritten	  with	  comments	  and	  concerns	  about	  the	  smallest	  detail—addresses	  
working–class	  resentment	  and	  dissent	  through	  the	  early	  1980s	  conservative	  
rhetoric	  of	  “personal	  responsibility”	  for	  one’s	  economic	  situation,	  insisting	  that	  the	  
problem	  is	  located	  primarily	  in	  Fred’s	  bad	  attitude	  toward	  progress	  of	  all	  kinds.147	  
In	  this	  Reagan–era	  discourse,	  which	  might	  accurately	  be	  called	  the	  “privatization	  of	  
blame,”	  poverty	  or	  the	  inability	  to	  overcome	  structural	  economic	  circumstances	  
were	  framed	  as	  personal	  or	  moral	  failings,	  leading	  to	  a	  logic	  that	  attributed	  any	  
economic	  difficulty	  to,	  as	  Lawrence	  P.	  Ford,	  the	  president	  of	  the	  Flint	  area	  Chamber	  
of	  Commerce	  noted,	  “a	  negative	  image	  of	  ourselves.”	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  sources	  used	  in	  this	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  York:	  Oxford	  UP,	  1992.;	  Tygiel,	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  New	  York:	  Longman,	  2004.;	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  Kyle.	  Deconstructing	  Reagan:	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  Mythology	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  Fortieth	  
President.	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  NY:	  M.E.	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Even	  following	  AutoWorld’s	  closing,	  after	  only	  nine	  months	  of	  operation,	  the	  
focus	  on	  image	  transformation	  and	  narratives	  of	  individual	  responsibility	  remained	  
central	  to	  revitalization	  in	  Flint,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  intensified.	  In	  1987,	  Money	  
magazine	  released	  the	  first	  of	  its	  annual	  issues	  ranking	  the	  “Best	  and	  Worst	  Places	  
to	  Live”	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  in	  which	  Flint	  placed	  last—a	  distinction	  made	  more	  
distressing	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  of	  the	  ten	  “worst”	  cities	  in	  the	  country,	  eight	  were	  located	  
in	  the	  “Rust	  Belt,”	  and	  five	  were	  in	  Michigan.	  The	  magazine	  noted	  that	  this	  was	  
“largely	  due	  to	  their	  high	  crime	  rates,	  weak	  economies	  and	  relatively	  few	  arts	  and	  
leisure	  activities,”148	  indicating	  an	  increasing	  interest	  around	  this	  moment	  of	  
scientifically	  calibrating	  a	  city’s	  overall	  “worth”	  through	  a	  complex	  metric	  of	  both	  
economic	  and	  cultural	  factors.	  
The	  previous	  year,	  the	  Flint	  Convention	  and	  Visitors	  Bureau	  collaborated	  
with	  PACE	  Communications,	  a	  publisher	  of	  in–flight	  magazines,	  to	  produce	  a	  special	  
issue	  called	  the	  “Flint	  Area	  Report,”	  presumably	  for	  use	  in	  Piedmont	  Airlines	  flights	  
serving	  Flint’s	  Bishop	  International	  Airport.	  This	  full–length	  magazine	  promotion	  
for	  the	  Flint	  area	  in	  a	  moment	  roughly	  contemporary	  to	  a	  major	  blow	  to	  its	  national	  
image	  (which,	  it	  could	  be	  argued,	  was	  already	  cemented	  in	  the	  public	  imagination	  by	  
this	  time)	  offers	  us	  a	  window	  into	  the	  intertwining	  narratives	  of	  what	  the	  “Rust	  
Belt”	  signified	  on	  both	  the	  national	  and	  local	  levels,	  and	  how	  these	  narratives	  
shaped	  the	  language	  and	  strategies	  of	  revitalization.	  The	  question	  of	  image	  itself	  is	  a	  
major	  theme	  running	  through	  the	  magazine,	  as	  the	  cover	  text	  proclaims	  that	  “the	  
Flint	  area	  has	  a	  sparkle	  and	  enthusiasm	  that	  contradicts	  any	  previously	  held	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  Best	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  to	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  in	  America."	  Money	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  Aug.	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notions.”149	  Inside	  the	  cover,	  the	  introductory	  overview	  reinforces	  this	  point,	  saying,	  
“stereotypical	  images	  of	  Flint,	  MI,	  are	  rapidly	  dissolving	  today	  …	  Nowhere	  are	  there	  
more	  surprises	  in	  store	  for	  visitors	  than	  in	  Flint’s	  downtown	  area	  …	  [where	  
development]	  took	  an	  indistinguishable	  river	  and	  gave	  it	  character	  and	  pizzazz;	  
cleared	  out	  drab	  buildings	  to	  erect	  an	  attractive	  urban	  campus	  of	  the	  University	  of	  
Michigan–Flint;	  and	  replaced	  several	  blocks	  of	  fading	  retail	  stores	  with	  a	  colorful	  
festival	  marketplace.”150	  Despite	  the	  noticeable	  absence	  of	  AutoWorld	  in	  this	  
overview	  (it	  had	  closed	  a	  year	  earlier	  and	  with	  its	  future	  very	  much	  in	  doubt),	  there	  
is	  a	  deliberate	  focus	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  “previously	  held”	  or	  “stereotypical”	  images	  of	  
the	  city.	  Exactly	  what	  those	  images	  are	  can	  apparently	  go	  without	  elaboration,	  as	  a	  
general	  audience	  of	  air	  travelers	  would	  without	  question	  know	  at	  least	  something	  of	  
Flint’s—and	  by	  extension,	  other	  Rust	  Belt	  cities’—reputation.	  	  
Throughout	  the	  PACE	  article,	  the	  moral	  dichotomy	  between	  an	  “industrial	  
city”	  and	  a	  “good	  city,”	  seen	  in	  Baltimore,	  Pittsburgh,	  and	  elsewhere,	  is	  again	  
employed	  in	  attempts	  to	  construct	  a	  new	  image	  for	  Flint.	  Charles	  R.	  Weeks,	  a	  bank	  
executive	  who	  came	  to	  Flint	  in	  1982,	  recalls	  his	  experience	  of	  recruiting	  employees	  
from	  other	  cities,	  and	  remembers	  that	  “many	  of	  them	  were	  shocked	  to	  find	  that	  Flint	  
‘isn’t	  a	  dirty	  industrial	  town.	  There	  are	  wide–open	  spaces,	  green	  grass	  and	  blue	  
skies.”151	  Not	  only	  is	  Flint	  not	  a	  “bad”	  industrial	  city	  in	  this	  description,	  it	  seems	  that	  
it’s	  barely	  a	  “city”	  at	  all,	  and	  more	  like	  suburb.	  Flint	  mayor	  James	  A.	  Sharp,	  Jr.,	  adds	  
what	  is	  intended	  as	  enthusiastic	  praise,	  but	  ultimately	  reads	  as	  more	  of	  an	  apology,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




	   113	  
as	  he	  says	  the	  city	  has	  “many	  beautiful	  parks	  and	  many	  attractive	  buildings.	  It’s	  
really	  a	  very	  pleasant	  city.”152	  Steven	  Wilson,	  president	  of	  the	  Flint	  Convention	  and	  
Visitors	  Bureau,	  addresses	  the	  city’s	  image	  directly	  while	  still	  maintaining	  this	  
established	  moral	  framework,	  arguing	  that	  “once	  we	  get	  people	  here,	  they	  are	  
surprised	  by	  the	  fun	  and	  the	  exciting	  atmosphere.	  People	  have	  a	  stereotyped	  image	  
of	  a	  factory	  town,	  but	  when	  they	  arrive,	  they’re	  delighted	  to	  see	  a	  beautiful	  city.”153	  
In	  short,	  we	  again	  see	  a	  resistance	  to	  national	  narratives	  of	  Rust	  Belt	  cities	  as	  “dirty,”	  
“dark,”	  run–down	  and	  generally	  undesirable	  places,	  but	  a	  persistent	  reliance	  upon	  
the	  same	  established	  and	  morally	  overdetermined	  dichotomies—there	  are	  dirty,	  
bad,	  run-­‐down	  factory	  towns	  out	  there,	  but	  Flint	  is	  certainly	  not	  one	  of	  them.	  
	  
Jacob	  Smith,	  Racial	  Anxiety,	  and	  the	  Spectral	  Whiteness	  of	  Flint	  
These	  narratives	  of	  failure	  and	  hopes	  of	  redemptive	  revitalization	  were,	  as	  
I’ve	  previously	  claimed,	  invested	  with	  a	  deep	  sense	  of	  racial	  anxiety	  on	  the	  part	  of	  
elites,	  crucial	  white	  consumers,	  and	  the	  nation	  in	  general,	  about	  urban	  space,	  
especially	  within	  the	  Rust	  Belt.	  To	  return	  to	  Mike	  Royko’s	  characterization	  of	  the	  
Rust	  Belt	  according	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country,	  cities	  were	  “too	  black,”	  “too	  Puerto	  
Rican,”	  and	  “too	  sinful	  and	  criminally	  inclined.”154	  As	  Royko	  also	  mentions,	  but	  does	  
not	  fully	  explore,	  Rust	  Belt	  cities	  were	  also	  seen	  as	  “dirty”	  and	  “gritty,”	  words	  used	  
to	  describe	  these	  cities—and	  often	  reclaimed	  by	  these	  cities	  themselves	  to	  resist	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  Ibid.	  
153	  Ibid.	  
154	  Royko,	  Mike.	  "Ron,	  Jim	  To	  Big	  Cities:	  Drop	  Dead."	  Chicago	  Tribune.	  N.p.,	  07	  Feb.	  1985.	  
Web.	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and	  distance	  themselves	  from	  this	  characterization—that	  are	  also	  loaded	  with	  
moral	  and	  racial	  significance.	  
	   In	  1983,	  the	  Flint	  Downtown	  Development	  Authority	  commissioned	  a	  survey	  
to	  assess	  the	  habits	  and	  attitudes	  of	  shoppers	  in	  downtown	  Flint.	  Among	  188	  former	  
downtown	  shoppers,	  a	  full	  4%	  responded	  that	  they	  felt	  “afraid	  of	  blacks.”	  
Additionally,	  8%	  felt	  “unsafe”	  downtown,	  4%	  reported	  they	  “[did]	  not	  like	  the	  
atmosphere,”	  4%	  felt	  that	  “downtown	  is	  not	  clean”	  and	  7%	  felt	  that	  “people	  are	  odd”	  
downtown.155	  Although	  not	  overwhelming	  numbers,	  especially	  as	  compared	  to	  
practical	  issues	  such	  as	  downtown	  parking,	  which	  was	  cited	  by	  50%	  of	  respondents	  
as	  a	  primary	  reason	  they	  no	  longer	  shopped	  downtown,	  the	  collection	  of	  explicitly	  
racial	  or	  at	  least	  racially	  loaded	  responses	  from	  presumably	  white,	  middle–class	  
shoppers	  (the	  demographic	  whose	  abandonment	  of	  urban	  centers	  throughout	  the	  
late	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  	  had	  been	  a	  source	  of	  concern	  for	  downtown	  retailers,	  city	  
governments,	  and	  others)	  helps	  to	  frames	  the	  issue	  of	  racial	  anxiety	  as	  an	  economic	  
one,	  as	  well	  as	  one	  related	  to	  image.	  This	  anxiety	  surrounding	  the	  racial	  character	  
and	  “safety”	  of	  urban	  space	  was	  particularly	  powerful	  in	  the	  rapidly	  declining	  Rust	  
Belt	  of	  former	  industrial	  cities	  in	  the	  Midwest—from	  Flint	  and	  Detroit	  to	  
Youngstown	  and	  Baltimore—once	  seen	  as	  “model	  cities”	  and	  now	  as	  urban	  
wastelands.	  Of	  course,	  American	  cities,	  and	  especially	  downtowns,	  had	  always	  been	  
segregated	  spaces	  that	  managed	  cross–racial	  and	  cross–class	  contact	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  
ways,	  but	  racial	  discourse	  and	  tensions	  were	  amplified	  in	  discussions	  of	  urban	  space	  
following	  the	  racially–motivated	  urban	  rebellions	  of	  the	  late	  1960s,	  many	  of	  which	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occurred	  in	  what	  were	  becoming	  Rust	  Belt	  cities	  (Detroit,	  Newark,	  Plainfield,	  New	  
Jersey	  and	  Minneapolis	  in	  1967;	  Baltimore	  and	  Chicago	  in	  1968).156	  	  
	   One	  of	  the	  ways	  AutoWorld,	  as	  a	  revitalization	  centerpiece,	  attempted	  to	  
manage	  the	  issue	  of	  race	  was	  through	  its	  exhibits.	  As	  visitors	  were	  presented	  with	  a	  
quasi–historical	  narrative	  of	  Flint	  and	  its	  place	  in	  the	  automotive	  industry,	  
contemporary	  images	  of	  the	  city	  as	  a	  dangerous	  deindustrialized	  battlefield	  were	  
elided	  or	  erased	  altogether.	  As	  exhibit	  designers,	  local	  elites,	  and	  public	  relations	  
firms	  worked	  to	  produce	  a	  marketable	  heritage	  for	  the	  city,	  that	  heritage	  was	  
grounded	  in	  nostalgia	  for	  segregated	  urban	  space,	  and	  a	  comforting	  white	  origin	  
narrative	  that	  connected	  a	  stable,	  distant	  past	  to	  a	  troubled	  present	  very	  much	  in	  
need	  of	  a	  reassuring	  racial	  symbol	  for	  middle–class	  consumers	  to	  grasp.	  Upon	  
entering	  AutoWorld,	  visitors	  were	  immediately	  greeted	  by	  a	  figure	  of	  great	  
importance	  and	  authority	  in	  the	  world	  that	  they	  were	  about	  to	  experience—as	  
Flint’s	  “first	  settler,”	  Jacob	  Smith	  was	  accorded	  a	  considerable	  measure	  of	  power	  in	  
the	  narrative	  of	  Flint’s	  identity	  and	  development	  presented	  at	  AutoWorld,	  and	  
particularly	  in	  the	  main	  domed	  exhibit	  area	  that	  contained	  a	  walkable	  recreation	  of	  
Flint’s	  history.	  If	  Fred	  the	  Carriageless	  Horse	  was	  AutoWorld’s	  Mickey	  Mouse,	  
condensing	  the	  entire	  experience	  of	  the	  park	  into	  a	  “fun”	  and	  marketable	  icon,	  then	  
Jacob	  Smith	  was	  the	  respectable	  obverse,	  providing	  AutoWorld	  with	  an	  authentic	  
historical	  anchor	  and	  a	  parallel	  mascot	  for	  the	  city	  itself.	  As	  a	  ghost	  from	  the	  distant	  
past,	  Smith	  spoke	  with	  the	  unique	  ability	  to	  collapse	  historical	  time	  to	  “remember”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156	  For	  an	  excellent	  discussion	  of	  the	  historical	  segregation	  of	  downtowns,	  see	  Isenberg,	  
Downtown	  America:	  A	  History	  of	  the	  Place	  and	  the	  People	  Who	  Made	  It.	  This	  argues	  against	  
scholarship	  that	  proposes	  a	  more	  recent	  eroding	  and	  loss	  of	  an	  idealized	  “public	  space,”	  
such	  as	  Sorkin,	  et	  al.,	  Variations	  on	  a	  Theme	  Park.	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the	  past,	  present,	  and	  future	  of	  Flint,	  making	  him	  as	  reliable	  and	  omniscient	  a	  
narrator	  as	  Fred	  is	  unreliable	  and	  wacky.	  By	  locating	  the	  authority	  of	  Flint’s	  origins	  
in	  this	  explicitly	  white	  figure,	  and	  through	  the	  specific	  technologies	  used	  to	  
represent	  these	  origins,	  the	  figure	  of	  Jacob	  Smith	  does	  the	  important	  work	  of	  
managing	  multiple	  racial	  anxieties	  that	  were	  very	  much	  a	  part	  of	  the	  urban	  culture	  
of	  Flint,	  and	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  whole,	  as	  it	  grappled	  with	  the	  late–twentieth–century	  
crisis	  of	  deindustrialization.	  	  
	   The	  technology	  mobilized	  in	  “Jacob	  Smith’s	  Cabin”	  is	  not	  technically	  audio–
animatronic	  in	  form,	  but	  rather	  a	  much	  older	  technology	  known	  as	  “Pepper’s	  Ghost,”	  
which	  relies	  on	  projection	  and	  mirrors	  to	  create	  the	  illusion	  of	  ghostly	  figures	  in	  
space.	  Developed	  in	  the	  late	  1800s,	  the	  technique	  was,	  and	  still	  is,	  most	  widely	  
employed	  in	  Disney	  theme	  parks	  in	  such	  attractions	  as	  “The	  Haunted	  Mansion,”	  
further	  illustrating	  the	  deep	  commitment	  of	  AutoWorld’s	  developers	  to	  the	  lucrative	  
Disney	  model.	  After	  gaining	  admission	  to	  the	  park,	  visitors	  would	  approach	  the	  
entrance	  to	  the	  main	  exhibit	  space,	  where	  Jacob	  Smith’s	  log	  cabin	  stood.	  Inside	  the	  
cabin,	  visible	  through	  a	  large,	  diorama–like	  opening	  at	  the	  front,	  sat	  a	  ghostly	  white,	  
blank–faced	  mannequin	  dressed	  in	  trapper’s	  furs	  complete	  with	  fur	  hat	  and	  rifle.	  
The	  cabin	  was	  similarly	  decorated	  with	  hanging	  and	  stretched	  furs	  and	  other	  
“historical”	  artifacts	  to	  make	  Smith’s	  nineteenth–century	  periodization	  clear.	  After	  
visitors	  pressed	  a	  large	  button	  at	  the	  front	  of	  the	  cabin’s	  “stage,”	  a	  film	  of	  Smith’s	  
spectral	  white	  face	  was	  projected	  onto	  the	  mannequin’s	  blank	  features,	  and	  Smith	  
would	  appear	  to	  “wake	  up”	  from	  a	  sleep	  to	  give	  a	  prerecorded	  speech	  about	  his	  own	  
background	  and	  the	  development	  of	  the	  little	  settlement	  that	  he	  had	  begun,	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culminating	  with	  an	  enthusiastic	  endorsement	  of	  the	  park	  that	  the	  visitor	  was	  about	  
to	  experience,	  and	  thus	  framing	  AutoWorld	  as	  the	  natural	  culmination	  of	  a	  history	  
that	  began	  with	  himself.	  Smith	  then	  went	  back	  into	  his	  sleep	  and	  the	  projection	  
stopped,	  leaving	  the	  figure	  once	  again	  blank	  (see	  Fig.	  10).	  
	   Smith’s	  speech	  begins	  with	  this	  introduction:	  “I’m	  Jacob	  Smith,	  fur	  trader.	  I	  
died	  here	  in	  my	  cabin	  back	  in	  1825.	  In	  those	  days,	  there	  wasn’t	  any	  kind	  of	  city	  here,	  
just	  an	  Indian	  village.”157	  The	  immediate	  distinction	  made	  by	  this	  figure	  of	  authority	  
between	  any	  kind	  of	  proper	  “city”	  and	  “just	  an	  Indian	  village”	  is	  a	  crucial	  moment	  in	  
the	  construction	  of	  Smith	  as	  a	  representative	  of	  Flint—a	  “city”	  is	  something	  to	  be	  
proud	  of	  and	  to	  monumentalize,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  something	  that	  was	  initiated	  
by	  white	  settlers	  like	  Smith,	  who	  are	  immediately	  positioned	  as	  the	  rightful	  point	  of	  
origin	  and	  identity	  against	  those	  who	  resided	  in	  “just	  an	  Indian	  village.”	  Smith	  is	  a	  
heroic	  and	  dignified	  figure,	  even	  if	  he	  goes	  on	  to	  marvel	  at	  how	  he	  could	  have	  never	  
imagined	  such	  as	  thing	  as	  the	  automobile,	  calling	  himself	  an	  “old–timer”	  who	  
nonetheless	  can	  transcend	  time	  to	  see	  everything	  about	  the	  development	  of	  his	  
town.	  His	  monologue	  ends	  by	  encouraging	  everyone	  to	  explore	  the	  entire	  park,	  and	  
further	  solidifying	  his	  position	  as	  an	  authoritative	  white	  subject	  by	  saying,	  “take	  the	  
advice	  of	  a	  fur	  trader	  who	  knows	  the	  lay	  of	  the	  land…don’t	  miss	  anything.”158	  The	  
Pepper’s	  Ghost	  technology	  reinforces	  the	  metaphors	  of	  whiteness,	  which	  designers	  
didn’t	  hesitate	  to	  emphasize:	  aside	  from	  simply	  being	  a	  representation	  of	  a	  white	  
man,	  Smith	  is	  “ghostly”	  and	  “ethereal”	  as	  his	  face	  is	  semi–transparent	  and	  made	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157	  Jacob	  Smith's	  Cabin.	  13	  Apr.	  1984.	  Exhibit	  Script.	  
158	  Ibid.	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light,159	  all	  of	  which	  serve	  to	  reinforce	  Flint’s	  white–centric	  heritage	  as	  located	  in	  the	  
figure	  of	  Smith.	  	  
	   The	  use	  of	  the	  Pepper’s	  Ghost	  technology	  is	  distinct	  from,	  but	  resonates	  
usefully	  with,	  the	  truly	  animatronic	  figures	  at	  AutoWorld,	  such	  as	  Fred.	  Although	  the	  
effect	  of	  “bringing	  history	  to	  life”	  in	  both	  exhibits	  is	  similar,	  the	  difference	  in	  
presentation	  makes	  the	  meanings	  of	  each	  technology	  mutually	  constitutive—the	  
animatronic	  is	  defined	  and	  its	  effects	  overdetermined	  against	  those	  figures	  that	  are	  
not	  animatronic.	  The	  blending	  of	  “fun”	  and	  “serious”	  here	  forms	  a	  mutually	  
reinforcing	  relationship,	  illuminating	  the	  presentation	  of	  seemingly	  conflicting	  types	  
of	  history.	  While	  it	  is	  conceivable	  that	  Jacob	  Smith	  could	  be	  made	  as	  cartoonish	  a	  
character	  as	  Fred,	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  is	  given	  a	  more	  serious	  form,	  in	  which	  the	  
imitation	  of	  reality	  (or	  unreality,	  as	  he	  is	  a	  ghost)	  is	  more	  highly	  valued,	  reinforces	  
the	  importance	  placed	  on	  Flint’s	  history	  and	  the	  ways	  it	  is	  represented.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  
say	  that	  Fred’s	  history	  is	  not	  treated	  as	  important	  within	  AutoWorld,	  only	  as	  more	  
available	  than	  Smith’s	  (and	  perhaps	  more	  desirable)	  for	  obvious	  fictionalization.	  
Again,	  this	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  dialectic	  between	  a	  “serious”	  mascot	  and	  a	  “fun”	  
mascot,	  a	  relationship	  that	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  in	  a	  parallel	  exhibits	  dealing	  with	  labor	  
history.	  	  
In	  “On	  The	  Move,”	  a	  diorama	  set	  frames	  a	  late	  1930s	  kitchen	  scene,	  in	  which	  
a	  white	  mannequin	  dressed	  in	  a	  blue	  factory–worker’s	  uniform	  sits	  at	  a	  table	  
reading	  a	  newspaper	  while	  his	  white	  wife	  prepares	  food	  in	  the	  background.	  At	  the	  
push	  of	  a	  button,	  a	  face	  appears	  on	  the	  masculine	  figure,	  who	  narrates	  the	  changes	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  “Smith’s	  Cabin	  AudioVisual	  Presentation.	  28	  Sept.	  1983.	  Exhibit.	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in	  his	  life	  that	  occurred	  after	  the	  landmark	  1937	  sit–down	  strike	  in	  Flint.	  He	  
describes	  seriously	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  strike	  and	  the	  power	  of	  the	  union	  in	  what	  is	  
marked	  as	  “working–class”	  diction	  (where,	  for	  example,	  “thinking”	  becomes	  
“thinkin’”	  and	  “remember”	  becomes	  “‘member”).	  His	  speech	  concludes	  with	  a	  
controversial	  line	  that	  was	  taken	  out	  of	  the	  presentation	  at	  the	  last	  minute:	  “Funny,	  
but	  I	  just	  don’t	  hate	  the	  assembly	  line	  like	  I	  used	  to.”160	  Even	  without	  this	  line,	  
however,	  the	  impression	  remains	  that	  the	  strike	  did	  its	  work	  in	  the	  1930s,	  and	  
things	  have	  been	  wholly	  unproblematic	  for	  workers	  ever	  since.	  In	  this	  exhibit,	  labor	  
history	  is	  treated	  “seriously”	  through	  this	  particular	  technology	  by	  allowing	  the	  
worker	  to	  “speak	  for	  himself”	  with	  a	  prerecorded	  message	  and	  a	  white	  face—though	  
he	  is,	  like	  Jacob	  Smith,	  long	  dead,	  only	  to	  tell	  his	  story	  as	  a	  forever–contented	  ghost.	  	  
This	  seemingly	  neutral	  normalization	  of	  whiteness	  through	  the	  
representative	  worker	  resonates	  even	  more	  deeply	  in	  the	  figure	  of	  Jacob	  Smith.	  As	  
Eric	  Hobsbawm,	  Benedict	  Anderson,	  and	  others	  have	  pointed	  out,	  the	  creation	  of	  
national	  or	  local	  origin	  narratives	  is	  one	  of	  the	  major	  ways	  that	  political,	  cultural	  or	  
economic	  groups	  are	  defined,	  and	  define	  themselves,	  as	  communities.161	  This	  
process	  becomes	  even	  more	  significant	  in	  the	  case	  of	  AutoWorld	  when	  we	  consider	  
that	  part	  of	  the	  competition	  between	  urban	  spaces	  to	  create	  and	  nurture	  a	  
marketable	  image	  is	  to	  “act	  as	  a	  lure	  to	  both	  capital	  and	  people	  ‘of	  the	  right	  sort’	  (i.e.	  
wealthy	  and	  influential).”162	  To	  this	  formulation,	  I	  would	  add	  the	  category	  (or	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  Labor	  on	  the	  Move.	  7	  Dec.	  1983.	  Exhibit	  Script.	  
161	  Anderson,	  Benedict	  R.	  O'G.	  Imagined	  Communities:	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Origin	  and	  Spread	  of	  
Nationalism.	  London:	  Verso,	  1991.;	  Hobsbawm,	  E.	  J.,	  and	  T.	  O.	  Ranger.	  The	  Invention	  of	  
Tradition.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  UP,	  1992.	  
162	  Harvey,	  The	  Condition	  of	  Postmodernity:	  295.	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simply	  make	  explicit	  the	  implication)	  of	  “white.”	  In	  the	  city	  of	  Flint—which,	  much	  
like	  Detroit,	  has	  been	  shaped	  by	  de	  facto	  segregation	  in	  housing	  and	  racialized	  
divisions	  of	  urban	  space	  such	  as	  highway	  construction	  that	  have	  only	  been	  
exacerbated	  by	  deindustrialization—the	  interconnections	  of	  “race”	  with	  tourism	  
and	  an	  image	  of	  “safety”	  are	  crucial	  for	  understanding	  how	  the	  cultural	  
representations	  shaped,	  and	  were	  shaped	  by,	  discourses	  of	  race	  in	  the	  post-­‐urban	  
rebellion,	  post-­‐“white	  flight”	  Rust	  Belt.163	  This	  concern	  is	  clear	  both	  in	  nonresidents’	  
perceptions	  of	  Flint	  as	  generally	  “unsafe,”	  as	  well	  as	  in	  more	  detailed	  descriptions	  of	  
the	  “problem”	  with	  Flint.	  For	  instance,	  a	  1984	  Saginaw	  News	  reader	  survey,	  asking	  
whether	  or	  not	  Saginaw,	  Michigan	  residents	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  make	  the	  45–
minute	  trip	  to	  visit	  AutoWorld,	  included	  responses	  such	  as:	  “besides	  the	  price	  being	  
too	  high,	  if	  I’m	  lucky,	  I’ll	  never	  have	  to	  go	  to	  Flint”	  and	  “it	  won’t	  be	  any	  safer	  in	  that	  
place	  than	  in	  downtown	  Flint.”	  The	  conflation	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  “safety”	  with	  “race”	  (read:	  
Black	  people)	  is	  just	  beneath	  the	  surface	  of	  comments	  such	  as	  these,	  but	  Maxine	  
Kronick,	  a	  “downtown	  Flint	  official”	  speaking	  about	  AutoWorld	  and	  Flint’s	  
revitalization	  efforts	  in	  the	  1988	  Michael	  Moore	  film	  Roger	  and	  Me	  makes	  clear	  this	  
connection	  between	  image,	  “the	  right	  sort	  of	  people”	  and	  race:	  
It	   started	   to	   get	   looking	   like	   Toronto,	   upper–middle	   class	   Black	   and	  
white	  people,	   and	   everybody	  was	  dressed	  nice,	   and	   ...	  we	   thought	   it	  
would	  be	  the	  entertainment	  center	  of	  the	  county,	  in	  all	  truth.	  And	  that	  
may	  be	  naïve,	  but	  that	  was	  my	  goal—let’s	  make	  it	  the	  entertainment	  
center,	  let’s	  make	  it	  so	  that	  everybody	  wants	  to	  be	  in	  downtown	  Flint.	  
We’re	  going	  to	  have	  entertainment,	  we’re	  going	  to	  have	  art,	  it’s	  going	  
to	  be	  very	  cultural,	  it’s	  going	  to	  be	  very	  upbeat.	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  For	  a	  full	  treatment	  of	  this	  phenomena	  as	  it	  has	  shaped	  the	  racial	  character	  of	  Detroit,	  
see	  Sugrue,	  The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Urban	  Crisis:	  Race	  and	  Inequality	  in	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Somebody	  said	  something	  to	  me,	  and	  maybe	  it’s	  true.	  They	  said,	  ‘look	  
Maxine—you	  can’t	  make	  Palm	  Beach	  out	  of	  the	  Bowery.’	  You	  want	  to	  
make	  Palm	  Beach,	  you	  gotta	  go	  to	  Palm	  Beach.164	  	  
	  
This	  representative	  of	  the	  cultural	  elite	  who	  most	  vocally	  and	  materially	  advanced	  
the	  project	  of	  AutoWorld	  and	  urban	  renewal	  in	  general	  clearly	  frames	  the	  “problem”	  
of	  Flint	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  classed	  formulation	  of	  local	  racial	  difference.	  “Middle–class”	  
Black	  people	  are	  not	  a	  threat	  to	  this	  project,	  as	  they	  are	  presumably,	  like	  middle–
class	  whites,	  on	  the	  tourist	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum,	  coming	  in	  to	  visit	  Flint	  from	  
elsewhere	  to	  spend	  money	  in	  this	  new	  economy.	  The	  real	  threat,	  if	  we	  interpret	  
Kronick’s	  comments	  in	  the	  context	  of	  urban	  realities,	  are	  unemployed	  Blacks	  who	  
live	  inside	  the	  city.	  Working–class	  and	  unemployed	  whites	  could	  also	  be	  considered	  
a	  threat,	  but	  in	  terms	  of	  troubled	  urban	  centers	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  the	  image	  of	  
these	  urban	  centers,	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  they	  are	  primarily	  Black	  and	  “unsafe”	  
places,	  unfit	  for	  family	  entertainment—one	  must	  go	  to	  Palm	  Beach	  for	  that	  kind	  of	  
thing.	  This	  image	  of	  problematic	  urban	  Blackness	  is	  grounded	  in	  racial	  discourses	  
that	  proliferated	  in	  the	  early	  1980s	  and	  throughout	  the	  Reagan	  administration.	  The	  
widely	  circulated	  image	  of	  the	  “welfare	  queen”	  that	  originated	  with	  Reagan’s	  
repeated	  use	  of	  a	  disingenuous	  anecdote	  regarding	  a	  Midwestern	  Black	  woman	  who	  
had	  defrauded	  taxpayers	  of	  millions	  of	  dollars	  in	  welfare	  funds	  advanced	  the	  image	  
of	  an	  urban	  Black	  population	  that	  was	  dangerous,	  untrustworthy,	  and	  undeserving	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of	  support.	  Such	  narratives,	  alongside	  images	  of	  an	  exploding	  crack	  epidemic	  and	  
accompanying	  media	  coverage,	  framed	  urban	  problems	  in	  terms	  of	  race.165	  
There	  are	  additional	  levels	  of	  racial	  meaning	  in	  Kronick’s	  comments.	  While	  
she	  does	  frame	  the	  problems	  of	  Flint	  in	  terms	  of	  “black	  and	  white,”	  her	  allowance	  
for	  theoretical	  class	  mobility	  within	  racial	  categories	  also	  grants	  both	  Blacks	  and	  
whites	  status	  as	  worthy	  populations.	  If	  we	  consider	  this	  status	  as	  being	  also	  
implicitly	  that	  of	  “citizen,”	  then	  we	  can	  also	  read	  her	  statements	  against	  the	  other	  
major	  anxiety	  that	  crossed	  class	  and	  racial	  boundaries	  at	  this	  time,	  especially	  in	  
automobile–industry	  based	  communities	  like	  those	  of	  Michigan:	  the	  racialized	  
threat	  of	  the	  “foreign	  competition”	  for	  American	  industrial	  jobs,	  and	  the	  growing	  
success	  of	  Japanese–made	  automobiles	  in	  the	  US.	  There	  was	  a	  specific	  controversy	  
that	  erupted	  around	  AutoWorld	  that	  contributes	  greatly	  to	  a	  better	  understanding	  
of	  how	  an	  exhibit	  such	  as	  Jacob	  Smith’s	  cabin	  constructed	  a	  stable	  origin	  through	  
race,	  as	  Michael	  Moore	  describes	  in	  a	  1984	  Michigan	  Voice	  column:	  
At	   issue	   is	   a	   poster	   at	   AutoWorld	   showing	   a	   car	   with	   stereotypical	  
“Oriental”	  [my	  quotes]	  features—buck	  teeth,	  slits	  for	  eyes,	  etc.—dive–
bombing	  an	  aircraft	  carrier	  named	  “Detroit”	  with	  the	  Japanese	  Rising	  
Sun	  in	  the	  background.	  The	  idea	  is	  to	  point	  out	  how	  Japan’s	  increased	  
auto	  sales	  in	  the	  U.S.	  is	  our	  “second	  Pearl	  Harbor.”	  (Fig.	  11)	  
	  
But	  Helen	  Zia	  of	  Citizens	  for	  Justice	  says	  that	  “this	  is	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  
racist	   defamation	   that	   killed	   Vincent	   Chin.”	   It	   is	   also	   effective	   in	  
turning	   autoworker	   anger	   against	   the	   Japanese	   instead	   of	   GM	   and	  
Ford.166	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  See	  Jeremy	  D.	  Mayer,	  “Reagan	  and	  Race:	  Prophet	  of	  Color	  Blindness,	  Baiter	  of	  the	  
Backlash”	  in	  Longley,	  Kyle.	  Deconstructing	  Reagan:	  Conservative	  Mythology	  and	  America's	  
Fortieth	  President.	  Armonk,	  NY:	  M.E.	  Sharpe,	  2007.	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  Moore,	  Michael.	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  Michigan	  Voice	  [Flint]	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The	  1982	  murder	  of	  Vincent	  Chin	  that	  is	  referenced	  here,	  and	  which	  is	  documented	  
in	  Christine	  Choy’s	  1987	  Academy–Award	  nominated	  documentary	  Who	  Killed	  
Vincent	  Chin?,	  refers	  to	  a	  Chinese	  American	  man	  murdered	  in	  Detroit	  by	  two	  
unemployed,	  white	  male	  auto	  workers,	  and	  serves	  as	  a	  useful	  touchstone	  for	  
understanding	  the	  depth	  of	  anti–Asian	  racial	  anxiety	  and	  hatred	  that	  accompanied	  
deindustrialization	  in	  former	  automotive	  towns.	  Asian	  American	  community	  
members	  and	  activist	  organizations	  were	  so	  vocal	  in	  their	  criticism	  of	  the	  poster	  
that	  it	  was	  eventually	  removed,	  but	  only	  after	  AutoWorld	  officials	  defended	  it	  by	  
suggesting	  that	  it	  shouldn’t	  be	  taken	  so	  seriously—the	  poster	  was	  explained	  as	  just	  
another	  part	  of	  the	  “wackiness”	  that	  AutoWorld	  offered.167	  
Against	  these	  social	  and	  cultural	  backgrounds,	  we	  can	  read	  Jacob	  Smith’s	  
Cabin	  as	  powerfully	  engaging	  with	  issues	  of	  race	  in	  local,	  national,	  and	  international	  
contexts.	  By	  selecting	  the	  figure	  of	  Jacob	  Smith	  to	  speak	  as	  the	  authority	  on	  and	  
irrefutable	  eyewitness	  to	  the	  beginnings	  of	  the	  modern	  postindustrial	  city	  of	  Flint,	  
and	  further	  positioning	  him	  as	  the	  first	  feature	  that	  visitors	  would	  encounter,	  
introducing	  them	  to	  the	  spectacular	  recreation	  of	  Flint’s	  history,	  this	  exhibit	  
participates	  in	  complex	  systems	  of	  meaning–making	  around	  race,	  class,	  citizenship,	  
and	  community	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  80s,	  as	  new	  discursive	  practices	  reified	  familiar	  
representational	  strategies	  through	  which	  whiteness	  was	  normalized,	  Blackness	  
was	  defined	  in	  relation	  to	  class	  and	  urban	  space,	  and	  Asianness	  was	  constructed	  as	  
an	  always–foreign	  threat.	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  For	  the	  controversy,	  see	  Asian	  Week	  [San	  Francisco]	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  as	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Returning	  to	  Maxine	  Kronick’s	  comments,	  we	  can	  also	  see	  an	  emerging	  
narrative	  of	  a	  city’s	  image	  that	  seemingly	  contradicts,	  but	  in	  many	  ways	  supports,	  
the	  dominant	  impulse	  of	  Rust	  Belt	  cities’	  efforts	  to	  transform	  “stereotypical	  images”	  
of	  themselves.	  Interviewed	  by	  Moore	  for	  Roger	  &	  Me	  after	  the	  massive	  failure	  of	  
AutoWorld	  and	  other	  revitalization	  projects	  begun	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  
1980s,	  Kronick	  brings	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight	  to	  her	  analysis	  of	  “what	  went	  wrong.”	  
In	  her	  view,	  and	  no	  doubt	  in	  the	  view	  of	  those	  around	  the	  country,	  AutoWorld	  was	  of	  
course	  a	  ridiculous	  idea,	  doomed	  to	  failure,	  for	  the	  simple	  reason	  that	  “you	  can’t	  
make	  Palm	  Beach	  out	  of	  the	  Bowery.”	  This	  common–sense	  notion—that	  Flint	  and	  
other	  Rust	  Belt	  cities	  like	  it	  had	  a	  certain	  unchangeable	  essence	  that	  was	  tragically	  
transparent	  to	  potential	  tourists—is	  rooted	  in	  a	  sentiment	  that	  ultimately	  exposes	  
the	  weakness	  of	  compulsory	  optimism,	  but	  also	  shores	  up	  a	  neoliberal	  logic	  that	  
dictates	  that	  failure	  is	  always	  deserved,	  and	  is	  evidence	  of	  some	  inherent,	  individual	  
failure	  of	  character.	  This	  is	  the	  double	  bind	  in	  which	  Rust	  Belt	  cities	  found	  
themselves	  as	  they	  struggled	  to	  navigate	  a	  postindustrial	  future—radiate	  positive	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Figure	  7:	  “	  ATTITUDE:	  The	  Magic	  Word	  for	  SUCCESS	  in	  Flint	  &	  Genesee	  County”	  
bumper	  sticker	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Figure	  8:	  “Attitude”	  billboard,	  Flint,	  1982	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Figure	  9:	  “Fred,	  the	  Carriageless	  Horse”	  character	  sketch	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Figure	  10:	  Jacob	  Smith	  in	  his	  cabin	  at	  AutoWorld	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Figure	  11:	  “Our	  Second	  Pearl	  Harbor”	  poster	  displayed	  at	  AutoWorld	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  Marketplaces	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Crises	  and	  Spectacles	  of	  Labor	  at	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  of	  “Morning	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  America”	  
	  
	  
Figure	  12:	  James	  Rouse	  on	  the	  cover	  of	  TIME	  magazine,	  1981	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On	  August	  24,	  1981,	  the	  cover	  of	  TIME	  magazine	  made	  a	  bold	  and	  triumphant	  
declaration:	  “Cities	  Are	  Fun!”168	  This	  celebratory	  message	  was	  probably	  news	  to	  
TIME’s	  readership	  and	  likely	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  whole	  in	  1981,	  and	  the	  very	  need	  to	  
make	  such	  a	  counterintuitive	  claim	  in	  such	  dramatic	  fashion	  was	  itself	  evidence	  of	  
the	  state	  of	  America	  cities—or	  at	  least	  most	  middle–class	  Americans’	  view	  of	  them.	  
For	  more	  than	  a	  decade,	  American	  urban	  centers,	  especially	  those	  in	  the	  Northeast,	  
Atlantic	  coast,	  and	  Midwest,	  had	  been	  increasingly	  perceived	  as	  run–down,	  unstable,	  
dangerous	  places.	  Unemployment	  had	  been	  steadily	  increasing	  as	  these	  regions	  
hemorrhaged	  industrial	  jobs,	  and	  the	  increasing	  polarization	  between	  urban	  and	  
suburban	  areas	  meant	  that	  cities	  were	  becoming	  more	  economically	  and	  politically	  
isolated	  from	  the	  guarded	  affluence	  outside	  their	  borders.	  Waves	  of	  suburban	  tax	  
revolts	  of	  the	  late	  1970s,	  among	  other	  popular	  and	  governmental	  actions,	  had	  sent	  a	  
clear	  message	  that	  the	  health	  of	  central	  cities	  was	  not	  high	  on	  the	  list	  of	  priorities	  
for	  white	  suburban	  taxpayers.	  
In	  support	  of	  their	  celebratory	  assertion,	  the	  cover’s	  illustration	  depicted	  a	  
kindly	  white	  gentleman’s	  bespectacled	  face,	  smiling	  comfortingly	  and	  identified	  as	  
“Master	  Planner	  James	  Rouse.”	  Rouse	  and	  his	  business,	  the	  Rouse	  Company,	  had	  
been	  extremely	  successful	  in	  the	  several	  years	  preceding	  this	  article	  in	  transforming	  
economically	  abandoned	  and	  commercially	  unviable	  urban	  districts	  into	  middle–
class	  tourist	  areas,	  mostly	  in	  the	  ailing	  former	  industrial	  Northeast,	  and	  the	  story	  to	  
accompany	  this	  cover	  image	  was	  in	  fact	  about	  Rouse’s	  latest	  development,	  
Baltimore’s	  Harborplace.	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  "Cities	  Are	  Fun!"	  Time	  24	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  Cover.	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The	  secondary	  cover	  story,	  displayed	  in	  the	  corner	  foldout,	  shows	  a	  
Professional	  Air	  Traffic	  Controllers’	  union	  (PATCO)	  picket	  line	  with	  the	  headline,	  
“There	  is	  No	  Strike:	  Reagan	  Stands	  Firm.”	  The	  PATCO	  strike	  had	  been	  an	  ongoing	  
national	  saga	  since	  August	  3	  of	  that	  year,	  when	  nearly	  13,000	  organized	  air	  traffic	  
controllers	  had	  walked	  off	  the	  job,	  hoping	  to	  disrupt	  the	  air	  travel	  industry	  and	  force	  
the	  federal	  government	  to	  meet	  demands	  for	  higher	  wages,	  a	  shorter	  work	  week,	  
and	  better	  retirement	  benefits.	  
These	  two	  headlines	  probably,	  at	  the	  time	  as	  well	  as	  today,	  seem	  unrelated	  
beyond	  their	  temporal	  proximity	  and	  shared	  space	  within	  the	  red	  border	  of	  TIME	  
magazine.	  Indeed,	  one	  occupied	  the	  “Living”	  section	  in	  the	  magazine,	  reserved	  for	  
cultural,	  or	  at	  least	  not	  specifically	  political	  or	  economic,	  news,	  and	  the	  other	  had	  
been	  a	  national	  headline	  for	  weeks,	  drawing	  the	  attention	  of	  President	  Reagan	  as	  
well	  as	  every	  major	  national	  news	  outlet.	  The	  academic	  literature	  would	  seem	  to	  
agree—much	  labor	  history,	  and	  history	  of	  this	  period	  in	  general,	  tends	  to	  deal	  with	  
cultural	  dimensions	  of	  labor	  and	  class	  dynamics	  in	  an	  updated	  version	  of	  older	  
analytical	  models	  where	  culture	  reflects	  some	  larger	  structures	  of	  what	  blue–collar	  
life	  looks	  like.	  Even	  recent	  cultural	  analysis	  of	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s	  
concentrates	  much	  of	  its	  energy	  upon	  either	  (a)	  a	  backlash	  narrative	  in	  which	  the	  
white	  working–class	  finds	  itself	  abandoned	  by	  or	  at	  odds	  with	  a	  post–1960s	  culture,	  
or	  (b)	  the	  popular	  cultural	  politics	  of	  “Staying’	  Alive,”	  the	  emergence	  of	  punk,	  or	  “All	  
in	  the	  Family.”169	  This	  unfortunately	  often	  comes	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  a	  deeper	  look	  at	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  See,	  for	  example,	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  The	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the	  largely	  unexamined	  questions	  about	  how	  changing	  economic	  and	  political	  
conditions	  in	  this	  period	  are	  intimately	  tied	  to,	  and	  in	  many	  ways	  mutually	  
constitutive	  of,	  cultural	  changes	  that	  ushered	  in	  and	  reinforced	  a	  shift	  toward	  the	  
hegemony	  of	  neoliberalism.	  As	  urban	  space	  became	  an	  even	  more	  heated	  
battleground	  in	  this	  period,	  literally	  and	  rhetorically,	  it	  is	  also	  an	  ideal	  location	  to	  
trace	  how	  the	  intersections	  of	  labor,	  economics,	  and	  culture	  shaped	  American	  cities,	  
especially	  in	  what	  would	  become	  widely	  known	  as	  the	  deindustrialized	  “Rust	  Belt”	  
of	  the	  Northeast	  and	  Midwest.	  But	  still,	  what	  could	  the	  pleasant	  outdoor	  cafes	  of	  
Baltimore’s	  Harborplace	  development	  possibly	  have	  to	  do	  with	  the	  labor	  crisis	  
gripping	  the	  nation	  during	  the	  week	  of	  August	  24,	  1981?	  	  
There	  is	  a	  level	  at	  which	  this	  magazine	  cover	  reads	  as	  a	  metaphor	  for	  the	  
Reagan	  80s—a	  brightly	  colored,	  defiantly	  upbeat,	  and	  tightly	  composed	  façade	  
dominating	  the	  visual	  field	  while	  a	  corner	  of	  unrest	  literally	  intrudes	  into	  the	  space,	  
unable	  to	  be	  completely	  concealed.	  The	  cover	  illustration	  itself,	  which	  is	  supposed	  to	  
convince	  us	  of	  the	  fun	  to	  be	  had	  in	  urban	  spaces,	  actually	  seems	  more	  like	  an	  eerily	  
hollow	  stage	  set.	  Rouse	  himself	  dominates	  the	  frame,	  placed	  centrally	  in	  the	  
composition	  and	  pictured	  from	  the	  chest	  up.	  To	  one	  side	  of	  him	  is	  a	  brightly	  colored	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Century	  of	  American	  Labor.	  Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  UP,	  2002.;	  Schulman,	  Bruce	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University	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  Period	  of	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geometric	  mass,	  meant	  to	  suggest	  architecture	  in	  the	  abstract	  and	  providing	  a	  solid	  
presence	  against	  which	  the	  “master	  planner”	  can	  rest.	  To	  the	  other	  side	  lies	  a	  vast	  
expanse	  of	  blue	  waves,	  referencing	  the	  tendency	  of	  Rouse’s	  festival	  marketplaces	  to	  
be	  situated	  on	  a	  waterfront,	  if	  the	  location	  allows.	  Two	  buildings	  are	  also	  included	  in	  
the	  composition—one,	  placed	  downward	  to	  the	  front	  of	  the	  frame,	  is	  recognizable	  
from	  its	  copper–domed	  bell	  tower	  as	  part	  of	  Rouse’s	  successful	  Fanuiel	  Hall	  festival	  
marketplace	  in	  Boston.	  The	  other,	  smaller	  and	  placed	  to	  the	  side,	  almost	  resting	  on	  
Rouse’s	  shoulder,	  is	  an	  abstract	  building	  again	  presumably	  meant	  to	  signify	  the	  
concept	  of	  development	  and	  growth	  rather	  than	  any	  specific	  structure.	  Several	  
things	  are	  immediately	  striking	  about	  the	  iconography	  and	  composition	  of	  this	  
illustration.	  First,	  the	  depiction	  of	  a	  space	  that	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  teeming	  with	  
activity	  and	  development	  is	  decidedly	  spare	  and	  severe	  looking.	  The	  abstract	  
architectural	  elements	  suggest	  nothing	  so	  much	  as	  an	  industrial	  skeleton,	  which	  
seems	  antithetical	  to	  the	  article’s	  aim.	  The	  two	  actual	  buildings,	  our	  only	  point	  of	  
reference	  to	  any	  actual	  place,	  likewise	  seem	  more	  like	  warehouses	  than	  bustling	  
marketplaces,	  and	  the	  largest	  compositional	  element	  besides	  Rouse	  himself	  is	  a	  
rather	  stormy	  looking	  ocean	  that—unlike	  the	  built	  environment—seems	  to	  expand	  
beyond	  the	  borders	  of	  the	  magazine’s	  cover.	  But	  perhaps	  the	  most	  striking	  and	  
significant	  feature	  of	  the	  illustration	  is	  what	  it’s	  lacking:	  people.	  Whatever	  space	  this	  
illustration	  is	  supposed	  to	  represent,	  it	  is	  as	  empty	  as	  a	  steel	  mill	  in	  Youngstown	  or	  
an	  assembly	  line	  in	  Flint—the	  only	  sign	  of	  life	  in	  this	  supposedly	  revitalized	  urban	  
landscape	  is	  the	  larger–than–life	  figure	  of	  Rouse	  at	  the	  center	  of	  it	  all.	  	  
	  
	   135	  
There	  are	  also	  the	  multiple	  levels	  of	  visual	  and	  historical	  irony	  that	  hint	  at	  
the	  tensions	  present	  in	  this	  captured	  moment.	  To	  begin	  with,	  the	  photo	  used	  on	  the	  
cover	  depicts	  striking	  workers	  of	  Local	  201,	  a	  New	  York	  City	  chapter	  of	  PATCO,	  
which	  rubs	  uncomfortably	  up	  against	  the	  exuberant	  main	  headline	  of	  “Cities	  Are	  
Fun.”	  Even	  if	  New	  York	  weren’t	  the	  site	  of	  South	  Street	  Seaport,	  one	  of	  Rouse’s	  most	  
successful	  and	  celebrated	  festival	  marketplace	  developments,	  the	  juxtaposition	  
would	  call	  uneasy	  attention	  to	  the	  unrest	  in	  American	  cities	  at	  that	  very	  moment.	  
What’s	  more,	  the	  secondary	  headline	  seems	  to	  deny	  the	  very	  existence	  of	  the	  news	  
item	  it’s	  meant	  to	  report—Reagan’s	  reaction	  to	  the	  labor	  crisis,	  that	  “There	  Is	  No	  
Strike,”	  asserts	  his	  power	  to	  control	  not	  only	  the	  situation,	  but	  reality	  itself.	  Reagan	  
“stands	  firm”	  in	  this	  moment	  with	  iron–fisted	  reassurance	  to	  ultimately	  unify	  the	  
message	  of	  the	  TIME	  cover—there	  is	  no	  strike;	  cities	  are	  fun;	  everything	  is	  fine.	  	  
But	  these	  narratives	  are	  also	  too	  simple	  to	  tease	  out	  the	  deeper	  relationships	  
between	  urban	  revitalization,	  culture,	  and	  labor,	  one	  that	  is	  only	  glimpsed	  in	  the	  
separate	  bodies	  of	  literature	  that	  address	  each.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  two	  
seemingly	  disparate	  elements	  that	  make	  up	  this	  magazine	  cover	  illustrate	  central	  
tensions	  faced	  by	  both	  cities	  and	  organized	  labor	  in	  the	  early	  1980s—tensions	  that,	  
perhaps	  just	  as	  importantly,	  also	  shaped	  the	  idea	  of	  both	  cities	  and	  organized	  labor	  
in	  the	  popular	  imagination	  and	  political	  discourse.	  The	  vision	  of	  urban	  revitalization	  
successfully	  asserted	  by	  Rouse	  and	  championed	  by	  TIME,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  scores	  of	  city	  
officials	  and	  boosters,	  meshed	  neatly	  with	  Reagan’s	  deregulated,	  market–friendly,	  
neoliberal	  framework	  within	  which	  deindustrialized	  Rust	  Belt	  cities	  found	  
themselves	  operating	  at	  the	  dawn	  of	  the	  1980s.	  Northeastern	  and	  Midwest	  
	  
	   136	  
manufacturing	  centers,	  traditional	  strongholds	  of	  organized	  labor	  that	  had	  been	  
losing	  jobs	  and	  population	  for	  years,	  increasingly	  came	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  relics	  of	  a	  social	  
order	  that	  was	  being	  left	  behind,	  even	  as	  deserving	  of	  their	  fate	  as	  they	  insisted	  
upon	  the	  failed	  politics	  of	  the	  New	  Deal.	  As	  neoliberal	  thought	  maintains	  that	  in	  a	  
free	  market,	  (un)employment	  is	  always	  voluntary,	  the	  employment	  crisis	  in	  these	  
former	  manufacturing	  centers	  became	  increasingly	  framed	  in	  individualized	  terms	  
and	  was	  further	  removed	  from	  any	  social	  protection	  into	  a	  narrative	  framework	  
built	  around	  the	  notion	  of	  “personal	  responsibility.”	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  in	  the	  popular	  
and	  political	  imagination,	  organized	  labor	  was	  behaving	  in	  a	  selfish	  and	  
irresponsible	  manner	  when	  making	  demands,	  and	  was	  furthermore	  responsible	  for	  
holding	  back	  cities	  and	  regions	  from	  the	  progress	  and	  plenty	  that	  was	  possible	  in	  a	  
deregulated,	  post–New	  Deal,	  individualist	  economy.	  As	  an	  outmoded	  and	  
unwelcome	  participant	  in	  the	  new	  economic	  and	  social	  order,	  organized	  labor	  was	  
seen	  as	  in	  fact	  one	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  deindustrialization	  and	  unemployment	  in	  the	  
Rust	  Belt,	  and	  as	  a	  legacy	  that	  must	  be	  transcended	  for	  the	  US	  and	  its	  cities	  to	  move	  
forward	  and	  be	  economically	  competitive.170	  
All	  of	  these	  factors	  coalesced	  into	  a	  new	  cultural	  and	  political	  economic	  
“common	  sense”	  about	  cities	  and	  labor	  at	  the	  dawn	  of	  “morning	  in	  America,”	  
wherein	  unions	  were	  the	  problem,	  the	  New	  Deal	  was	  finally	  over,	  and	  the	  Rust	  Belt	  
was	  its	  unfortunate	  but	  inevitable	  casualty.	  In	  this	  atmosphere,	  attractively	  upbeat,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170	  Thompson,	  Heather	  Ann.	  Whose	  Detroit?:	  Politics,	  Labor,	  and	  Race	  in	  a	  Modern	  American	  
City.	  Ithaca:	  Cornell	  UP,	  2001.	  Thompson	  argues,	  for	  example,	  that	  a	  common	  problematic	  
assumption	  about	  new	  scholarly	  examinations	  of	  cities,	  politics	  and	  labor	  in	  a	  post	  1980	  
context	  is	  that	  the	  American	  labor	  situation	  by	  1980,	  while	  notable,	  was	  largely	  
unavoidable.	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racially	  non–threatening	  models	  for	  revitalization	  like	  James	  Rouse’s	  “festival	  
marketplaces”	  thrived	  by	  promising	  to	  replace	  the	  lost,	  dirty,	  union	  manufacturing	  
jobs	  with	  new	  service	  and	  tourism–based	  employment—and	  above	  all,	  to	  make	  
cities	  “fun.”	  
Situated	  at	  the	  center	  of	  this	  transformation	  was	  Flint,	  Michigan.	  As	  the	  
birthplace	  of	  General	  Motors,	  Flint	  was	  integral	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  largest	  
and	  arguably	  most	  economically	  and	  culturally	  significant	  corporation	  in	  postwar	  
America,	  one	  that	  largely	  defined	  US	  industry	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  Likewise,	  as	  
the	  birthplace	  of	  the	  United	  Auto	  Workers	  union,	  Flint	  is	  the	  symbolic	  center	  of	  the	  
modern	  organized	  labor	  movement	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  As	  the	  “strike	  heard	  round	  
the	  world,”	  the	  1936–7	  Flint	  sit–down	  strike	  inaugurated	  a	  new	  era	  of	  
worker/capital	  relations	  as	  the	  US	  emerged	  from	  depression	  and	  entered	  the	  New	  
Deal	  order	  that	  would	  define	  much	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.171	  Labor	  
history,	  and	  to	  an	  extent	  American	  history	  in	  general,	  has	  elevated	  this	  event	  and	  the	  
waves	  of	  union	  activity	  that	  it	  set	  in	  motion	  to	  a	  legendary	  status,	  described	  by	  
eminent	  labor	  historian	  Nelson	  Lichtenstein	  as	  “undoubtedly	  the	  most	  significant	  
work	  stoppage	  in	  twentieth–century	  American	  history.”172	  Without	  recapitulating	  a	  
by–now	  familiar	  (and	  in	  many	  ways	  problematic)	  historical	  narrative	  of	  labor	  that	  
positions	  white	  male	  industrial	  labor	  as	  the	  heroic	  stand–in	  for	  all	  American	  
workers,	  and	  with	  a	  clear	  understanding	  that	  both	  the	  fight	  waged	  and	  the	  gains	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171	  "The	  1936	  -­‐	  37	  Flint,	  Michigan	  Sit-­‐Down	  Strike."	  BBC	  News.	  BBC,	  28	  Jan.	  2002.	  Web.	  25	  
Mar.	  2013.;	  For	  the	  most	  definitive	  historical	  treatment	  of	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  “New	  
Deal	  Order,”	  see	  Fraser,	  Steve,	  and	  Gary	  Gerstle.	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  the	  New	  Deal	  Order,	  
1930-­‐1980.	  Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  UP,	  1989.	  
172	  Nelson	  Lichtenstein,	  State	  of	  the	  Union:	  a	  Century	  of	  American	  Labor:	  48.	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made	  by	  the	  iconic	  sit–down	  strike	  were	  fraught	  with	  gendered	  and	  racial	  tensions	  
that	  are	  yet	  unresolved,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  retain	  this	  mythological	  notion—that	  Flint	  is	  
historically	  and	  symbolically	  central	  to	  the	  building	  of	  “the	  American	  century.”	  
Detroit	  has	  garnered	  much	  attention	  in	  both	  urban	  and	  labor	  history	  for	  its	  journey	  
from	  towering	  industrial	  capital	  to	  capital	  of	  the	  “urban	  crisis,”	  and	  rightly	  so.173	  But	  
if	  it	  is	  true,	  as	  historian	  Heather	  Ann	  Thompson	  has	  said,	  that	  Detroit	  “holds	  
symbolic	  meaning	  for	  America	  in	  every	  decade	  since	  World	  War	  II,”	  then	  I	  would	  
argue	  the	  same	  holds	  true	  for	  the	  relatively	  unexamined	  symbolic	  role	  of	  Flint—and	  
in	  the	  case	  of	  labor,	  perhaps	  even	  more	  so.174	  The	  origins	  of	  postwar	  prosperity,	  
built	  on	  union	  wages	  that	  created	  a	  white	  (eventually	  suburban)	  middle	  class,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173	  Indeed,	  the	  1936-­‐37	  Flint	  sit-­‐down	  strike	  goes	  a	  long	  way	  to	  establish	  and	  perpetuate	  
this	  narrative,	  as	  women	  were	  explicitly	  excluded	  from	  participating	  in	  the	  strike	  and	  
relegated	  to	  support	  positions	  such	  as	  providing	  food	  for	  striking	  workers.	  	  This	  is	  also	  
situated	  within	  a	  broader	  political	  and	  cultural	  context	  where	  the	  demands	  and	  concessions	  
on	  either	  side	  of	  labor	  disputes,	  both	  before	  and	  after	  1937,	  are	  articulated	  within	  a	  
framework	  of	  a	  “family	  wage”	  for	  workers	  that	  would	  support	  a	  white,	  heteronormative	  
nuclear	  family.	  	  For	  discussions	  of	  gender,	  race	  and	  labor,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  romantic	  ideal	  of	  
industrial	  labor,	  see	  Thomas	  Sugrue,	  The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Urban	  Crisis:	  Race	  and	  Inequality	  in	  
Postwar	  Detroit;	  Roediger,	  David	  R.	  The	  Wages	  of	  Whiteness:	  Race	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  the	  
American	  Working	  Class.	  London:	  Verso,	  1991.;	  Jefferson	  Cowie	  and	  Joseph	  Heathcott,	  eds.,	  
Beyond	  the	  Ruins:	  The	  Meanings	  of	  Deindustrialization;	  Heather	  Ann	  Thompson,	  Whose	  
Detroit?	  	  Politics,	  Labor,	  and	  Race	  in	  a	  Modern	  American	  City;	  Cohen,	  Lizabeth.	  Making	  a	  New	  
Deal:	  Industrial	  Workers	  in	  Chicago,	  1919-­‐1939.	  Cambridge	  [England:	  Cambridge	  UP,	  1990.;	  
Kessler-­‐Harris,	  Alice.	  Out	  to	  Work:	  A	  History	  of	  Wage-­‐earning	  Women	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  
New	  York:	  Oxford	  UP,	  1982;	  Lichtenstein,	  Nelson.	  The	  Most	  Dangerous	  Man	  in	  Detroit:	  
Walter	  Reuther	  and	  the	  Fate	  of	  American	  Labor.	  New	  York,	  NY:	  Basic,	  1995.;	  Nelson	  
Lichtenstein,	  State	  of	  the	  Union:	  A	  Century	  of	  American	  Labor;	  Nelson,	  Bruce.	  Divided	  We	  
Stand:	  American	  Workers	  and	  the	  Struggle	  for	  Black	  Equality.	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  UP,	  
2001Enstad,	  Nan.	  Ladies	  of	  Labor,	  Girls	  of	  Adventure:	  Working	  Women,	  Popular	  Culture,	  and	  
Labor	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indeed	  the	  popular	  image	  of	  the	  broad	  prosperity	  born	  of	  a	  supposed	  corporate–
labor	  accord	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  Flint	  and	  its	  iconic	  role	  in	  the	  history	  of	  organized	  
labor.	  The	  same	  can	  unfortunately	  be	  said	  of	  its	  representative	  status	  as	  a	  
deindustrialized	  shell	  of	  a	  company	  town	  where	  supposedly	  bloated	  and	  lazy	  union	  
workers	  were	  increasingly	  left	  behind	  in	  a	  rapidly	  changing	  world.	  	  
As	  the	  “American	  century”	  that	  Flint	  helped	  to	  define	  waned,	  the	  dilemmas	  of	  
a	  transforming	  economic	  and	  political	  culture	  resonated	  there	  deeply,	  and	  in	  ways	  
that	  might	  serve	  as	  a	  warning	  to	  cities	  both	  within	  and	  outside	  the	  industrial	  
Northeast	  and	  Midwest—in	  the	  popular	  imagination,	  it	  is	  safe	  to	  say	  that	  Flint	  
embodied	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  the	  “Rust	  Belt.”	  And	  at	  the	  center	  of	  Flint’s	  need	  to	  
reinvent	  itself	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  at	  the	  dawn	  of	  “morning	  in	  America,”	  was	  
AutoWorld,	  the	  Flint/auto–industry	  themed	  museum	  and	  amusement	  park,	  which	  
attempted	  in	  its	  remarkably	  short	  life	  (which	  lasted	  less	  than	  a	  year	  before	  the	  park	  
closed	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  attendance)	  to	  narrate	  a	  business–friendly	  history	  in	  which	  
labor	  conflict	  was	  a	  hermetically–sealed	  thing	  of	  the	  past.	  	  
As	  an	  early	  effort	  by	  one	  deindustrialized	  urban	  center	  to	  transform	  its	  real	  
and	  symbolic	  economy,	  AutoWorld	  provides	  a	  unique	  lens	  through	  which	  to	  view	  
the	  historical	  moment	  of	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  80s—especially	  as	  a	  real	  labor	  
dispute	  over	  its	  construction	  unfolded	  shortly	  before	  the	  grand	  opening,	  
illuminating	  the	  intersecting	  states	  of	  labor,	  culture,	  and	  urban	  revitalization	  in	  this	  
moment	  even	  more	  poignantly	  that	  the	  cover	  of	  TIME	  magazine.	  Through	  national	  
and	  local	  representations	  of	  industrial	  labor	  such	  as	  museum	  exhibitions,	  political	  
rhetoric,	  and	  media	  images,	  this	  chapter	  traces	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  different	  kind	  of	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labor—specifically	  service	  work	  in	  a	  new,	  spectacular	  tourist	  economy—was	  
posited	  as	  the	  only	  reasonable	  alternative	  to	  manufacturing	  for	  cities	  like	  Flint,	  and	  
how	  these	  jobs	  were	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  neoliberal	  restructuring	  toward	  
individualized,	  disposable	  employment,	  within	  which	  there	  was	  no	  space	  for	  the	  
antiquated	  collectivist	  labor	  politics	  of	  the	  New	  Deal.	  
	  
The	  Businessmen’s	  Long	  War	  on	  Labor,	  From	  The	  New	  Deal	  to	  Reagan’s	  America	  
Of	  course,	  the	  predicament	  in	  which	  American	  organized	  labor	  found	  itself	  
was	  not	  wholly	  invented	  by	  Ronald	  Reagan,	  and	  was	  not	  as	  simple	  as	  a	  sudden	  
backlash.	  Since	  before	  the	  watershed	  strike	  of	  1936–7,	  and	  the	  waves	  of	  
unionization	  that	  it	  inspired	  in	  the	  years	  soon	  following,	  corporate	  interests	  had	  
been	  waging	  war	  on	  organized	  labor.	  The	  ferocious	  and	  often	  violent	  battles	  
between	  labor	  and	  industrial	  bosses	  of	  the	  late	  1800s	  transformed	  into	  a	  relatively	  
less	  contentious	  system	  of	  welfare	  capitalism	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  described	  by	  
historians	  such	  as	  Lizabeth	  Cohen.	  As	  industrial	  capitalism	  crumbled	  in	  the	  
Depression	  years,	  “labor	  spies”	  were	  widely	  used	  as	  worker	  agitation	  built,	  and	  
General	  Motors	  spent	  more	  money	  than	  any	  other	  American	  company	  on	  anti–union	  
agents.175	  Anti–union	  consultants	  emerged	  in	  the	  1950s,	  during	  the	  supposed	  
“golden	  age”	  of	  labor	  relations,	  born	  out	  of	  corporate	  responses	  to	  labor	  victories	  of	  
the	  previous	  twenty	  years,	  to	  establish	  a	  new	  front	  in	  the	  ongoing	  corporate	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  Nelson	  Lichtenstein,	  State	  of	  the	  Union:	  A	  Century	  of	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  48.	  
	  
	   141	  
offensive	  against	  union	  activity,	  anticipating	  intensified	  union–busting	  strategies	  in	  
the	  decades	  to	  follow.176	  	  
Recently	  scholars	  such	  as	  Kim	  Phillips–Fein	  and	  Bethany	  Moreton	  have	  
argued	  convincingly	  for	  a	  long	  history	  of	  conservatism,	  refusing	  the	  familiar	  
historical	  narrative	  rooted	  in	  post–1960s	  white	  backlash	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  Reagan	  to	  
instead	  offer	  a	  more	  complex	  account	  of	  business	  conservatives	  and	  elites	  who	  led	  a	  
sustained,	  decades–long	  “crusade”	  against	  threats	  to	  corporate	  power	  such	  as	  
organized	  labor,	  and	  against	  the	  New	  Deal	  Order	  itself.	  Rather	  than	  an	  “accord,”	  a	  
“treaty”	  or	  a	  “golden	  age”	  of	  labor	  relations,	  this	  recent	  work	  reframes	  the	  “labor	  
question”	  as	  one	  that	  is	  never	  answered	  or	  resolved	  at	  any	  point,	  but	  rather,	  one	  
that	  is	  being	  attacked	  and	  undermined	  by	  corporate	  forces	  on	  multiple	  fronts,	  in	  
practically	  every	  historical	  moment	  since	  it	  was	  first	  posed.	  177	  Anti–union	  activity	  
has	  been	  not	  only	  a	  question	  of	  the	  bottom	  line,	  but	  also	  a	  question	  of	  what	  ideas	  
would	  prevail.	  As	  Phillips–Fein	  argues,	  unions	  were	  dangerous	  in	  the	  bigger	  picture	  
because	  they	  “implied	  the	  potential	  economic	  independence	  of	  the	  worker	  from	  his	  
job	  …	  unions	  seemed	  to	  business	  conservatives	  to	  be	  the	  embodiment	  of	  the	  most	  
social–democratic	  tendencies	  within	  liberalism.	  Defeating	  them	  was	  therefore	  the	  
key	  to	  undoing	  the	  New	  Deal	  order.”178	  In	  the	  1950s,	  with	  an	  attitude	  eerily	  
prescient	  of	  Reagan–era	  neoliberal	  rhetoric,	  General	  Electric	  corporate	  Vice	  
President	  and	  staunch	  anti–unionist	  Lemuel	  Ricketts	  Boulware	  worked	  under	  the	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  Kim	  Phillips-­‐Fein,	  Invisible	  Hands:	  The	  Businessman’s	  Crusade	  Against	  the	  New	  Deal:	  106.	  
177	  Lichtenstein	  argues	  that	  these	  very	  ideas	  of	  stable	  and	  mutually	  beneficial	  relations	  
between	  labor	  and	  management	  are	  in	  part	  a	  product	  of	  liberal	  and	  laborite	  reactions	  to	  the	  
explicitly	  hostile	  relations	  of	  the	  early	  1980s,	  and	  in	  any	  case	  are	  suspect	  and	  “a	  product	  of	  
defeat,	  not	  victory,”	  State	  of	  the	  Union:	  A	  Century	  of	  American	  Labor:	  98-­‐99.	  
178	  Kim	  Phillips-­‐Fein,	  Invisible	  Hands:	  The	  Businessman’s	  Crusade	  Against	  the	  New	  Deal:	  89.	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principle	  that	  the	  union	  should	  never	  be	  able	  to	  claim	  a	  victory	  for	  workers,	  
symbolically	  or	  otherwise,	  and	  that	  the	  union	  was	  ultimately	  “a	  destructive	  
interloper,	  distorting	  the	  information	  given	  by	  the	  free	  market.”179	  As	  the	  labor	  
movement	  became	  “big	  labor”	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  60s,	  organized	  labor	  was	  struggling	  
with	  its	  own	  reputation	  and	  the	  popular	  perception	  of	  unions	  as	  part	  of	  the	  
economic	  and	  political	  problem,	  rather	  than	  the	  solution—a	  perception	  due	  in	  part	  
to	  business	  conservatives’	  efforts	  to	  control	  both	  perception	  and	  reality,	  as	  well	  as	  
to	  institutional	  realities	  of	  the	  organized	  labor	  establishment.180	  This	  conflict,	  
coupled	  with	  the	  structural	  inequalities	  of	  race	  and	  gender	  built	  into	  the	  New	  Deal	  
as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  “victories”	  of	  the	  labor	  movement,	  meant	  that	  tensions	  were	  
mounting	  from	  within	  the	  Liberal	  coalition	  as	  well	  as	  without	  as	  the	  “American	  
century”	  wore	  on.181	  By	  the	  1970s,	  Jefferson	  Cowie	  has	  argued,	  “workers,”	  as	  a	  
consciously	  identified	  group,	  had	  become	  largely	  unworthy	  of	  attention,	  
disappearing	  from	  the	  national	  political	  scene,	  and	  that	  “the	  idea	  of	  workers	  in	  civic	  
and	  popular	  discourse	  had	  been	  defeated.”182	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  Ibid.,	  100.	  
180	  Lichtenstein,	  State	  of	  the	  Union:	  A	  Century	  of	  American	  Labor:	  141-­‐3.	  	  
181	  Many	  scholars	  have	  explored	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  organized	  labor	  continually	  and	  
systematically	  excluded	  African	  American	  workers,	  relegating	  them	  to	  the	  “meanest	  and	  
dirtiest	  jobs”	  even	  as	  gains	  were	  being	  made	  for	  white	  workers.	  	  See	  Thomas	  Sugrue,	  The	  
Origins	  of	  the	  Urban	  Crisis:	  Race	  and	  Inequality	  in	  Postwar	  Detroit;	  David	  Roediger,	  Working	  
Toward	  Whiteness:	  How	  America’s	  Immigrants	  Became	  White:	  The	  Strange	  Journey	  from	  Ellis	  
Island	  to	  the	  Suburbs;	  Heather	  Ann	  Thompson,	  Whose	  Detroit?	  	  Politics,	  Labor,	  and	  Race	  in	  a	  
Modern	  American	  City;	  Nelson	  Lichtenstein,	  The	  Most	  Dangerous	  Man	  in	  Detroit:	  Walter	  
Reuther	  and	  the	  Fate	  of	  Organized	  Labor;	  Nelson	  Lichtenstein,	  State	  of	  the	  Union:	  A	  Century	  
of	  American	  Labor;	  Bruce	  Nelson,	  Divided	  We	  Stand:	  American	  Workers	  and	  the	  Struggle	  for	  
Black	  Equality.	  
182	  Jefferson	  Cowie,	  “Vigorously	  Left,	  Right	  and	  Center”	  in	  Bailey	  and	  Farber,	  America	  in	  the	  
‘70s:	  102.	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Especially	  for	  cities	  in	  the	  Rust	  Belt,	  the	  process	  of	  deindustrialization	  itself	  
can	  be	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  the	  long	  corporate	  battle	  against	  organized	  labor.	  Far	  from	  a	  
golden	  age	  of	  labor	  relations,	  the	  years	  following	  the	  intense	  waves	  of	  unionization	  
in	  the	  1930s	  and	  40s	  saw	  giant	  corporations	  like	  General	  Motors	  go	  immediately	  on	  
the	  offensive,	  developing	  and	  deploying	  multiple	  strategies	  with	  the	  explicit	  or	  
veiled	  purpose	  of	  undermining	  the	  power	  of	  organized	  labor	  (besides	  preemptive	  
measures	  of	  labor	  spies	  and	  union–busters)	  such	  as	  automation,	  retooling	  and	  
reorganization	  to	  make	  sit–down	  strikes	  less	  effective,	  and	  ultimately	  capital	  
mobility	  and	  plant	  relocation	  at	  an	  accelerated	  rate.183	  The	  process	  of	  making	  labor	  
politically	  and	  culturally	  weak	  is	  the	  product	  of	  a	  long	  effort	  by	  business	  elites	  and	  
political	  conservatives	  that	  was	  not	  necessarily	  invented	  with	  the	  election	  of	  Ronald	  
Reagan.	  
However,	  the	  historical	  moment	  of	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s	  was	  a	  
unique	  opportunity	  for	  those	  anti–labor	  interests	  and	  activists	  to	  exploit	  the	  
growing	  cracks	  in	  the	  New	  Deal	  order,	  and	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  Reagan	  
administration’s	  unprecedented	  level	  of	  hostility	  toward	  organized	  labor.	  Scholars	  
of	  neoliberalism	  such	  as	  David	  Harvey	  have	  pointed	  to	  Reagan’s	  national	  
acceleration	  of	  trends	  that	  had	  begun	  to	  develop	  in	  the	  mid–late	  1970s	  and	  which	  
would	  bring	  labor	  “to	  heel	  to	  conform	  with	  the	  new	  social	  order,”	  as	  the	  new	  
administration	  transformed	  the	  National	  Labor	  Relations	  Board—a	  government	  
entity	  that	  was	  largely	  the	  product	  of	  1930s	  labor	  activism—into	  “a	  vehicle	  for	  
attacking	  and	  regulating	  the	  rights	  of	  labour	  at	  the	  very	  moment	  when	  business	  was	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  See	  Nelson	  Lichtenstein,	  Walter	  Reuther:	  The	  Most	  dangerous	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  Detroit	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being	  deregulated.”184	  Returning	  to	  the	  famous	  example	  that	  began	  this	  chapter,	  
Reagan’s	  dismantling	  of	  the	  Professional	  Air	  Traffic	  Controllers	  Organization	  strike	  
in	  1981	  sent	  a	  very	  clear	  message	  regarding	  the	  political	  place	  of	  organized	  labor	  in	  
the	  new	  administration.	  Immediately	  crushing	  the	  strike	  by	  declaring	  it	  illegal	  (if,	  
indeed,	  it	  existed	  at	  all),	  Reagan	  fired	  the	  strikers,	  decertified	  their	  union	  and	  
ordered	  military	  personnel	  to	  replace	  the	  dismissed	  controllers.	  Historian	  Bruce	  
Schulman	  observes	  that,	  with	  these	  actions,	  Reagan	  actually	  won	  a	  major	  victory,	  
saying,	  “The	  public	  applauded	  his	  principled	  stance,	  admired	  his	  toughness,	  and	  
blamed	  the	  controllers	  for	  the	  ensuing	  delays	  at	  the	  airports.	  Business	  leaders	  
realized	  that	  they	  had	  a	  staunch	  ally	  in	  the	  White	  House	  and	  turned	  up	  the	  pressure	  
on	  organized	  labor.”185	  With	  the	  PATCO	  strike	  as	  a	  watershed	  moment	  in	  labor	  
history,	  in	  some	  ways	  symbolically	  bookending	  the	  New	  Deal	  order	  and	  organized	  
labor’s	  volatile	  but	  privileged	  place	  in	  it,	  the	  early	  1980s	  were	  a	  time	  of	  real	  crisis	  
for	  both	  the	  actual	  labor	  movement	  and	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  labor	  in	  political	  and	  
popular	  discourse.	  	  
	  
The	  Image	  and	  Idea	  of	  “Labor”	  and	  the	  “Rust	  Belt”	  
The	  image	  and	  representation	  of	  labor—or	  at	  least	  the	  image	  of	  a	  particular	  
postwar	  abstraction	  of	  white,	  masculine	  industrial	  production—was	  in	  many	  ways	  
shaped	  by	  two	  popular	  modes	  of	  understanding	  that	  relied	  either	  on	  iconic	  
historical	  events	  such	  as	  the	  Flint	  sit–down	  strike	  and	  auto	  manufacturing	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184	  David	  Harvey,	  A	  Brief	  History	  of	  Neoliberalism:	  52.	  	  	  	  
185	  Bruce	  Schulman,	  The	  Seventies:	  The	  Great	  Shift	  in	  American	  Culture,	  Society	  and	  Politics:	  
233.	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general,	  or	  on	  a	  corrupt	  and	  bloated	  bureaucratic	  image	  of	  “big	  labor.”	  In	  the	  late	  
1970s	  and	  early	  1980s,	  as	  deindustrialization	  and	  unemployment	  grew	  to	  crisis	  
levels	  especially	  in	  urban	  centers	  of	  the	  industrial	  Northeast	  and	  Midwest	  (what	  
would	  be	  increasingly	  become	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “Rust	  Belt”),	  the	  issue	  of	  organized	  
labor	  took	  a	  rhetorical	  and	  representational	  turn	  as	  cities	  found	  themselves	  
grasping	  for	  solutions	  to	  these	  crises.	  Not	  only	  was	  the	  idea	  of	  organized	  labor	  being	  
devalued	  nationally,	  but	  in	  the	  case	  of	  individual	  cities,	  organized	  labor	  was	  being	  
held	  responsible	  for	  creating	  a	  “bad	  business	  climate.”	  The	  evaluation	  of	  a	  location’s	  
business	  environment,	  a	  product	  of	  neoliberal	  efforts	  to	  restructure	  urban	  space	  to	  
better	  suit	  the	  needs	  of	  modern	  capital,	  became	  a	  common–sense	  priority	  for	  cities	  
hard	  hit	  by	  job	  loss	  and	  capital	  flight.	  186	  The	  first	  feature	  of	  a	  “good	  business	  
climate”	  was,	  and	  is,	  understood	  as	  providing	  low	  labor	  costs,	  which	  ultimately	  
demonized	  the	  relatively	  well–off	  union	  worker	  as	  selfish	  and	  “a	  problem”	  for	  cities	  
trying	  to	  economically	  revive	  themselves.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186	  See	  Harvey,	  A	  Brief	  History	  of	  Neoliberalism:	  46-­‐7.;	  as	  well	  as	  Lisa	  Duggan,	  The	  Twilight	  of	  
Equality:	  Noliberalism,	  Cultural	  Politics	  and	  the	  Attack	  on	  Democracy;	  Jason	  Hackworth,	  The	  
Neoliberal	  City:	  Government,	  Ideology,	  and	  Development	  in	  American	  Urbanism;	  Leitner,	  
Helga,	  Jamie	  Peck,	  and	  Eric	  S.	  Sheppard.	  Contesting	  Neoliberalism:	  Urban	  Frontiers.	  New	  
York:	  Guilford,	  2007.;	  Mike	  Davis	  and	  Daniel	  Bertrand	  Monk,	  eds.,	  Evil	  Paradises:	  
Dreamworlds	  of	  Neoliberalism;	  Neil	  Brenner	  and	  Nik	  Theodore,	  eds.	  Spaces	  of	  Neoliberalism:	  
Urban	  restructuring	  in	  North	  America	  and	  Western	  Europe;	  Sharon	  Zukin,	  Landscapes	  of	  
Power:	  From	  Detroit	  to	  Disney	  World;	  Zukin,	  Sharon.	  Loft	  Living:	  Culture	  and	  Capital	  in	  Urban	  
Change.	  Baltimore:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  UP,	  1982.;	  George	  F.	  Lord	  and	  Albert	  C.	  Price.	  “Growth	  
Ideology	  In	  a	  Period	  of	  Decline:	  Deindustrialization	  and	  Restructuring,	  Flint	  Style.”;	  
Jefferson	  Cowie	  and	  Joseph	  Heathcott,	  eds.,	  Beyond	  the	  Ruins:	  The	  Meanings	  of	  
Deindustrialization;	  Steven	  P.	  Dandenau,	  A	  Town	  Abandoned:	  Flint,	  Michigan	  Confronts	  
Deindustrialization;	  Jon	  C.	  Teaford.	  The	  Rough	  Road	  to	  Renaissance:	  Urban	  Revitalization	  in	  
America,	  1940-­‐1985.;	  Michael	  Sorkin,	  ed.,	  Variations	  on	  a	  Theme	  Park:	  The	  New	  American	  
City	  and	  the	  End	  of	  Public	  Space.	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Not	  that	  organized	  labor	  didn’t	  have	  its	  place	  in	  revitalization	  strategies—its	  
place	  just	  happened	  to	  be	  planted	  firmly	  in	  the	  past.	  Dominant	  modes	  of	  envisioning	  
labor	  in	  the	  popular	  cultural	  imagination,	  possibly	  as	  one	  result	  of	  defining	  labor	  in	  
the	  postwar	  era	  as	  the	  province	  of	  white	  masculine	  breadwinners,	  imply	  that	  there	  
might	  have	  been	  a	  moment	  in	  which	  the	  labor	  movement	  was	  a	  noble	  and	  
necessary,	  but	  that	  moment	  is	  past	  and	  irrelevant	  to	  contemporary	  political	  
economic	  realities.	  As	  the	  former	  industrial	  belt	  rusted,	  there	  was	  at	  least	  the	  sense	  
that	  labor	  was	  complicit	  in	  creating	  “dead”	  or	  “ghost	  town”	  cities	  in	  the	  region,	  and	  
that	  it	  was	  in	  many	  ways	  dead	  itself.	  
One	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  implied	  death	  of	  labor	  became	  useful	  in	  Rust	  
Belt	  revitalization	  plans	  was	  to	  seal	  off	  a	  history	  of	  strong	  labor	  activity	  as	  an	  
important	  but	  outmoded	  historical	  relic,	  making	  such	  histories	  an	  element	  of	  
marketable	  “heritage.”	  Sharon	  Zukin	  and	  other	  scholars	  of	  urban	  transformation	  in	  
this	  period	  have	  traced	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  deindustrialization	  has	  gone	  hand–in–
hand	  with	  a	  cultural	  shift	  in	  industrial	  urban	  space	  from	  production	  to	  consumption,	  
marking	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  commitment	  in	  cities	  to	  the	  middle	  and	  upper	  class—
increasingly	  tourists—rather	  than	  the	  working	  class.187	  The	  proliferation	  of	  urban	  
residential	  loft	  space,	  one	  of	  Zukin’s	  major	  examples,	  nicely	  illustrates	  the	  
repackaging	  of	  “abandoned”	  industrial	  space	  as	  it	  is	  transformed	  into	  a	  desirable	  
middle	  and	  upper	  class	  residence,	  and	  can	  be	  seen	  everywhere	  from	  Brooklyn	  to	  
Flint	  as	  an	  almost	  mandatory	  feature	  of	  a	  Rust	  Belt	  city’s	  new	  life.	  “Gentrification”	  is	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  Sharon	  Zukin,	  Loft	  Living:	  Culture	  and	  Capital	  in	  Urban	  Change.	  Zukin	  argues	  this	  
specifically	  in	  terms	  of	  residential	  space,	  but	  applies	  the	  idea	  broadly	  to	  include	  related	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in	  fact	  no	  longer	  a	  dirty	  word	  as	  cities	  officially	  pursue	  the	  attraction	  and	  retention	  
of	  “the	  right	  sort	  of	  people.”188	  	  
The	  success	  of	  Rouse–inspired	  “festival	  marketplace”	  models	  of	  revitalization	  
also	  relies	  upon	  a	  repackaging	  of	  spaces	  of	  labor	  into	  spaces	  of	  consumption,	  and	  of	  
aestheticized	  labor	  spectacle.	  A	  hallmark	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  to	  transform	  urban	  
space	  where	  industrial	  work	  has	  been	  eliminated	  into	  a	  safe	  and	  nostalgic	  bubble	  of	  
affluence	  filled	  with	  symbolic	  markers	  of	  a	  time	  gone	  by.	  South	  Street	  Seaport	  in	  
New	  York	  City	  and	  the	  Harborplace	  development	  in	  Baltimore	  are	  clear	  examples	  of	  
this	  kind	  of	  transformation,	  as	  M.	  Christine	  Boyer	  observes	  that	  “the	  Seaport’s	  
imaginary	  historical	  museum	  is	  everywhere,	  surrounding	  the	  spectator	  with	  an	  
artfully	  composed	  historic	  ambience.”189	  In	  the	  celebratory	  TIME	  article	  profiling	  
Rouse,	  the	  historical	  break	  between	  the	  old	  city	  with	  its	  forms	  of	  labor	  and	  the	  new	  
Baltimore	  defined	  by	  Harborplace’s	  success	  is	  apparent.	  “This	  is	  the	  new	  Baltimore,	  
not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  the	  old,”	  the	  article	  boasts,	  defining	  the	  “old”	  Baltimore	  by	  
its	  accent,	  its	  riots,	  and	  its	  working	  class	  history,	  describing	  it	  as	  “traditionally	  a	  
blue–collar,	  beer–and–shot	  town,	  built	  on	  19th	  century	  technologies,	  mainly	  steel	  
and	  shipbuilding,	  that	  have	  since	  trailed	  off,	  as	  has	  its	  population.”	  Through	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  middle–class	  and	  tourist–friendly	  Harborplace,	  this	  hopelessly	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  Florida,	  Richard	  L.	  The	  Rise	  of	  the	  Creative	  Class:	  And	  How	  It's	  Transforming	  Work,	  Leisure,	  
Community	  and	  Everyday	  Life.	  New	  York,	  NY:	  Basic,	  2002.	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  M.	  Christine	  Boyer,	  “Cities	  for	  Sale:	  Merchandising	  History	  at	  South	  Street	  Seaport”	  in	  
Sorkin,	  ed.	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  on	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antiquated	  and	  dying	  place	  was	  rescued	  by	  Rouse,	  who	  had	  a	  vision	  that	  “Baltimore	  
could	  become	  a	  valuable	  and	  joyous	  town	  (my	  emphasis).”190	  
Institutionally,	  there	  were	  also	  efforts	  to	  define,	  memorialize,	  and	  otherwise	  
represent	  organized	  labor	  in	  this	  period	  of	  crisis.	  Youngstown,	  Ohio,	  for	  example,	  
began	  work	  on	  the	  Youngstown	  Historical	  Center	  for	  Industry	  and	  Labor	  in	  1983,	  
after	  receiving	  funding	  from	  the	  state	  legislature,	  with	  an	  official	  groundbreaking	  
ceremony	  taking	  place	  in	  1986.	  Conceived	  and	  proposed	  by	  Youngstown	  native	  and	  
State	  Senator	  Harry	  Meshel	  in	  1977	  shortly	  after	  Youngstown	  Sheet	  &	  Tube	  
announced	  it	  was	  closing	  its	  Campbell	  Works	  operation,	  the	  center	  did	  not	  officially	  
open	  with	  a	  permanent	  collection	  until	  1992.191	  From	  its	  conception	  in	  a	  moment	  of	  
industrial	  withdrawal,	  however,	  to	  its	  stated	  mission	  upon	  opening	  to	  provide	  “a	  
dramatic	  overview	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  iron	  and	  steel	  industry	  on	  Youngstown	  and	  
other	  Mahoning	  Valley	  communities,”	  it	  is	  clearly	  an	  institution	  born	  out	  of	  the	  
desire	  to	  memorialize	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  labor	  as	  it	  disappeared	  from	  the	  region.192	  
The	  permanent	  exhibit	  on	  display	  since	  the	  center’s	  opening	  has	  been	  “By	  the	  Sweat	  
of	  Their	  Brow:	  Forging	  the	  Steel	  Valley,”	  which	  explicitly	  seeks	  to	  explore	  “labor,	  
immigration	  and	  urban	  history,	  using	  videos,	  artifacts,	  photographs,	  and	  
reconstructed	  scenes.”193	  The	  building	  that	  houses	  the	  center,	  designed	  by	  architect	  
Michael	  Graves	  in	  1986,	  is	  deliberately	  made	  to	  evoke	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  steel	  mill,	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  Demarest,	  Michael.	  "He	  Digs	  Downtown:	  For	  Master	  Planner	  James	  Rouse,	  Urban	  Life	  Is	  a	  
Festival."	  Time	  24	  Aug.	  1981:	  42-­‐53.	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  "Steel	  Museum	  Celebrates	  15	  Years,	  Seeks	  Support."	  Vindy.com.	  The	  Youngstown	  
Vindicator,	  27	  Sept.	  2007.	  Web.	  25	  Mar.	  2013.	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  Industry	  &	  Labor."	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  The	  
Youngstown	  Historical	  Center	  of	  Industry	  &	  Labor.	  Ohio	  Historical	  Society,	  n.d.	  Web.	  25	  Mar.	  
2013.	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  Ibid.	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complete	  with	  stylized	  smokestack	  elements,	  further	  suggesting	  an	  aestheticized	  
memorialization	  of	  industrial	  labor.	  
At	  the	  other	  extreme,	  we	  must	  consider	  Enterprise	  Square	  USA,	  a	  virtual	  
“free	  market	  Disneyworld”	  which	  opened	  at	  Oklahoma	  Christian	  University	  in	  1982.	  
The	  product	  of	  decades	  of	  free–market	  evangelizing	  by	  George	  Benson,	  the	  head	  of	  
Oklahoma	  Christian’s	  sister	  campus,	  Harding	  University,	  Enterprise	  Square	  USA	  was	  
a	  theme	  park	  of	  free–market	  capitalism	  and,	  according	  to	  its	  own	  publicity,	  “the	  
nation’s	  only	  major	  visitor	  attraction	  designed	  to	  interpret	  the	  free–market	  
system.”194	  With	  a	  structure	  and	  approach	  that	  at	  times	  seems	  identical	  to	  
AutoWorld’s,	  Enterprise	  Square	  USA	  enlisted	  the	  services	  of	  former	  Disney	  
imagineers	  to	  craft	  exhibits	  that	  would	  “blend	  education	  and	  entertainment”	  with	  
graphics,	  photography,	  animation,	  animatronics,	  and	  computers,	  as	  well	  as	  
intellectual	  input	  from	  the	  chief	  economist	  of	  the	  conservative	  American	  Enterprise	  
Institute.195	  As	  Enterprise	  Square	  USA’s	  technical	  director	  explained,	  “It	  has	  some	  
traits	  of	  a	  museum,	  and	  some	  traits	  of	  an	  amusement	  park,”196	  pointing	  toward	  the	  
blending	  of	  education	  and	  fun	  that	  was	  happening	  more	  broadly	  within	  institutions,	  
like	  museums,	  that	  were	  increasingly	  faced	  with	  a	  responsibility	  to	  attract	  tourists	  
while	  also	  claiming	  some	  cultural	  authority—a	  blend	  that	  AutoWorld	  banked	  on.	  
The	  biggest	  obvious	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  is	  their	  disparate	  levels	  of	  success,	  
as	  Enterprise	  Square	  USA	  remained	  open	  and	  active	  until	  2002,	  while	  AutoWorld	  
closed	  within	  a	  year	  of	  its	  opening.	  There	  is	  also	  the	  common	  theme	  of	  regaining	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  Free	  Enterprise.	  
Cambridge,	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what	  has	  been	  lost,	  presumably	  as	  a	  cost	  of	  New	  Deal	  liberalism—at	  Enterprise	  
Square	  USA’s	  groundbreaking	  ceremony,	  Senator	  David	  Boren	  took	  the	  opportunity	  
to	  declare	  the	  opening	  a	  chance	  to	  help	  America	  win	  back	  its	  lost	  prestige	  as	  “the	  
number	  one	  nation	  in	  the	  world.”197	  	  
Visitors	  to	  Enterprise	  Square	  USA	  experienced	  a	  three–hour	  tour	  of	  the	  
capitalist	  system,	  guided	  by	  three	  aliens	  whose	  craft	  crash–lands	  right	  in	  front	  of	  
them	  to	  begin	  the	  trip.	  According	  to	  the	  tour’s	  narrative,	  the	  spacecraft	  has	  run	  out	  
of	  fuel	  and	  the	  alien	  guides,	  innocent	  of	  capitalism,	  must	  learn	  the	  ways	  of	  the	  
American	  free	  market	  system	  to	  solve	  their	  crisis.	  Visitors	  are	  guided	  through	  
several	  interactive	  exhibits,	  all	  designed	  to	  teach	  a	  different	  lesson	  of	  capitalism.	  
Historian	  Bethany	  Moreton	  describes	  one	  exhibit,	  the	  “grimly	  Orwellian	  ‘Great	  
Talking	  Face	  of	  Government.’”	  
[The	   exhibit]	   covered	   one	   wall	   and	   housed	   nine	   separate	   video	  
screens	   representing	   mouth,	   eyes,	   ears	   and	   brain.	   ‘As	   the	   face	  
expounds	   on	   the	   needs	   for	   more	   regulatory	   power	   to	   protect	   the	  
people,’	  wrote	  an	  enthusiastic	  reviewer	  of	  an	  early	  sneak	  preview,	  ‘the	  
tempo	   and	   action	   increase	   until	   the	   face	   short–circuits.	   “It’s	  
overworked,”’	  explained	  the	  alien	  guide.198	  
	  
Espousing	  the	  neoliberal	  gospel	  of	  free–market	  capitalism	  and	  meddlesome	  
government	  regulation	  had	  the	  implied	  if	  not	  explicit	  message	  that	  organized	  labor	  
was	  also	  an	  unwelcome	  interloper	  into	  the	  province	  of	  the	  invisible	  hands	  of	  the	  
marketplace,	  and	  a	  successful	  theme	  park	  dedicated	  to	  such	  ideas	  could	  find	  no	  
more	  comfortable	  or	  appropriate	  a	  historical	  moment.	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AutoWorld	  and	  the	  Memorialization	  of	  a	  Time	  Gone	  By	  
In	  his	  sweeping	  and	  influential	  synthesis	  of	  twentieth–century	  labor	  history,	  
Nelson	  Lichtenstein	  argues	  that	  the	  “labor	  question”	  was	  central	  to	  American	  
political	  and	  social	  imagination	  during	  the	  Great	  Depression	  and	  the	  years	  
immediately	  following.	  In	  contemporary	  politics,	  however,	  he	  argues	  that	  
“Americans	  have	  largely	  forgotten	  why	  the	  unions	  grew	  so	  explosively	  in	  the	  decade	  
after	  1933.”199	  Although	  his	  arguments	  concerning	  the	  long–term	  loss	  of	  union	  
power	  over	  the	  intervening	  decades	  is	  more	  problematic,	  he	  does	  observe	  that	  the	  
tendency	  on	  both	  the	  left	  and	  the	  right	  to	  construct	  a	  “programmatically	  convenient	  
mythology”	  around	  the	  dramatic	  rise	  of	  organized	  labor	  relies	  on	  a	  common	  theme	  
of	  historical	  distance.	  Union	  sympathizers	  on	  the	  left	  recall	  wistfully	  a	  “golden	  age”	  
of	  labor	  relations	  that	  conveniently	  leaves	  out	  structural	  inequalities	  of	  race	  and	  
gender	  in	  the	  movement,	  and	  does	  little	  to	  deepen	  our	  historical	  understanding.	  On	  
the	  other	  hand,	  Reaganites	  and	  business	  conservatives	  advance	  a	  narrative	  in	  which	  
we	  are	  to	  imagine	  “an	  unbridgeable	  divide	  separating	  our	  era	  from	  both	  the	  
economic	  structures	  of	  the	  depression	  decade	  and	  the	  technology	  of	  the	  mass	  
production	  regime	  that	  was	  thought	  to	  dominate	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  
century.”200	  According	  to	  this	  narrative,	  these	  early	  strikes	  hold	  an	  honored	  place	  in	  
American	  history,	  but	  since	  then,	  blue–collar	  work	  has	  become	  less	  significant	  and	  
bosses	  have	  learned	  their	  lesson,	  meaning	  that	  unions	  are	  essentially	  an	  irrelevant	  
and	  clunky	  relic	  of	  a	  time	  gone	  by.	  The	  outcome	  of	  both	  narratives,	  left	  and	  right,	  
ultimately	  relegates	  organized	  labor	  to	  the	  past,	  to	  be	  briefly	  recognized	  and	  then	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moved	  past.	  The	  representations	  of	  labor	  in	  the	  exhibits	  of	  AutoWorld	  perfectly	  
exemplify	  this	  strategy	  in	  the	  moment	  when	  it	  was	  being	  formed	  nationally,	  and	  
illustrate	  the	  cultural	  process	  of	  its	  formation	  in	  the	  birthplace	  of	  the	  modern	  labor	  
movement.	  	  
	   To	  give	  a	  snapshot	  of	  the	  economic	  context	  in	  which	  AutoWorld	  was	  
representing	  Flint	  and	  the	  wonders	  of	  the	  American	  automobile	  industry,	  by	  the	  
time	  that	  it	  opened	  in	  July	  1984,	  the	  community	  that	  it	  greeted	  with	  its	  celebratory	  
message	  had	  roughly	  26%	  unemployment,	  and	  Flint	  was	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  a	  sharp,	  
decade-­‐long	  decline	  in	  manufacturing	  employment	  that	  would	  see	  30,000	  jobs	  
eliminated	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s.	  Population	  loss	  accelerated	  as	  well,	  as	  one	  half	  
of	  the	  30%	  who	  were	  unemployed	  in	  1982	  had	  left	  the	  city.201	  	  
	   Fredrick	  Hope	  was	  in	  the	  perfect	  position	  to	  bring	  a	  light	  into	  the	  dark	  place	  of	  
Flint.	  As	  an	  exhibit	  designer	  with	  9	  years	  of	  experience	  as	  a	  Disney	  “imagineer,”	  
Hope	  was	  chosen	  to	  head	  the	  AutoWorld	  creative	  team	  specifically	  for	  his	  
credentials	  with	  the	  most	  recognizable	  creator	  of	  entertaining	  and	  profitable	  
environments	  in	  the	  world.	  The	  Disney	  “experience”	  or	  “atmosphere”	  of	  magic,	  
wonder,	  and	  fun	  was	  repeatedly	  articulated	  as	  the	  model	  for	  the	  AutoWorld	  
experience.	  A	  promotional	  film	  script,	  written	  to	  sell	  the	  project	  to	  investors,	  asserts	  
that	  “not	  since	  Walt	  Disney	  opened	  his	  ‘Magic	  Kingdoms’	  has	  such	  a	  concept	  been	  
realized	  and	  AutoWorld	  will	  be	  a	  place	  that	  even	  that	  great	  man	  would	  be	  proud	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  Moore,	  Michael.	  "Dance	  Band	  on	  the	  Titanic:	  AutoWorld	  and	  the	  Death	  of	  Flint."	  The	  
Michigan	  Voice	  [Flint]	  Sept.	  1984:	  10.;	  Lord,	  George	  F.,	  and	  Albert	  C.	  Price.	  "Growth	  Ideology	  
in	  a	  Period	  of	  Decline:	  Deindustrialization	  and	  Restructuring,	  Flint	  Style."	  Social	  Problems	  
39.2	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of.”202	  Hope	  and	  his	  associates	  in	  “The	  Only	  Animated	  Display	  and	  Design	  Company”	  
were	  frequently	  hailed	  in	  local	  media	  and	  AutoWorld	  materials	  for	  their	  impressive	  
pedigree,	  and	  the	  animatronic	  character	  and	  eventual	  spokesfigure	  of	  Fred,	  the	  
“Carriageless	  Horse”	  was	  explicitly	  described	  as	  a	  spokesman	  in	  the	  style	  of	  Mickey	  
Mouse,	  which	  meant	  that	  he	  was	  both	  a	  character	  saturated	  with	  sometimes	  
contradictory	  meaning,	  and	  a	  malleable	  product	  to	  be	  sold	  in	  many	  forms.203	  This	  
strong	  and	  conscious	  connection	  to	  Disney	  and	  its	  theme	  parks	  also	  meant	  a	  strong	  
commitment	  to	  animatronic	  displays	  as	  the	  main	  form	  of	  displaying	  the	  historical	  
content	  at	  AutoWorld,	  with	  over	  100	  individual	  animatronic	  figures	  in	  use	  
throughout	  the	  park.	  The	  specific	  history	  of	  animatronics	  also	  helps	  to	  illuminate	  
the	  relationship	  between	  this	  technological	  form	  and	  historical	  representation—the	  
first	  animatronic	  figure	  was	  the	  Abraham	  Lincoln	  robot	  created	  by	  Disney	  
imagineers	  in	  collaboration	  with	  the	  State	  of	  Illinois	  for	  their	  “A	  Visit	  with	  Mr.	  
Lincoln”	  pavilion,	  and	  later	  incorporated	  into	  the	  “Hall	  of	  Presidents”	  exhibit	  at	  the	  
Magic	  Kingdom.	  Like	  the	  exhibits	  at	  AutoWorld,	  these	  original	  figures	  of	  animatronic	  
technology	  were	  meant	  to	  narrate	  a	  serious	  history	  in	  an	  entertaining	  and	  
technologically	  impressive	  way,	  and	  it	  is	  this	  “experiential”—but	  also	  potentially	  
alienating,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  visitors	  in	  both	  contexts	  were	  not	  expected	  to	  actually	  
mistake	  animatronic	  figures	  for	  “the	  real	  thing”—method	  of	  narrating	  history,	  and	  
its	  lucrative	  possibilities,	  that	  AutoWorld	  wanted	  to	  recreate.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  
recognize	  the	  resonance	  of	  Disney’s	  valuing	  of	  the	  notions	  of	  “progress,”	  especially	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  The	  Only	  Animated	  Display	  and	  Design	  Company.	  Fredric	  Hope	  and	  Associates,	  1984.	  
Transcript.	  
203	  AutoWorld	  General	  Concept	  Design	  Notes:	  Fred	  the	  Horse.	  17	  Nov.	  1982.	  Exhibit	  Design	  
Notes.	  Sloan	  Archives,	  Flint.	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in	  terms	  of	  technological	  innovation	  and	  virtuosity,	  in	  AutoWorld’s	  privileging	  of	  
animatronic	  exhibits,	  as	  it	  was	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  their	  stated	  mission	  to	  honor	  and	  
memorialize	  the	  technological	  achievements	  of	  the	  automobile	  industry.	  The	  irony	  
here,	  of	  course,	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  Henry	  Ford’s	  Greenfield	  Village,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  
it	  contained	  the	  same	  central	  contradiction	  of	  capitalism	  that	  I	  would	  argue	  
AutoWorld	  reveals:	  the	  very	  industry	  that	  has	  destroyed	  the	  past	  through	  
“progress”	  would	  then	  choose	  to	  honor	  it	  through	  nostalgic	  representation.	  	  
Fred	  the	  Carriageless	  Horse	  (hereafter,	  simply	  “Fred”)	  was	  created	  and	  
developed	  by	  Fredric	  Hope	  and	  Associates	  in	  collaboration	  with	  Flint	  AutoWorld	  
officials	  as	  a	  highly	  complex	  and	  rounded	  character,	  with	  a	  nuanced	  history	  and	  
personality	  that	  could	  be	  drawn	  upon	  to	  inform	  his	  interactions	  with	  the	  AutoWorld	  
public.	  This	  is	  all	  to	  say	  that	  Fred	  was	  taken	  very	  seriously	  in	  his	  central	  role	  in	  
representing	  the	  project	  of	  AutoWorld	  and	  its	  missions.	  As	  Fredric	  Hope,	  who	  
articulated	  the	  character	  and	  shaped	  the	  look	  of	  Fred,	  asserted	  in	  his	  general	  
concept	  design	  notes:	  
“Fred,	   the	   “Carriageless	  Horse”	   is	   a	  mascot,	   logo	   and	   spokesman	   for	  
the	  entire	  AutoWorld	  project.	  In	  addition	  to	  being	  featured	  in	  several	  
of	   the	   entertainment	   events	  within	   AutoWorld,	   he	  will	   undoubtedly	  
be	  called	  upon	  to	  support	  and	  promote	  the	  project.	  Because	  of	  this	  we	  
thought	  that	  a	  bit	  of	  a	  psychological	  profile	  would	  be	  in	  order.	  
	  
First	   of	   all,	   Fred	   is	   not,	   repeat	   NOT	   an	   animated	   figure,	   a	   robot,	  
automaton,	   audio–animatronic	   device	   or	   any	   other	   demeaning	   and	  
meaningless	   aphorism.	   Fred	   is	   a	   living,	   breathing	   character	   and	   as	  
such,	  he	  has	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses,	  talents	  and	  foibles,	  just	  as	  we	  
human	  beings	  do	  (though	  he	  would	  deny	  it	  emphatically!).204	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Of	  course,	  however,	  Fred	  was	  all	  of	  these	  dreaded	  and	  “demeaning”	  things	  that	  Hope	  
facetiously	  denied	  in	  his	  steadfast	  defense	  of	  Fred’s	  “reality.”	  As	  the	  audio–
animatronic	  robot	  host	  to	  the	  main	  “ride”	  inside	  AutoWorld,	  called	  “The	  Humorous	  
History	  of	  Automobility,”	  Fred	  was	  the	  figure	  of	  authority	  presiding	  over	  a	  self–
consciously	  frivolous	  version	  of	  automotive	  history.	  He	  also	  is	  the	  only	  character	  to	  
appear	  multiple	  times	  in	  multiple	  contexts	  (he	  also	  appears	  to	  play	  banjo	  and	  
entertain	  those	  visitors	  waiting	  to	  see	  another	  animated	  ride	  depicting	  a	  worker–
less	  assembly	  line,	  along	  with	  his	  recurring	  presence	  on	  shirts	  and	  other	  souvenirs),	  
solidifying	  his	  status	  as	  a	  mascot,	  logo	  and	  spokeshorse	  for	  AutoWorld.	  In	  this	  “dark	  
ride”—much	  like	  Disney’s	  “It’s	  a	  Small	  World”	  or	  “Haunted	  Mansion”	  rides—visitors	  
boarded	  a	  replica	  of	  an	  “antique	  touring	  car”	  and	  rode	  along	  a	  track	  that	  took	  them	  
through	  a	  series	  of	  20	  animated	  and	  animatronic	  vignettes,	  “each	  presented	  in	  
tongue–in–cheek	  manner,	  bringing	  to	  life	  the	  trials	  and	  tribulations	  of	  keeping	  
America	  on	  the	  road.”205	  In	  this	  history—significant	  in	  its	  explicit	  and	  unusual	  
purpose	  to	  present	  as	  flawed	  but	  frivolous	  (or	  “fun”)	  a	  narrative	  of	  the	  automobile	  
and	  the	  industry	  around	  it	  as	  possible—the	  automobile	  is	  a	  perpetual	  underdog	  that	  
pluckily	  fights	  its	  way	  through	  the	  history	  of	  America	  to	  rightful	  prominence.	  Fred,	  
who	  is	  present	  bodily	  to	  introduce	  you	  to	  the	  ride	  and	  throughout	  the	  “Humorous	  
History”	  as	  a	  narrator	  through	  a	  drive–in	  movie–style	  speaker	  attached	  to	  each	  
individual	  car,	  “haplessly	  and	  hopelessly,	  but	  valiantly,	  tries	  to	  convince	  his	  touring	  
audience	  that	  the	  automobile	  is	  just	  a	  passing	  fancy—a	  folly—certainly	  not	  to	  be	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  Associates.	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taken	  seriously.”206	  The	  layers	  of	  meaning	  here	  are	  complex,	  to	  say	  the	  least:	  we	  are	  
taken	  as	  visitors	  through	  a	  ride	  presenting	  a	  history	  that	  is	  obviously	  serious,	  but	  is	  
presented	  as	  frivolous	  by	  an	  unreliable	  narrator	  who	  we	  are/are	  not	  supposed	  to	  
take	  seriously	  when	  he	  instructs	  us	  not	  to	  take	  automobiles	  seriously.	  	  	  
But	  what	  were	  the	  actual	  anxieties	  and	  dissenting	  voices	  that	  a	  text	  and	  
character	  such	  as	  this	  were	  trying	  to	  manage	  and	  contain?	  Although	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  
uncover	  and	  quantify	  by	  the	  very	  fact	  of	  the	  dominant	  local	  discourse’s	  virtual	  
monopoly	  on	  rhetorics	  of	  “progress”	  and	  “consensus,”	  there	  are	  glimpses	  of	  class–
based	  dissent	  being	  voiced	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  AutoWorld	  project.	  In	  the	  September	  
1984	  issue	  of	  the	  local	  alternative	  newspaper	  The	  Michigan	  Voice,	  editor	  Michael	  
Moore	  relates	  a	  story	  about	  a	  factory	  worker	  friend	  who	  insisted	  on	  joining	  him,	  
drunk,	  on	  Moore’s	  weekly	  Flint	  radio	  show	  to	  talk	  about	  his	  experiences.	  “The	  
phones	  lit	  up,”	  he	  writes,	  “and	  one	  caller	  after	  another	  talked	  about	  their	  hot,	  dirty,	  
thankless	  jobs	  in	  the	  factories	  …	  and	  how	  much	  they	  hated	  General	  Motors—and	  
AutoWorld	  (“a	  joke	  and	  an	  insult	  to	  my	  intelligence,	  my	  dignity	  and	  my	  wallet,”	  as	  
one	  caller	  put	  it).”207	  However	  biased	  or	  romanticized	  this	  account	  may	  or	  may	  not	  
be—though	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  “bias”	  is	  always	  relative,	  especially	  in	  this	  context—it	  
seems	  difficult	  to	  argue	  that	  this	  point	  of	  view	  did	  not	  exist.	  Occasional	  letters	  to	  the	  
editors	  of	  various	  local	  newspapers	  also	  provide	  some	  insight.	  One	  Michigan	  Voice	  
letter	  reads,	  “I’ve	  never	  worked	  on	  an	  assembly	  line,	  but	  I	  cringed	  at	  that	  inane	  ‘My	  
Buddy’	  display—this	  must	  make	  factory	  workers	  feel	  like	  garbage.”208	  Another	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  Ibid.	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  Michael	  Moore,	  “Dance	  Band	  on	  the	  Titanic.”	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  Moore,	  Michael.	  The	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  Voice	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letter	  to	  the	  Flint	  Journal,	  positive	  in	  its	  assessment	  of	  AutoWorld	  (unsurprising	  
given	  the	  Journal’s	  staunch	  and	  arguably	  biased	  boosterism	  of	  the	  project),	  
references	  an	  amorphous	  local	  dissent	  in	  saying	  “the	  reason	  I’m	  writing	  is	  because	  it	  
seems	  that	  AutoWorld	  seems	  to	  draw	  too	  many	  undeserved	  negative	  opinions.”209	  
Perhaps	  the	  most	  damning	  assessments	  come	  from	  a	  viewer	  survey	  conducted	  by	  
the	  Saginaw	  (Michigan)	  News,	  where	  97%	  of	  292	  votes	  gave	  negative	  impressions	  of	  
the	  AutoWorld	  concept,	  including	  responses	  such	  as	  “What	  do	  they	  think	  it	  is,	  
DisneyWorld?”	  and	  “I	  can	  just	  imagine	  the	  long	  line	  of	  laid	  off	  auto	  workers	  waiting	  
to	  get	  in,	  ha	  ha.”210	  These	  two	  texts	  are	  also	  clearly	  poles	  of	  sentiment	  concerning	  
AutoWorld,	  with	  a	  majority	  of	  residents	  divided	  about	  the	  subject	  in	  one	  way	  or	  
another.	  In	  any	  case,	  these	  sentiments	  needed	  to	  be	  managed	  by	  AutoWorld’s	  
dominant	  discourses	  if	  the	  project	  was	  to	  progress	  with	  what	  they	  had	  always	  
assumed	  and	  expected	  to	  be	  the	  full	  mandate	  of	  Flint	  residents.	  
As	  the	  project	  of	  AutoWorld	  progressed,	  the	  animatronic	  incarnation	  of	  Fred	  
began	  to	  take	  shape.	  Fred’s	  appearance	  was	  codified	  in	  ways	  that	  marked	  him	  
visually	  as	  both	  working–class—or	  at	  least	  as	  “a	  worker”—and	  quaintly	  obsolete	  or	  
antiquated.	  In	  formal	  character	  sketches	  and	  animatronic	  costume	  instructions,	  he	  
is	  dressed	  in	  striped	  overalls	  or	  belted	  pants,	  with	  a	  long	  shop	  or	  driving	  coat.	  He	  
wears	  a	  polka–dotted	  bow	  tie,	  shop	  or	  driving	  gloves,	  and	  a	  conductor’s	  hat	  with	  
driving	  goggles.	  In	  his	  dress,	  he	  projects	  the	  look	  of	  a	  laborer	  “dressed	  up”	  for	  a	  
special	  event,	  and	  combines	  a	  vague	  “old–timey”	  aesthetic	  with	  working–class	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  to	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markings.	  The	  most	  telling	  detail	  in	  his	  wardrobe	  is	  the	  crescent	  wrench	  that	  he	  
either	  holds	  in	  his	  gloved	  hand	  or	  protrudes	  from	  his	  jacket	  pocket—an	  item	  that	  is	  
completely	  anachronistic	  to	  his	  character	  as	  it	  has	  been	  articulated,	  except	  for	  the	  
purpose	  of	  providing	  a	  visual	  touchstone	  tying	  him	  in	  a	  general	  way	  to	  the	  modern	  
world	  of	  manual,	  masculine	  “work.”	  It	  is	  also	  significant	  that	  Fred	  is	  placed	  
geographically	  within	  the	  specific	  concerns	  of	  the	  Midwestern	  “Rust	  Belt”	  and,	  we	  
can	  assume,	  Flint	  itself,	  through	  the	  concerns	  and	  debates	  surrounding	  his	  
appearance	  and	  performance	  as	  a	  three–dimensional	  animatronic	  character.	  In	  a	  
memorandum	  to	  the	  exhibit	  designers	  from	  AutoWorld	  officials,	  it	  is	  specifically	  
noted	  that	  “Fred	  should	  be	  more	  a	  Michigan	  horse,	  Midwestern	  and	  urban,	  as	  
opposed	  to	  a	  ‘Western’	  horse.	  Horses	  had	  urban	  experiences	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  
ranch/farm	  experience.”211	  This	  characterization	  of	  Fred	  as	  a	  specifically	  “Michigan”	  
and	  “urban”	  horse	  serves	  to	  reinforce	  the	  insistence	  upon	  AutoWorld’s	  
representations	  addressing	  local	  concerns	  in	  a	  national	  context.	  	  
	   The	  driving	  apparel	  that	  Fred	  displays	  is	  a	  practical	  element	  relating	  to	  the	  
specifics	  of	  his	  role	  as	  host	  to	  the	  “Humorous	  History	  of	  Automobility”	  ride.	  In	  this	  
role,	  Fred	  has	  been	  given	  a	  partner	  that	  both	  complicates	  his	  defining	  character	  
traits	  and	  affords	  him	  more	  authority	  to	  narrate	  the	  story	  of	  automobility—“Lin	  
Tizzy”	  is	  an	  antique	  car	  that	  Fred	  interacts	  with	  and	  rides	  in.	  In	  his	  animatronic	  
form,	  Fred	  retains	  his	  edge	  of	  resentment,	  but	  has	  somehow	  made	  peace	  with	  
technology—at	  least	  on	  an	  individual,	  humanized	  basis—enough	  to	  sing	  with	  and	  
even	  give	  some	  credit	  and	  thanks	  to	  the	  machines	  that	  replaced	  him	  and	  his	  kind.	  In	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the	  banter	  between	  Fred	  and	  Tizzie	  (though	  Tizzie	  speaks	  only	  in	  abstract	  but	  
recognizable	  honks	  and	  beeps),	  and	  before	  singing	  a	  song	  titled	  “Necessity	  is	  the	  
Mother	  of	  Invention”	  about	  how	  horses	  should	  actually	  be	  glad	  that	  the	  automobile	  
was	  invented,	  Fred	  says	  to	  his	  friend/nemesis,	  “Where	  would	  I	  be	  without	  you,	  eh?	  
Probably	  stretched	  out	  on	  some	  Ky–Ro	  Practor’s	  back	  bench!!”	  The	  automobile	  has	  
saved	  Fred	  from	  literally	  back–breaking	  labor,	  and	  there	  is	  some	  part	  of	  him	  that	  
has	  made	  his	  peace	  with,	  and	  is	  indeed	  grateful	  for,	  it,	  even	  though	  that	  freedom	  cost	  
Fred	  his	  livelihood	  and	  sense	  of	  purpose.	  
	   This	  sentiment	  is	  echoed	  in	  a	  much	  more	  explicitly	  contemporary	  and	  
problematic	  way	  in	  another	  animatronic	  display	  contained	  in	  a	  larger	  exhibit	  called	  
“The	  Wonders	  of	  Autowonders,”	  which	  depicted	  three	  stages	  of	  automobile	  
manufacture,	  from	  research	  and	  development	  to	  production	  to	  designing	  the	  “cars	  
of	  the	  future.”	  The	  display	  that	  is	  meant	  to	  show	  the	  production	  stage,	  taking	  place	  
on	  the	  assembly	  line,	  consists	  of	  a	  human	  autoworker	  character	  and	  a	  robotic	  
welding	  arm	  that	  the	  worker	  calls	  “Spot.”	  This	  mechanical	  character	  is,	  like	  Tizzie,	  
mute	  except	  for	  lights	  and	  beeps,	  but	  the	  autoworker	  and	  Spot	  together	  tell	  a	  story	  
about	  how	  their	  partnership	  actually	  means	  progress	  and	  productivity.	  This	  story,	  
very	  much	  parallel	  to	  Fred’s,	  is	  meant	  to	  illustrate	  that	  technology	  rescues	  human	  
workers	  from	  the	  hardships	  of	  manual	  labor,	  and	  culminates	  in	  a	  song	  that	  the	  two	  
sing	  together	  titled	  “Me	  and	  My	  Buddy”	  about	  how	  they	  “make	  the	  dreams	  come	  
true”	  for	  consumers	  (see	  Fig.	  14).	  
	   In	  one	  of	  the	  most	  explicit	  efforts	  to	  seal	  off	  the	  presence	  of	  organized	  labor,	  
AutoWorld	  boasted	  an	  exhibit	  dedicated	  exclusively	  to	  representing	  the	  assembly	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line,	  perhaps	  the	  single	  most	  significant	  development	  in	  automotive	  history.	  Both	  
designers	  and	  officials	  realized	  to	  some	  extent	  that	  exhibits	  such	  as	  this	  would	  have	  
to	  deal	  in	  some	  way	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  assembly	  lines,	  and	  industry	  in	  general,	  
required	  workers.	  “The	  dilemma	  we	  had,”	  said	  Frederick	  Hope,	  “is	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  
tell	  that	  story	  [the	  story	  of	  the	  automotive	  industry]	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  an	  area	  where	  
nobody	  knows	  more	  about	  how	  cars	  are	  being	  put	  together	  than	  the	  people	  who	  are	  
coming	  to	  see	  it.”212	  The	  logic	  put	  forward	  to	  solve	  this	  dilemma	  seems	  flawed,	  at	  
best,	  as	  Hope	  follows	  his	  previous	  statement	  by	  saying,	  “Because	  of	  that,	  a	  stylized	  
or	  artistic	  approach	  was	  taken.”213	  The	  result	  of	  this	  stylized	  approach	  was	  “the	  
Magical,	  Musical	  Motor	  Car	  Machine,”	  an	  exhibit	  that	  represented	  the	  assembly	  line	  
as	  a	  dark	  ride	  where	  visitors	  drove	  through	  an	  extended	  set	  of	  moving	  gears	  and	  
blinking	  lights,	  accompanied	  by	  a	  song	  about	  working	  on	  an	  assembly	  line—but	  
representing	  no	  actual	  workers.	  A	  promotional	  letter	  included	  with	  an	  AutoWorld	  
informational	  pamphlet	  describes	  the	  “Assembly	  Line”	  exhibit	  as	  “a	  ride	  on	  a	  
moving	  sidewalk	  past	  a	  special	  effect,	  dimensional	  and	  animated	  collage	  that	  depicts	  
the	  musical,	  magical	  evolution	  of	  the	  assembly	  process.”214	  In	  this	  formulation,	  the	  
process	  of	  auto	  assembly	  is	  not	  only	  not	  performed	  by	  anyone	  in	  particular,	  but	  is	  a	  
spectacular,	  sensory	  and	  “magical”	  process,	  disconnected	  from	  actual	  work	  or	  any	  
meaningful	  history	  of	  work.	  Despite	  concerns	  voiced	  by	  local	  university	  historians	  
and	  the	  UAW	  about	  a	  lack	  of	  union	  representation	  in	  AutoWorld’s	  exhibits,	  the	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  Worth,	  Jan.	  "Designer	  Wanted	  Rides	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  Surprise."	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Flint	  Journal	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creative	  solution	  to	  dilemmas	  regarding	  labor’s	  place	  in	  Flint’s	  new	  cultural	  
revitalization	  strategy	  was	  to	  marginalize,	  aestheticize,	  and	  memorialize	  it	  out	  of	  the	  
present.	  Just	  as	  James	  Rouse’s	  “fun”	  city	  on	  the	  cover	  of	  TIME	  was	  eerily	  devoid	  of	  
actual	  life,	  so	  this	  assembly	  line	  promised	  a	  history	  of	  industrial	  glory	  without	  
conflict	  with	  actual	  workers.	  	  
	   These	  animatronic	  displays	  perform	  a	  complicated	  postmodern	  feat	  wherein	  
the	  “human/horse/real”	  character	  is	  explicitly	  juxtaposed	  against	  the	  
“mechanical/automated/unreal,”	  all	  in	  animatronic	  form.	  Thus,	  even	  the	  “real”	  here	  
is	  unreal	  and	  mechanized,	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  is	  tension	  in	  the	  characters’	  
interaction	  (Fred’s	  resentment/gratitude	  toward	  the	  automobile	  or	  the	  wholly	  
amicable	  relationship	  between	  “Me	  and	  My	  Buddy”),	  the	  foundation	  that	  these	  
representations	  are	  built	  upon	  is	  always	  already	  removed	  from	  “the	  real”—these	  
are	  machines	  talking	  about	  the	  relationship	  of	  people	  to	  machines.	  Though	  this	  
might	  be	  seen	  as	  only	  (though	  monumentally)	  ironic,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  this	  mode	  
of	  representation	  was	  particularly	  suited	  to	  AutoWorld’s	  mission	  to	  “leave	  the	  real	  
world	  behind”	  while	  recognizing	  its	  obligation—not	  necessarily	  based	  in	  any	  moral	  
or	  social	  impetus,	  but	  at	  least	  unavoidable	  on	  some	  level—to	  address	  the	  
relationship	  of	  workers	  to	  machines.	  In	  these	  characters,	  the	  desired	  atmosphere	  of	  
Disney–esque	  “fun”	  can	  be	  achieved	  by	  presenting	  singing,	  dancing	  technological	  
marvels—which	  AutoWorld	  was	  very	  much	  committed	  to	  celebrating—while	  still	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As	  a	  final	  illustration	  of	  the	  intersecting	  predicaments	  of	  Rust	  Belt	  urban	  
centers	  and	  American	  organized	  labor,	  we	  must	  step	  back	  again,	  to	  before	  
AutoWorld	  opened	  its	  doors	  and	  before	  it	  was	  filled	  with	  talking	  robot	  horses	  and	  
anthropomorphic	  cars.	  Before	  Fred	  sang	  or	  spoke	  a	  word,	  a	  real–life	  labor	  dispute	  
took	  place	  involving	  a	  group	  of	  construction	  workers	  who	  were	  building	  
AutoWorld’s	  skeleton.	  The	  issues	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  dispute	  were	  not	  so	  dramatic	  as	  
those	  animating	  the	  legendary	  strikers	  of	  the	  winter	  of	  1936–7,	  but	  the	  events	  of	  the	  
summer	  of	  1983	  were	  similarly	  historic,	  as	  they	  offer	  us	  a	  unique	  opportunity	  to	  
better	  understand	  how	  the	  political	  economic	  and	  cultural	  climate	  had	  dramatically	  
shifted;	  almost	  a	  time–lapse	  snapshot	  of	  the	  same	  place,	  through	  the	  same	  lens,	  
showing	  us	  changes	  over	  the	  intervening	  decades.	  
In	  May	  1983,	  just	  over	  a	  year	  before	  AutoWorld	  was	  scheduled	  to	  hold	  its	  
Independence	  Day	  grand	  opening	  celebration,	  finishers	  of	  the	  Cement	  Mason	  Local	  
198	  who	  were	  contracted	  to	  help	  the	  facility	  meet	  its	  scheduled	  debut	  declared	  a	  
strike,	  in	  a	  work	  stoppage	  that	  threatened	  to	  eventually	  derail	  many	  other	  
construction	  activities.	  At	  issue	  was	  a	  70–cent–per–hour	  raise,	  which	  covered	  a	  20–
cent	  wage	  decrease	  from	  the	  year	  before,	  plus	  another	  50	  cents	  to	  match	  a	  raise	  for	  
general	  laborers.	  The	  general	  contractors	  wanted	  a	  wage	  freeze	  and	  so	  found	  
themselves	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  cement	  finishers	  union,	  leading	  to	  the	  work	  stoppage	  
and	  almost	  a	  dozen	  rounds	  of	  unsuccessful	  bargaining	  sessions,	  some	  with	  a	  federal	  
mediator.215	  The	  strike	  escalated	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  picket	  line	  by	  the	  cement	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finishers	  union	  on	  June	  22,	  shutting	  down	  all	  construction	  at	  the	  AutoWorld	  site	  
after	  allegations	  by	  the	  striking	  workers	  that	  the	  local	  contractor,	  Sorensen–Gross,	  
was	  allowing	  other	  tradespeople	  to	  do	  their	  finishing	  work,	  using	  improper	  tools	  
and	  methods.	  “They	  are	  using	  tricks	  to	  get	  it	  done,”	  the	  union’s	  business	  manager,	  
Anderson	  Abrams,	  said.	  “They	  are	  doing	  everything	  in	  the	  book	  to	  get	  the	  job	  done	  
with	  other	  trades.”216	  After	  almost	  a	  week,	  the	  finishers’	  union	  withdrew	  from	  the	  
picket	  line	  and	  returned	  to	  work	  under	  the	  original	  wage	  rate	  while	  negotiations	  
proceeded,	  allowing	  all	  construction	  to	  be	  resumed.	  On	  the	  part	  of	  the	  union,	  the	  
decision	  to	  back	  down	  and	  stop	  the	  work	  disruption	  was	  apparently	  a	  gesture	  of	  
goodwill	  toward	  the	  general	  progress	  of	  the	  project,	  and	  Sorensen–Gross,	  the	  local	  
contractor,	  joined	  in	  the	  selfless	  gesture	  by	  agreeing	  not	  to	  generate	  another	  
obstacle	  by	  objecting	  to	  their	  $1	  million	  cement	  work	  contract	  being	  terminated	  by	  
the	  project	  manager,	  even	  though	  the	  firm	  only	  completed	  about	  half	  the	  work	  and	  
considered	  the	  AutoWorld	  job	  a	  “plum.”217	  Almost	  exactly	  one	  year	  later,	  AutoWorld	  
opened	  on	  July	  4,	  right	  on	  schedule.	  
As	  labor	  sagas	  go,	  it	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  stuff	  of	  legend.	  It	  is	  a	  more	  or	  less	  
ordinary	  story	  of	  a	  simple	  wage	  dispute	  that	  grew	  into	  a	  minor	  work	  stoppage.	  By	  
Sorensen–Gross’s	  own	  calculations,	  the	  70–cent	  increase	  that	  the	  cement	  finishers’	  
union	  was	  demanding	  would	  have	  cost	  about	  $500	  for	  the	  whole	  project.	  What	  
makes	  this	  significant	  beyond	  its	  local	  context	  is	  the	  debate	  surrounding	  the	  strike,	  
carried	  on	  between	  labor	  leaders,	  business	  interests,	  city	  and	  project	  officials,	  and	  
the	  local	  media—a	  debate	  that	  signals	  a	  significant	  shift	  in	  the	  real	  and	  perceived	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relationship	  between	  organized	  labor	  and	  the	  changing	  political	  economic	  and	  
cultural	  landscape	  of	  deindustrialized	  urban	  centers.	  As	  a	  dispute	  that	  took	  place	  in	  
the	  midst	  of	  one	  of	  the	  most	  labor–hostile	  political	  climates	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  
in	  the	  birthplace	  of	  the	  modern	  labor	  movement,	  and	  concerning	  the	  construction	  of	  
an	  institution	  meant	  to	  reverse	  the	  effects	  of	  deindustrialization	  and	  job	  loss,	  
analyzing	  the	  terms	  of	  this	  strike	  and	  how	  it	  was	  resolved	  offer	  a	  revelatory	  
perspective	  on	  the	  intersecting	  predicaments	  of	  labor,	  culture,	  and	  urban	  space.	  
To	  understand	  the	  terms	  of	  debate	  in	  this	  strike,	  we	  must	  again	  step	  back	  
and	  understand	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  AutoWorld	  was	  seen	  at	  the	  time	  by	  city	  
officials,	  the	  media,	  and	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  the	  public	  as	  the	  key	  to	  Flint’s	  
economic	  revitalization.	  During	  the	  preceding	  years	  of	  planning	  and	  deliberation	  
about	  how	  AutoWorld	  would	  run,	  what	  kind	  of	  institution	  it	  would	  be,	  and	  what	  it	  
would	  look	  like,	  the	  economic	  situation	  in	  Flint	  had	  grown	  steadily	  worse,	  while	  the	  
optimistic	  rhetoric	  surrounding	  revitalization	  plans	  and	  the	  successful	  shift	  to	  a	  
tourist–based	  comeback	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  AutoWorld	  seemed	  to	  inversely	  rise.	  At	  
the	  time	  of	  the	  finishers’	  union	  strike,	  at	  least	  $63	  million	  had	  been	  poured	  into	  the	  
project,	  and	  expectations	  for	  a	  return	  on	  that	  investment	  were	  tremendously	  high.	  
These	  hopes	  are	  reflected	  in	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  labor	  dispute—the	  spokesman	  for	  
striking	  workers	  explained	  their	  eventual	  picket	  withdrawal	  in	  selfless	  terms,	  
saying,	  “I’m	  doing	  this	  in	  good	  faith	  so	  we	  can	  get	  AutoWorld	  moving.”218	  Sorensen–
Gross	  president	  Ghassan	  Saab	  was	  similarly	  magnanimous	  in	  explaining	  his	  firm’s	  
decision	  to	  allow	  their	  contract	  termination,	  saying	  that	  “we	  are	  pleased	  that	  the	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project	  will	  be	  able	  to	  go	  ahead	  and	  won’t	  be	  encumbered	  any	  longer	  by	  this	  
problem.”219	  In	  the	  name	  of	  such	  a	  massively	  important	  civic	  project,	  these	  opposing	  
sides	  had	  seemingly	  found	  some	  common	  ground.	  
City	  officials	  and	  local	  media	  were	  even	  more	  insistent	  that	  AutoWorld	  was	  
bigger	  than	  the	  issues	  threatening	  to	  slow	  its	  progress.	  Following	  the	  finishers’	  
union	  decision	  to	  remove	  the	  picket	  line	  and	  go	  back	  to	  work,	  Flint	  mayor	  James	  
Rutherford	  enthusiastically	  praised	  Sorensen–Gross,	  saying,	  “They	  deserve	  to	  be	  
applauded	  for	  their	  community	  spirit.	  They	  gracefully	  stepped	  aside	  so	  that	  this	  
project	  could	  continue.”220	  Mott	  Foundation	  president	  and	  vocal	  AutoWorld	  
champion	  William	  White	  said	  the	  move	  by	  workers	  to	  remove	  the	  picket	  line	  was	  
“wonderful”	  and	  that	  Sorensen–Gross’s	  decision	  was	  “a	  magnificent	  community	  
gesture	  on	  their	  part.”221	  These	  remarks	  clearly	  place	  the	  actions	  of	  organized	  labor	  
as	  well	  as	  management	  in	  the	  realm	  not	  of	  politics	  or	  of	  the	  legitimate	  actions	  of	  a	  
union	  to	  address	  grievances,	  but	  rather	  in	  terms	  of	  “community	  spirit”	  and	  of	  
selflessness	  and	  service	  to	  a	  cause	  of	  greater	  social	  and	  economic	  import.	  
Coverage	  in	  the	  Flint	  Journal	  framed	  the	  unfolding	  events	  in	  even	  grander	  
terms.	  Also	  a	  longtime	  supporter	  of	  the	  AutoWorld	  project,	  the	  paper’s	  editorial	  
page	  had	  grave	  concern	  for	  what	  any	  postponement	  of	  the	  attraction’s	  opening	  
might	  mean	  for	  the	  city,	  and	  praised	  any	  sacrifice	  made	  in	  its	  name,	  especially	  on	  the	  
part	  of	  labor.	  “The	  cement	  masons	  showed	  commendable	  civic	  responsibility	  in	  
their	  decision	  to	  permit	  other	  crafts	  to	  resume	  work	  at	  the	  construction	  site,	  even	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219	  "Resumption	  of	  Work	  on	  AutoWorld	  Hailed."	  The	  Flint	  Journal	  29	  July	  1983,	  sec.	  A:	  2.	  
220	  Ibid.	  
221	  Ibid.	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though	  no	  final	  settlement	  has	  been	  reached	  with	  contractors	  on	  the	  union’s	  
demand	  for	  an	  hourly	  wage	  increase,”	  they	  said,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  expressing	  
some	  concern	  for	  the	  commendable–but–unfortunate	  decision	  by	  Sorensen–Gross	  
to	  step	  aside,	  lamenting	  that	  “It	  is	  regrettable	  resolving	  AutoWorld’s	  labor	  problems	  
might	  require	  such	  economic	  sacrifice.”222	  The	  final	  thought	  made	  the	  paper’s	  
position	  even	  more	  plain:	  “Work	  on	  the	  theme	  park,	  so	  vital	  to	  Flint’s	  future	  
economic	  well	  being,	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  go	  on	  without	  disruption.”223	  	  
It	  shouldn’t	  necessarily	  be	  a	  surprise	  that	  the	  Flint	  Journal	  took	  a	  decidedly	  
pro–business,	  pro–AutoWorld	  stance	  in	  this	  moment	  of	  crisis.	  Even	  during	  the	  
1936–37	  UAW	  strike,	  the	  Journal,	  like	  many	  city	  newspapers,	  was	  staunchly	  anti–
union,	  with	  allies	  in	  state	  and	  local	  government	  as	  well	  as	  in	  big	  business.	  What	  is	  
different	  in	  the	  debate	  regarding	  AutoWorld’s	  work	  stoppage	  are	  the	  terms	  being	  
used	  to	  frame	  the	  issue	  of	  labor	  as	  it	  threatened	  a	  symbol	  of	  hope	  for	  economic	  
transformation—AutoWorld	  represented	  a	  new	  neoliberal	  “common	  sense”	  solution	  
to	  the	  city’s	  woes,	  beyond	  petty	  concerns	  like	  organized	  labor	  that	  defined	  the	  New	  
Deal	  order.	  In	  this	  new	  context,	  the	  old	  politics	  of	  labor	  had	  clearly	  failed,	  and	  the	  
evidence	  of	  that	  failure	  was	  everywhere	  you	  looked	  in	  Flint.	  The	  way	  forward,	  the	  
way	  to	  become	  competitive	  in	  a	  new	  marketplace	  of	  tourist	  destinations	  was	  clear,	  
and	  nothing	  must	  stand	  in	  the	  way	  of	  its	  completion.	  According	  to	  this	  logic,	  Flint	  
simply	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  wait,	  and	  that	  sentiment	  is	  made	  perfectly	  clear	  in	  the	  
title	  of	  the	  Flint	  Journal’s	  July	  12	  editorial:	  “No	  time	  for	  strike.”224	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222	  "Good	  AutoWorld	  Move."	  The	  Flint	  Journal	  29	  July	  1983.	  
223	  Ibid.	  
224	  "No	  Time	  for	  Strike."	  The	  Flint	  Journal	  12	  July	  1983.	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strike,	  even	  before	  a	  picket	  line	  went	  up,	  the	  editorial	  page	  declared	  that	  “Flint	  has	  
sunk	  too	  much—financially	  and	  emotionally—into	  AutoWorld	  to	  watch	  next	  
Independence	  Day	  turn	  into	  anticlimax	  because	  of	  the	  hard–headedness	  either	  of	  a	  
handful	  of	  workers	  or	  of	  the	  contractors’	  association.”225	  Carefully	  framing	  its	  own	  
position	  as	  community–minded	  common	  sense	  rather	  than	  the	  deeply	  political	  
stance	  that	  it	  was,	  the	  official	  position	  of	  the	  paper	  read:	  
We	  are	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  judge	  the	  rightness	  of	  either	  side’s	  position	  
in	   this	  dispute,	  but	  we	  do	  know	  that	  many	  Flint	  people	  worked	   long	  
and	   hard	   to	   bring	   AutoWorld	   to	   fruition.	   It	   has	   created	   work	   for	  
contractors	   and	   construction	   workers,	   and	   we	   strongly	   urge	   both	  
show	   their	   appreciation	   of	   this	   effort	   by	   negotiating	   earnestly,	   and	  
continuing	   to	  work,	   until	   a	   settlement	   is	   reached.	   Flint	   supplied	   the	  
work.	   Flint,	   eagerly	   awaiting	   economic	   recovery,	   deserves	   full	   value	  
from	  those	  involved	  in	  it.226	  
	  
Here,	  we	  see	  a	  radical	  redefinition	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  workers,	  
management,	  and	  the	  city	  that	  closely	  mirrored	  the	  national	  debate	  on	  organized	  
labor’s	  role	  in	  a	  changing	  economic	  landscape.	  Not	  only	  is	  it	  a	  call	  to	  transcend	  the	  
outmoded	  and	  selfish	  politics	  of	  the	  New	  Deal—while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  disavowing	  a	  
political	  position—but	  it	  posits	  AutoWorld,	  Flint,	  and	  indeed	  the	  economic	  survival	  
of	  an	  entire	  community	  as	  the	  employing	  authority.	  Flint,	  as	  an	  abstract	  neoliberal	  
individual,	  is	  demanding	  “full	  value”	  in	  what	  is	  essentially	  a	  market	  transaction	  like	  
any	  other,	  and	  the	  demand	  is	  seen	  as	  both	  logical	  and	  moral.	  In	  short,	  in	  the	  
birthplace	  of	  the	  modern	  American	  labor	  movement,	  a	  place	  saturated	  with	  an	  
infamous	  history	  of	  class	  conflict,	  striking	  workers	  met	  with	  an	  outcry	  to	  abandon	  
the	  old	  way	  of	  resolving	  issues	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  moving	  a	  single	  tourist	  attraction	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forward.	  And	  they	  did.	  The	  headline	  “No	  time	  for	  strike”	  can,	  I	  would	  argue,	  be	  read	  
as	  an	  ideological	  companion	  to	  Reagan’s	  declaration	  that	  “There	  is	  no	  strike”—both	  
forcefully	  advance	  the	  position	  that	  the	  actions	  of	  organized	  labor	  are	  either	  too	  
petty,	  or	  altogether	  illegitimate,	  in	  a	  changing	  political	  economic	  and	  cultural	  reality,	  
especially	  for	  deindustrialized	  urban	  centers.	  
The	  stories	  of	  cities	  and	  workers	  have	  always	  been	  intertwined,	  and	  their	  
relationship	  explored	  by	  scholars	  of	  labor	  and	  urban	  history.	  At	  the	  dawn	  of	  
“morning	  in	  America,”	  however,	  and	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  profound	  shift	  toward	  what	  
would	  become	  hegemonic	  neoliberal	  paradigms,	  the	  cultural	  terrain	  upon	  which	  the	  
too–often	  separately	  analyzed	  historical	  threads	  of	  urban	  crisis	  and	  organized	  labor	  
intersect	  is	  crucial	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  both.	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“A	  Place	  Filled	  With	  Fun	  and	  Facts,	  Happiness	  and	  History”:	  	  
Museums,	  Economics	  and	  the	  Cultural	  Politics	  of	  Tourism	  
	  
The	  usual	  Mickey	  Mouse	  fantasy	  stuff	  would	  be	  supplemented	  with	  a	  roller	  coaster	  
ride	   through	   a	   reproduction	   of	   an	   early	   steelworks,	   a	   depiction	   of	   plantation	   life	  
(complete	   with	   slaves),	   whizzbang	   "Audio–Animatronics"	   images	   of	   dead	  
Presidents,	   and	   other	   history–related	   entertainments.	   The	   Disney	   Company	   is	  
hoping	   to	   capitalize	  on	   the	   flow	  of	   tourists	   to	   the	  Washington	  area,	   and	   to	   sell	   its	  
idea	  with	   ersatz	   history.	  Make	  no	  mistake:	  What	   the	   kids	  would	   remember	   about	  
such	  an	  experience	  would	  be	  the	  technology	  and	  the	  thrills,	  not	  the	  history.	  This	  is	  
not	  an	  educational	  undertaking;	  it	  is	  a	  business	  venture.	  
	  
	   —New	  York	  Times	  editorial,	  “Virginia,	  Say	  No	  to	  the	  	  
	   	   Mouse”	  February	  24,	  1994227	  
	  
	  
AutoWorld	   is	   unique!	   I	   call	   it	   a	   celebration.	   It	   is	   a	   celebration	   of	   the	   automobile	  
industry	   and	   the	   men	   and	   women	   who	   made	   it	   great.	   Science	   museum?	   Theme	  
park?	  Historical	  exhibit?	  Festival	  marketplace?	  It’s	  all	  of	  them	  and	  more!	  
	  
	   —William	  S.	  White,	  President	  of	  the	  C.S.	  Mott	  	  
	   	   Foundation	  in	  his	  opening	  remarks	  to	  a	  “Salute	  to	  	  
	   	   AutoWorld”	  gala	  dinner,	  July	  3,	  1984228	  
	  
	  
	   The	  tension	  present	  within	  and	  between	  these	  two	  quotations	  is	  striking,	  as	  
they	  stake	  out	  the	  ideological	  territory	  and	  purpose(s)	  of	  contemporary	  cultural	  
institutions.	  On	  one	  hand,	  in	  its	  critique	  of	  Disney’s	  America—Disney’s	  proposed,	  
then	  abandoned,	  American	  History–based	  Virginia	  theme	  park—the	  New	  York	  Times	  
is	  articulating	  a	  fairly	  traditional	  defense	  of	  disciplinary	  and	  cultural	  boundaries.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227	  "Virginia,	  Say	  No	  to	  the	  Mouse."	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  24	  Feb.	  1994.	  
228	  White,	  William	  S.	  The	  Evolution	  of	  AutoWorld.	  3	  July	  1984.	  Yankee	  Doodle	  Dandy:	  A	  
Salute	  to	  AutoWorld	  Banquet	  Program.	  Sloan	  Archives,	  Flint.	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Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Walt	  Disney	  World	  and	  Disneyland	  theme	  parks	  have	  
always	  been	  in	  many	  ways	  based	  on	  some	  version	  of	  American	  history	  (or	  at	  least	  
American	  myth),	  the	  Times	  argues	  that	  the	  Disney’s	  America	  concept	  goes	  too	  far,	  
and	  must	  be	  publicly	  rejected.	  They	  argue	  that	  “education,”	  presumably	  the	  function	  
of	  a	  traditional	  museum	  or	  historical	  site,	  is	  fundamentally	  distinct	  from	  the	  profit	  
motive,	  and	  the	  blending	  of	  the	  two	  into	  some	  sort	  of	  “Disneyfied”	  historical	  hybrid	  
is	  unacceptable,	  despite	  the	  wishes	  of	  local	  residents	  and	  politicians	  who	  welcomed	  
Disney’s	  “business	  venture”	  as	  a	  proven	  service–job	  creator.	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  William	  S.	  White,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  powerful	  C.S.	  Mott	  
Foundation—which	  conceived	  of,	  funded,	  and	  executed	  Flint’s	  AutoWorld—
articulates	  a	  very	  different	  conception	  of	  what	  a	  cultural	  institution	  should	  be.	  Here,	  
AutoWorld	  can	  be	  multiple	  things	  for	  multiple	  audiences	  and	  purposes—it	  is	  
educational,	  entertaining,	  profitable,	  exciting,	  and	  authentic,	  without	  compromising	  
on	  any	  one	  category.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  piece,	  there	  is	  no	  apparent	  
anxiety	  in	  White’s	  statement	  about	  the	  blurring	  of	  disciplinary	  lines,	  and	  White	  
offers	  a	  model	  that	  is	  flexible,	  endlessly	  available	  to	  consumers	  of	  all	  kinds,	  and	  
willfully	  transgressive	  of	  old	  boundaries.	  In	  fact,	  his	  characterization	  of	  AutoWorld	  
as	  a	  theme	  park	  would	  have	  a	  literal	  basis,	  since	  the	  Six	  Flags	  company	  was	  brought	  
in	  to	  manage	  the	  park	  relatively	  late	  in	  the	  process,	  signaling	  an	  important	  identity	  
shift	  less	  than	  a	  year	  before	  opening.229	  Though	  written	  ten	  years	  apart,	  these	  two	  
texts	  together	  illustrate	  the	  difficult	  terrain	  that	  theme	  parks,	  tourist	  attractions,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229	  The	  mechanics	  of	  this	  arrangement	  are	  too	  complex	  to	  detail	  throughout	  my	  entire	  
dissertation	  at	  this	  stage,	  but	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  chapter,	  the	  partnership	  is	  important.	  
For	  some	  details,	  see	  Graham,	  David	  V.	  "Six	  Flags	  Hired	  to	  Manage	  AutoWorld."	  The	  Flint	  
Journal	  24	  May	  1983,	  sec.	  A:	  1.	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and	  particularly	  museums	  had	  to	  navigate	  during	  the	  neoliberal	  shift	  of	  the	  late	  
1970s	  and	  80s,	  and	  into	  the	  decades	  beyond.	  	  
None	  of	  the	  arguments	  presented	  in	  these	  two	  cases	  is	  particularly	  new.	  
Disney,	  and	  especially	  Disney’s	  theme	  parks,	  have	  long	  been	  the	  topic	  of	  popular	  and	  
scholarly	  debate,	  and	  are	  a	  familiar	  academic	  punching	  bag	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  their	  
construction	  of	  historical	  narratives.230	  And	  so	  it	  is	  unsurprising,	  and	  frankly	  easy	  to	  
sympathize	  with,	  the	  Times’	  critique	  of	  Disney’s	  motives	  behind	  Disney’s	  America.	  
Despite	  Disney	  CEO	  Michael	  Eisner’s	  explanation	  in	  a	  published	  response	  to	  the	  
Times	  that	  “We	  have	  always	  planned	  for	  our	  park	  to	  be	  an	  entertaining,	  enlightening	  
and	  educational	  portrayal	  of	  history,”	  it	  seems	  clear	  to	  us	  what	  the	  company’s	  real	  
motives	  are.	  But	  Eisner	  continues,	  citing	  concern	  for	  the	  state	  of	  Americans’—and	  
especially	  young	  Americans’—knowledge	  of	  their	  own	  past:	  “Our	  debate	  is	  not	  with	  
historians;	  we	  respect	  them	  and,	  more	  important,	  respect	  our	  history.	  But,	  sadly,	  
American	  students	  do	  not	  know	  enough	  about	  our	  history.	  We	  have	  always	  been	  
concerned	  to	  help	  educate	  through	  entertainment.”231	  Even	  the	  title	  of	  his	  published	  
response	  promises	  the	  benefits	  of	  a	  theme	  park	  like	  Disney’s	  America	  to	  “bring	  the	  
American	  Experience	  to	  life.”	  But	  beyond	  displaying	  a	  fundamental	  disconnect	  
between	  each	  side’s	  view	  of	  the	  possibilities	  or	  problematics	  of	  a	  “Disneyfied”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230	  The	  cultural	  criticism	  of	  Disney’s	  film	  productions	  is	  vast,	  but	  for	  critical	  Disney	  
literature	  regarding	  theme	  parks	  and	  treatment	  of	  historical	  narratives,	  see	  Fjellman,	  
Stephen	  M.	  Vinyl	  Leaves:	  Walt	  Disney	  World	  and	  America.	  Boulder:	  Westview,	  1992.;	  The	  
Project	  on	  Disney.	  Inside	  the	  Mouse:	  Work	  and	  Play	  at	  Disney	  World.	  Durham:	  Duke	  UP,	  
1995.;	  Wallace,	  Mike.	  Mickey	  Mouse	  History	  and	  Other	  Essays	  on	  American	  Memory.	  
Philadelphia:	  Temple	  UP,	  1996.	  	  	  
231	  Eisner,	  Michael.	  "Disney's	  Virginia	  Park	  Will	  Bring	  American	  Experience	  to	  Life."	  The	  New	  
York	  Times.	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  23	  June	  1994.	  Web.	  25	  Mar.	  2013.	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history	  lesson,	  this	  debate	  illustrates	  changing	  ideas	  about	  the	  most	  effective	  way	  to	  
narrate	  history—particularly	  a	  US	  nationalist	  history—and	  what	  kind	  of	  institution	  
can	  best	  bring	  that	  history	  “to	  life”	  as	  a	  product,	  making	  it	  appealing	  to	  a	  new	  
generation	  of	  consumers	  in	  a	  tourist	  marketplace.	  	  
Disney’s	  position	  in	  this	  debate	  is	  clear,	  but	  it	  also	  obscures	  perhaps	  a	  more	  
important	  point:	  Disney’s	  model	  of	  entertaining	  historical	  tourism	  had	  already	  been	  
massively	  influential	  for	  at	  least	  a	  decade	  prior	  to	  the	  Disney’s	  America	  project,	  and	  
served	  as	  an	  idealized	  neoliberal	  model	  for	  institutions	  in	  crisis	  during	  the	  late	  
1970s	  and	  early	  1980s.	  AutoWorld,	  which	  was	  largely	  designed	  by	  former	  Disney	  
“imagineers”	  and	  based	  explicitly	  on	  the	  success	  of	  the	  Disney	  theme	  parks	  as	  
tourist	  attractions,	  is	  an	  clear	  example	  of	  this	  influence.	  As	  White’s	  explicitly	  open–
ended	  description	  suggests,	  AutoWorld	  aimed	  to	  draw	  upon	  multiple	  institutional	  
attributes	  for	  maximum	  marketability,	  deliberately	  without	  tying	  itself	  to	  a	  
“traditional”	  identity	  of	  any	  kind.	  Again	  and	  again,	  AutoWorld	  officials	  and	  boosters	  
insisted	  upon	  the	  project’s	  cutting–edge	  flexible	  identity	  as	  a	  completely	  “new”	  kind	  
of	  attraction.	  The	  traditional	  cultural	  authority	  of	  a	  museum	  is	  simultaneously	  
undermined	  and	  deployed	  in	  descriptions	  of	  the	  project	  as	  “serious,	  but	  not	  too	  
serious;”	  the	  excitement	  of	  a	  theme	  park	  is	  enriched	  and	  legitimized	  by	  “historical”	  
content;	  the	  “festival	  marketplace,”	  already	  a	  powerful	  buzzword	  in	  terms	  of	  urban	  
revitalization	  at	  the	  time,	  is	  invoked	  as	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  economic	  boon	  an	  
institution	  like	  AutoWorld	  promised	  to	  be.	  AutoWorld	  was	  an	  ideal	  neoliberal	  
subject	  in	  this	  sense,	  acting	  at	  once	  as	  a	  serious	  historical	  site,	  a	  thrilling	  tourist	  
attraction,	  a	  location–specific	  celebration	  of	  unique	  cultural	  heritage,	  and	  a	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responsible,	  self–sufficient	  corporate	  entity	  that	  would	  help	  to	  reinvent	  the	  local	  
economy	  and	  pull	  Flint	  up	  by	  its	  own	  bootstraps.	  	  
AutoWorld’s	  attempt	  to	  address	  multiple	  crises	  through	  an	  endlessly	  flexible	  
brand	  identity	  is	  the	  crux	  of	  why	  I	  argue	  that	  it	  matters	  for	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  
rise	  of	  neoliberalism	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  1980s.	  As	  a	  material	  site	  where	  questions	  
of	  identity	  and	  economy	  converge,	  AutoWorld	  represents	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  institution	  
meant	  to	  deal	  with	  new	  political	  economic	  frameworks.	  Furthermore,	  it	  represents	  a	  
unique	  site	  of	  overlap,	  where	  the	  economic	  and	  cultural	  logics	  of	  neoliberalism	  
interact	  and	  reveal	  themselves	  in	  practice,	  providing	  an	  opportunity	  to	  link	  
conversations	  about	  capital,	  heritage,	  and	  urban	  economy	  that	  too	  rarely	  intersect.	  
“Heritage”	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  novel	  category	  of	  concern	  for	  urban	  or	  cultural	  
historians—Walter	  Benjamin	  spoke	  of	  the	  appreciation	  of	  heritage	  as	  a	  
“catastrophe,”	  and	  scholars	  such	  as	  David	  Harvey	  and	  Sharon	  Zukin	  have	  discussed	  
some	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  heritage–based	  development	  in	  urban	  areas.232	  Less	  well	  
explored,	  however,	  is	  the	  intersection	  of	  the	  broad	  theoretical	  contours	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  
“heritage	  industries”	  with	  the	  specific	  demands	  being	  made	  upon	  cultural	  
institutions	  in	  what	  I	  argue	  is	  a	  crucial	  historical	  moment	  in	  the	  history	  of	  American	  
cities.	  The	  links	  between	  the	  heritage	  and	  memory	  boom	  in	  the	  late	  1970s,	  and	  the	  
concurrent	  rise	  of	  neoliberalism,	  have	  yet	  to	  be	  satisfyingly	  examined.	  Moreover,	  
during	  the	  same	  period,	  museums	  were	  beginning	  to	  experience	  a	  crisis	  of	  identity,	  
as	  their	  cultural	  role	  and	  their	  commercial	  viability	  were	  being	  questioned.	  No	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232	  See	  particularly	  Harvey’s	  discussion	  of	  Baltimore’s	  HarborPlace	  in	  The	  Condition	  of	  
Postmedernity:	  91-­‐93.;	  and	  Zukin’s	  introduction	  in	  Zukin,	  Sharon.	  Naked	  City:	  The	  Death	  and	  
Life	  of	  Authentic	  Urban	  Places.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  UP,	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longer	  an	  uncontested	  “temple	  of	  knowledge,”	  museums	  were	  forced	  to	  navigate	  a	  
changing	  cultural	  and	  economic	  environment.	  Barbara	  Kirshenblatt–Gimblett	  notes	  
that	  the	  museum	  finds	  itself	  competing	  “with	  other	  attractions	  within	  a	  tourism	  
economy	  that	  privileges	  experience,	  immediacy,	  and	  what	  the	  industry	  calls	  
adventure.	  Forced	  to	  depend	  more	  than	  ever	  on	  earned	  income,	  museums	  are	  
becoming	  more	  service	  oriented.”233	  The	  founding	  of	  new	  museums	  in	  the	  US,	  and	  
overall	  attendance	  at	  existing	  museums,	  were	  on	  the	  decline	  during	  the	  late	  70s	  and	  
into	  the	  1980s	  as	  well,	  as	  traditional	  institutions	  had	  to	  compete	  with	  what	  historian	  
Michael	  Kammen	  argues	  was	  the	  broadening	  of	  the	  very	  category	  of	  “history”	  into	  
popular	  culture	  and	  alternative	  modes	  of	  constructing	  historical	  narratives.	  “It	  is	  not	  
easy,”	  he	  claims,	  “for	  conventional	  museums	  to	  compete	  with	  robotic	  presidents	  
who	  have	  authentic	  hairlines	  and	  the	  capacity	  to	  speak!”234	  	  
And	  yet,	  history	  understood	  through	  “heritage”	  was	  in	  the	  same	  moment	  
becoming	  increasingly	  important	  in	  the	  popular	  imagination	  as	  the	  late	  1970s	  
“memory	  boom”	  made	  it	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  national	  conversations	  about	  identity.	  
In	  addition	  to	  factors	  as	  diverse	  as	  the	  national	  need	  to	  make	  meaning	  out	  of	  the	  
recently–ended	  war	  in	  Vietnam	  and	  the	  nation’s	  bicentennial,	  the	  1977	  television	  
miniseries	  Roots	  proved	  to	  be	  massively	  popular	  and	  influential,	  sparking	  
widespread	  popular	  historical	  interest,	  and	  the	  1978	  NBC	  miniseries	  on	  the	  
Holocaust,	  with	  an	  approximate	  audience	  of	  120	  million	  viewers,	  similarly	  moved	  
history	  and	  heritage	  to	  the	  center	  of	  national	  consciousness.	  Cultural	  productions	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  Barbara	  Kirschenblatt-­‐Giblett.	  Destination	  Culture:	  7.	  
234	  Michael	  Kammen.	  Mystic	  Chords	  of	  Memory:	  The	  Transformation	  of	  Tradition	  in	  American	  
Culture:	  640.	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such	  as	  these,	  combined	  with	  a	  national	  mania	  for	  heritage–based	  events	  
surrounding	  the	  US	  bicentennial	  in	  1976,	  effectively	  moved	  “heritage”—racial,	  
ethnic,	  national,	  and	  otherwise—into	  the	  poplar	  consciousness	  in	  unprecedented	  
ways,	  making	  mass	  expression	  and	  consumption	  of	  history	  a	  tremendously	  
influential	  and	  lucrative	  form	  of	  entertainment.	  It	  is	  not	  coincidental,	  it	  seems,	  that	  
the	  proliferation	  of	  heritage	  and	  historical	  memory	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  comes	  at	  
the	  same	  time	  that	  state	  mechanisms	  for	  memory	  in	  the	  form	  of	  traditional	  history	  
museums	  are	  being	  gutted	  by	  neoliberal	  austerity—suggesting	  that	  instead	  of	  the	  
familiar	  formulation	  of	  heritage	  as	  a	  turn	  inward,	  it	  in	  fact	  turns	  increasingly	  
outward	  through	  popular	  culture.	  	  
Michael	  Kammen	  specifically	  refers	  to	  the	  “heritage	  syndrome,”	  and	  its	  rise	  
over	  the	  past	  four	  decades	  due	  in	  part	  to	  some	  of	  these	  factors.235	  As	  a	  recognition	  of	  
the	  combination	  of	  cultural	  and	  economic	  forces	  at	  work	  in	  this	  moment,	  Holocaust	  
survivor	  and	  history	  professor	  Yaffa	  Eliach	  wrote	  in	  1979	  of	  the	  “vast	  educational	  
and	  financial	  potential	  of	  the	  Holocaust.”236	  Andreas	  Huyssen	  expands	  on	  this	  point,	  
and	  makes	  a	  case	  for	  the	  late	  1970s	  as	  a	  unique	  moment	  in	  the	  longer	  history	  of	  
“heritage,”	  to	  argue,	  
When	   it	   comes	   to	   present	   pasts,	   memory	   of	   the	   Holocaust	   and	   its	  
place	  in	  the	  reassessment	  of	  Western	  modernity,	  however,	   is	  not	  the	  
whole	  story.	  Many	  subplots	  make	  up	  the	  current	  memory	  narrative	  in	  
its	   broadest	   scope	   and	   distinguish	   our	   times	   quite	   clearly	   from	   the	  
earlier	   decades	   of	   this	   century.	   Let	   me	   just	   list	   a	   few	   of	   the	   salient	  
phenomena.	  Since	  the	  1970s	  in	  Europe	  and	  the	  United	  States	  we	  have	  
the	   historicizing	   restoration	   of	   old	   urban	   centers,	   whole	   museum	  
villages	   and	   landscapes,	   various	   national	   heritage	   and	   patrimony	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  Quoted	  in	  Linenthal,	  Edward.	  Preserving	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  Create	  America's	  
Holocaust	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enterprises,	   the	   new	   wave	   of	   museum	   architecture	   that	   shows	   no	  
signs	  of	  receding,	  the	  boom	  in	  retro	  fashions	  and	  repro	  furniture,	  the	  
mass–marketing	   of	   nostalgia,	   the	   obsessive	   self–musealization	   per	  
video	  recorder,	  memoir	  writing,	  and	  confessional	  literature,	  the	  rise	  of	  
autobiography	  and	  of	  the	  postmodern	  historical	  novel	  with	  its	  uneasy	  
negotiation	  between	  fact	  and	  fiction,	  the	  spread	  of	  memory	  practices	  
in	  the	  visual	  arts	  often	  centered	  on	  the	  medium	  of	  photography,	  and	  
the	   increase	   of	   historical	   documentaries	   on	   television	   including	   (in	  
the	  United	  States)	  a	  channel	  dedicated	  entirely	  to	  history,	  the	  History	  
Channel.237	  	  
	  
Of	  course,	  all	  of	  the	  many	  phenomena	  Huyssen	  brings	  up	  interrelate,	  but	  of	  
particular	  interest	  for	  this	  study	  is	  the	  “historicizing	  restoration	  of	  old	  urban	  
centers”	  and	  the	  closely	  related	  issues	  facing	  museums	  in	  urban	  contexts.	  Although	  
Huyssen	  is	  speaking	  generally	  about	  a	  national,	  as	  well	  as	  global,	  trend,	  there	  are	  
specific	  historical	  circumstances	  that	  can	  illuminate	  the	  broader	  cultural	  and	  
economic	  shifts	  at	  play	  in	  the	  transitional	  moment	  that	  I	  wish	  to	  examine.	  Cities	  in	  
the	  Rust	  Belt	  in	  particular,	  which	  were	  experiencing	  their	  own	  particular	  crises	  of	  
identity	  and	  economy,	  turned	  significantly	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  to	  memorial	  
and	  museological	  strategies	  to	  address	  these	  crises.	  In	  1982,	  for	  example,	  when	  
Youngstown,	  Ohio	  was	  planning	  a	  historical	  museum	  focused	  on	  the	  regional	  and	  
national	  history	  of	  the	  steel	  industry—in	  many	  ways	  a	  memorial	  museum,	  given	  
Youngstown’s	  job	  losses	  in	  that	  industry	  at	  the	  time—the	  project’s	  development	  
proposal	  made	  the	  following	  points	  clear:	  
Museums	   in	   general	   perform	   the	   important	   role	   of	   introducing	   the	  
public	  to	  history	  in	  a	  palatable	  form	  and	  thereby	  facilitate	  educational	  
processes	   concerning	   the	   past.	   In	   short,	   museums	   are	   successful	  
because	   they	   provide	   an	   inherent	   attractiveness	   and	   a	   good	  
atmosphere	  in	  which	  learning	  can	  be	  developed	  and	  fostered	  without	  
the	  disadvantages	  that	  often	  accompany	  more	  structured	  methods.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237	  Huyssen,	  Andreas.	  Present	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History	   is	  generating	   increasing	   interest	  among	  the	  public	  with	  each	  
successful	   year.	   History	   books	   and	   historical	   novels	   continually	  
appear	   on	   the	   best	   seller	   lists	   while	   television	   and	   motion	   picture	  
producers	   find	   that	   presentations	   with	   historical	   themes	   captivate	  
audiences.	  Recently,	  the	  television	  programs	  “Holocaust”	  and	  “Roots”	  
have	  drawn	  more	  viewers	  than	  any	  previous	  television	  presentations.	  
History	  wrapped	   in	  an	  attractive	  package	  has	  been	  and	  continues	   to	  
be	  a	  most	  lucrative	  and	  popular	  enterprise.	  
	  
While	  many	  museums	  have	  been	   successful	   in	  meeting	   the	  needs	  of	  
the	  public,	   it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Science	  and	  Industry	  museums,	   in	  
the	  last	  decade,	  have	  led	  the	  way	  in	  fulfilling	  the	  dual	  role	  of	  attracting	  
and	  educating	  visitors.238	  
	  
This	  passage	  encapsulates	  several	  concerns	  that	  had	  become	  common	  among	  
museums	  and	  their	  audiences	  in	  the	  early	  1980s.	  For	  example,	  we	  see	  the	  broad	  
understanding	  that	  there	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  national	  memory	  boom,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  an	  
opportunity	  to	  be	  capitalized	  upon	  with	  a	  corresponding	  institution.	  More	  
importantly,	  though,	  there	  is	  the	  immediate	  recognition	  that	  museums	  are	  now	  at	  
once	  educational	  and	  commercial	  enterprises,	  and	  that	  the	  two	  are	  interdependent.	  
This	  is	  not	  only	  significant	  as	  a	  general	  issue	  that	  concerns	  museums	  nationally	  and	  
globally,	  but	  is	  also	  of	  particular	  concern	  to	  a	  city	  like	  Youngstown	  that	  is	  clearly	  
interested	  in	  both	  educating	  visitors	  about	  their	  local	  heritage	  and	  making	  that	  
heritage	  as	  marketable	  and	  attractive	  to	  potential	  tourists	  as	  possible.	  	  
The	  understanding	  that	  museums	  and	  similar	  cultural	  institutions	  signified	  
not	  only	  cultural	  legitimacy	  at	  a	  time	  when	  deindustrializing	  cities	  in	  the	  Rust	  Belt	  
were	  suffering	  from	  an	  abysmal	  national	  image,	  but	  also	  the	  potential	  for	  jobs	  and	  
revenue	  through	  tourism	  activity,	  is	  crucial	  for	  understanding	  the	  linked	  trajectories	  
of	  urban	  revitalization	  and	  museum	  development	  in	  this	  moment.	  Drawing	  on	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Benedict	  Anderson’s	  famous	  formulation	  of	  the	  museum	  as	  a	  necessary	  pillar	  of	  
community	  identity	  formation,	  Barbara	  Kirshenblatt–Gimblett	  argues	  that	  “Having	  a	  
past,	  a	  history,	  a	  ‘folklore’	  of	  your	  own,	  and	  institutions	  to	  bolster	  these	  claims,	  is	  
fundamental	  to	  the	  politics	  of	  culture:	  the	  possession	  of	  a	  national	  folklore,	  
particularly	  as	  legitimized	  by	  a	  national	  museum	  and	  troupe,	  is	  cited	  as	  a	  mark	  of	  
being	  civilized.”239	  Although	  this	  has	  long	  been	  understood	  as	  a	  feature	  of	  national	  
political	  and	  cultural	  identity,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  likewise	  true	  for	  regional	  and	  
local	  identity,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  institutional	  identity	  and	  self–definition.	  For	  Rust	  Belt	  
cities	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  80s,	  museums	  became	  a	  flexible	  tool	  for	  redefining	  
image	  and	  identity,	  and	  for	  reasserting	  legitimacy	  as	  a	  mark	  of	  being	  “civilized”	  
within	  a	  postindustrial	  context.	  Museums	  themselves,	  also	  in	  crisis,	  were	  a	  ready	  
and	  apt	  institutional	  form	  to	  be	  molded	  to	  these	  cities’	  purposes,	  based	  on	  the	  
neoliberal	  call	  for	  private,	  cultural,	  and	  service–based	  solutions	  to	  urban	  problems;	  
places	  like	  AutoWorld	  were	  explicit	  reflections	  of	  this	  demand	  for	  multi–purpose,	  
profitable	  flexibility.	  When	  we	  examine	  the	  broader	  neoliberal	  cultural	  politics	  of	  
the	  1970s	  and	  80s	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  history	  of	  cultural	  institutions,	  the	  familiar	  
discussion	  in	  museum	  studies	  of	  the	  museum’s	  transformation	  from	  “temple”	  to	  
“forum”	  must	  be	  expanded	  to	  consider	  the	  proliferation	  of	  roles	  that	  they	  were	  
made	  to	  take	  on,	  including	  marketplace,	  employer,	  tourist	  trap,	  and	  memorial	  site.	  	  
As	  Kirschenblatt–Gimblett	  also	  points	  out,	  “Indeed,	  museums—and	  the	  
larger	  heritage	  industry	  of	  which	  they	  are	  part—play	  a	  pivotal	  role	  in	  creating	  the	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sense	  of	  ‘hereness’	  necessary	  to	  convert	  a	  location	  into	  a	  destination.”240	  Cities	  like	  
Flint,	  Detroit,	  Youngstown,	  and	  Cleveland	  were	  very	  much	  being	  framed	  in	  this	  
moment	  as	  abandoned,	  old,	  and	  as	  more	  “nowhere”	  than	  “here,”	  in	  terms	  of	  
marketable	  heritage.	  Their	  various	  bids	  for	  “hereness”	  came,	  in	  part,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
cultural	  institutions	  that	  would	  bestow	  authenticity,	  excitement,	  and	  material	  
remedies	  for	  the	  suffering	  that	  deindustrialization	  had	  wrought.	  These	  projects,	  
while	  very	  much	  a	  result	  of	  neoliberal	  demand,	  also	  served	  the	  parallel	  purpose	  of	  
obscuring	  the	  underlying	  structural	  causes	  of	  urban	  crisis—deindustrialization	  and	  
mobile	  capital,	  slashed	  funding	  for	  cities,	  decades	  of	  racially	  biased	  resource	  
allocation,	  and	  so	  on—by	  refocusing	  the	  major	  questions	  of	  urban	  revitalization	  to	  
those	  of	  image,	  tourism,	  entrepreneurship,	  and	  unique	  “heritage,”	  with	  cultural	  
institutions	  figuring	  prominently	  in	  many	  cities’	  strategies.	  
To	  explore	  the	  range	  of	  institutional	  forms	  and	  their	  missions	  that	  arose	  to	  
address	  those	  questions,	  in	  this	  chapter,	  I	  examine	  three	  primary	  sites,	  beginning	  
with	  Flint’s	  AutoWorld.	  The	  construction	  of	  AutoWorld’s	  complex	  institutional	  
identity	  from	  its	  inception	  in	  the	  early	  1970s	  as	  a	  straightforward	  “Hall	  of	  Fame,”	  to	  
its	  ultimate	  form	  as	  a	  deliberately	  confounding	  history	  museum/theme	  park	  hybrid,	  
will	  help	  to	  trace	  the	  pressures	  faced	  by	  cities	  hoping	  to	  reinvent	  themselves	  
through	  cultural	  institutions	  during	  this	  time,	  and	  illuminate	  the	  underlying	  logic	  of	  
a	  seemingly	  absurd	  project.	  I	  also	  pay	  some	  special	  attention	  to	  the	  feature	  of	  Flint’s	  
iconic	  “Vehicle	  City”	  street	  arches,	  originally	  structures	  used	  to	  light	  Flint’s	  main	  
downtown	  street	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  re–created	  as	  a	  central	  exhibit	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component	  within	  AutoWorld.	  Next,	  the	  Youngstown	  Museum	  of	  Industry	  and	  
Labor—a	  museum	  born	  out	  of	  the	  same	  moment	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  that	  saw	  massive	  
job	  losses	  and	  deindustrialization	  in	  Youngstown,	  Ohio—is	  a	  relatively	  traditional	  
institution	  that	  was	  nonetheless	  uniquely	  shaped	  by	  the	  similar	  economic	  and	  
cultural	  pressures	  as	  AutoWorld.	  Finally,	  I	  will	  consider	  Disney’s	  America.	  Though	  
conceived	  of	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  this	  project	  represents	  the	  broader	  trajectory	  of	  
many	  of	  these	  institutions,	  from	  Disney’s	  takeover	  of	  the	  “theme	  park”	  form	  in	  the	  
mid–twentieth	  century,	  to	  its	  pervasive	  influence	  in	  the	  transformation	  of	  historical	  
narratives	  in	  the	  1980s,	  to	  its	  attempt	  to	  redefine	  its	  own	  role	  in	  a	  changing	  
institutional	  landscape.	  Finally,	  the	  fact	  that	  Disney’s	  America	  never	  opened	  in	  its	  
intended	  form,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  fact	  that	  AutoWorld	  closed	  its	  doors	  almost	  
immediately	  after	  opening	  them,	  leads	  me	  to	  also	  reflect	  on	  failure	  as	  a	  feature	  of	  
these	  institutions,	  as	  the	  aftermath	  of	  these	  projects	  tells	  us	  as	  much	  as	  their	  life.	  In	  
the	  case	  of	  both	  AutoWorld	  and	  Disney’s	  America,	  the	  “common	  sense”	  argument	  
concerning	  their	  failure	  significantly	  does	  not	  address	  the	  underlying	  issues	  that	  I	  
mean	  to	  get	  at	  in	  this	  chapter—AutoWorld	  is	  generally	  regarded	  as	  a	  failure	  in	  part	  
because	  it	  was	  “confused”	  about	  its	  mission,	  and	  Disney’s	  America	  was	  resisted	  
primarily	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  would	  somehow	  taint	  the	  more	  “authentic”	  
historical	  sites	  so	  close	  to	  its	  Virginia	  location.	  In	  each	  case,	  the	  arguments	  against	  
these	  places	  miss	  the	  mark	  as	  much	  as	  the	  arguments	  in	  their	  favor	  Using	  the	  
analytical	  framework	  of	  “failure,”	  I	  conclude	  the	  chapter	  by	  exploring	  why	  both	  sides	  
of	  these	  debates	  ultimately	  obscure	  the	  underlying	  cultural	  and	  economic	  logics	  that	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persist	  to	  the	  present	  day,	  and	  ultimately	  accept	  neoliberal	  cultural	  and	  economic	  
terms	  rather	  than	  interrogating	  them.	  
	  
AutoWorld:	  “Where	  the	  past	  becomes	  familiar	  and	  the	  future	  peeks	  around	  
every	  corner.”	  
	  
	   AutoWorld,	  as	  established	  in	  previous	  chapters,	  began	  its	  conceptual	  life	  as	  
an	  “automotive	  hall	  of	  fame”	  designed	  to	  celebrate	  the	  automobile	  industry	  and	  
those	  who	  played	  important	  roles	  in	  its	  creation,	  specifically	  those	  based	  in	  Flint,	  
Michigan.	  As	  a	  project	  that	  was	  in	  many	  ways	  a	  reaction	  against	  critiques	  being	  
leveled	  against	  the	  auto	  industry—and	  big	  business	  in	  general—in	  the	  early	  1970s,	  
the	  AutoWorld	  concept	  was	  not	  invested	  with	  much	  meaning	  beyond	  creating	  an	  
institutional	  home	  to	  further	  legitimize	  a	  powerful,	  if	  somewhat	  increasingly	  
unpopular,	  viewpoint.	  However,	  as	  the	  decade	  progressed—and	  the	  economic	  crisis	  
in	  Flint	  deepened	  as	  automotive	  industry	  jobs	  bled	  more	  severely	  with	  recession,	  oil	  
crises,	  and	  the	  continued	  out–migration	  of	  capital	  to	  lower–wage	  and	  non–union	  
locations—AutoWorld	  became	  a	  concept	  that	  was	  posited	  more	  and	  more	  by	  local	  
business	  and	  political	  elites	  as	  a	  viable	  mega–project	  solution	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  
deindustrialization.	  As	  William	  White	  tells	  the	  story,	  
In	   succeeding	   years,	   many	   consultants	   worked	   with	   the	   Mott	  
Foundation	   and	   designated	   agencies	   such	   as	   the	   Flint	   Area	  
Conference,	   Inc.,	   to	   translate	   this	   story	   [of	   the	   automotive	   industry	  
and	   Flint’s	   place	   in	   it]	   into	   a	   workable	   format.	   Over	   the	   years,	   we	  
realized	   what	   we	   wanted	   was	   not	   simply	   a	   scientific	   research	  
laboratory	  nor	  another	  traditional	  museum,	  but	  a	  way	  to	  tell	  the	  story	  
in	  a	  lively,	  entertaining	  manner.	  The	  result	  is	  AutoWorld.241	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In	  this	  quotation,	  White	  narrates	  how	  “entertainment”	  came	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  
most	  effective	  way	  to	  communicate	  historical	  and	  cultural	  information—it	  is	  no	  
longer	  enough	  by	  the	  early	  1980s,	  when	  White	  is	  speaking,	  to	  create	  an	  old,	  
“traditional”	  institution	  to	  address	  Flint’s	  needs.	  Over	  the	  years	  since	  AutoWorld’s	  
inception,	  it	  had	  become	  clear	  that	  a	  new	  type	  of	  project	  must	  be	  undertaken,	  one	  
that	  is	  “lively”	  and	  “entertaining,”	  especially—as	  White	  observes	  in	  the	  same	  
speech—if	  it	  “will	  help	  us	  tap	  the	  tourist	  market	  and	  diversify	  our	  economy.”	  And	  so	  
the	  purpose	  of	  AutoWorld	  became	  not	  only	  “to	  show,”	  but	  to	  transform,	  save,	  and	  
sell	  through	  showing.	  	  
	   The	  central	  importance	  of	  demonstrating	  and	  marketing	  a	  unique	  heritage	  
for	  Flint	  was	  articulated	  early	  on	  in	  the	  AutoWorld	  project.	  As	  I’ve	  discussed	  in	  
previous	  chapters,	  The	  Glyn	  Group,	  Inc.,	  a	  New	  York–based	  production	  company	  
specializing	  in	  instructional	  and	  promotional	  films,	  was	  hired	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  by	  
the	  C.S.	  Mott	  Foundation	  to	  produce	  promotional	  materials	  for	  AutoWorld	  with	  the	  
aim	  of	  raising	  awareness	  and	  investor	  support.	  The	  narrative	  structure	  and	  rhetoric	  
of	  the	  resulting	  film,	  The	  Little	  Town	  That	  Could,	  warrants	  further	  examination	  in	  
this	  context,	  especially	  for	  its	  framing	  of	  heritage	  and	  history	  as	  an	  economic	  
strategy.	  The	  narrative	  that	  the	  film	  constructs	  is	  grandiose	  and	  almost	  fairytale–
like	  in	  tone,	  but	  it	  is	  consistent:	  a	  “little	  town”	  called	  Flint	  becomes	  an	  important	  and	  
“internationally	  famous”	  industrial	  center	  early	  in	  the	  century,	  but	  “despite	  its	  fame,	  
it	  somehow	  never	  occurred	  to	  outsiders	  that	  the	  ‘Vehicle	  City’—which	  was	  what	  the	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town	  came	  to	  be	  called—was	  an	  interesting,	  historical	  and	  exciting	  place,	  a	  good	  
place	  to	  visit.”242	  The	  script	  continues,	  
Then,	  one	  day,	  someone	  had	  a	  really	  bright	  idea.	  “Why	  don’t	  we	  invite	  
people	   to	   come	  and	  see	  what	  we’ve	  done!	  …	  And	   let’s	  do	   something	  
really	  exciting	  for	  our	  visitors;	  they	  call	  us	  ‘the	  Vehicle	  City’,”	  he	  said	  …	  
“Let’s	   create	   a	   special	   event	   for	   our	   visitors	   around	   cars—an	  
attraction	  that’s	  like	  nothing	  else	  anywhere	  in	  the	  country.	  Or,	  for	  that	  
matter,	  anywhere	  else	  in	  the	  world!	  
…	   Naturally,	   word	   soon	   spread	   about	   the	   town	   and	   its	   ‘AutoWorld’	  
and	  every	  day,	  year	  after	  year,	  more	  and	  more	  visitors	  arrived.	  From	  
far	   and	   wide	   they	   came	   …	   families	   …	   tour	   groups	   …	   international	  
dignitaries	  …	  school	  parties	  …	  it	  was	  endless.	  And,	  as	  its	  fame	  spread,	  
‘AutoWorld’	   expanded,	   adding	   new	   attractions,	   new	   rides,	   new	  
excitement—for	  a	  whole	  new	  industry	  grew	  up	  around	  AutoWorld	  so	  
that	   everyone	   flourished—the	   town,	   the	   townspeople,	   the	  
investors…243	  
	  
The	  implications	  of	  this	  narrative	  are	  clear:	  this	  town’s	  “fame”	  as	  a	  manufacturing	  
center,	  while	  somewhat	  important	  early	  in	  its	  history,	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  sustain	  it	  or	  
allow	  it	  to	  achieve	  its	  full	  potential	  as	  a	  modern	  destination,	  as	  the	  fairytale	  
structure	  strongly	  suggests	  a	  hazy	  “once	  upon	  a	  time”	  past	  progressing	  into	  a	  more	  
clearly	  defined	  present	  and	  sunny	  future.	  Specifically,	  it	  is	  through	  the	  act	  of	  
showing	  outside	  visitors	  that	  Flint	  is	  an	  “interesting,	  historical	  and	  exciting	  place”	  
that	  it	  gains	  real	  value	  as	  “a	  good	  place	  to	  visit.”	  This	  explicit	  equation	  of	  “historical”	  
with	  “good”	  is	  of	  particular	  interest	  here,	  and	  is	  a	  crucial	  intersection	  of	  museums’	  
and	  Rust	  Belt	  cities’	  intertwined	  crises,	  illustrating	  the	  contemporary	  demand	  in	  
urban	  revitalization	  for	  authenticity	  and	  tourist	  potential,	  and	  giving	  new	  meaning	  
and	  purpose	  to	  the	  museum’s	  traditional	  role	  as	  a	  certificate	  of	  legitimacy	  and	  
modernity.	  By	  this	  formulation,	  the	  “problem”	  with	  Flint	  is	  formulated	  not	  as	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structural,	  or	  even	  as	  one	  with	  serious	  consequences—the	  “problems”	  that	  Flint	  is	  
experiencing	  are	  framed	  more	  as	  loneliness	  than	  unprecedented	  unemployment,	  
poverty,	  and	  crime.	  The	  “problem,”	  	  according	  to	  this	  narrative,	  is	  that	  it	  had	  
somehow	  not	  occurred	  to	  Flint’s	  residents	  to	  share	  their	  story	  effectively	  with	  those	  
in	  the	  outside	  world,	  so	  that	  they	  might	  come	  to	  see—and	  spend	  tourist	  dollars	  in—
the	  city.	  Representing	  the	  impulse	  to	  put	  oneself	  on	  display	  as	  natural	  and	  good,	  the	  
film	  also	  suggests	  that	  the	  ideal	  way	  to	  achieve	  this	  goal	  is	  through	  an	  institution	  
that	  might	  sound	  like	  a	  museum,	  but	  is	  actually	  something	  “like	  nothing	  else	  
anywhere	  in	  the	  country.	  Or,	  for	  that	  matter,	  anywhere	  else	  in	  the	  world!”	  
	   The	  “newness”	  and	  groundbreaking	  nature	  of	  AutoWorld	  as	  an	  institution	  is	  
a	  feature	  that	  was	  advertised	  loudly	  and	  constantly.	  And	  yet,	  within	  these	  
pronouncements	  of	  newness	  were	  always	  embedded	  references	  to	  the	  multitude	  of	  
traditional	  qualities	  that	  it	  would	  contain	  within	  its	  cutting–edge	  identity.	  For	  
example,	  this	  is	  just	  a	  sampling	  of	  descriptions	  of	  AutoWorld	  from	  a	  few	  particularly	  
salient	  official	  representative	  and	  media	  sources:	  
AutoWorld	  itself	  is	  a	  unique	  facility;	  it	  tells	  the	  story	  of	  the	  automobile	  
in	   a	   very	   entertaining	   fashion.	  Many	   people	  will	   think	   it	   is	   a	   theme	  
park,	  but	   it	   is	  not	   a	   theme	  park.	   It	   is	   essentially	   a	   celebration	  of	   the	  
automobile	  and	  the	  worker	  and	  all	  those	  who	  have	  had	  anything	  to	  do	  
with	  making	  the	  automobile	  and	  the	  industry	  great.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  
it	  does	  pay	  homage	  to	  Flint,	  the	  birthplace	  of	  General	  Motors.	  So	  it	  is	  a	  
unique	  educational	  experience.	  Unlike	  most	  museums,	  it	  is	  going	  to	  be	  
managed	   by	   a	   professional	   marketing	   firm,	   the	   Six	   Flags	  
Corporation.244	  
	   —William	  S.	  White,	  letter	  to	  Ronald	  Reagan’s	  	  
	   	   Appointments	  and	  Scheduling	  Director,	  April	  	  
	   	   14,	  1984	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  White,	  William	  S.	  Letter	  to	  Frederick	  J.	  Ryan.	  14	  Apr.	  1984.	  MS.	  Sloan	  Archives,	  Flint,	  
Michigan.	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[AutoWorld’s	  purpose	  is]	  to	  provide	  in	  downtown	  Flint	  an	  attraction	  
that	  is	  expected	  to	  help	  elevate	  tourism	  into	  the	  area’s	  second	  largest	  
industry.	   It	   will	   be	   “a	   celebration	   of	   the	   automobile	   and	   the	   people	  
who	   made	   it	   great”	   and	   will	   combine	   elements	   of	   a	   theme	   park,	   a	  
science	  center	  and	  a	  museum.245	  
—C.S.	  Mott	  grant	  fact	  sheet,	  1982	  
	   	   	  
AutoWorld	  …	  not	  a	  tired	  museum,	  not	  a	  raucous	  amusement	  park,	  but	  
a	   place	   filled	   with	   fun	   and	   facts,	   happiness	   and	   history.	   An	  
entertainment	   center	   with	   something	   for	   everyone.	   Yes,	  
entertainment	  with	  a	  capital	  “E.”	  our	  greatest	  common	  denominator.	  
Touching	  a	  part	  of	  every	  person,	  and	  AutoWorld	  has	  it	  to	  spare!	  
	  
Not	   since	   Walt	   Disney	   opened	   his	   “Magic	   Kingdoms”	   has	   such	   a	  
concept	   been	   realized	   and	  AutoWorld	  will	   be	   a	   place	   that	   even	   that	  
great	  man	  would	  be	  proud	  of.	  	  
	  
…	  This,	  then,	  is	  AutoWorld.	  A	  place	  to	  celebrate	  and	  enjoy.	  Where	  the	  
past	  becomes	  familiar	  and	  the	  future	  peeks	  around	  every	  corner.246	  
—AutoWorld	  exhibit	  designers	  Fredric	  Hope	  and	  	  
	   Associates	  promotional	  demonstration	  film	  
	  
In	  these	  descriptions,	  we	  see	  a	  carefully	  calculated,	  yet	  seemingly	  haphazard,	  
brand	  identity	  strategy.	  The	  slippage	  between	  the	  established	  terms	  of	  “theme	  
park,”	  “amusement	  park,”	  “educational	  center,”	  “museum,”	  etc.,	  allows	  an	  appealing	  
play	  of	  significance	  as	  to	  what	  AutoWorld	  actually	  is.	  Even	  in	  writing	  this	  
dissertation,	  I	  have	  consistently	  found	  the	  descriptive	  language	  difficult	  to	  pin	  down,	  
and	  that	  very	  difficulty	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  strength	  by	  AutoWorld’s	  creators.	  In	  its	  many	  
contradictions—AutoWorld	  is/is	  not	  a	  theme	  park;	  AutoWorld	  is/is	  not	  a	  museum,	  
and	  so	  on—it	  claims	  the	  strengths	  of	  every	  institution	  it	  flirts	  with,	  while	  assuming	  
none	  of	  the	  responsibility	  for,	  for	  example,	  the	  historical	  accuracy	  that	  a	  traditional	  
museum	  would	  be	  held	  accountable	  for.	  The	  only	  attribute	  that	  AutoWorld	  would	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  AutoWorld	  Project.	  1982.	  Grant	  Fact	  Sheet.	  Genesee	  Historical	  Collections	  Center,	  Flint.	  
246	  The	  Only	  Animated	  Display	  and	  Design	  Company.	  Fredric	  Hope	  and	  Associates,	  1984.	  
Transcript.	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fully	  embrace	  was	  excitement,	  in	  part	  based	  upon	  its	  very	  non–identity.	  In	  this	  way,	  
AutoWorld	  was	  in	  theory	  the	  perfect	  neoliberal	  institution,	  heeding	  every	  call	  for	  
flexibility,	  profitability,	  self–sufficiency,	  and	  erasure	  of	  New	  Deal	  organizations	  of	  
labor	  (the	  non–union	  service	  jobs	  it	  promised	  were	  also	  billed	  as	  a	  remedy	  for	  lost	  
industrial	  work,	  not	  to	  mention	  the	  exhibits’	  complex	  erasures	  of	  labor	  and	  
workers).	  This	  is	  also	  precisely	  the	  balancing	  act	  that	  was	  being	  demanded	  of	  
museums	  in	  this	  moment,	  as	  traditional	  institutions	  turned	  increasingly	  toward	  
service,	  excitement,	  and	  quasi–historical	  “blockbuster	  exhibits”	  to	  demonstrate	  their	  
fitness	  as	  profitable,	  self–sufficient	  corporate	  subjects	  themselves.	  It	  is	  significant,	  
for	  example,	  that	  William	  White	  boasts	  the	  qualification	  that	  AutoWorld	  will	  be	  
managed	  by	  a	  “professional	  marketing	  firm,”	  distinguishing	  it	  from	  “most	  museums”	  
while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  tacitly	  identifying	  AutoWorld	  as	  a	  museum	  itself	  (albeit	  an	  
exciting	  new	  kind).	  	  
It	  is	  also	  significant	  that	  the	  professional	  marketing	  firm	  being	  celebrated	  as	  
a	  stamp	  of	  modern,	  responsible	  profitability	  in	  contrast	  to	  modest	  or	  failing	  
traditional	  museums	  is	  Texas–based	  Six	  Flags.	  As	  the	  world’s	  largest	  amusement	  
park	  operator,	  Six	  Flags	  at	  the	  time	  ran	  theme	  parks	  in	  mostly	  Sun	  Belt	  locations,	  
including	  Dallas,	  Houston,	  Atlanta,	  Los	  Angeles,	  Orlando,	  and	  Anaheim,	  and	  their	  
involvement	  in	  AutoWorld	  was	  announced	  in	  May	  1983,	  fairly	  late	  in	  the	  
development	  process.	  The	  firm	  was	  pursued	  specifically	  because	  of	  their	  financial	  
record	  of	  keeping	  parks	  profitable,	  a	  record	  put	  in	  appealing	  terms	  by	  AutoWorld	  
officials	  as	  being	  “second	  only	  to	  the	  Walt	  Disney	  empire	  in	  sales	  and	  attendance	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figures.”247	  In	  perhaps	  the	  most	  complex	  marketing	  contradiction	  of	  all,	  Six	  Flags	  
Senior	  Vice	  President	  George	  Delanoy	  described	  AutoWorld	  at	  the	  time	  as	  “a	  new	  
frontier,	  representing	  a	  1980s	  return	  to	  urban	  theme	  attractions,	  breaking	  a	  30–
year	  escape	  to	  the	  suburbs	  begun	  by	  Walt	  Disney.”248	  This	  contradiction	  seems	  to	  
play	  with	  the	  very	  foundation	  of	  marketability	  that	  AutoWorld	  was	  relying	  upon,	  but	  
also	  makes	  perfect	  sense	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  operators’	  strategy	  of	  flexible	  
identity—just	  as	  it	  both	  is	  and	  is	  not	  a	  museum,	  AutoWorld	  is	  like	  and	  unlike	  Disney,	  
appropriating	  the	  profitable	  strengths	  without	  the	  possible	  unappealing	  
connotations	  of	  Disney’s	  bland	  suburban	  safety.	  The	  involvement	  of	  Six	  Flags	  then	  
represents	  a	  multilayered	  neoliberal	  strategy,	  as	  a	  thriving	  Sun	  Belt	  enterprise	  that	  
promised	  financial	  stability,	  tourist	  potential,	  and	  a	  significant	  shot	  of	  amusement	  
park	  excitement	  to	  bolster	  any	  fear	  of	  the	  stuffiness	  associated	  with	  “most	  
museums.”	  
In	  fact,	  Flint	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  uniquely	  effective	  example	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  
economic	  and	  cultural	  shift.	  In	  Newsweek,	  one	  of	  the	  few	  pieces	  of	  national	  media	  to	  
examine	  AutoWorld,	  one	  journalist	  claims	  that	  “AutoWorld	  itself	  …	  could	  serve	  as	  
the	  model	  for	  the	  gentrified	  theme	  park	  of	  the	  future:	  carpeted,	  air–conditioned,	  
entirely	  enclosed…”249	  Here,	  the	  disconnect	  between	  a	  themed	  entertainment	  
environment	  and	  any	  exterior	  reality	  that	  AutoWorld	  represents	  is	  actually	  
described	  as	  the	  ideal	  way	  of	  taking	  part	  in	  “the	  service	  economy	  of	  the	  1980s,”	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247	  Graham,	  David	  V.	  "Six	  Flags	  Hired	  to	  Manage	  AutoWorld."	  The	  Flint	  Journal	  24	  May	  1983,	  
sec.	  A:	  1	  
248	  Goodman,	  David	  N.	  "AutoWorld	  Needed	  Top	  Operator—got	  Six	  Flags."	  The	  Flint	  Journal	  
24	  June	  1984:	  49.	  
249	  Adler,	  Jerry.	  "Honoring	  the	  Auto’s	  Past."	  Newsweek	  3	  Sept.	  1984:	  9.	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admission	  that	  tells	  us	  much	  about	  the	  larger	  economic	  processes,	  and	  their	  
interaction	  with	  culture	  through	  memory	  and	  history,	  that	  are	  embodied	  in	  this	  site.	  
Hence	  we	  see	  that	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  marketable	  past	  is	  necessarily	  a	  project	  of	  
distancing,	  aestheticizing,	  and	  making	  the	  past	  “entirely	  enclosed,”	  in	  order	  to	  take	  
part	  in	  the	  national	  economic	  future	  in	  any	  meaningful	  way.	  The	  Newsweek	  article	  
also	  addresses	  the	  lingering	  ambivalence	  of	  this	  process	  for	  Flint,	  as	  it	  is	  divided	  into	  
thematic	  sections	  titled	  “Homage”	  and	  “Defiance.”	  
Another	  promotional	  film	  script	  produced	  by	  exhibit	  designers	  Fredric	  Hope	  
and	  Associates	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  openly	  ridicule	  the	  atmosphere	  and	  mission	  of	  
traditional	  museums:	  
Did	  we	  say	  wacky?	  Why	  wacky	   is	   the	  best	  of	   it!	  Some	  of	   this	  stuff	   is	  
downright	   OUT–RAGEOUS!	   Talking	   Horses	   and	   Wise	   Cracking	  
Flivvens.	   Musical	   Robots	   and	   Dancing	   Chassis.	   Teetering	   Explorers	  
and	   Tootering	   Transmissions.	   Hundreds	   of	   Hacked–up	   Historical	  
High–Jinx.	  And	  Mirthful,	  Madcap	  Museums.250	  
	  
Read	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  script,	  a	  complicated	  picture	  of	  this	  place	  
emerges,	  a	  space	  where	  boundaries	  between	  “serious”	  and	  “fun”	  elements	  happily	  
mix	  in	  a	  distinctive—and	  marketable—atmosphere.	  Directly	  preceding	  this	  
moment,	  the	  film’s	  narrator	  intones	  gravely	  about	  “history”	  and	  “tradition”	  before	  
breaking	  the	  mood	  with	  a	  laugh	  at	  his	  own	  gravitas	  and	  remarking	  on	  the	  one	  
significant	  aspect	  of	  AutoWorld	  that	  he	  forgot	  to	  mention:	  “It’s	  FUN!”	  This	  
atmosphere	  of	  “historical	  fun”	  and	  “wackiness”	  was	  defined	  largely	  through	  action,	  
song	  and	  performances	  that	  were	  presented	  in	  the	  form	  of	  animatronic	  characters	  
and	  representations,	  and	  the	  blending	  of	  these	  two	  elements	  was	  a	  self–conscious	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  AutoWorld:	  A	  Place	  of	  Magic.	  Fredric	  Hope	  and	  Associates,	  1982.	  Transcript.	  (Emphasis	  
in	  original.)	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strategy	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  creators	  and	  developers	  of	  the	  project	  to	  replicate	  the	  
lucrative	  quasi–historical	  total	  environment	  of	  the	  Disney	  theme	  parks,	  thereby	  
luring	  thousands	  of	  tourists	  and	  the	  economic	  promise	  they	  represented.	  	  
Fredrick	  Hope	  was	  in	  an	  ideal	  position	  to	  provide	  this	  kind	  of	  atmosphere.	  As	  
an	  exhibit	  designer	  with	  9	  years	  of	  experience	  as	  a	  Disney	  “imagineer,”	  Hope	  was	  
chosen	  specifically	  for	  his	  credentials	  with	  the	  world’s	  most	  recognizable	  company	  
in	  creating	  entertaining	  and	  profitable	  environments.	  The	  Disney	  “experience”	  or	  
“atmosphere”	  of	  magic,	  wonder,	  and	  fun	  was	  repeatedly	  articulated	  as	  the	  model	  for	  
the	  AutoWorld	  experience,	  and	  Hope	  and	  his	  associates	  in	  “The	  Only	  Animated	  
Display	  and	  Design	  Company”	  were	  frequently	  hailed	  in	  local	  media	  and	  AutoWorld	  
materials	  for	  their	  impressive	  pedigree—the	  animatronic	  character	  of	  Fred	  the	  
“Carriageless	  Horse,”	  as	  discussed	  in	  previous	  chapters,	  was	  explicitly	  described	  as	  a	  
spokesman	  in	  the	  style	  of	  Mickey	  Mouse,	  which	  meant	  that	  he	  was	  both	  a	  character	  
saturated	  with	  sometimes	  contradictory	  meaning,	  and	  a	  malleable	  product	  to	  be	  
sold	  in	  many	  forms.251	  
While	  it	  was	  open,	  what	  visitors	  actually	  found	  inside	  AutoWorld	  was	  a	  
mixture	  of	  history	  lessons,	  corporate	  sponsorship,	  tame	  amusement	  park	  rides,	  
merchandising,	  and	  vague	  nostalgia,	  all	  based	  on	  the	  automobile	  and	  the	  industry	  
that	  produced	  it.	  In	  its	  form	  and	  its	  treatment	  of	  history,	  AutoWorld	  was,	  again,	  
based	  explicitly	  on	  the	  model	  of	  the	  lucrative	  Disney	  theme	  parks,	  complete	  with	  
historically–based	  “dark	  rides”	  similar	  to	  “It’s	  a	  Small	  World”	  and	  “The	  Hall	  of	  
Presidents.”	  Moreover,	  Disney’s	  fictional	  “Main	  Street	  USA”	  was	  a	  model	  for	  the	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  AutoWorld	  General	  Concept	  Design	  Notes:	  Fred	  the	  Horse.	  17	  Nov.	  1982.	  Exhibit	  Design	  
Notes.	  Sloan	  Archives,	  Flint.	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large	  exhibit	  in	  the	  main	  building	  that	  contained	  a	  walkable	  scale	  model	  of	  historic	  
downtown	  Flint’s	  Saginaw	  Street.	  In	  all	  of	  these	  ways,	  AutoWorld	  was	  committed	  to	  
evoking	  the	  lucrative	  Disney–esque	  “full	  experience”	  of	  history,	  which	  inevitably	  
relied	  on	  nostalgia	  and	  remembering	  a	  sort	  of	  “Golden	  Age”	  of	  automobiles	  and	  the	  
auto	  industry,	  especially	  in	  Flint.	  AutoWorld’s	  mission	  was	  at	  once	  very	  modest	  and	  
impossibly	  grand—it	  meant	  to	  do	  no	  more	  than	  to	  provide	  some	  family	  fun	  and	  no	  
less	  than	  to	  build	  a	  timeless	  institution	  that	  would	  save	  Flint	  from	  demise.	  
After	  encountering	  an	  animatronic	  representation	  of	  founding	  Flint	  settler–
turned–tourguide	  Jacob	  Smith	  at	  the	  front	  gate,	  visitors	  walked	  through	  log–cabin	  
Flint	  with	  scenes	  of	  animatronic	  Indians	  building	  canoes	  on	  the	  banks	  of	  a	  pristine	  
Flint	  River	  (the	  actual	  river	  just	  outside	  AutoWorld’s	  doors	  was	  infamously	  polluted	  
by	  industrial	  waste),	  antique	  sawmills,	  log–cabin	  “general	  stores	  and	  so	  on”—all	  
“historically	  accurate,”	  according	  to	  one	  promotional	  booklet.	  This	  conscious	  
emphasis	  on	  and	  tension	  surrounding	  ideas	  of	  “authenticity”	  and	  “historical	  
accuracy”	  is	  on	  display	  in	  every	  aspect	  of	  AutoWorld,	  and	  can	  be	  seen	  most	  clearly	  
in	  a	  conference	  report	  from	  February	  16,	  1984,	  just	  months	  before	  AutoWorld’s	  
grand	  opening.	  “In	  describing	  Six	  Flags	  AutoWorld,”	  the	  conference	  notes	  suggest,	  
“try	  to	  use	  more	  descriptive	  words,	  phrases—spectacular,	  awesome,	  authentic	  
instead	  of	  historic,	  vastness,	  hi–tech,	  first	  of	  a	  kind.”252	  The	  slippage	  between	  the	  
meanings	  of	  “authentic”	  and	  “historic”	  here	  reinforces	  the	  notion	  that	  while	  it	  may	  
not	  be	  strictly	  “historic,”	  the	  playful	  and	  malleable	  “authenticity”	  of	  AutoWorld’s	  
representations	  allow	  for	  a	  kind	  of	  fantasizing,	  by	  creators	  and	  visitors,	  within	  a	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  PR	  Associates.	  Six	  Flags	  AutoWorld.	  16	  Feb.	  1984.	  Conference	  Report	  Notes.	  Sloan	  
Archives,	  Flint.	  (Emphasis	  in	  original.)	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plausible	  historical	  frame.	  Similarly,	  the	  explicitly	  desirable	  description	  of	  “first	  of	  a	  
kind”	  continues	  to	  define	  AutoWorld	  through	  what	  it	  is	  not—namely,	  not	  just	  
another	  dry	  “historical”	  museum.	  Within	  the	  “serious,	  but	  not	  really”	  logic	  of	  
AutoWorld,	  all	  of	  this	  effort	  to	  create	  an	  “authentic”	  or	  “historic”	  experience	  has	  no	  
trouble	  existing	  side–by–side	  with	  the	  marketing	  of	  the	  park’s	  completely	  climate	  
controlled	  dome	  that,	  “with	  a	  year–round	  temperature	  of	  70	  degrees,”	  prevented	  
any	  native	  Michigan	  foliage	  from	  being	  used	  to	  landscape	  the	  exhibit	  (the	  problem	  
was	  solved	  by	  “importing	  more	  than	  a	  half	  million	  dollars	  in	  lavish,	  tropical	  foliage,	  
carefully	  chosen	  to	  resemble	  native	  Michigan	  trees	  and	  shrubs”).253	  
The	  culmination	  of	  Flint’s	  history	  in	  this	  spatial	  timeline	  is	  the	  re–creation	  of	  
early	  twentieth–century	  Flint,	  with	  shops	  and	  restaurants	  along	  Saginaw	  Street.	  
Visitors	  would	  immediately	  notice	  the	  visual	  markers	  that	  identified	  this	  as	  Flint’s	  
main	  street,	  not	  only	  from	  its	  explicit	  designation	  as	  such,	  but	  from	  the	  distinctive	  
red–brick	  cobblestones,	  which	  then	  (as	  now)	  paves	  Saginaw	  Street,	  the	  road	  that	  
most	  visitors	  probably	  drove	  on	  to	  reach	  AutoWorld.	  But	  the	  re–creation	  also	  
featured	  a	  reproduction	  of	  Flint’s	  iconic	  “Vehicle	  City”	  arches,	  which	  no	  longer	  stood	  
on	  the	  real	  Saginaw	  Street.	  Thus,	  the	  arches	  became	  the	  central	  element	  that—along	  
with	  the	  obvious	  distinction	  of	  open,	  populated	  retail	  stores—distinguished	  this	  re–
creation,	  both	  conceptually	  and	  visually,	  from	  the	  actual	  landscape	  outside,	  and	  
marked	  the	  temporal	  and	  spacial	  distance	  between	  the	  two	  spaces	  (see	  Fig.	  15).	  
The	  recreated	  arches	  are	  not	  purely	  ideological	  icons,	  but	  complex	  structures	  
that	  serve	  to	  freeze	  as	  well	  as	  reshape	  imagined	  “better	  times,”	  and	  to	  both	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  PR	  Associates.	  Six	  Flags	  AutoWorld’s	  Football	  Field–Size	  Dome	  Is	  Starting	  Point	  for	  
Excitement,	  Beginning	  July,	  1984.	  1984.	  Press	  Release.	  Sloan	  Archives,	  Flint.	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remember	  and	  forget	  Flint’s	  connection	  to	  a	  preindustrial	  origin	  in	  AutoWorld’s	  
“authentic/(a)historic”	  institutional	  context.	  The	  model	  arches	  were	  based	  on	  actual	  
structures	  that	  stood	  along	  and	  lit	  South	  Saginaw	  Street	  from	  1899	  to	  1919,	  erected	  
to	  replace	  the	  gas	  lanterns	  that	  had	  previously	  illuminated	  Flint’s	  business	  district	  at	  
night.	  Built	  by	  the	  Genesee	  Iron	  Works	  and	  financed	  by	  individuals	  and	  businesses	  
to	  create	  a	  “new	  and	  exciting	  system	  of	  lighting	  Saginaw	  Street,”	  five	  arches	  were	  
placed	  at	  intersections	  along	  the	  street,	  and	  each	  arch	  was	  built	  with	  50	  light	  bulbs	  
to	  illuminate	  it.	  254	  When	  Flint	  celebrated	  its	  50th	  anniversary	  in	  1905,	  two	  
additional	  arches	  were	  erected	  with	  the	  words	  “Flint:	  Vehicle	  City”	  at	  their	  crowns	  
(see	  Fig.	  16).255	  	  
	   Despite	  this	  designation,	  the	  historical	  narrative	  presented	  at	  AutoWorld	  
insisted	  that	  the	  arches	  were	  not	  directly	  related	  to	  the	  auto	  industry.	  Official	  
literature	  stated	  that,	  “Though	  many	  believe	  the	  arches	  celebrated	  Flint's	  heritage	  as	  
a	  center	  for	  automobile	  manufacturing,	  the	  original	  arches	  were	  a	  salute	  to	  Flint	  as	  
the	  world's	  largest	  volume	  manufacturer	  of	  horse	  drawn	  carriages.”256	  Automobile	  
production	  in	  Flint	  began	  in	  1903,	  however,	  with	  General	  Motors	  incorporating	  in	  
1908	  from	  the	  already	  existing	  Buick	  motor	  company.	  It	  seems,	  then,	  more	  plausible	  
that	  these	  arches	  were	  conceived	  of	  at	  least	  partially	  to	  solidify	  and	  commemorate	  
Flint’s	  place	  in	  a	  new	  modern	  era	  of	  industrial	  production.	  In	  AutoWorld’s	  emphasis	  
on	  the	  pre–industrial	  history	  of	  Flint—in	  celebrating	  the	  horse–drawn	  carriage,	  or	  
even	  the	  earlier	  lumber	  industry—we	  can	  see	  a	  desire	  to	  escape	  a	  direct	  link	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254	  Lethbridge,	  Alice.	  "Main	  Street	  Illuminated	  by	  Arches	  Years	  Ago."	  The	  Flint	  Journal	  24	  
June	  1984:	  61.	  
255	  Flint	  Vehicle	  City	  Arches.	  Web.	  25	  Mar.	  2013.	  <http://www.flintarches.com/>.	  
256	  Ibid.	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industrial	  production—and	  hence	  the	  subsequent	  joblessness	  and	  trauma	  of	  
industrial	  withdrawal—while	  still	  appealing	  to	  a	  marketable	  common	  “heritage”	  for	  
tourism.	  By	  denying	  any	  link	  between	  the	  “Vehicle	  City”	  arches	  and	  the	  
postindustrial	  present,	  the	  creators	  and	  promoters	  of	  the	  Saginaw	  Street	  re–
creation	  attempt	  to	  locate	  the	  history	  of	  Flint	  outside	  of	  a	  larger	  historical	  trajectory	  
that	  is	  all	  too	  obvious,	  given	  Flint’s	  late	  twentieth	  century	  economic	  condition,	  and	  
into	  a	  nostalgic	  landscape	  where	  visitors	  can	  experience	  a	  “Golden	  Age”	  of	  the	  city.	  	  
	   This	  nostalgic	  landscape	  was	  haphazard	  but	  deliberate	  in	  its	  intentions,	  as	  is	  
reflected	  in	  the	  brochure's	  description:	  
You'll	   know	   AutoWorld	   is	   something	   special	   as	   soon	   as	   you	   step	  
inside.	  There,	  enclosed	  within	  a	  spectacular	  dome	  so	  big	  it	  could	  cover	  
an	  entire	  football	  field,	  is	  log	  cabin	  Flint.	  You'll	  follow	  a	  life–sized	  Flint	  
River	   flowing	   past	   old	  mills,	   shops,	   and	   a	  working	   antique	   carousel	  
through	   an	   expansive,	   lush	   green	   pine	   forest,	   right	   into	   Flint	   of	   the	  
1890's.	   It's	   a	   more	  modern	   Flint	   with	   ornate	   arches,	   brick	   building	  
charm,	   and	  a	   cobblestoned	  Saginaw	  Street.	   Plus,	   you'll	   find	   shops	   to	  
shop	  in	  and	  an	  outstanding	  restaurant	  to	  dine	  in.	  And	  no	  matter	  what	  
the	  weather	  is	  outside,	  it's	  always	  a	  balmy	  summer	  evening	  inside.257	  	  
	  
The	  historical	  illusion	  described	  here,	  and	  which	  the	  re–created	  Saginaw	  Street	  
worked	  in	  large	  part	  to	  construct,	  was	  one	  that	  promoted	  the	  remembering	  of	  a	  
vaguely	  defined	  past,	  full	  of	  possibility,	  through	  which	  an	  alternate	  present	  could	  be	  
imagined	  for	  Flint	  and	  the	  troublesome	  postindustrial	  urban	  landscape	  that	  it	  had	  
come	  to	  represent.	  
	   The	  signage	  for	  this	  exhibit	  reinforced	  the	  historical	  “freezing”	  of	  Flint	  by	  
constantly	  reiterating	  the	  mantra	  of	  Flint	  as	  a	  “boomtown,”	  with	  no	  hint	  of	  looming	  
complications	  beyond	  the	  turn–of–the–century	  culmination	  that	  the	  exhibit	  offered.	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  Associates,	  1984.	  Print.	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The	  final	  section	  of	  the	  exhibit	  that	  depicted	  the	  development	  of	  the	  lumber	  and	  
carriage	  industries	  in	  Flint,	  and	  which	  included	  the	  Saginaw	  Street	  re–creation,	  is	  
titled	  “From	  Village	  to	  Boom	  Town.”	  Individual	  signage	  along	  the	  path	  offers	  a	  
reassuring	  and	  celebratory	  historical	  trajectory.	  The	  timeline	  begins	  with	  settlement	  
and	  early	  industry:	  
A	   city	   at	   last!	   With	   Flint’s	   incorporation	   in	   1855,	   Jacob	   Smith’s	  
settlement	  was	   now	   a	   booming	   town.	   Settlers	   were	   arriving	   almost	  
daily	   to	   partake	   of	   the	   area’s	   rich	   resources	   and	   growing	   new	  
industry—lumbering.	   For	   the	   next	   25	   years,	   lumbering	   would	   rule	  
supreme	  before	  giving	  way	  to	  another	  “king”—carriage–making.	  
	  
Timber!	  As	  the	  lumberjack’s	  axe	  and	  saw	  claimed	  scores	  of	  Michigan	  
Pine,	  Flint’s	  sawmills	  produced	  a	  profitable	  harvest.	  With	  the	  coming	  
of	  the	  railroad	  in	  1862,	  Flint’s	   lumber	  was	  going	  places—and	  so	  was	  
this	  bustling	  boomtown!	  
	  
Continuing	  to	  more	  modern	  industrial	  production,	  the	  narrative	  takes	  up	  the	  
continuity	  between	  carriage	  production	  and	  the	  automobile	  industry,	  and	  goes	  no	  
further:	  	  
It’s	   a	   hit!	   By	   1880,	   Flint	   had	   a	   new	   industrial	   “king”—carriage–
making.	   Almost	   overnight,	   carriage	   manufacturers	   were	   mass–
producing	  quality	  carriages	  and	  exporting	  them	  all	  over	  the	  world.	  As	  
countless	   carriages	   rolled	   forth,	   Flint	   proudly	   claimed	   the	   title	  
“Vehicle	  City!”	  
	  
Here	   to	   stay!	  With	   the	   coming	   of	   the	   Automobile,	   Flint	   entered	   the	  
20th	  century	  on	   the	  verge	  of	  a	  new	   industry	  and	  a	  new	  era.	  Carriage	  
factories	   aplenty	   made	   the	   “Vehicle	   City”	   a	   natural	   place	   for	   auto	  
production	   to	   take	   hold.	   And	   take	   hold	   it	   did!	   Soon	  Flint–made	   cars	  
could	  be	  seen	  all	  over	  America!258	  
	  
Thus	  ends	  this	  exhibit’s	  narrative	  of	  Flint’s	  history:	  frozen	  at	  the	  birth	  of	  the	  
automotive	  industry,	  with	  nothing	  but	  brighter	  days	  to	  come.	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  From	  Village	  to	  Boom	  Town:	  The	  Lumber	  and	  Carriage	  Industries	  in	  Flint.	  23	  Sept.	  1983.	  
Exhibit	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  Flint.	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   In	  the	  historical	  narrative	  promoted	  by	  AutoWorld	  and	  the	  Flint	  Journal,	  there	  
is	  a	  consistent	  emphasis	  on	  Flint’s	  pre–industrial	  past,	  celebrating	  the	  horse–drawn	  
carriage,	  or	  even	  the	  earlier	  lumber	  industry.	  Such	  a	  history	  elides	  any	  direct	  link	  to	  
industrial	  production,	  while	  still	  appealing	  to	  a	  marketable	  “heritage”	  for	  tourism.	  
By	  denying—or	  at	  least	  complicating—the	  link	  between	  the	  “Vehicle	  City”	  arches	  
and	  the	  postindustrial	  present,	  the	  creators	  and	  promoters	  of	  this	  re–creation	  
attempt	  to	  locate	  the	  history	  of	  Flint	  outside	  of	  a	  larger	  historical	  trajectory	  that	  is	  
all	  too	  obvious,	  and	  into	  a	  mythical	  “Golden	  Age.”	  This	  complex	  denial	  and	  relocation	  
also	  serves	  in	  some	  ways	  to	  monumentalize	  a	  moment	  of	  prosperity	  and	  possibility	  
as	  the	  norm,	  rather	  than	  a	  moment	  gone	  forever.	  With	  AutoWorld	  and	  the	  
surrounding	  revitalization	  projects	  imagined	  as	  a	  renaissance	  for	  the	  city,	  visitors	  
are	  also	  encouraged	  to	  imagine	  that	  the	  industrial	  age	  of	  Flint	  will	  continue	  to	  serve	  
the	  “Vehicle	  City”	  well,	  now	  as	  a	  history	  that	  can	  be	  packaged	  and	  sold	  in	  the	  new	  
tourism	  and	  service–based	  economy.	  	  
	   While	  the	  “Vehicle	  City”	  arches	  obviously	  serve	  as	  an	  iconic	  and	  symbolic	  
monument	  to	  the	  memory	  of	  economic	  success	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century,	  as	  the	  re–
creation	  makes	  clear,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  they	  also	  invoke	  the	  booming	  auto	  industry	  
of	  the	  1950s,	  a	  time	  when	  Flint	  was	  enjoying	  such	  prosperity	  that	  it	  was	  hailed	  as	  a	  
“Model	  City”	  in	  the	  modern	  corporate	  industrial	  age.	  In	  these	  years,	  which	  have	  
been	  the	  fodder	  for	  much	  nostalgic	  longing,	  Flint	  as	  well	  as	  other	  major	  industrial	  
centers	  were	  enjoying	  major	  growth	  and	  prestige	  as	  the	  capitals	  of	  the	  new	  postwar	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American	  society.259	  In	  an	  illustration	  from	  a	  1984	  Flint	  Journal	  article	  inviting	  
residents	  to	  “Take	  your	  pick”	  from	  two	  proposed	  symbolic	  gateways	  to	  the	  city	  in	  
the	  form	  of	  highway	  overpass	  decorations,	  we	  can	  see	  how	  the	  two	  eras	  became	  
conflated	  in	  the	  revitalization	  effort.	  Both	  options	  presented	  to	  the	  reader	  for	  
articulating	  a	  visual	  identity	  for	  the	  new,	  tourist–friendly	  city	  are	  overdetermined	  in	  
their	  historically–based	  aesthetic—a	  vaguely	  “classic”	  auto	  grill,	  or	  the	  antique	  
arches.	  The	  article	  asks,	  “What’s	  it	  going	  to	  be,	  Flint?”260	  Though	  neither	  overpass	  
was	  eventually	  built,	  the	  proposed	  project,	  financed	  by	  the	  Mott	  Foundation,	  
collapses	  the	  two	  most	  recognizable	  and	  memorable	  eras	  of	  auto–industry	  
prosperity	  into	  a	  single	  postmodern	  gesture.	  We	  can	  literally	  “take	  our	  pick”	  
because	  both	  choices	  provided	  here	  signify	  essentially	  the	  same	  thing:	  a	  vaguely–
defined	  and	  nostalgic	  atmosphere	  mobilized	  to	  address	  economic	  trauma.	  As	  a	  
further	  example	  of	  the	  call	  to	  memory	  throughout	  AutoWorld—and	  especially	  to	  the	  
era	  of	  the	  1950s,	  when	  many	  parents	  bringing	  families	  to	  visit	  the	  park	  could	  
potentially	  remember	  this	  “better	  time”—there	  was	  a	  large	  display	  dedicated	  to	  the	  
advertising	  and	  Automobiles	  of	  the	  1950s	  called	  “Remembering	  the	  Car	  of	  Your	  
Dreams.”	  By	  mobilizing	  the	  eminently	  recognizable	  figures	  of	  Dinah	  Shore	  and	  
commercial	  jingles	  such	  as	  “See	  The	  U.S.A.	  in	  Your	  Chevrolet,”	  this	  exhibit	  further	  
illustrates	  how	  visitors	  were	  encouraged	  to	  interact	  with	  AutoWorld’s	  presentation	  
of	  history	  in	  a	  broad	  sense:	  as	  appealingly	  “authentic”	  without	  being	  dryly	  “historic”;	  
as	  exciting	  and	  new	  as	  well	  as	  comfortingly	  familiar;	  and	  above	  all,	  FUN!	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  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  in	  terms	  of	  Detroit’s	  development,	  which	  parallels	  Flint	  in	  many	  
ways,	  see	  Thomas	  Sugrue,The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Urban	  Crisis:	  Race	  and	  Inequality	  in	  Postwar	  
Detroit.	  
260	  "What's	  It	  Going	  to	  Be,	  Flint?"	  The	  Flint	  Journal	  11	  Mar.	  1984.	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The	  Youngstown	  Historical	  Center	  for	  Industry	  and	  Labor:	  	  
“A	  Monument	  of	  the	  Steel	  Industry”	  
	  
	   While	  pursuing	  a	  different	  mission	  than	  AutoWorld,	  the	  Youngstown	  Historical	  
Center	  for	  Industry	  and	  Labor	  in	  Youngstown,	  Ohio,	  was	  born	  from	  similar	  impulses	  
and	  in	  response	  to	  similar	  crises.	  State	  Senator	  Harry	  Meshel	  called	  for	  the	  museum	  
to	  be	  built	  in	  1977,	  shortly	  following	  the	  September	  19	  announcement	  of	  the	  closing	  
of	  Youngstown	  Sheet	  and	  Tube’s	  Campbell	  Works	  plant,	  one	  of	  the	  area’s	  largest	  
steel–related	  employers.	  The	  date	  became	  known	  as	  “Black	  Monday”	  in	  
Youngstown,	  and	  five	  thousand	  workers	  would	  lose	  their	  jobs	  in	  the	  months	  
following	  the	  announcement.	  A	  museum	  to	  commemorate	  the	  steel	  industry	  
specifically	  in	  a	  moment	  of	  steep	  decline	  and	  crisis	  was	  proposed	  by	  Meshel	  as	  a	  
fitting	  way	  to	  memorialize	  what	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  disappearing	  mode	  of	  working	  and	  
living	  in	  the	  Youngstown	  area.	  In	  a	  sentiment	  that	  echoes	  the	  similar	  founding	  
impulse	  for	  AutoWorld,	  but	  from	  a	  different	  point	  of	  view	  (Meshel	  worked	  in	  an	  
open	  hearth	  at	  US	  Steel	  in	  his	  college	  years),	  the	  Senator	  said,	  “I	  wanted	  to	  create	  a	  
monument	  of	  the	  steel	  industry	  because	  of	  the	  deep	  and	  abiding	  impact	  it	  had	  on	  the	  
community.”261	  
	   While	  AutoWorld	  was	  in	  many	  ways	  about	  the	  denial	  of	  deindustrialization	  as	  
well	  as	  a	  proposed	  remedy	  for	  the	  destruction	  it	  brought,	  the	  Youngstown	  Historical	  
Center	  dealt	  with	  the	  steel	  industry’s	  decline	  relatively	  explicitly—to	  even	  include	  
“Labor”	  in	  its	  name	  reflects	  a	  certain	  point	  of	  view	  that	  did	  not	  aim	  to	  gloss	  over	  the	  
experience	  (and	  suffering)	  of	  steel	  workers	  with	  a	  sheen	  of	  Disneyfied	  excitement	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  Shilling,	  Don.	  "Museum	  Celebrates	  15th	  Anniversary."	  Vindy.com.	  The	  Youngstown	  
Vindicator,	  28	  Sept.	  2007.	  Web.	  25	  Mar.	  2013.	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and	  fun.	  This	  is	  understandable,	  given	  the	  economic	  realities	  of	  Youngstown	  in	  this	  
period:	  between	  the	  announcement	  of	  the	  Campbell	  Works	  closing	  and	  1983,	  when	  
$3	  million	  in	  state	  funding	  was	  actually	  approved	  for	  the	  museum	  project,	  an	  
estimated	  40,000	  manufacturing	  jobs	  were	  lost,	  50,000	  people	  were	  displaced	  
because	  of	  mill	  shutdowns,	  and	  unemployment	  would	  rise	  to	  20	  percent,	  remaining	  
in	  double	  digits	  for	  the	  next	  decade.262	  During	  this	  time,	  Youngstown—like	  Flint,	  
Detroit,	  and	  a	  handful	  of	  other	  “representative”	  cities—became	  a	  “poster	  child	  for	  
deindustrialization,”	  finding	  itself	  in	  crisis,	  with	  an	  identity	  that	  was	  “up	  for	  
grabs.”263	  Discussions	  during	  the	  planning	  stages,	  proposals	  for	  funding,	  and	  the	  
final	  form	  the	  museum	  would	  take,	  however,	  all	  reveal	  similar	  institutional	  
pressures	  as	  AutoWorld	  faced	  concerning	  what	  a	  cultural	  institution	  should	  be	  in	  
this	  transformational	  historical	  moment.	  	  
	   Located	  on	  the	  campus	  of	  Youngstown	  State	  University	  and	  operated	  by	  the	  
Ohio	  Historical	  Society,	  the	  Historical	  Center	  does	  not	  pretend	  to	  be	  anything	  but	  a	  
museum	  in	  a	  traditional	  sense,	  presenting	  an	  object–based	  historical	  narrative	  of	  
the	  steel	  industry,	  those	  who	  worked	  in	  it,	  and	  Youngstown’s	  prominent—though	  
radically	  diminished—role	  in	  American	  steel	  production.	  Although	  the	  project	  was	  
initially	  proposed	  in	  1977,	  it	  took	  six	  years	  to	  secure	  state	  funding	  to	  begin	  work	  on	  
the	  structure,	  and	  another	  three	  years	  before the	  groundbreaking	  ceremony	  in	  1986.	  
The	  physical	  museum	  opened	  with	  temporary	  exhibits	  in	  1990,	  but	  it	  took	  another	  
two	  years	  of	  fundraising	  to	  build	  a	  significant	  permanent	  collection.	  Throughout	  the	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  Bruno,	  Robert.	  Steelworker	  Alley:	  How	  Class	  Works	  in	  Youngstown.	  Ithaca,	  NY:	  Cornell	  UP,	  
1999:149;	  Sherry	  Lee	  Linkon	  and	  John	  Russo,	  Steeltown	  U.S.A.:	  Work	  and	  Memory	  in	  
Youngstown:	  131.	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  Linkon	  and	  Russo,	  Steeltown	  U.S.A.:	  Work	  and	  Memory	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  Youngstown:150.	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effort	  to	  bring	  the	  museum	  project	  to	  fruition,	  questions	  about	  the	  uses	  of	  history	  
and	  memory,	  and	  how	  to	  properly	  honor	  and/or	  represent	  the	  past	  were	  debated	  by	  
different	  factions	  of	  the	  Youngstown	  community.	  Since	  opening,	  the	  museum	  has	  
had	  consistent	  problems	  attracting	  even	  local	  visitors.	  Five	  years	  after	  officially	  
opening,	  the	  museum	  had	  a	  reputation	  as,	  as	  the	  local	  newspaper	  put	  it,	  a	  “beautiful	  
and	  informative	  museum—that	  no	  one	  visits.”264	  In	  “Steeltown	  U.S.A.,”	  their	  
prominent	  study	  of	  Youngstown’s	  struggles	  over	  history	  and	  memory,	  historians	  
Sherry	  Lee	  Linkon	  and	  John	  Russo	  argue	  that,	  “While	  locals	  sought	  to	  understand	  
the	  changing	  meaning	  of	  work	  and	  how	  their	  community	  was	  being	  reshaped	  by	  
deindustrialization,	  representations	  produced	  for	  a	  national	  audience	  found	  the	  
Youngstown	  story	  useful	  for	  everything	  from	  critiquing	  the	  excessive	  power	  of	  
corporations	  to	  warning	  union	  members	  against	  fighting	  too	  hard	  for	  better	  
treatment.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  community	  struggled	  over	  how	  to	  remember	  the	  past.”265	  
I	  would	  argue,	  however,	  that	  although	  the	  Historical	  Center	  is	  primarily	  local	  in	  
focus,	  it	  also	  represents	  a	  more	  complicated	  middle	  ground.	  The	  new	  emphasis	  on	  
tourist	  economies,	  and	  the	  increasing	  material	  stakes	  for	  image–crafting	  through	  
cultural	  institutions,	  meant	  that	  museum	  projects	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  80s	  attempted	  to	  
self–consciously	  create	  identities	  that	  could	  reproduce	  and	  interact	  with	  national	  
narratives	  in	  a	  marketable	  way,	  rather	  than	  being	  strictly	  products	  of	  local	  struggles	  
between	  interested	  factions	  in	  a	  stable	  “community,”	  somehow	  apart	  from	  national	  
concerns.	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  Whitley,	  Chris.	  "Steel	  Museum	  Passes	  the	  Test	  of	  Its	  Mettle."	  The	  Youngstown	  Vindicator	  6	  
July	  1997.	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  Linkon	  and	  Russo,	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   From	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  museum	  planning	  process,	  the	  dual	  concerns	  of	  
education	  and	  economic	  or	  tourist	  appeal	  were	  intertwined,	  and	  appeared	  in	  
discussions	  of	  the	  multiple	  uses	  of	  the	  prospective	  institution.	  A	  1982	  grant	  
proposal	  by	  the	  Mahoning	  Valley	  Economic	  Development	  Authority	  acknowledges	  
the	  breadth	  of	  the	  museum’s	  ambition,	  saying,	  “The	  scope	  of	  the	  museum’s	  content	  
is	  truly	  national	  and	  not	  merely	  restricted	  to	  the	  Mahoning	  Valley.”	  The	  grant	  
proposal	  also	  makes	  clear	  the	  economic	  stakes	  of	  the	  project:	  
Some	  mention	  must	  also	  be	  made	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  an	  iron	  and	  steel	  
museum	   located	  within	   the	  Mahoning	  Valley.	  There	   is	   little	  question	  
concerning	   the	   educational	   value	   and	   need	   of	   an	   iron	   and	   steel	  
museum	  for	  the	  steel	   industry,	  the	  nation,	  and,	  more	  specifically,	   the	  
residents	   of	   the	   Mahoning	   Valley.	   Furthermore,	   the	   museum	   will	  
generate	   a	   favorable	   economic	   impact	   throughout	   the	   Youngstown	  
area.	  How	  significant	  this	  will	  be	  cannot	  adequately	  be	  foretold	  at	  this	  
time,	   though	   it	   undoubtedly	   will	   be	   related	   to	   the	   quality,	  
comprehensiveness	   and	   attractiveness	  of	   the	  displays	   and	   exhibits…	  
Once	  open,	  the	  museum	  itself	  will	  provide	  a	  number	  of	  permanent	  job	  
positions.	   The	   economic	   value	   of	   an	   iron	   and	   steel	   museum	   in	   the	  
Mahoning	   Valley,	   however,	   will	   exceed	   these	   immediately	  
recognizable	  benefits.	  A	  study	  of	   cultural	   institutions	   in	  Philadelphia	  
indicated	  that	  a	  museum	  that	  attracts	  twenty–five	  people	  a	  day	  brings	  
the	  same	  income	  into	  a	  community	  as	  a	  new	  business	  with	  a	  payroll	  of	  
$125,000	  and	  that	  an	  additional	  100	  out–of–town	  visitors	  per	  day	  will	  
generate	   111	   industry–related	   jobs,	   $1.2	   million	   in	   retail	   sales,	   and	  
$78,000	  in	  taxes.266	  
	  
From	  this	  document,	  it	  is	  actually	  unclear	  why	  the	  educational	  value	  and	  need	  is	  
unquestionable	  specifically	  for	  the	  residents	  of	  the	  Mahoning	  Valley—the	  
implication	  is	  that	  this	  museum	  will	  be	  the	  main	  repository	  of	  a	  dying	  local	  way	  of	  
life,	  but	  it	  also	  seems	  to	  imply	  that	  local	  residents	  are	  in	  particular,	  immediate	  need	  
of	  education	  as	  to	  their	  own	  history.	  More	  important,	  however,	  is	  the	  argument	  that	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  Valley	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  Historical	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a	  museum	  will	  be	  a	  unique	  and	  proven	  way	  to	  produce	  jobs,	  revenue,	  and	  tourists	  
for	  the	  troubled	  Youngstown	  area.	  Going	  so	  far	  as	  to	  cite	  studies	  that	  place	  cultural	  
institutions	  on	  par	  with	  any	  other	  new	  business	  venture	  in	  their	  revenue	  potential,	  
the	  benefit	  of	  pursuing	  a	  museum	  project	  is	  framed	  in	  economic	  terms,	  as	  the	  of	  
number	  of	  visitors/customers	  attracted.	  Although	  not	  nearly	  on	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  
messianic	  expectations	  for	  economic	  transformation	  that	  were	  invested	  in	  
AutoWorld,	  we	  still	  see	  here	  a	  self–conscious	  attempt	  to	  marry	  the	  dual	  purposes	  of	  
historical	  education	  with	  profitability,	  with	  each	  enhancing	  the	  other,	  in	  a	  
particularly	  powerful	  way	  that	  only	  a	  cultural	  institution	  could	  achieve.267	  
	   One	  of	  the	  clearest	  illustrations	  of	  the	  Youngstown	  Historical	  Center’s	  strategy	  
for	  creating	  an	  institution	  that	  would	  not	  only	  memorialize	  an	  industrial	  history,	  but	  
also	  reflect	  the	  broader	  economic	  and	  cultural	  ambitions	  of	  a	  contemporary	  
museum,	  was	  the	  building	  itself.	  In	  1985,	  with	  planning	  stages	  for	  the	  museum	  in	  
progress,	  local	  architectural	  firm	  Raymond	  J.	  Jaminet	  and	  Partners	  pursued	  and	  won	  
the	  attention	  of	  Michael	  Graves,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  modern	  architects	  of	  the	  
time.	  While	  the	  Ohio	  Historical	  Society	  and	  Youngstown	  State	  University	  stipulated	  
early	  on	  that	  an	  architect	  with	  museum	  design	  experience	  be	  involved,	  Graves	  
certainly	  seemed	  to	  be	  overqualified	  by	  any	  standard,	  having	  been	  previously	  
involved	  with	  the	  Whitney	  Museum	  of	  American	  Art,	  the	  Newark	  Museum,	  and	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  And	  yet,	  there	  was	  considerable	  resistance	  from	  the	  Youngstown	  business	  community	  to	  
the	  museum,	  as	  in	  their	  view,	  it	  represented	  a	  threat	  to	  a	  total	  business–friendly	  image	  
makeover	  that	  would	  further	  erase	  the	  city’s	  association	  with	  organized	  labor.	  Dubbed	  a	  
“get	  over	  it”	  attitude	  by	  Linkon	  and	  Russo,	  business	  leaders	  feared	  that	  the	  museum	  would	  
only	  contribute	  to	  the	  community’s	  dwelling	  on	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  past	  that	  was	  not	  in	  line	  
with	  the	  neoliberal	  goal	  of	  completely	  shedding	  a	  Rust	  Belt	  image.	  See	  their	  discussion	  in	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several	  other	  museum–related	  projects.	  As	  a	  strategy	  for	  generating	  excitement	  and	  
legitimacy	  for	  the	  museum,	  hiring	  a	  big–name	  architect	  to	  design	  the	  structure	  was	  
a	  proven	  one,	  and	  one	  that	  was	  being	  increasingly	  employed	  by	  museums	  of	  all	  
kinds	  to	  give	  an	  institution	  crucial	  “cutting–edge”	  appeal	  and	  tourist	  potential—I.M.	  
Pei,	  though	  famously	  indifferent	  to	  modern	  popular	  music,	  was	  courted	  and	  won	  to	  
design	  Cleveland’s	  Rock	  and	  Roll	  Hall	  of	  Fame	  based	  on	  name	  recognition	  and	  the	  
air	  of	  respectability	  he	  brought	  to	  the	  project.	  This	  approach	  was	  successful	  in	  some	  
ways	  for	  the	  Youngstown	  Historical	  Center	  (the	  structure	  was	  completed	  in	  1989	  at	  
a	  cost	  of	  almost	  $4	  million),	  as	  the	  design	  won	  awards	  for	  Graves	  and	  publicity	  for	  
the	  museum	  (see	  Fig.	  17).268	  The	  form	  itself	  appealed	  to	  architecture	  experts	  and	  
critics,	  but	  so	  did	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  structure	  in	  a	  national	  narrative	  about	  
deindustrialization	  and	  memory.	  Critic	  Philip	  Arcidi	  wrote	  in	  Progressive	  
Architecture,	  
The	   steel	   mills	   that	   once	   dominated	   Youngstown	   are	   closing	   down,	  
and	   their	   former	   employees	   are	   adjusting	   to	   a	   postindustrial	   future.	  
During	   these	   difficult	   transitional	   years,	   Youngstown	   might	   find	   its	  
new	  museum,	  which	  won	  a	  citation	  in	  the	  P/A	  awards	  program	  (P/A,	  
Jan.	  1988,	  pp.	  122–123),	  doubly	   important.	  The	  building,	  by	  Michael	  
Graves,	   Architect,	   in	   association	   with	   Raymond	   J.	   Jaminet	   and	  
Partners,	  serves	  the	  city	  in	  two	  ways:	  It	  documents	  the	  development	  
of	  Ohio's	  steel	  industry	  and	  commemorates	  a	  vanishing	  way	  of	  life.269	  
	  
Although	  no	  doubt	  biased	  in	  its	  opinion	  about	  the	  transformative	  power	  of	  
architecture,	  these	  accolades	  illuminate	  the	  demands	  being	  made	  of	  cultural	  
institutions	  at	  this	  moment,	  and	  specifically	  upon	  the	  Rust	  Belt.	  First	  of	  all,	  Michael	  
Graves	  becomes	  a	  noble	  servant	  to	  Youngstown’s	  naturalized	  transition	  from	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  Linkon	  and	  Russo,	  Steeltown	  U.S.A.:	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  in	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“industrial”	  to	  “postindustrial,”	  as	  this	  museum	  becomes	  a	  site	  not	  just	  of	  
remembering,	  but	  of	  mourning.	  Presumably,	  those	  who	  visit	  the	  museum	  to	  witness	  
the	  commemoration	  of	  a	  “vanishing”	  way	  of	  life	  are	  themselves	  the	  subjects	  of	  that	  
vanishing–in–progress,	  and	  it	  is	  implied	  that	  this	  institution—now	  “doubly	  
important”	  through	  its	  particular	  transformational	  power	  of	  memory—will	  in	  some	  
way	  provide	  safe	  passage	  through	  these	  “transitional	  years.”	  As	  an	  explicitly	  
memorial	  site,	  the	  Historical	  Center	  does	  this	  work	  as	  monuments	  and	  museums	  
often	  have,	  by	  attempting	  to	  detach	  and	  display	  a	  painful	  past	  and	  making	  it	  
symbolic—and	  commodifiable—as	  “heritage.”	  As	  a	  memorial	  site,	  the	  museum	  also	  
has	  the	  power	  to	  level	  historical	  narratives,	  especially	  in	  moral	  terms,	  since	  
although	  there	  is	  a	  certain	  defiance	  in	  choosing	  to	  represent	  deindustrialization	  or	  
organized	  labor	  at	  all,	  there	  is	  no	  particular	  politics	  attached	  to	  that	  remembering.	  
As	  I’ve	  discussed	  in	  previous	  chapters	  regarding	  the	  neoliberal	  national	  narratives	  
framing	  the	  decline	  of	  organized	  labor	  as	  a	  natural	  economic	  evolution	  out	  of	  the	  
antiquated	  New	  Deal	  era,	  the	  deindustrialization	  of	  Youngstown	  simply	  happened,	  
and	  now	  something	  else	  is	  happening—all	  that’s	  left	  is	  to	  properly	  remember	  the	  
past.270	  As	  a	  1986	  Youngstown	  State	  University	  newspaper	  article	  about	  the	  
Historical	  Center	  begins	  by	  saying,	  “Industry	  was	  an	  important	  part	  of	  Youngstown’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270	  Historian	  and	  critic	  Mike	  Wallace,	  for	  one,	  has	  suggested	  that	  the	  main	  permanent	  
exhibit	  on	  display	  at	  the	  museum,	  titled	  “By	  the	  Sweat	  of	  Their	  Brow:	  Forging	  the	  Steel	  
Valley,”	  actually	  does	  a	  much	  better	  job	  of	  dealing	  with	  some	  historical	  details	  of	  
deindustrialization	  than	  most	  other	  museum	  treatments	  of	  similar	  subjects.	  However,	  as	  
Linkon	  and	  Russo	  point	  out,	  while	  the	  exhibit	  depicts	  aspects	  of	  working–class	  life,	  it	  also	  
downplays	  the	  role	  of	  conflict	  in	  shaping	  the	  culture	  and	  community.	  I	  would	  also	  argue	  that	  
the	  very	  form	  and	  planning	  of	  the	  museum,	  aside	  from	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  main	  exhibit,	  
suggest	  the	  naturalized	  narratives	  of	  heritage	  more	  than	  anything.	  See	  Mike	  Wallace,	  Mickey	  
Mouse	  History	  and	  Other	  Essays	  on	  American	  Memory:	  92–93;	  Linkon	  and	  Russo,	  Steeltown	  
U.S.A.:	  Work	  and	  Memory	  in	  Youngstown:	  179–180.	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history	  and	  even	  if	  we	  must	  move	  on	  to	  other	  things,	  it	  is	  important	  for	  us	  to	  
remember	  our	  heritage.”271	  We	  also	  see	  in	  this	  museum	  the	  multiple	  cultural	  and	  
economic	  pressures	  that	  were	  placed	  on	  cultural	  institutions	  to	  do	  the	  work	  of	  
redefining	  Rust	  Belt	  urban	  identity	  in	  a	  moment	  of	  crisis,	  as	  not	  only	  must	  
Youngstown	  and	  its	  residents	  “adjust	  to	  a	  postindustrial	  future,”	  but	  the	  city	  also	  
must	  properly	  exhibit	  itself	  and	  its	  history	  to	  remain	  relevant	  and	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  
present—and,	  in	  Kirschenblatt–Gimblett’s	  formulation,	  to	  become	  “real”	  and	  
modern.	  
	   The	  most	  widely	  praised	  element	  of	  Graves’	  museum	  design	  was	  also	  an	  
explicitly	  memorial	  gesture,	  as	  he	  included	  elements	  meant	  to	  echo	  industrial	  
buildings,	  including	  mill	  stack–inspired	  turrets.	  Director	  of	  the	  Historical	  Center	  
Gary	  Ness	  praised	  the	  design	  in	  an	  Historical	  Society	  press	  release,	  particularly	  “the	  
incorporation	  of	  industrial	  shapes	  from	  the	  18th,	  19th	  and	  20th	  centuries,”	  and	  
Progressive	  Architecture	  commended	  Graves’	  industrial–inspired	  elements,	  saying	  in	  
their	  award	  citation	  that	  the	  building	  “recognizes	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  imagery	  
of	  public	  buildings,	  in	  its	  classically	  inspired	  front	  facade,	  and	  that	  of	  industrial	  
buildings,	  in	  the	  three	  architectural	  elements	  at	  the	  rear	  of	  the	  building.”272	  
Essentially	  a	  design	  strategy	  that	  aestheticized	  the	  functional	  forms	  of	  the	  very	  mills	  
that	  were	  being	  closed	  all	  around	  the	  Youngstown	  area,	  the	  architecture	  crystallizes	  
an	  effect	  of	  detaching	  the	  viewer	  from	  the	  lived	  history	  of	  work	  that	  it	  aims	  to	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  Morgan,	  Susan.	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  Roots."	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memorialize.	  In	  fact,	  as	  noted	  by	  Linkon	  and	  Russo—and	  borne	  out	  by	  the	  often	  low	  
attendance	  numbers—“while	  it	  appealed	  to	  architecture	  fans,	  many	  local	  critics	  
complained	  that	  it	  simply	  didn’t	  capture	  the	  scale	  or	  experience	  of	  the	  real	  thing.”273	  
The	  incorporation	  of	  nostalgic	  formal	  elements	  and/or	  explicit	  references	  to	  that	  
which	  is	  being	  memorialized	  is	  not	  unusual	  in	  this	  kind	  of	  institution—Cleveland’s	  
Rock	  and	  Roll	  Hall	  of	  Fame,	  for	  example,	  has	  the	  suggestion	  of	  a	  record	  turntable	  
built	  into	  its	  form	  by	  I.M.	  Pei,	  especially	  when	  viewed	  from	  above.	  Considering	  the	  
opening	  of	  Pei’s	  building	  was	  in	  1995—a	  very	  dark	  time	  for	  vinyl	  records,	  since	  
compact	  discs	  easily	  dominated	  the	  recorded	  music	  market,	  with	  vinyl	  widely	  seen	  
as	  obsolete	  technology—the	  reference	  to	  a	  record	  player	  as	  the	  physical	  expression	  
of	  the	  Hall	  of	  Fame	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  memorial	  gesture	  for	  a	  dying	  technology,	  or	  
at	  the	  very	  least	  an	  affirmation	  of	  the	  Hall	  of	  Fame’s	  nostalgic	  mission.	  
	   The	  industrial	  architectural	  references	  also	  have	  very	  real	  precedents	  in	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  Historical	  Center.	  State	  Senator	  Harry	  Meshel,	  who	  originally	  
proposed	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  “National	  Steel	  Museum”	  in	  Youngstown,	  advocated	  in	  1983	  
for	  the	  museum	  to	  incorporate	  large	  pieces	  of	  an	  actual	  closed	  steel	  coke	  facility,	  the	  
former	  Youngstown	  Sheet	  and	  Tube	  Co.’s	  Brier	  Hill	  plant.274	  Before	  that,	  there	  was	  
serious	  talk	  of	  actually	  housing	  the	  museum	  itself	  in	  a	  vacant	  steel	  mill,	  raising	  
questions	  of	  what	  that	  kind	  of	  repurposing	  might	  have	  meant	  for	  the	  museum’s	  
historical	  narrative,	  since	  such	  a	  move	  would	  have	  been	  a	  disturbingly	  literal	  
illustration	  of	  the	  basic	  postmodern	  economic	  progression	  from	  “making”	  to	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  Linkon	  and	  Russo,	  Steeltown	  U.S.A.:	  Work	  and	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  in	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  Reiss,	  George	  R.	  "Meshel	  Proposes	  Brier	  Hill	  Plant	  Become	  National	  Steel	  Museum."	  The	  
Youngstown	  Vindicator	  10	  July	  1983.	  
	  
	   208	  
“showing.”275	  These	  plans	  were	  scrapped	  relatively	  early	  on	  in	  the	  planning	  process,	  
however,	  since	  vacant	  steel	  mills	  are,	  it	  turns	  out,	  prohibitively	  expensive	  to	  
renovate	  for	  commercial	  use,	  and	  to	  heat	  through	  an	  Ohio	  winter.	  
	   In	  contrast,	  AutoWorld	  had	  no	  such	  qualms	  about	  its	  location.	  When	  choosing	  
a	  site,	  Mott	  Foundation	  and	  AutoWorld	  officials	  decided	  on	  a	  large	  lot	  on	  a	  northern	  
corner	  of	  downtown	  on	  South	  Saginaw	  Street,	  occupied	  at	  the	  time	  by	  the	  Industrial	  
Mutual	  Association,	  or	  IMA,	  Auditorium.	  Built	  in	  1929	  as	  a	  multi–purpose	  venue	  
primarily	  used	  for	  entertaining	  the	  thousands	  of	  auto	  workers	  in	  the	  city,	  the	  
auditorium	  was	  beloved	  for	  the	  years	  of	  memories	  it	  had	  provided,	  but	  largely	  
unused	  by	  the	  early	  1980s,	  and	  was	  prime	  downtown	  real	  estate.	  As	  the	  Flint	  
Journal	  described	  it	  upon	  AutoWorld’s	  grand	  opening,	  “The	  IMA	  Auditorium—that	  
symbol	  of	  better	  days	  in	  a	  declining	  downtown,	  that	  place	  that	  held	  thousands	  of	  
bright	  memories	  for	  Flint	  people	  of	  all	  ages—has	  become	  part	  of	  AutoWorld.”276	  Not	  
only	  did	  the	  AutoWorld	  facility	  occupy	  the	  land	  on	  which	  the	  IMA	  stood,	  it	  
appropriated	  the	  building	  itself	  for	  exhibit	  space,	  forming	  the	  architectural	  
companion	  to	  its	  newly	  constructed	  glass	  dome.	  The	  final	  act	  of	  this	  literal	  
absorption	  of	  the	  past	  into	  the	  spectacular	  present	  was	  for	  the	  letters	  of	  the	  original	  
“IMA	  Auditorium”	  sign	  to	  be	  taken	  down	  and	  rearranged	  into	  its	  new	  identity,	  
spelling	  “AutoWorld.”	  As	  the	  Flint	  Journal	  put	  it	  in	  ironically	  melancholy	  terms,	  
saying,	  “Now,	  as	  part	  of	  AutoWorld,	  perhaps	  its	  identity	  will	  blend	  into	  that	  of	  the	  
new	  complex.	  Only	  older	  residents	  may	  retain	  the	  image	  of	  the	  building	  that	  spelled	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magic	  and	  prestige,	  excitement	  and	  pride	  for	  so	  many	  years.”277	  The	  old	  symbol	  of	  
downtown,	  a	  monument	  to	  working–class	  leisure	  and	  the	  product	  of	  old	  Liberal	  
arrangements	  of	  worker/company	  relations	  was	  gone,	  but	  in	  its	  new	  heritage–
based	  form,	  perhaps	  we	  can	  at	  least	  remember	  it.	  That	  era	  simply	  happened,	  and	  
now	  something	  else	  was	  happening.	  	  
	  
Disney’s	  America:	  On	  “Historicidal”	  Enterprises	  
	   In	  Mike	  Wallace’s	  1996	  essay	  “Mickey	  Mouse	  History,”	  he	  argues	  that	  
“Corporate	  desire	  to	  fudge	  the	  past	  combined	  with	  Disney’s	  ability	  to	  spruce	  it	  up	  
promotes	  a	  sense	  of	  history	  as	  a	  pleasantly	  nostalgic	  memory,	  now	  so	  completely	  
transcended	  by	  the	  modern	  corporate	  order	  as	  to	  be	  irrelevant	  to	  modern	  life.”278	  
The	  effect	  of	  this,	  he	  says,	  is	  a	  diminishment	  of	  Americans’	  ability	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  
the	  past,	  to	  question	  the	  present,	  and	  to	  critically	  assess	  how	  we	  got	  here.	  This	  is	  not	  
a	  unique	  argument	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  Disney,	  and	  there	  are	  two	  sides	  to	  the	  same	  
“common	  sense”	  coin	  about	  how	  Disney’s	  influence	  operates:	  Disney	  is	  the	  most	  
recognizable	  and	  respected	  name	  in	  themed	  environments,	  which	  are	  almost	  by	  
nature	  quasi–historical;	  simultaneously	  Disney	  is	  a	  synonym	  for	  “inauthenticity,”	  
especially	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  question	  of	  history.	  Echoing	  the	  concerns	  of	  the	  New	  
York	  Times	  editorial	  that	  began	  this	  chapter,	  Wallace	  sets	  up	  his	  examination	  of	  
Disney’s	  role	  in	  commercialized	  history	  by	  observing	  that,	  “Nowadays,	  it	  often	  
seems	  as	  if	  the	  past	  gets	  presented	  to	  popular	  audiences	  more	  by	  commercial	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operators	  pursuing	  profit	  than	  by	  museums	  bent	  on	  education.”279	  If,	  however,	  we	  
consider	  Disney’s	  proposed	  historical	  theme	  park	  (“Disney’s	  America”),	  and	  the	  
debates	  surrounding	  it,	  in	  comparison	  with	  places	  such	  as	  AutoWorld	  and	  the	  
Youngstown	  Historical	  Center,	  we	  find	  a	  more	  complex	  picture	  of	  cultural	  
institutions	  in	  crisis.	  	  
	   Plans	  for	  Disney’s	  America	  were	  announced	  in	  late	  1993,	  on	  the	  heels	  of	  
several	  pledges	  by	  the	  recently	  restructured	  Walt	  Disney	  Company	  to	  “reinvent”	  
their	  theme	  park	  experience,	  and	  immediately	  following	  huge	  losses	  on	  its	  recent	  
EuroDisney	  venture.	  The	  proposed	  site	  was	  3,000	  acres	  of	  rural	  Northern	  Virginia	  in	  
Prince	  William	  County,	  abutting	  the	  busy	  interstate	  and	  roughly	  35	  miles	  from	  the	  
White	  House	  in	  Washington	  D.C.	  Divided	  into	  nine	  themed	  “Lands”—a	  common	  
Disney	  device	  for	  dividing	  space,	  having	  been	  pioneered	  in	  the	  original	  Disney	  
parks—the	  theme	  park	  would	  represent	  the	  grand	  sweep	  of	  American	  history,	  
bringing	  the	  American	  experience	  “to	  life,”	  as	  Disney	  CEO	  Michael	  Eisner	  put	  it.	  
Among	  the	  plans	  for	  each	  themed	  area	  was	  a	  recreated	  “Indian	  Village,”	  complete	  
with	  a	  Lewis	  and	  Clark	  whitewater	  ride;	  a	  “Main	  Street	  U.S.A.”–type	  souvenir	  
marketplace	  styled	  as	  a	  bustling	  town	  of	  the	  mid–1800s;	  a	  Civil	  War	  scene	  complete	  
with	  replica	  fort,	  slaves	  and	  soldiers;	  an	  Ellis	  Island	  replica;	  and	  a	  vaguely	  “old–
timey”	  (that	  is	  to	  say,	  pre–WWII	  and	  pre–modern	  labor	  unrest)	  “factory	  town”	  
called	  Enterprise,	  where	  visitors	  could	  ride	  a	  thrilling	  roller	  coaster	  through	  a	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  to	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  concerns	  later	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  the	  book,	  saying	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  is	  no	  
particular	  conflict	  inherent	  to	  the	  intersection	  of	  history	  and	  commercial	  enterprise—but	  
rather	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  education/entertainment	  anxiety	  is	  a	  common	  framework	  at	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replicated	  steel	  blast	  furnace.	  Significantly,	  however,	  Disney	  anticipated	  public	  
skepticism	  regarding	  how	  they	  might	  treat	  American	  history	  in	  the	  proposed	  park,	  
and	  insisted	  from	  the	  beginning	  that	  this	  would	  be	  no	  “Disneyfied”	  narrative.	  
Especially	  after	  partnering	  with	  Columbia	  University	  historian	  Eric	  Foner	  to	  revamp	  
and	  update	  the	  iconic	  “Hall	  of	  Presidents”	  exhibit	  at	  their	  Disneyworld	  park,	  Disney	  
was	  keen	  to	  frame	  this	  new	  venture	  as	  “serious	  fun,”	  not	  shying	  away	  from	  sensitive	  
historical	  material.	  Eisner	  assured	  skeptics,	  for	  instance,	  that	  “We	  will	  show	  the	  Civil	  
War	  with	  all	  its	  conflict.”	  Disney	  Vice	  President	  Robert	  Weis	  said	  that	  “We	  want	  to	  
make	  you	  feel	  what	  it	  was	  like	  to	  be	  a	  slave	  or	  what	  it	  was	  like	  to	  escape	  through	  the	  
underground	  railroad”—which,	  apparently,	  was	  supposed	  to	  set	  troubled	  minds	  at	  
ease.	  There	  was	  to	  be	  no	  “Pollyanna	  view”	  of	  history	  and	  no	  “propaganda”	  in	  
Disney’s	  America.280	  Disney	  also	  highlighted	  the	  proven	  marketable	  appeal	  of	  its	  
theme	  parks,	  as	  the	  park’s	  general	  manager	  insisted	  that	  despite	  some	  possibly	  
difficult	  historical	  topics,	  “It	  is	  going	  to	  be	  fun	  with	  a	  capital	  ‘F.’”281	  However,	  the	  
goal	  of	  Disney’s	  America,	  as	  Peter	  Rummel,	  head	  of	  the	  Disney	  Design	  and	  
Development	  unit	  that	  designed	  the	  park,	  insisted,	  “is	  to	  make	  this	  real.”282	  Disney’s	  
attempt	  to	  frame	  the	  new	  venture	  as	  not	  just	  another	  Disney	  experience,	  but	  a	  new	  
kind	  of	  hybrid	  institution	  that	  took	  history	  seriously—but	  not	  so	  seriously	  as	  to	  be	  
unentertaining—echoes	  many	  of	  the	  flexible	  mission	  claims	  made	  by	  AutoWorld	  a	  
decade	  earlier,	  and	  the	  attempts	  to	  balance	  profitability	  with	  authenticity	  made	  by	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countless	  institutions—especially	  museums—since	  the	  1970s.	  	  
	   While	  the	  proposal	  did	  generate	  criticism	  from	  intellectuals,	  academics,	  and	  
some	  in	  the	  media	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  concept	  was	  inherently	  objectionable—
Wallace	  notes	  that	  most	  historians	  “saw	  an	  irreconcilable	  tension	  between	  the	  
subjects	  that	  Disney	  planned	  to	  treat	  and	  the	  way	  it	  planned	  to	  treat	  them”—the	  
arguments	  against	  the	  park	  that	  gained	  the	  most	  traction	  were	  not	  ones	  
ideologically	  opposed	  to	  the	  project.283	  In	  fact,	  polls	  showed	  that	  the	  project	  had	  
support	  from	  a	  majority	  of	  Virginians,	  no	  doubt	  on	  economic	  grounds,	  since	  the	  
promise	  of	  a	  Disney	  theme	  park	  certainly	  meant	  tourist	  revenue	  and	  badly	  needed	  
jobs.	  As	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  reported,	  “Prince	  William	  County	  is	  in	  the	  economic	  
horse	  latitudes	  after	  two	  go–go	  decades,	  and	  the	  park’s	  3,000	  jobs	  seemed	  as	  
thrilling	  to	  local	  residents	  as	  the	  prospect	  of	  something	  new	  to	  do.”284	  Organizations	  
of	  local	  officials	  and	  business	  leaders	  formed	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  “Welcome	  Disney	  
Committee”	  to	  support	  the	  development,	  and	  Disney	  itself	  projected	  very	  attractive	  
benefits	  for	  the	  local	  economy,	  including	  up	  to	  19,000	  permanent	  jobs,	  2,800	  
construction	  jobs,	  $48	  million	  a	  year	  in	  new	  state	  taxes,	  and	  up	  to	  $12	  million	  in	  tax	  
revenue	  for	  Prince	  William	  County.	  Governor	  George	  Allen	  himself	  spearheaded	  the	  
effort	  to	  pass	  a	  bond	  issue	  to	  provide	  Disney	  with	  the	  $163	  million	  in	  public	  money	  
that	  the	  company	  had	  requested	  to	  prepare	  and	  improve	  access	  to	  the	  proposed	  
site.285	  This	  tradeoff	  of	  public	  funds	  for	  private	  enterprise’s	  promise	  of	  future	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revenue	  that	  is	  a	  standard	  feature	  of	  neoliberal	  governance	  seemed	  to	  residents	  and	  
officials	  a	  safe	  bet,	  given	  Disney’s	  reputation	  for	  profitability	  (EuroDisney	  
notwithstanding).	  
	   However,	  as	  the	  proposal	  came	  under	  more	  criticism	  and	  pressure	  from	  
opponent	  groups	  such	  as	  “Protect	  Historic	  America,”	  made	  up	  of	  a	  group	  of	  
historians	  and	  writers,	  as	  well	  as	  environmentalists	  and	  other	  concerned	  activists,	  
the	  issue	  became	  much	  more	  than	  one	  of	  local	  development.	  The	  arguments	  getting	  
the	  most	  serious	  consideration	  were	  those	  concerning	  urban	  sprawl,	  over–
development,	  and	  the	  disturbance	  of	  nearby	  Civil	  War	  battle	  sites.	  In	  the	  summer	  of	  
1994,	  a	  bipartisan	  group	  of	  16	  House	  members	  in	  Washington,	  encouraged	  by	  
activist	  groups,	  introduced	  a	  resolution	  opposing	  the	  building	  of	  the	  park.	  Although	  
possibly	  haunted	  by	  principled	  anti–Disneyfication	  sentiment,	  the	  issue	  ultimately	  
came	  down	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  highway	  width,	  air	  quality,	  and	  general	  concern	  over	  
what	  might	  happen	  to	  the	  “historic”	  Virginia	  countryside	  when	  Disney’s	  America	  
inevitably	  became	  too	  successful.	  The	  most	  influential	  critics	  were	  clear	  that	  they	  
were	  not	  opposed	  to	  the	  project	  itself,	  but	  the	  proposed	  location,	  and	  even	  the	  New	  
York	  Times	  opinion	  page,	  which	  had	  been	  routinely	  outraged	  at	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  
Disney’s	  plans,	  said,	  “There	  are	  millions	  of	  acres	  elsewhere	  more	  appropriate	  for	  
such	  a	  project	  and	  where	  Disney	  can	  exercise	  its	  creative	  freedom.”286	  The	  
implication	  of	  these	  arguments	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  there	  are	  plenty	  of	  heritage–free	  
blank	  canvases	  in	  America	  to	  work	  with—Orlando,	  for	  example—and	  that	  there	  is	  a	  
distinction	  of	  value	  that	  must	  be	  made	  between	  “real”	  heritage	  and	  Disney’s	  brand	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of	  history.	  In	  the	  end,	  these	  arguments	  based	  on	  land	  use	  and	  potential	  
environmental	  impact	  won	  out,	  or	  at	  least	  cost	  Disney	  too	  much	  in	  delays,	  and	  the	  
project	  was	  abandoned.	  
	   Disney	  is	  a	  complex	  cultural	  force,	  and	  seems	  to	  signify	  at	  once	  the	  destruction	  
of	  history,	  and	  the	  most	  successful	  popular	  expression	  of	  American	  historical	  
appetites.	  The	  Disney	  theme	  parks	  have	  always	  been	  in	  part	  a	  historical	  enterprise,	  
narrating	  a	  particular	  story	  of	  American	  exceptionalism	  and	  progress,	  from	  
Frontierland	  to	  the	  future–obsessed	  Epcot.	  In	  many	  ways,	  the	  resistance	  mounted	  to	  
Disney’s	  America	  was	  the	  most	  powerful	  testament	  to	  their	  success	  in	  the	  
marketplace	  of	  commodified	  history—a	  marketplace	  that	  Disney	  itself	  had	  shaped	  
over	  the	  preceding	  few	  decades.	  Disney	  has	  long	  been	  cited	  as	  a	  prominent	  example	  
for	  successfully	  attracting	  tourists,	  and	  as	  a	  compelling	  example	  for	  the	  economic	  
possibilities	  of	  packaging	  heritage	  and	  theme–park	  excitement.	  AutoWorld	  
constantly	  referenced	  Disney	  as	  a	  model	  for	  their	  “fun”	  approach	  to	  history,	  and	  
explicitly	  hoped	  to	  replicate	  Disney’s	  success	  as	  a	  tourist	  destination.	  When	  the	  Rock	  
and	  Roll	  Hall	  of	  Fame	  in	  Cleveland	  was	  stalled	  in	  the	  planning	  stages,	  trying	  to	  
secure	  funding,	  a	  frustrated	  Cleveland	  lawyer	  donated	  his	  personal	  collection	  of	  
Elvis	  Presley	  memorabilia	  to	  the	  museum’s	  collection	  in	  hopes	  that	  it	  might	  help	  the	  
project	  move	  forward.	  “I	  believe,”	  he	  said,	  explaining	  his	  deep	  desire	  to	  see	  the	  
museum	  come	  to	  fruition,	  “that	  the	  Rock	  and	  Roll	  Hall	  of	  Fame	  will	  do	  for	  Cleveland	  
what	  DisneyWorld	  did	  for	  Orlando,	  Florida.”287	  Even	  though	  the	  Youngstown	  
Historical	  Center	  had	  a	  more	  traditional	  mission,	  it	  is	  also	  clear	  that	  they	  had	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commercial	  ambition,	  at	  least	  for	  generating	  new	  economic	  activity	  in	  Youngstown,	  
just	  as	  local	  Virginians	  had	  for	  the	  prospect	  of	  Disney’s	  America.	  	  
	   In	  this	  way,	  Disney’s	  development	  strategies	  were	  effectively	  legitimized	  by	  
market	  forces—the	  most	  important	  neoliberal	  arbiter	  of	  value.	  Even	  if	  the	  Disney	  
brand	  is	  at	  some	  points	  contested,	  the	  Disney	  approach	  to	  history	  has	  been	  
thoroughly	  insinuated	  into	  accepted	  common	  sense	  about	  how	  to	  successfully	  
package	  historical	  narratives—the	  very	  ideas	  of	  a	  historical	  “experience”	  and	  
“bringing	  history	  to	  life,”	  so	  commonplace	  in	  the	  language	  of	  museums	  and	  cultural	  
attractions,	  are	  deeply	  indebted	  to	  the	  Disney	  model.	  I	  would	  not	  so	  much	  argue	  
with	  Wallace,	  then,	  on	  his	  characterization	  of	  Disney’s	  historical	  project,	  since	  
Corporate	  Disney	  is	  undoubtedly	  a	  rabidly	  historicidal	  enterprise.	  Rather,	  I	  would	  
try	  to	  step	  back	  and	  amend	  his	  statement	  by	  suggesting	  that	  neoliberalism	  itself	  is	  
historicidal,	  and	  its	  hegemonic	  rise	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  allowed	  Disney	  to	  
multiply	  its	  power	  for	  historicide	  through	  the	  many	  cultural	  institutions	  that	  it	  
shaped.	  	  
	   Even	  when	  we	  consider	  the	  issue	  of	  failure—failure	  as	  AutoWorld	  certainly	  
was,	  the	  Youngstown	  Historical	  Center	  struggled	  not	  to	  be,	  and	  Disney’s	  America	  
never	  got	  the	  chance	  to	  be—we	  see	  that	  the	  neoliberal	  logic	  that	  Disney	  helped	  to	  
construct	  remains	  intact.	  To	  become	  “real”	  and	  relevant	  in	  a	  postindustrial	  era,	  Flint	  
attempted	  to	  transform	  itself	  into	  a	  destination	  with	  a	  marketable,	  fun	  heritage	  in	  
the	  Disney	  mold.	  In	  hindsight,	  AutoWorld’s	  failure	  is	  seen	  as	  clearly	  a	  desperate	  and	  
ridiculous	  project	  from	  the	  start,	  both	  within	  and	  outside	  of	  Flint.	  Despite	  being	  
based	  on	  proven	  tourist	  models	  and	  despite	  hiring	  veterans	  of	  the	  most	  successful	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companies	  in	  the	  field,	  AutoWorld	  is	  seen	  as	  somehow	  destined	  to	  fail—and	  so	  
ultimately,	  that	  failure	  is	  not	  about	  the	  strategies	  themselves,	  or	  about	  how	  to	  
represent	  history,	  but	  rather	  about	  where	  they	  are	  implemented,	  and	  the	  value	  
those	  places	  have	  in	  a	  heritage	  economy.	  Virginia’s	  Civil	  War	  battlefields	  were	  too	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Figure	  16:	  The	  original	  “Vehicle	  City”	  arches	  as	  they	  stood	  along	  South	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Figure	  17:	  The	  Youngstown	  Historical	  Center	  of	  Industry	  and	  Labor,	  designed	  






















	   	  
	  









	   In	  the	  final	  stages	  of	  writing	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  found	  myself	  unsure	  of	  how	  
to	  conclude.	  I	  wanted	  to	  bring	  all	  the	  historical	  analysis	  of	  the	  previous	  chapters	  up	  
to	  the	  present	  because,	  living	  and	  working	  in	  Flint,	  I	  see	  the	  legacies	  of	  1980s	  
revitalization	  projects	  all	  around	  me	  every	  day.	  Especially	  in	  the	  last	  several	  months,	  
it	  seems	  that	  there	  has	  been	  a	  flurry	  of	  development	  activity	  in	  Michigan,	  and	  all	  of	  it	  
seems	  an	  appropriate	  way	  to	  put	  an	  uneasy	  question	  mark	  on	  where	  exactly	  the	  
neoliberal	  shifts	  of	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  have	  guided	  us,	  and	  what	  the	  future	  
will	  look	  like.	  	  
	   In	  September	  2012,	  tentative	  plans	  were	  announced	  to	  demolish	  downtown	  
Flint’s	  Genesee	  Towers	  building.	  Genesee	  Towers	  has	  stood	  as	  the	  tallest	  building	  in	  
Flint	  and	  Genesee	  County	  since	  its	  completion	  in	  1968,	  and	  remains	  a	  fixture	  of	  the	  
downtown	  skyline,	  even	  after	  its	  last	  tenant	  left	  in	  1997	  and	  its	  official	  
condemnation	  by	  the	  city	  in	  2004.	  Since	  2007,	  the	  roads	  around	  the	  Towers	  have	  
been	  partially	  blocked	  off	  because	  of	  safety	  concerns,	  as	  sections	  of	  the	  building	  
threaten	  to	  fall	  into	  the	  streets	  below.	  In	  its	  place,	  developers	  have	  proposed	  an	  as–
yet	  vaguely	  defined	  “urban	  plaza,”	  the	  details	  of	  which	  have	  not	  been	  elaborated	  
upon.	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   The	  demolition	  of	  Genesee	  Towers	  sparked	  debate	  as	  a	  deal	  was	  apparently	  
struck	  between	  the	  private	  Uptown	  Reinvestment	  Corporation—a	  group	  of	  local	  
business	  elites	  who	  have	  almost	  single–handedly	  shaped	  downtown	  development	  
for	  more	  than	  a	  decade	  with	  private	  investments—and	  the	  state–appointed	  
Emergency	  Financial	  Manager	  Michael	  Brown,	  without	  public	  input.	  Under	  current	  
state	  law,	  Emergency	  Managers	  are	  not	  required	  to	  follow	  traditional	  guidelines	  
regarding	  such	  matters.288	  Furthermore,	  the	  Flint	  Journal	  revealed	  that	  Brown	  had	  
already	  committed	  $750,000	  of	  the	  city's	  federal	  community	  development	  grant	  
funding	  to	  go	  toward	  the	  Genesee	  Towers	  demolition,	  funneling	  these	  funds	  into	  
clearing	  more	  downtown	  real	  estate	  for	  private	  development	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  
neighborhood	  demolition	  projects	  that	  would	  clear	  some	  of	  the	  city’s	  many	  
abandoned	  and	  condemned	  structures.289	  
	   Even	  more	  recently,	  in	  early	  March	  2013,	  the	  Uptown	  Reinvestment	  
Corporation	  also	  announced	  that	  they	  are	  planning	  to	  relocate	  the	  Flint	  Farmer’s	  
Market	  from	  its	  current	  location	  of	  more	  than	  70	  years,	  on	  the	  northern	  banks	  of	  the	  
Flint	  River,	  to	  the	  center	  of	  downtown.	  Proposed	  as	  part	  of	  a	  $32	  million	  
redevelopment	  plan	  related	  to	  the	  demolition	  of	  the	  Genesee	  Towers,	  and	  justified	  
by	  cost–prohibitive	  building	  improvements	  needed	  at	  the	  current	  location,	  the	  new	  
Farmer’s	  Market	  will	  become	  the	  latest	  attraction	  situated	  in	  the	  investment–rich	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urban	  core.	  The	  Market	  has	  been	  an	  increasingly	  popular	  Flint	  destination	  in	  recent	  
years,	  and	  estimates	  suggest	  that	  it	  attracts	  270,000	  visitors	  a	  year	  and	  brings	  in	  $4	  
to	  $5	  million	  annually	  for	  its	  30	  to	  50	  vendors.	  Uptown	  Reinvestment	  hopes	  to	  
double	  that	  revenue	  figure	  by	  moving	  the	  Market	  downtown.290	  Spokespeople	  for	  
the	  Market	  and	  the	  investors	  even	  framed	  the	  move	  as	  an	  assertion	  of	  proper	  local	  
heritage,	  saying	  that	  “the	  market	  is	  really	  coming	  back	  home.”291	  This	  is	  a	  reference	  
to	  the	  Market’s	  original	  location	  when	  it	  was	  founded	  in	  1905,	  but	  the	  insistence	  
upon	  downtown	  as	  the	  proper	  historical	  site	  (especially	  when	  the	  Market	  relocated	  
out	  of	  downtown	  in	  1940),	  once	  again	  deploys	  the	  expression	  of	  heritage	  as	  the	  
driving	  spatial	  and	  moral	  logic	  of	  economic	  development.	  	  
	   Critics	  of	  the	  relocation,	  as	  well	  the	  analysis	  of	  neoliberal	  revitalization	  
strategies	  I’ve	  put	  forward	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  suggest	  that	  the	  move	  is	  simply	  
another	  in	  a	  series	  of	  efforts	  by	  Uptown	  and	  other	  city	  elites	  to	  consolidate	  Flint’s	  
marketable	  aspects	  into	  the	  increasingly	  powerful	  and	  exclusive	  urban	  core,	  and	  to	  
condense	  all	  meaningful	  development	  resources	  within	  the	  controllable,	  policed	  
boundaries	  of	  downtown.	  The	  main	  business	  district	  is	  already	  more	  surveilled	  than	  
any	  other	  part	  of	  the	  city,	  by	  two	  officially	  deputized	  private	  security	  forces	  
provided	  by	  the	  Downtown	  Development	  Authority	  and	  the	  University	  of	  Michigan–
Flint,	  to	  supplement	  the	  drastically	  underfunded	  city	  police	  force.	  In	  a	  one–question	  
poll	  by	  the	  Flint	  Journal	  of	  Genesee	  County	  residents,	  respondents	  were	  split	  50/50	  
on	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  market	  should	  be	  moved,	  and	  the	  announcement	  has	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290	  Byron,	  Shaun.	  "Flint	  Farmers'	  Market	  Moves	  to	  Downtown	  Location	  in	  2014."	  MLive.	  The	  
Flint	  Journal,	  8	  Mar.	  2013.	  Web.	  25	  Mar.	  2013.	  
291	  Ibid.	  	  
	  
	   223	  
generated	  considerable	  heated	  debate.292	  However,	  as	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  
demolition	  of	  Genesee	  Towers,	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether,	  and	  frankly	  unlikely	  that,	  this	  
debate	  will	  change	  the	  course	  of	  private	  investment	  and	  its	  partnership	  with	  city	  
and	  state	  leaders.	  The	  city’s	  previous	  mayor,	  like	  countless	  neoliberal	  politicians	  on	  
the	  both	  the	  Right	  and	  Left,	  pledged	  to	  run	  Flint	  like	  a	  business,	  and	  that	  remains	  the	  
prevailing	  standard	  for	  responsible	  municipal	  governance.293	  
	   Interestingly,	  the	  announcement	  of	  the	  Farmer’s	  Market	  relocation	  came	  
with	  an	  artist’s	  rendering	  of	  what	  the	  brand	  new	  downtown	  site	  might	  look	  like.	  
Situated	  at	  the	  entrance	  to	  the	  proposed	  new	  Market	  stood	  a	  prominent	  “Vehicle	  
City”	  iron	  arch	  (Fig.	  18).	  Although	  members	  of	  the	  Uptown	  Reinvestment	  
Corporation,	  city	  officials,	  and	  others	  boosters	  would	  say	  (and	  have	  said)	  that	  the	  
lessons	  of	  AutoWorld	  have	  been	  learned,	  and	  that	  Flint	  is	  pursuing	  smaller,	  
“organic”	  entrepreneurial	  revitalization	  projects	  instead	  of	  big–ticket	  spectacles,	  it’s	  
difficult	  to	  ignore	  the	  similar	  undergirding	  logics,	  and	  the	  similar	  elite	  power	  
structures	  that	  shape	  decisions	  regarding	  where	  resources	  will	  be	  concentrated.	  
Instead	  of	  one	  sealed	  glass	  dome	  that	  holds	  a	  replica	  of	  a	  bustling	  Flint	  downtown,	  
perhaps	  downtown	  itself	  has	  been	  sealed	  off,	  concentrating	  a	  vision	  of	  a	  prosperous	  
city	  within	  ideologically	  policed	  borders—complete	  with	  the	  very	  same	  arches	  that	  
adorned	  AutoWorld’s	  pleasantly	  historic	  vision.	  The	  symbolism	  is	  not	  lost	  on	  Flint	  
residents	  even	  thirty	  years	  later,	  as	  the	  artist’s	  rendering	  of	  the	  new	  Farmer’s	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Market	  site	  has	  a	  single,	  sarcastic	  reader	  comment	  on	  the	  Flint	  Journal’s	  web	  page:	  
“Is	  that	  AutoWorld	  in	  the	  background?”294	  	  	  	  
	   It	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  Farmer’s	  Market	  would	  use	  the	  “Vehicle	  City”	  
arch	  as	  a	  symbolic	  entrance,	  since	  over	  the	  last	  ten	  years,	  the	  city	  of	  Flint	  has	  
enthusiastically	  embraced	  the	  arch	  as	  its	  official	  symbol,	  adorning	  everything	  from	  
the	  new	  seal	  of	  the	  city	  to	  souvenir	  t–shirts.	  This	  due	  in	  part	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  
November	  2003,	  downtown	  Flint	  saw	  something	  it	  hadn’t	  since	  1919:	  seven	  ornate	  
steel	  arches,	  each	  fitted	  with	  50	  light	  bulbs,	  were	  erected	  along	  South	  Saginaw	  
Street,	  spanning	  the	  width	  of	  the	  street	  and	  demarcating	  the	  central	  business	  
district	  of	  the	  city.	  The	  drive	  to	  replicate	  and	  install	  the	  iconic	  arches	  84	  years	  after	  
they	  had	  disappeared	  from	  the	  streetscape	  was	  a	  popular	  and	  relatively	  easy	  
project,	  as	  a	  broad	  coalition	  of	  community	  organizations,	  businesses,	  and	  individual	  
investors—including	  the	  Flint	  Area	  Convention	  and	  Visitors	  Bureau,	  the	  Downtown	  
Development	  Authority,	  Uptown	  Reinvestment	  Corporation,	  and	  the	  Genesee	  
County	  Historical	  Society,	  among	  others—raised	  the	  funds	  and	  brought	  the	  project	  
to	  fruition	  under	  the	  name	  “Arches	  Restoration	  to	  Celebrate	  our	  Heritage”	  (or	  
ARCH).295	  The	  mania	  for	  the	  arch	  has	  recently	  extended	  to	  include	  mini–replicas	  at	  
more	  minor	  downtown	  area	  intersections,	  highway	  entrances,	  and	  even	  vacant	  lots	  
in	  other	  areas	  of	  the	  city—where	  there	  was	  once	  an	  abandoned	  building,	  blight,	  and	  
visible	  evidence	  of	  Flint’s	  economic	  and	  structural	  challenges,	  there	  can	  now	  be	  a	  
new	  (old)	  symbol	  of	  the	  city’s	  heritage	  and	  hope	  for	  a	  brighter	  future	  based	  on	  a	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brighter	  yesterday.	  The	  arch,	  once	  specifically	  a	  symbol	  of	  downtown,	  has	  grown	  to	  
encompass	  the	  cultural	  and	  historical	  identity	  of	  the	  whole	  city.	  This	  is	  significant,	  of	  
course,	  because	  although	  the	  only	  historical	  reference	  to	  the	  arches	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  
Flint	  since	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  was	  their	  resurrection	  within	  
AutoWorld,	  that	  fact	  is	  nowhere	  to	  be	  found	  in	  their	  current	  celebration.	  Instead,	  the	  
arches	  have	  effectively	  been	  lifted	  from	  the	  context	  of	  AutoWorld,	  shedding	  all	  
negative	  connotations,	  to	  define	  a	  “new”	  era	  of	  revitalization.	  Though	  many	  involved	  
in	  current	  efforts	  would	  deny	  it,	  the	  roots	  of	  Flint’s	  revitalization	  are	  still	  planted	  in	  
AutoWorld’s	  soil.	  	  
	   According	  to	  the	  ARCHES’	  website,	  “The	  well–known	  arches	  that	  once	  spanned	  
Saginaw	  Street	  are	  being	  restored	  in	  downtown	  Flint.	  A	  group	  of	  community	  
organizations,	  committed	  businesses	  and	  individuals	  are	  spearheading	  a	  fund	  
raising	  effort	  to	  rebuild	  seven	  arches	  along	  Saginaw	  Street.	  You	  can	  help	  bring	  these	  
magnificent	  symbols	  of	  Flint’s	  past	  into	  the	  present!	  	  Be	  a	  part	  of	  Flint’s	  future!	  	  
Contribute	  now!”	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  rhetoric	  present	  in	  this	  effort	  is	  familiar	  and	  
hopefully	  clear:	  the	  collapsing	  of	  history	  with	  the	  clear	  goal	  of	  transcending	  the	  
troublesome	  present—which	  is	  still	  characterized	  by	  disproportionately	  high	  
unemployment	  and	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  related	  social	  and	  economic	  problems—and	  into	  
a	  vaguely	  defined	  “future”	  that	  is	  no	  longer	  explicitly	  based	  in	  a	  move	  to	  a	  tourism–
based	  economy,	  but	  is	  still	  very	  much	  dependent	  on	  a	  therapeutic	  model	  of	  
“bringing	  a	  new	  sense	  of	  pride	  to	  the	  community”	  after	  the	  demoralizing	  trauma	  of	  
deindustrialization.296	  The	  levels	  of	  signification	  here	  are	  complex,	  however,	  and	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reveal	  new	  wrinkles	  in	  the	  project	  of	  revitalization	  nearly	  20	  years	  after	  AutoWorld	  
opened,	  while	  using	  the	  same	  recreated	  monuments	  to	  signify	  progress.	  First,	  we	  
see	  the	  conscious	  move	  in	  this	  group’s	  name	  toward	  “heritage”	  as	  a	  therapeutic	  
mechanism	  for	  revitalization	  from	  the	  “inside	  out,”	  rather	  than	  from	  the	  “outside	  in”	  
(as	  was	  the	  case	  with	  self–conscious	  tourist	  marketing).	  While	  this	  is	  still	  based	  in	  
familiar	  notions	  of	  symbols	  of	  “hope”	  and	  “pride,”	  we	  see	  these	  rhetorics	  aimed	  even	  
more	  explicitly	  inward,	  mobilized	  as	  a	  reclaiming	  of	  roots	  and	  collective	  heritage	  for	  
self–improvement.	  Furthermore,	  the	  element	  of	  local	  boosterism	  (“Be	  a	  part	  of	  
Flint’s	  future—contribute	  now!”)	  explicitly	  links	  economic	  investment	  with	  a	  
prosperous	  future;	  however,	  it	  is	  the	  investment	  in	  monuments	  and	  cultural	  
representations	  rather	  than	  in	  economic	  or	  social	  programs	  that	  will	  help	  the	  city	  
seize	  upon	  a	  useable	  heritage	  and	  make	  the	  “real”	  difference	  in	  attitude,	  thereby	  
empowering	  individual	  citizens	  to	  help	  Flint	  collectively	  overcome	  the	  crisis	  of	  
deindustrialization	  (and	  of	  past	  failed	  attempts	  to	  address	  it)	  with	  positive	  feelings.	  	  
In	  this	  way,	  the	  devices	  of	  memory	  and	  monuments	  are	  actually	  working	  
against	  what	  I	  would	  argue	  is	  a	  more	  productive	  type	  of	  remembering—that	  of	  
perhaps	  reconstructing	  the	  history	  of	  deindustrialization	  as	  an	  inherent	  part	  of	  the	  
logic	  of	  modern	  capitalism,	  rather	  than	  privileging	  earlier	  moments	  in	  that	  process	  
as	  a	  “cultural	  heritage”	  (or	  “inventing	  the	  tradition”	  of	  automobile–based	  prosperity,	  
as	  Hobsbawm	  might	  see	  it).	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  these	  monuments	  are	  simply	  a	  
distraction	  from	  “real”	  issues—the	  arches	  in	  all	  their	  forms	  are	  actually	  complex	  and	  
unique	  sites	  that	  help	  to	  reveal,	  and	  are	  knit	  together	  with,	  “real	  issues”—but	  they	  
also	  are	  an	  important	  site	  where	  we	  see	  a	  community	  grappling	  with	  image	  and	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identity	  using	  the	  imperfect	  tools	  of	  memory.	  AutoWorld	  has	  been	  consistently	  
disowned	  and	  forgotten,	  but	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  legacies	  of	  its	  neoliberal	  logic	  
still	  suggest	  that	  a	  good	  enough	  representation	  can	  literally	  transform	  the	  problems	  
of	  urban	  spaces,	  not	  only	  for	  outsiders,	  but	  also	  for	  residents.	  This	  individualizing	  
ethic	  is	  articulated	  in	  the	  recent	  re–creation	  of	  the	  arches	  on	  Saginaw	  Street,	  as	  a	  
way	  for	  Flint	  to	  “reclaim”	  its	  history	  and	  to	  “feel	  better”	  about	  itself	  as	  a	  crucial	  step	  
toward	  material	  transformation.	  	  
When	  “branding	  expert”	  Eric	  La	  Brecque	  was	  brought	  in	  to	  work	  with	  the	  
Detroit	  Metro	  Convention	  and	  Visitors	  Bureau	  in	  2006,	  the	  debate	  over	  how	  to	  
reinvent	  not	  only	  Detroit,	  but	  the	  entire	  region,	  echoed	  similar	  previous	  
conversations	  in	  Flint.	  In	  trying	  to	  develop	  a	  brandable	  identity	  for	  Southeast	  
Michigan	  to	  promote,	  La	  Brecque	  (not	  a	  Detroit	  native)	  observed	  that	  while	  Detroit	  
is	  known	  worldwide	  primarily	  for	  automobiles	  and	  the	  auto	  industry,	  it	  doesn’t	  have	  
a	  central	  attraction	  celebrating	  it.	  Detroit	  Free	  Press	  columnist	  Ron	  Dzwonkowski	  
immediately	  took	  the	  suggestion	  as	  a	  dangerous	  one	  that	  could	  send	  Detroit	  down	  
the	  disastrous	  path	  to	  AutoWorld,	  saying,	  “No	  thanks.	  We	  don’t	  need	  to	  repeat	  that	  
debacle.”297	  Instead,	  Dzwonkowski	  suggests	  a	  different	  strategy:	  
They	  [the	  Convention	  and	  Visitors	  Bureau	  and	  La	  Brecque]	  will	  have	  
to	  be	  careful	  not	   to	   let	   this	  comprehensive	  exercise	   in	  “branding”	  be	  
boiled	  down	  to	  a	  slogan	  that—no	  matter	  how	  apt	  and	  catchy—is	  likely	  
to	  be	  trashed	  from	  St.	  Clair	  Shores	  to	  Flat	  Rock.	  Why?	  Because	  that’s	  
the	  way	   this	   region	   is.	  Nobody	   is	  harder	  on	  us	   than	  us.	  Detroit	   area	  
people	   will	   have	   to	   be	   sold	   on	   the	   Detroit	   area	   before	   they	   can	   be	  
expected	   to	   sell	   it	   to	   the	   world.	   We	   will,	   collectively,	   need	   to	   stop	  
apologizing	  for	  where	  we	  are	  and	  what	  we	  are,	  and	  start	  embracing	  it.	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…	  No,	  we	  don’t	  need	  another	  AutoWorld.	  We	  need	   to	  appreciate	   the	  
one	  that’s	  already	  here,	  and	  everything	  that	  comes	  with	  it.	  We	  need	  to	  
figure	   out	   our	   house,	   fix	   it	   up	   and	   show	   some	  pride	   in	   it	   before	  we	  
invite	  the	  world	  in.298	  
	  
This	  suggestion,	  which	  has	  very	  much	  in	  common	  with	  Flint’s	  recent	  adoption	  of	  the	  
arch,	  articulates	  a	  struggle	  to	  reconcile	  the	  continuing	  dominance	  of	  individualized	  
neoliberal	  “common	  sense”	  in	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  Rust	  Belt	  cities,	  with	  the	  
continued	  failure	  by	  these	  places	  to	  revitalize	  themselves	  over	  the	  past	  30–40	  years.	  
Dzwonkowski’s	  critique	  is	  simultaneously	  a	  hopeful	  rejection	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  
strategies	  of	  the	  past,	  saying	  that	  Detroit	  doesn’t	  need	  to	  subscribe	  to	  the	  specific	  
demands	  that	  produced	  AutoWorld,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  illustrating	  the	  difficulty	  
of	  resisting	  the	  continuing	  and	  similar	  pressures	  still	  being	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  Rust	  
Belt	  cities,	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  neoliberal	  logic	  still	  structures	  urban	  
revitalization	  strategies.	  In	  his	  remarks,	  there	  is	  at	  once	  the	  rejection	  of	  ideas	  like	  
AutoWorld	  that	  seem	  to	  have	  made	  a	  bad	  situation	  even	  worse	  by	  bringing	  (well–
deserved)	  shame	  upon	  cities	  that	  irresponsibly	  pursued	  them,	  and	  an	  acceptance	  of	  
the	  underlying	  notion	  that	  the	  real	  key	  to	  success	  and	  prosperity	  is	  taking	  personal	  
responsibility,	  individually	  and	  collectively,	  to	  “figure	  out”	  and	  “fix	  up”	  our	  own	  
houses.	  In	  some	  ways,	  we	  still	  believe	  that	  only	  when	  our	  cities	  and	  our	  selves	  are	  
rebuilt	  into	  good	  neoliberal	  citizens	  will	  we	  be	  ready	  to	  “sell	  ourselves”	  and	  our	  
image	  to	  the	  world—still	  the	  unquestioned	  goal	  of	  Rust	  Belt	  revitalization.	  
	   But	  in	  the	  insistent	  rejection	  and	  forgetting	  of	  AutoWorld,	  I	  believe	  that	  
possible	  important	  critiques	  are	  lost.	  In	  his	  Free	  Press	  column,	  Dzwonkowski	  calls	  
AutoWorld	  an	  “epic	  failure,”	  and	  says	  that	  he	  was	  one	  of	  the	  few	  people	  he	  knew	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that	  visited	  AutoWorld,	  and	  that	  he	  “can’t	  say	  [he’s]	  proud	  of	  that	  fact.”299	  He’s	  
certainly	  not	  alone	  in	  this	  sentiment,	  and	  even	  in	  his	  film	  Roger	  &	  Me,	  Michael	  Moore	  
essentially	  dismisses	  AutoWorld	  as	  a	  tragic	  joke.	  But	  to	  remember	  and	  to	  take	  
seriously	  what	  cultural	  and	  political	  work	  AutoWorld	  did,	  and	  the	  very	  serious	  
national	  context	  that	  shaped	  its	  strategies	  and	  representations,	  is	  to	  consider	  that	  
perhaps	  it	  did	  its	  job	  too	  well—allowing	  a	  harrowing	  glance	  into	  a	  changing	  
landscape	  of	  capitalist	  processes	  as	  it	  happened,	  depicting	  deindustrialization	  a	  
grotesquely	  cruel	  and	  comic	  debacle.	  Instead	  of	  inviting	  structural	  critique	  of	  the	  
crises	  that	  it	  was	  supposed	  to	  ease,	  AutoWorld	  was	  instead	  absorbed	  into	  its	  own	  
logic,	  further	  proof	  that	  there	  must	  be	  something	  wrong	  with	  Flint.	  AutoWorld	  and	  
other	  sites	  of	  Rust	  Belt	  revitalization,	  when	  taken	  seriously,	  can	  reveal	  the	  logics	  of	  
neoliberalism	  in	  material	  form	  as	  they	  happened	  on	  the	  ground,	  and	  can	  allow	  us	  to	  
trace	  how	  they	  became	  common	  sense,	  how	  the	  Rust	  Belt	  became	  “the	  Rust	  Belt,”	  
and	  how	  those	  logics	  continue	  to	  operate	  today.	  	   	  
	   This	  analytical	  perspective	  is	  crucial,	  especially	  in	  a	  time	  when	  history	  seems	  
to	  repeat	  itself	  more	  quickly	  than	  ever.	  In	  January	  2013,	  Detroit	  Free	  Press	  business	  
columnist	  Tom	  Walsh	  wrote,	  “It's	  time	  to	  get	  serious	  about	  creating	  a	  stupendous,	  
one–of–a–kind,	  Disney–esque	  automotive	  attraction	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  Detroit.	  
Something	  so	  exciting	  that	  it	  would	  draw	  millions	  of	  visitors	  from	  far	  and	  wide,	  
cementing	  Detroit's	  place	  as	  the	  Motor	  City	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  world	  for	  
generations.”300	  This	  opinion	  was	  prompted	  by	  talk	  of	  such	  a	  project	  from	  Quicken	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Loans	  chairman	  and	  Detroit	  developer	  Dan	  Gilbert,	  great–grandson	  of	  Henry	  Ford	  
and	  Ford	  Motors	  executive	  chairman	  Bill	  Ford,	  and	  head	  of	  Penske	  Automotive	  
Group	  Bill	  Penske,	  all	  of	  whom	  are	  have	  expressed	  enthusiasm	  about	  the	  idea.	  Again	  
citing	  Disney	  as	  an	  influence	  for	  a	  new,	  exciting	  auto–themed	  cultural	  attraction,	  any	  
talk	  of	  the	  concept	  being	  similar	  to	  Flint’s	  AutoWorld	  is	  brushed	  off	  by	  Walsh	  in	  
eerily	  familiar	  terms,	  as	  he	  dismisses	  out	  of	  hand	  the	  “legions	  of	  Detroit	  naysayers	  
[who]	  will	  no	  doubt	  scoff	  at	  this	  idea.”301	  After	  all,	  he	  argues,	  with	  such	  successful	  
and	  established	  leadership,	  there’s	  no	  way	  that	  Detroit	  would	  repeat	  the	  mistakes	  of	  
Flint.	  
	   In	  response	  to	  this,	  longtime	  Flint	  Journal	  columnist	  Andrew	  Heller	  voiced	  his	  
own	  hindsight	  perspective	  on	  AutoWorld	  (“My	  god,	  it	  was	  awful”),	  while	  offering	  his	  
own	  sincere	  advice	  on	  how	  to	  do	  it	  right	  in	  Detroit—after	  all,	  he	  says,	  “Flint's	  lame,	  
underfunded	  attempt	  at	  Disney	  greatness	  doesn't	  necessarily	  mean	  the	  concept	  was	  
flawed.”302	  Despite	  the	  wildly	  inaccurate	  characterization	  of	  AutoWorld	  as	  
“underfunded,”	  this	  reveals	  the	  legacy	  of	  AutoWorld,	  and	  of	  neoliberalism	  itself,	  in	  
shaping	  the	  possibilities	  and	  limitations	  of	  Rust	  Belt	  revitalization	  in	  the	  decades	  
since,	  as	  well	  as	  anything	  does.	  The	  structure	  and	  strategy	  are	  sound,	  we	  are	  told;	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  Andrew.	  "Andrew	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On	  Hope,	  and	  Its	  Use	  
A	  good	  man	  is	  one	  who	  plants	  a	  tree	  and	  never	  expects	  to	  sit	  in	  its	  shade	  …	  Is	  there	  
another	  city	  in	  this	  country	  that	  holds	  the	  promise	  of	  such	  a	  beautiful	  forest?	  I	   love	  
Flint.	  
	   —anonymous	  AutoWorld	  contributor	  quoted	  in	  “Yankee	  	  
	   	   Doodle	  Dandy:	  a	  Salute	  to	  AutoWorld”	  banquet	  	  
	   	   program,	  July	  3,	  1984.303	  
	  
	   Hope	  is	  a	  funny,	  fragile	  thing.	  It	  has	  uses	  both	  noble	  and	  cruel,	  and	  for	  people	  
who	  live	  in	  the	  places	  I’ve	  spent	  this	  dissertation	  describing	  and	  analyzing,	  hope	  can	  
often	  be	  exhausting.	  When	  new	  plans	  for	  development,	  revitalization	  or	  possible	  
investment	  in	  these	  Rust	  Belt	  cities	  appear	  in	  local	  newspapers,	  they	  are	  more	  often	  
than	  not	  appearing	  right	  beside	  the	  latest	  murder	  rates	  or	  national	  violent	  crime	  
rankings	  or	  factory	  closing.	  And	  so	  we	  are	  in	  some	  ways	  so	  tired	  of	  hope—and	  yet,	  it	  
seems	  more	  important	  than	  ever	  to	  cling	  to	  it	  whenever	  it	  presents	  itself.	  That	  is	  
also	  why	  critical	  analysis	  of	  seemingly	  hopeful	  ideas—any	  ideas—is	  often	  pointedly	  
ignored	  or	  greeted	  with	  hostility	  as	  harmful	  “naysaying”	  from	  those	  who	  are	  “just	  
being	  too	  negative”	  or	  somehow	  “don’t	  want	  the	  city	  to	  succeed.”	  Michael	  Moore	  is	  
an	  intensely	  polarizing	  figure	  in	  his	  hometown	  of	  Flint,	  eliciting	  a	  special	  kind	  of	  
vitriolic	  response	  from	  residents	  for	  that	  very	  reason.	  And	  though	  I	  remain	  deeply	  
critical	  of	  revitalization	  strategies	  I’ve	  examined	  up	  to	  the	  present	  day,	  I	  believe	  that	  
hope	  is	  important,	  and	  hope	  is	  at	  the	  center	  of	  my	  desire	  to	  understand	  these	  
places—where	  we’ve	  come	  from	  and	  where	  we	  may	  go.	  
	   I	  say	  “we”	  because	  I	  identify	  as	  thoroughly	  Midwestern,	  for	  better	  or	  worse,	  
and	  I	  feel	  that	  more	  deeply	  than	  ever	  now,	  as	  I	  approach	  the	  end	  of	  this	  project.	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What	  does	  that	  mean?	  I	  don’t	  actually	  know	  for	  sure,	  but	  I	  feel	  it,	  in	  a	  way	  that	  I	  
suppose	  I	  can’t	  argue	  with	  hard	  evidence.	  I	  visited	  AutoWorld	  as	  a	  child	  with	  my	  
family	  and	  with	  my	  grade–school	  class	  on	  field	  trips,	  and	  I	  was	  genuinely	  enchanted	  
by	  the	  Disney–esque	  spectacle	  of	  it	  all,	  unaware	  of	  much	  except	  what	  great	  fun	  it	  
was	  to	  ride	  the	  giant	  indoor	  Ferris	  wheel	  and	  to	  watch	  the	  animatronic	  characters	  
sing	  and	  dance	  just	  for	  me	  (see	  Fig.	  19).	  My	  father	  came	  from	  Poland	  with	  his	  family	  
directly	  to	  Flint	  during	  the	  “golden	  age”	  of	  manufacturing,	  the	  mid–1950s.	  My	  
mother’s	  family	  came	  to	  Flint	  at	  the	  same	  time	  from	  rural	  Michigan,	  also	  in	  search	  of	  
the	  work	  that	  the	  booming	  city	  could	  offer.	  My	  grandfather	  got	  a	  job	  without	  even	  
knowing	  English	  at	  “Chevy	  in	  the	  Hole,”	  the	  same	  plant	  that	  was	  home	  to	  the	  1936	  
sit–down	  strike,	  and	  my	  father	  worked	  almost	  his	  whole	  life	  for	  General	  Motors	  as	  
well.	  I	  live	  less	  than	  a	  mile	  away	  from	  the	  empty	  field	  where	  that	  plant	  used	  to	  stand.	  	  
More	  than	  all	  that	  though,	  I	  feel	  that	  I	  relate	  to	  Rust	  Belt	  cities	  in	  a	  particular,	  
peculiar	  way—as	  I	  visited	  Toledo	  or	  Youngstown	  or	  Pittsburgh	  to	  do	  research	  for	  
this	  dissertation,	  I	  would	  find	  them	  instantly	  and	  deeply	  familiar.	  I	  found	  myself	  
instinctively	  navigating	  by	  landmarks	  I’d	  never	  seen	  before,	  as	  if	  I	  could	  find	  my	  way	  
somehow	  by	  feel.	  This	  was	  of	  course	  not	  always	  the	  case	  in	  practical	  terms,	  and	  my	  
generally	  poor	  sense	  of	  direction	  got	  me	  lost	  many	  times,	  but	  still,	  it	  was	  familiar	  to	  
me	  in	  a	  comforting	  and	  eerie	  way.	  “Here	  is	  the	  river,”	  I	  would	  think,	  “and	  here	  is	  the	  
old	  factory	  surrounded	  by	  barbed	  wire,	  and	  so	  if	  I	  turn	  left,	  then	  there	  will	  probably	  
be	  a	  business	  district,	  and	  if	  I	  go	  far	  enough	  in	  this	  direction,	  then	  the	  houses	  and	  
roads	  and	  streetlights	  will	  probably	  start	  to	  look	  nicer,”	  and	  so	  on	  and	  so	  on.	  I	  don’t	  
mean	  to	  imply	  that	  people	  and	  places	  share	  some	  sort	  of	  an	  innate	  character,	  or	  are	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somehow	  supernaturally	  linked,	  but	  rather	  to	  try	  to	  explain	  a	  small	  part	  of	  how	  this	  
project	  has	  made	  me	  even	  more	  aware	  of	  the	  funny,	  fragile	  hope	  that	  exists	  in	  me	  for	  
my	  home,	  and	  of	  the	  shared	  histories	  and	  troubles	  and	  possibilities	  of	  the	  Rust	  Belt.	  
And	  that	  hope	  keeps	  my	  attention	  and	  affection	  focused	  on	  these	  places	  that	  are	  not	  
supposed	  to	  attract	  either.	  
	   Flint	  is	  difficult,	  and	  often	  heartbreaking,	  and	  it	  resists	  description—just	  like	  
Cleveland	  or	  Youngstown	  or	  Detroit,	  or	  any	  other	  place	  on	  earth,	  I’d	  imagine.	  In	  the	  
final	  months	  of	  writing	  this	  dissertation,	  the	  house	  near	  downtown	  Flint	  that	  I	  own	  
and	  have	  lived	  in	  for	  nearly	  ten	  years	  was	  broken	  into	  and	  robbed.	  Robbed	  twice,	  
actually,	  within	  six	  months.	  Each	  time,	  my	  computer	  and	  hard	  drive,	  including	  
months	  of	  writing	  and	  years	  of	  research,	  were	  taken.	  The	  last	  time	  this	  happened,	  
the	  laptop	  that	  was	  taken	  from	  my	  desk	  was	  actually	  open	  to	  a	  document	  in–
progress	  much	  like	  this	  one,	  an	  attempt	  to	  grapple	  with	  the	  personal	  dimensions	  of	  
making	  the	  troubles	  of	  Flint	  my	  academic	  work.	  Needless	  to	  say,	  I	  had	  to	  rewrite	  
that	  bit	  from	  scratch	  once	  I’d	  replaced	  the	  computer.	  Each	  time	  my	  house	  was	  
broken	  into,	  I	  came	  uncomfortably	  close	  to	  the	  endless	  layers	  of	  dysfunction	  that	  
Flint	  faces	  these	  days.	  Tragically	  understaffed	  due	  to	  rounds	  of	  budget	  cutbacks,	  the	  
police	  can’t	  even	  pretend	  to	  pursue	  property	  crime,	  and	  the	  city	  now	  encourages	  
citizens	  to	  report	  robberies	  and	  similar	  activity	  using	  an	  online	  system	  that	  will	  
immediately	  generate	  a	  complaint	  number	  for	  insurance	  purposes.	  Even	  though	  it	  
was	  clearly	  our	  nearest	  neighbors	  who	  had	  broken	  in	  both	  times	  (some	  of	  our	  only	  
neighbors,	  in	  fact,	  since	  in	  the	  last	  year,	  the	  houses	  on	  each	  side	  of	  ours	  have	  burned	  
due	  to	  arson	  and	  gone	  into	  foreclosure,	  respectively),	  the	  few	  remaining	  Flint	  city	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detectives	  spend	  all	  day,	  every	  day	  investigating	  the	  staggering	  number	  of	  murders	  
in	  the	  city,	  and	  have	  no	  time	  or	  resources	  for	  much	  else.	  The	  complex	  municipal	  and	  
state	  dynamics	  of	  Flint	  under	  Emergency	  Financial	  Management	  only	  serve	  to	  
heighten	  the	  dysfunction	  and	  neoliberal	  pressures	  of	  “personal	  responsibility”	  
brought	  to	  bear	  on	  an	  already	  unbearably	  stressed	  city.304	  And	  so	  each	  time	  I	  started	  
over	  with	  a	  blank	  computer	  screen,	  I	  was	  reminded	  of	  the	  complicated	  mess	  of	  
cultural	  theory	  and	  life	  “on	  the	  ground”;	  of	  the	  realities	  of	  austerity	  in	  Rust	  Belt	  
cities,	  and	  the	  challenges	  and	  the	  appeal	  of	  hope.	  And	  then	  I	  would	  try	  to	  start	  over.	  	  
	   Walter	  Benjamin	  writes	  that	  the	  “states	  of	  emergency”	  in	  which	  we	  live	  are	  
not	  the	  exception,	  but	  the	  rule,	  and	  are	  manufactured	  to	  prevent	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  
real	  state	  of	  emergency—one	  that	  would	  be	  oppositional,	  brought	  about	  to	  disrupt	  
the	  dominant	  order	  of	  things.305	  The	  circumstances	  that	  Benjamin	  describes	  are	  
clearly	  specific	  to	  his	  own	  historical	  moment,	  but	  this	  is	  still	  a	  hopeful	  notion	  to	  me.	  
Instead	  of	  a	  reactionary	  politics	  of	  what	  our	  cities	  should	  look	  like	  and	  what	  work	  
“revitalization”	  should	  do,	  perhaps	  we	  can	  hope	  and	  work	  for	  something	  to	  emerge	  
that	  is	  better,	  and	  that	  challenges	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  business	  and	  political	  elites	  
have	  framed	  our	  problems	  for	  the	  last	  30–40	  years.	  Something	  better	  than	  
AutoWorld;	  better	  than	  what	  we’ve	  seen	  happen	  since;	  better	  even	  than	  the	  “golden	  
age”	  of	  corporatism	  that	  was	  in	  so	  many	  ways	  no	  golden	  age	  at	  all.	  Perhaps	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304	  Emergency	  Managers	  are	  controversially	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  cities	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  Michigan	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  former	  industrial	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  majority	  Black	  populations,	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reinforcing	  the	  perception	  of	  these	  places	  as	  irresponsible	  neoliberal	  subjects,	  unable	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  political	  or	  moral	  order.	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something	  more	  inclusive	  than	  exclusive,	  something	  broadly	  shared	  rather	  than	  
held	  as	  a	  reward	  for	  the	  “desirable”	  and	  the	  “deserving.”	  And	  in	  that	  spirit,	  I	  keep	  
returning	  to	  the	  quote	  that	  I	  began	  this	  Conclusion	  with:	  “Is	  there	  another	  city	  in	  
this	  country	  that	  holds	  the	  promise	  of	  such	  a	  beautiful	  forest?”	  This	  was	  said,	  I’m	  
sure,	  with	  the	  intention	  that	  Flint	  could	  reclaim	  its	  former	  glory	  in	  some	  way,	  or	  at	  
least	  become	  something	  more	  than	  a	  cautionary	  tale	  in	  the	  national	  imagination	  and	  
perhaps	  even	  a	  halfway	  respectable	  place.	  But	  embedded	  in	  this	  quote	  is	  also	  the	  
oppositional	  sentiment	  that	  Flint,	  badly	  beaten	  as	  it	  was,	  might	  just	  be	  a	  place	  where	  
anything	  could	  happen—not	  just	  what	  was	  expected	  to	  happen,	  and	  not	  just	  what	  a	  
limited	  group	  of	  people	  might	  want	  to	  happen,	  but	  anything.	  And	  I	  suppose	  that’s	  
what	  I	  hope	  for.	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Figure	  18:	  Artist	  rendering	  of	  proposed	  downtown	  site	  for	  the	  Flint	  Farmer’s	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Figure	  19:	  At	  AutoWorld,	  1984	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